SCDSS v. Brown

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Dexter Bernard Brown, II, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2011-202947

Appeal From Barnwell County
Edgar W. Dickson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-303
Submitted July 1, 2014 – Filed July 30, 2014

AFFIRMED

Tommy Arthur Thomas, of Irmo, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Christina J. Catoe, both of Columbia;
and Solicitor James Strom Thurmond, Jr., of Aiken, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Dexter Bernard Brown, II, appeals his convictions for two
counts of attempted murder and one count of possession of a weapon during the
commission of a violent crime, arguing the trial court erred in (1) denying his
motion for directed verdict and (2) charging the jury on "inferred malice" from the
use of a deadly weapon. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the
following authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred in denying counsel's motion for directed
verdict: S.C. Code Ann. § 16-1-60 (Supp. 2013) (showing attempted murder is
listed as a "violent crime" per statute); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-23-490(A) (2003) ("If
a person is in possession of a firearm . . . during the commission of a violent crime
and is convicted of committing or attempting to commit a violent crime as defined
in [s]ection 16-1-60, he must be imprisoned five years . . . ."); State v. Weston, 367
S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When ruling on a motion for a
directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of
evidence, not its weight."); id. at 292-93, 625 S.E.2d at 648 ("If there is any direct
evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove
the guilt of the accused, [an appellate court] must find the case was properly
submitted to the jury."); State v. Dennis, 402 S.C. 627, 638, 742 S.E.2d 21, 27 (Ct.
App. 2013) (noting the jury may infer an intent to kill from the use of a dangerous
or deadly weapon in a manner reasonably calculated to cause death or great bodily
harm).

2. As to whether the trial court erred in charging that malice may be inferred
from the use of a deadly weapon: State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587
S.E.2d 691, 693-94 (2003) ("In order for an issue to be preserved for
appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial
[court.] Issues not raised and ruled upon in the trial court will not be
considered on appeal.").
AFFIRMED.1

HUFF, THOMAS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.