State v. Thomas

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Jeffrey Dodd Thomas, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2012-212428

Appeal From Lexington County
George C. James, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-143
Heard March 3, 2014 – Filed April 2, 2014

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Christina J. Catoe, of Columbia, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Jeffrey Thomas appeals his conviction for manufacturing
methamphetamine, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion for a
directed verdict on the charge of manufacturing methamphetamine because the
prosecution failed to present any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial
evidence that he engaged in the production, preparation, propagation,
compounding, conversion, or processing of any substance containing amphetamine
or methamphetamine. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the
following authorities: State v. Kelsey, 331 S.C. 50, 62, 502 S.E.2d 63, 69 (1998)
(providing that when ruling on a motion for directed verdict, the trial court is
concerned with the existence of evidence rather than its weight); State v. Cherry,
361 S.C. 588, 594, 606 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004) ("[A] trial judge is not required to
find that the evidence infers guilt to the exclusion of any other reasonable
hypothesis." (emphasis omitted)); State v. Brandt, 393 S.C. 526, 542, 713 S.E.2d
591, 599 (2011) ("When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, an appellate court
views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
State."); id. (stating if there is any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial
evidence that reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused, this court must
find the case was properly submitted to the jury); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-110
(Supp. 2013) (defining manufacturing as "the production, preparation, propagation,
compounding, conversion, or processing of a controlled substance, either directly
or indirectly by extraction from substances of natural origin, or independently by
means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical
synthesis, and includes any packaging or repackaging of the substance or labeling
or relabeling of its container"); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-375(D) (Supp. 2013)
("Possession of equipment or paraphernalia used in the manufacture of cocaine,
cocaine base, or methamphetamine is prima facie evidence of intent to
manufacture.").

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and SHORT and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.