State v. Beeks

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Nathaniel Bernard Beeks, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2013-001783

Appeal From Greenville County
J. Mark Hayes, II, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-382
Heard March 4, 2015 – Filed July 29, 2015

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Senior
Assistant Attorney General W. Edgar Salter, III, all of
Columbia; and Solicitor William Walter Wilkins, III, of
Greenville, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Nathaniel Bernard Beeks appeals his conviction for murder. He
contends the trial court erred by (1) failing to instruct the jury that sufficient legal
provocation includes a "very emotional argument" and (2) instructing the jury that
words alone would not satisfy the sufficient legal provocation element of voluntary
manslaughter. He asserts the trial court's instruction "would leave the jury unable
to find [him] guilty of manslaughter."

We find Beeks was not entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter
and, therefore, affirm his murder conviction. See Rule 220(c), SCACR ("The
appellate court may affirm any ruling, order, decision or judgment upon any
ground(s) appearing in the Record on Appeal."). "The law to be charged must be
determined from the evidence presented at trial." State v. Cole, 338 S.C. 97, 101,
525 S.E.2d 511, 512 (2000). "To warrant a court's eliminating the offense of
manslaughter, it should very clearly appear that there is no evidence whatsoever
tending to reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter." Id. at 101, 525 S.E.2d
at 513. "[S]udden heat of passion upon sufficient legal provocation is defined as
an act or event that must be such as would naturally disturb the sway of reason, and
render the mind of an ordinary person incapable of cool reflection, and produce
what, according to human experience, may be called an uncontrollable impulse to
do violence." State v. Starnes, 388 S.C. 590, 598, 698 S.E.2d 604, 609 (2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Tucker, 324 S.C. 155, 171-72,
478 S.E.2d 260, 269 (1996) ("The provocation of the deceased must be such as
naturally and instantly produces in the mind of a person ordinarily constituted the
highest degree of exasperation, rage, anger, sudden resentment, or terror, rendering
the mind incapable of cool reflection[.]" (quoting State v. Franklin, 310 S.C. 122,
125, 425 S.E.2d 758, 760 (Ct. App. 1992), overruled on other grounds by
Brightman v. State, 336 S.C. 348, 520 S.E.2d 614 (1999))).

During the trial, Detective David Garrison of the Greenville Police Department
testified that after Beeks was arrested, he informed Detective Garrison that the
victim had told him she was seeing someone else and, as a result, he snapped,
grabbed the victim, threw her to the floor, and started choking her. Additionally,
Darron Montgomery testified that Beeks stated he and the victim were arguing and
he grabbed the victim around the neck because she "wouldn't shut the f*** up."
We find this argument between Beeks and the victim regarding the victim's
decision to end their romantic relationship does not amount to sufficient legal
provocation as it would not produce in the mind of an ordinary person "the highest
degree of exasperation, rage, anger, sudden resentment, or terror." See id.; cf. State
v. Cooley, 342 S.C. 63, 68, 536 S.E.2d 666, 668 (2000) ("In general, South
Carolina has allowed marital infidelity to support a charge of marital voluntary
manslaughter only when the killer finds the other spouse and paramour in a guilty
embrace or flagrantly suggestive situation."). Thus, even if we were to find the
trial court's voluntary manslaughter instruction to be incorrect, the error would be
harmless. See State v. Gadsden, 314 S.C. 229, 232, 442 S.E.2d 594, 597 (1994)
("A jury charge misdefining an element of voluntary manslaughter that had no
effect on any other aspect of the trial, evidence, or burden of proof would be
harmless error absent evidence requiring the charge."); id. ("[W]here there is no
evidence to support a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter, a jury charge
which effectively prohibits the jury from considering the lesser-included offense
cannot be error.").

AFFIRMED.

THOMAS, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.