State v. Felder

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Antrell R. Felder, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2011-203747

Appeal From Sumter County
Howard P. King, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-437
Heard November 13, 2013 – Filed November 27, 2013

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Kathrine H. Hudgins, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, and Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, all
of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Antrell R. Felder appeals his convictions of murder and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime, arguing the trial
court erred in (1) excluding evidence of the victim's unrelated burglary charges and
(2) denying Felder's directed verdict motion. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim's burglary
charges: State v. Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 121, 551 S.E.2d 240, 244 (2001) ("The
admission or exclusion of evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial
[court], whose decision will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion."); Rule 401, SCRE ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence."); State v. Gregory, 198 S.C. 98, 104, 16 S.E.2d 532, 534
(1941) ("[E]vidence which can have (no) other effect than to cast a bare suspicion
upon another, or to raise a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime
by another, is not admissible." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Rule 403,
SCRE ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury . . . ."); State v. Lyles, 379 S.C. 328, 338, 665 S.E.2d 201,
206 (Ct. App. 2008) ("When juxtaposing the prejudicial effect against the
probative value, the determination must be based on the entire record and will turn
on the facts of each case."); Saltz, 346 S.C. at 130-31, 551 S.E.2d at 249 (noting
the trial court can exercise its discretion and limit the scope of cross-examination
notwithstanding a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses).

2. As to whether the trial court erred in denying Felder's directed verdict motion:
State v. Martin, 340 S.C. 597, 602, 533 S.E.2d 572, 574 (2000) ("In reviewing the
appeal of a refusal to grant a directed verdict of not guilty, [the appellate court]
must look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the State."); State v.
Schrock, 283 S.C. 129, 132, 322 S.E.2d 450, 451-52 (1984) ("When a motion for a
directed verdict is made in a criminal case, the trial [court] is concerned with the
existence or non-existence of evidence, not its weight."); State v. Weston, 367 S.C.
279, 292-93, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("If there is any direct evidence or any
substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the
accused, the [appellate court] must find the case was properly submitted to the
jury."); State v. Bostick, 392 S.C. 134, 139, 708 S.E.2d 774, 776-77 (2011)
("Unless there is a total failure of competent evidence as to the charges alleged,
refusal by the trial [court] to direct a verdict of acquittal is not error.").

AFFIRMED.
FEW, C.J., and PIEPER and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.