State v. Daniels

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Jermel Rashond Daniels, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2013-001210

Appeal From Greenwood County
Frank R. Addy, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-476
Submitted October 1, 2014 – Filed December 23, 2014

AFFIRMED

Appellant Defender Lara Mary Caudy, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott,
both of Columbia; and Solicitor David Matthew Stumbo,
of Greenwood, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: State v. Wise, 359 S.C. 14, 21, 596 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004) ("The
admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court[,] and its ruling will not be disturbed in the absence of a manifest
abuse of discretion accompanied by probable prejudice. . . . An abuse of discretion
occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or are
controlled by an error of law."); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01
(1980) ("[T]he special procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are required not
where a suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather where a suspect in custody
is subjected to interrogation. . . . [T]he Miranda safeguards come into play
whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its
functional equivalent. That is to say, the term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers
not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the
police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect."); Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 529 (1987) ("'Any statement given
freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible
in evidence.'" (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966))); State v.
Franklin, 299 S.C. 133, 138, 382 S.E.2d 911, 914 (1989) ("The trial [court's]
determination of the voluntariness of a statement must be made on the basis of the
totality of the circumstances, including the background, experience and conduct of
the accused.").

AFFIRMED.1

WILLIAMS, GEATHERS, and McDONALD, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.