Damballah v. SCDC

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Shango Damballah, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Corrections, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2012-213456

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
Carolyn C. Matthews, Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-478
Submitted October 1, 2013 – Filed December 18, 2013

AFFIRMED

Shango Damballah, pro se.

Shanika Kenyetta Johnson, of the South Carolina
Department of Corrections, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Shango Damballah, an inmate incarcerated with the South
Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC), appeals the Administrative Law
Court's (ALC) dismissal of his appeal from a prison disciplinary conviction. We
affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:
1. As to whether SCDC afforded Damballah minimal due process: Al-Shabazz v.
State, 338 S.C. 354, 369-70, 527 S.E.2d 742, 750 (2000) ("The statutory right to
sentence-related credits is a protected 'liberty' interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment, entitling an inmate to minimal due process to ensure the state-created
right was not arbitrarily abrogated."); id. at 371, 527 S.E.2d at 751 ("[D]ue process
in a prison disciplinary proceeding involving serious misconduct requires: (1) that
advance written notice of the charge be given to the inmate at least twenty-four
hours before the hearing; (2) that factfinders must prepare a written statement of
the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action; (3) that the inmate
should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, provided
there is no undue hazard to institutional safety or correctional goals; (4) that
counsel substitute (a fellow inmate or a prison employee) should be allowed to
help illiterate inmates or in complex cases an inmate cannot handle alone; and (5)
that the persons hearing the matter, who may be prison officials or employees,
must be impartial.").

2. As to whether substantial evidence supports the ALC's decision: Grant v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 353, 461 S.E.2d 388, 391 (1995) (providing a
reviewing court will not disturb the findings of an administrative agency if those
findings are supported by substantial evidence); id. ("The possibility of drawing
two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an
[a]dministrative [a]gency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence.
Rather, we need only find, considering the record as a whole, evidence that would
allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative agency
reached." (internal quotations marks and citation omitted)).

3. As to whether the ALC abused its discretion: Rish v. Rish, 296 S.C. 14, 15, 370
S.E.2d 102, 103 (Ct. App. 1988) ("When an appellate court is in agreement with a
discretionary ruling or is only mildly in disagreement, it says that the trial [court]
did not abuse his discretion.").

AFFIRMED.1

FEW, C.J., and PIEPER and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.