Berry v. Reichardt

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Carl Eugene Berry, Respondent,

v.

Jess T. Reichardt and Thomas H. Reichardt, Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2014-001588

Appeal From Saluda County
Letitia H. Verdin, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-441
Submitted July 1, 2015 – Filed August 26, 2015

AFFIRMED

Philip Herman Woolhiser, of Woolhiser, Inc., of Aiken,
for Appellants.

Jeff D. Griffith, III, and Richard Lee Whitt, both of
Austin & Rogers, PA, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Jess and Thomas Reichardt appeal an order for damages, arguing
the trial court erred in (1) finding they intentionally trespassed on Carl Berry's land
when they cut timber there, (2) finding they had record notice of the property
boundary, (3) awarding actual damages for the timber cutting when Berry did not
present sufficient evidence, (4) awarding $4,193.90 in actual damages, and (5)
awarding punitive damages. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the
following authorities:

1. As to Issues 1 and 2: Ammons v. Hood, 288 S.C. 278, 282, 341 S.E.2d 816, 818
(Ct. App. 1986) ("In a default action, the default judgment settles the issue of
liability.").

2. As to Issue 3: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Marion Amphitheatre, LLC, 408 S.C.
87, 90, 757 S.E.2d 557, 558 (Ct. App. 2014) (providing a plaintiff must prove
damages by a preponderance of the evidence even in a default case); S.C. Code
Ann. § 16-11-615 (2003) ("If it is necessary to institute civil action to recover the
fair market value of the timber, . . . the owner, in case of private lands, shall
receive damages of not to exceed exactly three times the fair market value of the
timber established by a registered forester if judgment is in favor of . . . the
owner."); Wimberly v. Barr, 359 S.C. 414, 421, 597 S.E.2d 853, 857 (Ct. App.
2004) ("While his recovery of damages for the timber may be limited to three
times the fair market value of the timber removed, the statute does not express an
intent by the Legislature that all damages resulting from that removal be capped at
three times the fair market value.").

3. As to Issue 4: Austin v. Specialty Transp. Servs., Inc., 358 S.C. 298, 310, 594
S.E.2d 867, 873 (Ct. App. 2004) ("The trial [court] has considerable discretion
regarding the amount of damages . . . ."); id. at 311, 594 S.E.2d at 873 ("Our task
in reviewing a damages award is not to weigh the evidence, but to determine if
there is any evidence to support the damages award."); Marion Amphitheatre, 408
S.C. at 90, 757 S.E.2d at 558 (providing a plaintiff must prove damages by a
preponderance of the evidence even in a default case); Austin, 358 S.C. at 311, 594
S.E.2d at 874 ("Actual damages are properly called compensatory damages,
meaning to compensate, to make the injured party whole, to put him in the same
position he was in prior to the damages received insofar as this is monetarily
possible. Actual damages are awarded to a litigant in compensation for his actual
loss or injury." (citation omitted)).

4. As to Issue 5: Welch v. Epstein, 342 S.C. 279, 305, 536 S.E.2d 408, 421 (Ct.
App. 2000) ("The trial [court] is vested with considerable discretion over the
amount of a punitive damages award, and this [c]ourt's review is limited to
correction of errors of law."); Austin, 358 S.C. at 313, 594 S.E.2d at 875 ("Punitive
damages can only be awarded where the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing
evidence the defendant's misconduct was willful, wanton, or in reckless disregard
of the plaintiff's rights."); id. at 313-14, 594 S.E.2d at 875 ("[F]actors relevant to
consideration of punitive damages are: (1) the character of the defendant's acts; (2)
the nature and extent of the harm to plaintiff which defendant caused or intended to
cause; (3) defendant's degree of culpability; (4) the punishment that should be
imposed; (5) duration of the conduct; (6) defendant's awareness or concealment;
(7) the existence of similar past conduct; (8) likelihood the award will deter the
defendant or others from like conduct; (9) whether the award is reasonably related
to the harm likely to result from such conduct; and (10) defendant's wealth or
ability to pay." (citing Gamble v. Stevenson, 305 S.C. 104, 406 S.E.2d 350
(1991))); Limehouse v. Hulsey, 404 S.C. 93, 116, 744 S.E.2d 566, 578-79 (2013)
(providing that a defaulting defendant's participation in a damages hearing is
limited to cross-examining witnesses and objecting to evidence).

AFFIRMED.1

FEW, C.J., and HUFF and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.