Gregorie v. Spring Island Club

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Daniel A. Gregorie, Appellant,

v.

Spring Island Club, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2013-001757

Appeal From Beaufort County
Carmen T. Mullen, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-087
Submitted January 1, 2015 – Filed February 25, 2015

AFFIRMED

John P. Qualey, Jr., of Qualey Law Firm, PA, of Hilton
Head Island, for Appellant.

David Shuler Black, of Howell Gibson & Hughes, PA, of
Beaufort, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Daniel A. Gregorie appeals the trial court's order granting Spring
Island Club's (Spring Island's) motion for summary judgment, arguing the trial
court erred in (1) relying on amendments to Spring Island's bylaws and club plan
and (2) denying his motion for summary judgment. We affirm pursuant to Rule
220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred in granting Spring Island's motion for
summary judgment: Roe v. Bibby, 410 S.C. 287, 292, 763 S.E.2d 645, 648 (Ct.
App. 2014) ("When reviewing an order granting summary judgment, an appellate
court employs the same standard applied by the trial court under Rule 56, SCRCP."
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Rule 56(c), SCRCP (providing
summary judgment shall be granted when "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law"); Bibby, 410 S.C. at 292-93, 763 S.E.2d at 648 ("In determining whether any
triable issue of fact exists, the evidence and all inferences which can reasonably be
drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party."); Seabrook Island Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Berger, 365 S.C. 234, 239, 616
S.E.2d 431, 434 (Ct. App. 2005) ("Restrictive covenants are contractual in nature
and bind the parties thereto in the same manner as any other contract." (quoting
Seabrook Island Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Pelzer, 292 S.C. 343, 347, 356 S.E.2d 411,
414 (Ct. App. 1987))); McGill v. Moore, 381 S.C. 179, 185, 672 S.E.2d 571, 574
(2009) ("The cardinal rule of contract interpretation is to ascertain and give legal
effect to the parties' intentions as determined by the contract language."); id. ("A
contract is read as a whole document so that one may not create an ambiguity by
pointing out a single sentence or clause."); Stevens Aviation, Inc. v. DynCorp Int'l
LLC, 394 S.C. 300, 307-08, 715 S.E.2d 655, 659 (Ct. App. 2011) ("To incorporate
the terms of extrinsic material, a contract need not use magic words." (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
407 S.C. 407, 756 S.E.2d 148 (2014); id. at 308, 715 S.E.2d at 659 ("[T]he contract
must explicitly, or at least precisely, identify the written material being
incorporated and must clearly communicate that the purpose of the reference is to
incorporate the referenced material into the contract (rather than merely to
acknowledge that the referenced material is relevant to the contract, e.g., as
background law or negotiating history)." (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).

2. As to whether the trial court erred in denying Gregorie's motion for summary
judgment: Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518
S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (noting an appellate court need not address appellant's
remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive).

AFFIRMED.1

WILLIAMS, GEATHERS, and McDONALD, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.