Jones v. Warden & Smith Concrete

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

David G. Jones, Employee, Claimant, Appellant,

v.

Warden & Smith Concrete, Employer, and Bridgefield
Casualty Insurance Company c/o Summit Holdings, Inc.,
Carrier, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2013-000931

Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission

Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-210
Heard October 9, 2014 – Filed April 22, 2015

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Blake Alexander Hewitt and John S. Nichols, of
Bluestein Nichols Thompson & Delgado, LLC, of
Columbia; and William L. Smith, II, of Chappell Smith
& Arden, PA, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Nicolas Lee Haigler, of Sowell Gray Stepp & Laffitte,
LLC, of Columbia, for Respondents.
PER CURIAM: In this workers' compensation case, David G. Jones appeals the
findings of the Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) that (1) Jones
attained maximum medical improvement (MMI) and (2) Jones was not a credible
witness. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Whether an individual has attained MMI is a factual determination to be made by
the Commission and must be upheld on review unless unsupported by substantial
evidence. Curiel v. Envtl. Mgmt. Servs., 376 S.C. 23, 29, 655 S.E.2d 482, 485
(2007). The issue in this case stems from the Commission's failure to explain the
rule of law it applied, as statutorily mandated, in reaching its determination as to
whether Jones attained MMI. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-350 (2005) ("A final
decision shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated.").
Here, the Commission determined that Jones attained MMI by using statements
from two physicians from whom Jones sought treatment after his injury, which
stated that each physician "had nothing further" to offer Jones within the
physician's respective area of medical expertise. Therefore, the Commission may
have applied an incorrect legal standard. See Curiel, 376 S.C. at 29, 655 S.E.2d at
485 ("The term 'maximum medical improvement' means a person has reached such
a plateau that, in the physician's opinion, no further medical care or treatment will
lessen the period of impairment."). Absent clear understanding of the legal
standard upon which the finding of MMI was based, we are unable to determine
whether Jones's substantial rights were prejudiced so as to warrant altering the
Commission's decision. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5)(e) (Supp. 2014)
(allowing the court, in a judicial review proceeding, to reverse or modify a decision
of the administrative agency "if substantial rights of the appellant have been
prejudiced because [such] findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . .
clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record"). Because of this uncertainty, we reverse the finding that Jones
attained MMI and remand this case to the Commission for a rehearing followed by
an order that includes a specific explanation of the rule of law the Commission is
applying to the facts. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5) ("The court may affirm
the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings."). In
reversing the finding of MMI and remanding the matter to the Commission, we do
not decide the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the ruling at issue
here and give the Commission the opportunity to revisit its determination as to
whether, based on the present record, Jones attained MMI. See Shealy v. Algernon
Blair, Inc., 250 S.C. 106, 110, 156 S.E.2d 646, 648 (1967) ("Only the Commission
is authorized to pass upon the weight of the evidence in a workmen's compensation
case, and it is proper to remand a case to it for required findings where the record
contains evidence from which such findings may be made."); Sigmon v. Dayco
Corp., 316 S.C. 260, 262-63, 449 S.E.2d 497, 498-99 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding the
circuit court, in a judicial review of a workers' compensation case, "usurped the
[C]ommission's authority to make findings of fact" and remanding the case to the
Commission "to determine anew, based on the present record," whether the
claimant sustained an injury by accident).

Because our determination of the first issue disposes of this appeal, we do not
address the issue of credibility. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown,
Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling an appellate court need
not review remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive of
the appeal).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

FEW, C.J., and THOMAS and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.