CourtListener 10148036•State v. Wright
Full text
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
v.
Gregory Wright, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2009-113766
Appeal From Sumter County
Michael G. Nettles, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-326
Submitted April 1, 2013 – Filed July 17, 2013
AFFIRMED
Appellate Defender Robert M. Pachak, of Columbia, for
Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Assistant
Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., all of Columbia,
for Respondent, and Solicitor Ernest A. Finney, III, of
Sumter, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Gregory Wright appeals his convictions on charges of possession
of marijuana, trafficking in cocaine, and trafficking in crack cocaine, arguing the
trial court erred in finding there was sufficient direct evidence or substantial
circumstantial evidence that he constructively possessed the drugs.1 We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Brown,
402 S.C. 119, 124, 740 S.E.2d 493, 495 (2013) (stating that on appeal from the
denial of a directed verdict in a criminal case, the appellate court "must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State"); id. ("[I]f there is any direct or
substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the
accused, an appellate court must find the case was properly submitted to the
jury."); State v. Cherry, 361 S.C. 588, 594, 606 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004) (stating a
directed verdict motion should be granted "when the evidence merely raises a
suspicion that the accused is guilty," but also emphasizing that the trial court "is
not required to find that the evidence infers guilt to the exclusion of any other
reasonable hypothesis"); State v. Ballenger, 322 S.C. 196, 199, 470 S.E.2d 851,
854 (1996) (stating constructive possession of drugs occurs when the person
charged with possession has dominion and control over either drugs or the
premises upon which the drugs are found); State v. Hudson, 277 S.C. 200, 203, 284
S.E.2d 773, 775 (1981) ("Where contraband materials are found on premises under
the control of the accused, this fact in and of itself gives rise to an inference of
knowledge and possession which may be sufficient to carry the case to the jury.");
id. at 202, 284 S.E.2d at 775 ("Constructive possession can be established by
circumstantial evidence as well as direct evidence, and possession may be
shared."); id. (noting that both defendants "shared control of the premises" and
holding there was "sufficient evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt" that one of the defendants, though he was
away from the premises when the drugs were found and was arrested three hours
later while driving on the interstate, "constructively possessed heroin with intent to
distribute").
AFFIRMED.
SHORT, THOMAS, and PIEPER, JJ., concur.
1
Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Wright's appellate counsel
filed a brief asserting there were no meritorious grounds for appeal and requested
permission to withdraw from further representation. This court denied the request
and instructed the parties to file additional briefs.
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