Haynie v. Cash

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

F.M. Haynie d/b/a Docwild's General Contractor,
Appellant,

v.

Paul E. Cash and Carole S. Cash, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2012-210746

Appeal From Richland County
Joseph M. Strickland, Master-In-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-489
Submitted October 1, 2013 – Filed December 23, 2013

AFFIRMED

F.M. Haynie, pro se, of Columbia.

Catharine H. Garbee Griffin, of Baker Ravenel &
Bender, LLP, of Columbia, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: F.M. Haynie d/b/a Docwild's General Contractor (Haynie)
appeals the master-in-equity's order, arguing the master erred by (1) finding the
contract was a sum certain contract, (2) denying damages to Haynie under the
theory of quantum meruit, (3) awarding damages to Paul Cash and Carole Cash
(the Cashes), and (4) adopting the Cashes' proposed order. We affirm.

1. The master did not err in concluding the parties' contract was for a sum certain.
The March 2, 2007 letter from Haynie to the Cashes served as an offer, and the
parties made counteroffers through oral negotiations. The master found the parties
eventually orally agreed the cost of the shed would be for a sum certain of $35,000
with the cost of the windows and doors to be added once those items were selected.
See Gaskins v. Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J., 206 S.C. 213, 216, 33 S.E.2d
498, 499 (1945) (noting that if there is a meeting of the minds with regard to the
essential elements of a contract, it is immaterial whether the contract is written or
oral). The master's finding is supported by evidence of the parties' intent. See U.S.
Bank Trust Nat'l Ass'n v. Bell, 385 S.C. 364, 374, 684 S.E.2d 199, 204-05 (Ct.
App. 2009) ("When interpreting an oral contract, a court must give effect to the
intentions of the parties. The determination of the parties' intent is a question of
fact." (citations omitted)). Haynie's ledger, spreadsheets, and internal documents
reference a contract price of $35,000, and Cash noted the cost of the project was
$35,000 in his ledger. During the course of building the shed, the parties orally
agreed to changes and upgrades to the initial scope of work. See Roberts v.
Gaskins, 327 S.C. 478, 483, 486 S.E.2d 771, 773 (Ct. App. 1997) ("A contract is
an obligation which arises from [an] actual agreement of the parties manifested by
words, oral or written, or by conduct."). The parties agreed on the cost for each
change or upgrade, and the Cashes paid Haynie accordingly. Thus, based upon our
"any evidence" standard of review, the master did not err by concluding the
contract was for a sum certain of $35,000, with subsequent oral modifications. See
Sherlock Holmes Pub, Inc. v. City of Columbia, 389 S.C. 77, 81, 697 S.E.2d 619,
621 (Ct. App. 2010) ("An action to construe a contract is an action at law
reviewable under an any evidence standard." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2. The master did not err in denying damages to Haynie under the theory of
quantum meruit. Because the master properly concluded the parties had an express
contract, Haynie cannot recover under quantum meruit. See Earthscapes
Unlimited, Inc. v. Ulbrich, 390 S.C. 609, 616, 703 S.E.2d 221, 225 (2010)
("Absent an express contract, recovery under quantum meruit is based on quasi-
contract."). Further, Haynie cannot establish a claim under quantum meruit
because he failed to prove the Cashes unjustly retained a benefit without paying for
it. See id. at 616-17, 703 S.E.2d at 225 ("To establish a claim of quantum meruit,
the plaintiff must prove: (1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff;
(2) realization of that benefit by the defendant; and (3) retention by the defendant
of the benefit under conditions that make it unjust for him to retain it without
paying its value."). Haynie failed to provide an accurate estimate because he based
his opinion on the value of the shed on the erroneous premise that the shed was a
residential, conventional, or recreational dwelling. However, Haynie admitted the
Cashes cannot occupy the shed because it does not have a kitchen or full bath.
Thus, Haynie failed to meet his burden of proof to establish a claim for damages
under quantum meruit.

3. The master did not err in awarding $4,135 in damages to the Cashes. The record
contains evidence Haynie failed to meet the proper standard of care when installing
the septic tank and the shingles to the shed. See Doe v. Marion, 373 S.C. 390, 400,
645 S.E.2d 245, 250 (2007) ("To prove negligence, a plaintiff must show: (1)
defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff; (2) defendant breached the duty by a
negligent act or omission; (3) defendant's breach was the actual and proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury; and (4) plaintiff suffered an injury or damages.");
Smith v. Breedlove, 377 S.C. 415, 422, 661 S.E.2d 67, 71 (2008) ("A builder who
contracts to construct a dwelling impliedly warrants that the work undertaken will
be performed in a careful, diligent, workmanlike manner."). Mr. Cash testified he
paid $1,975 to replace the septic tank in the shed because Haynie did not install it
according to code and it overflowed into the shed. Replacing the defective septic
tank also damaged the Cashes' sprinkler system, which cost an additional $1,590 to
repair. Finally, Mr. Cash testified Haynie's improper installation of the shingles
caused the shed to rot from water pooling. The Cashes paid $585 to replace the
shingles. Therefore, the master properly awarded $4,135 in damages to the
Cashes.

4. Haynie argues the master erred in adopting the Cashes' proposed order. This
issue is not preserved because Haynie raises it for the first time on appeal. See
Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("It is
axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have
been raised to and ruled upon by the trial [court] to be preserved for appellate
review.").

AFFIRMED.1

FEW, C.J., and PIEPER and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.