Atlantic Coast Properties v. Swann

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Atlantic Coast Properties, Inc., Respondent,

v.

Jerry E. Swann, Jr., Sandra A. Swann, Patricia Hite, and
John Hicks, Defendants,

of whom John Hicks is the Appellant,

and Jerry E. Swann, Jr., Sandra A. Swann, and Patricia
Hite are the Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2012-208246

Appeal From Aiken County
M. Anderson Griffith, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-365
Submitted July 1, 2013 – Filed October 2, 2013

AFFIRMED

James Ross Snell, of Law Office of James R. Snell, Jr.,
LLC, of Lexington, and Jennifer Marie Clinkscales, of
Lexington, for Appellant.
Kathy Ouzts Rushton, of Kathy Ouzts Rushton, PA, of
Saluda, for Respondent Atlantic Coast Properties, Inc.,
and James L. Verenes, of Fox & Verenes, of Aiken, for
Respondent Patricia Hite.

PER CURIAM: John Hicks (Hicks) appeals the Master-in-Equity's (Master)
finding that Patricia Hite (Patricia) held an equitable lien on property in Aiken
County. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:

1. As to whether the Master erred in failing to find Patricia was collaterally
estopped from pursuing her claim, we affirm. Nutt Corp. v. Howell Rd., LLC, 396
S.C. 323, 327, 721 S.E.2d 447, 449 (Ct. App. 2011) (stating this court reviews
"factual findings and legal conclusions in an equitable action de novo," which
"'permits appellate court fact-finding, notwithstanding the presence of evidence
supporting the trial court's findings'" (citing and quoting Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C.
381, 386, 390, 709 S.E.2d 650, 652, 654 (2011))); Carolina Renewal, Inc. v. S.C.
Dep't of Transp., 385 S.C. 550, 554, 684 S.E.2d 779, 782 (Ct. App. 2009) ("The
party asserting collateral estoppel must demonstrate that the issue in the present
lawsuit was: (1) actually litigated in the prior action; (2) directly determined in the
prior action; and (3) necessary to support the prior judgment." (citing Beall v. Doe,
281 S.C. 363, 369 n.1, 315 S.E.2d 186, 189 n.1 (Ct. App. 1984))).

2. As to whether the Master erred in finding Patricia was entitled to an equitable
lien because she had no adequate remedy at law, we affirm. Nutt Corp., 396 S.C.
at 327, 721 S.E.2d at 449 ("The basis for granting equitable relief is the
impracticability of obtaining full and adequate compensation at law." (citing
Monteith v. Harby, 190 S.C. 453, 456, 3 S.E.2d 250, 251 (1939))); id. ("'For an
equitable lien to arise, there must be a debt, specific property to which the debt
attaches, and an expressed or implied intent that the property serve as security for
payment of the debt.'" (quoting Regions Bank v. Wingard Props., Inc., 394 S.C.
241, 250, 715 S.E.2d 348, 353 (Ct. App. 2011))).

3. As to whether the Master erred in relying on the Release because it was
improperly executed and never recorded, we affirm. Commerce Ctr. of Greenville,
Inc. v. W. Powers McElveen & Assocs., Inc., 347 S.C. 545, 559, 556 S.E.2d 718,
725 (Ct. App. 2001) ("It is well settled that the admission and rejection of
testimony are matters largely within the trial court's sound discretion, the exercise
of which will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion."); id. at
559, 556 S.E.2d at 726 ("In order for this [c]ourt to reverse a case based on the
erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence, prejudice must be shown.").

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and GEATHERS and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.