Wilson v. Cleversey

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Kenneth A. Wilson, Respondent,

v.

Lora Cleversey, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2012-205808

Appeal From Aiken County
Vicki J. Snelgrove, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-433
Submitted September 1, 2013 – Filed November 27, 2013

AFFIRMED

Brian Austin Katonak, of Law Office of Brian Katonak,
PA, of Aiken, for Appellant.

Kenneth A. Wilson, of Beech Island, pro se.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011)
("In appeals from the family court, this [c]ourt reviews factual and legal issues de
novo."); Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 384, 709 S.E.2d 650, 651 (2011) ("[T]he
appellate court has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its view of the
preponderance of the evidence."); id. ("However, this broad scope of review does
not require [the appellate c]ourt to disregard the findings of the family court.");
Emery v. Smith, 361 S.C. 207, 216, 603 S.E.2d 598, 602 (Ct. App. 2004) ("The
inquiry into the applicability of laches is highly fact-specific and each case must be
judged by its own merits."); Strickland v. Strickland, 375 S.C. 76, 83, 650 S.E.2d
465, 469 (2007) ("In order to establish laches as a defense, a defendant must show
that the complaining party unreasonably delayed its assertion of a right, resulting in
prejudice to the defendant."); id. at 83, 650 S.E.2d at 469 ("On previous occasions,
this [c]ourt has alluded to the inapplicability of the defense of laches in actions to
enforce a court order."); id. at 83, 650 S.E.2d at 469-70 ("Although the equitable
nature of laches generally comports with the family court's equitable jurisdiction in
determining support and maintenance between former spouses, the concept of
'inexcusable delay' in the laches defense is inconsistent with the judicial authority
inherent in a court order."); id. at 84, 650 S.E.2d at 470 (finding "the theory of
equitable estoppel appropriately balances principles of equity and judicial authority
when the underlying facts of a case call into question the equity of enforcing a
court order"); id. at 85, 650 S.E.2d at 470 (recognizing the "affirmative defenses to
a cause of action in any pleading must generally be asserted in a party's responsive
pleading" to preserve the defense); id. at 86, 650 S.E.2d at 470 (addressing the
merits of equitable estoppel although it was not explicitly pled and preserved
because the defendant's pleading of laches resulted in an almost indistinguishable
argument from equitable estoppel under the facts of the case); id. at 84-85, 650
S.E.2d at 470 ("The party asserting estoppel must show: (1) lack of knowledge,
and the means of knowledge, of the truth as to the facts in question; (2) reliance
upon the conduct of the party estopped; and (3) a prejudicial change of position in
reliance on the conduct of the party being estopped."); I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt.
Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 420, 526 S.E.2d 716, 723 (2000) (holding the appellate
court may rely on any reason in the record to affirm the lower court's judgment).

AFFIRMED.1

FEW, C.J., and PIEPER and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.