Adams v. State

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Tommy S. Adams, Petitioner,

v.

State of South Carolina, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2011-200566

Appeal From Edgefield County
William P. Keesley, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-174
Heard December 8, 2014 – Filed April 1, 2015

REVERSED

Teresa L. Norris, of Blume Norris & Franklin-Best, LLC,
of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Assistant
Attorney General John Walter Whitmire, and Assistant
Attorney General Mary Williams Leddon, all of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Tommy S. Adams was convicted of lewd act on a child under
sixteen and first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor. He appeals from the
denial and dismissal of his application for post-conviction relief (PCR), arguing his
trial counsel was ineffective.1 We agree.

We find Adams' trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the admission
of Adams' statement to police because it was improper character evidence and
should not have been admitted. See State v. Haselden, 353 S.C. 190, 196, 577
S.E.2d 445, 448 (2003) ("Character evidence is not admissible to prove the accused
possesses a criminal character or has a propensity to commit the crime with which
he is charged."). The State used Adams' statement in its closing argument as
evidence of Adams' bad character to prove he was guilty as charged. See State v.
Nelson, 331 S.C. 1, 15-16, 501 S.E.2d 716, 723-24 (1998) (finding defendant's
statements to police that he "was uncomfortable around adult women" and "he had
fantasies about children" were improper character evidence and were not relevant
to the crime charged). Further, we find trial counsel's explanation he did not object
to the statement because he did not want to "wave a red flag" before the jury was
not a reasonable strategy because the issue could have been litigated outside the
presence of the jury. See Dawkins v. State, 346 S.C. 151, 157, 551 S.E.2d 260, 263
(2001) (finding trial counsel's failure to object to testimony because he did not
want to confuse or upset the jury was not a valid strategy because he could have
sought a determination as to the inadmissibility of the testimony out of the hearing
of the jury); see also Matthews v. State, 350 S.C. 272, 276, 565 S.E.2d 766, 768
(2002) ("[C]ounsel cannot assert trial strategy as a defense for failure to object to
comments which constitute an error of law and are inherently prejudicial.").
Finally, we find there was not overwhelming evidence of Adams' guilt; therefore,
the PCR court erred in finding Adams failed to prove prejudice. See generally
Smith v. State, 386 S.C. 562, 566, 689 S.E.2d 629, 631 (2010) (stating "no
prejudice occurs, despite trial counsel's deficient performance, where there is
otherwise overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt").

We decline to address Adams' remaining issues because our determination that
Adams' counsel was deficient for failing to object to the admission of his statement
to police is dispositive. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335
S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court need not
review remaining issues when its determination of another issue is dispositive of
the appeal).

1
Adams filed an application for PCR, and after an evidentiary hearing, the PCR
court filed its order denying Adams relief. Adams thereafter filed a petition for a
writ of certiorari, which this court granted.
REVERSED.

SHORT, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.