State v. Milledge

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Michael Milledge, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2010-156666

Appeal From Greenville County
Robin B. Stilwell, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-273
Heard May 6, 2013 – Filed June 19, 2013

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender LaNelle Cantey DuRant, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, both of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Michael Milledge was convicted of possession of ecstasy,
possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, trafficking in crack cocaine, and
possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. On appeal, he
argues the trial court erred in (1) admitting evidence of contraband found pursuant
to an illegal search and (2) refusing to direct a verdict in his favor on the charges of
trafficking in crack cocaine and possession of a weapon during the commission of
a violent crime. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:

1. As to the legality of the search: State v. Simpson, 325 S.C. 37, 42, 479
S.E.2d 57, 60 (1996) ("A ruling in limine is not a final ruling on the admissibility
of evidence. Unless an objection is made at the time the evidence is offered and a
final ruling made, the issue is not preserved for review." (citations omitted)); Burke
v. AnMed Health, 393 S.C. 48, 55, 710 S.E.2d 84, 88 (Ct. App. 2011) ("When a
party states to the trial court that it has no objection to the introduction of evidence,
even though the party previously made a motion to exclude the evidence, the issue
raised in the previous motion is not preserved for appellate review.").

2. As to the refusal to direct a verdict: State v. McHoney, 344 S.C. 85, 97, 544
S.E.2d 30, 36 (2001) ("A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the State
fails to produce evidence of the offense charged. In reviewing a motion for
directed verdict, the trial judge is concerned with the existence of the evidence, not
with its weight." (citations omitted)); State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292-93, 625
S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) (ruling an appellate court considering the denial of a
motion for a directed verdict views the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the State but requiring it to affirm if
it finds find "any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence
reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused"); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-
375(C) (Supp. 2012) ("A person . . . who is knowingly in actual or constructive
possession . . . of ten grams or more of . . . cocaine base, as defined and otherwise
limited in Section 44-53-110 . . . is guilty of a felony which is known as 'trafficking
in . . . cocaine base.'"); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-110 (Supp. 2012) (defining
"cocaine base" as "an alkaloidal cocaine or freebase form of cocaine, which is the
end product of a chemical alteration whereby the cocaine in salt form is converted
to a form suitable for smoking," and which "is commonly referred to as 'rock' or
'crack cocaine'"); State v. Hernandez, 382 S.C. 620, 624, 677 S.E.2d 603, 605
(2009) (explaining the element of knowledge in a drug case "is seldom established
through direct evidence, but may be proven circumstantially . . . by the evidence of
acts, declarations, or conduct of the accused from which the inference may be
drawn that the accused knew of the existence of the prohibited substances."
(citations omitted)); State v. Attardo, 263 S.C. 546, 550, 211 S.E.2d 868, 869
(1975) ("Possession [of a controlled substance] . . . gives rise to an inference of the
possessor's knowledge of the character of the substance."); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-
23-490(A) (2003) ("If a person is in possession of a firearm . . . during the
commission of a violent crime and is convicted of committing . . . a violent crime
as defined in Section 16-1-60, he must be imprisoned five years, in addition to the
punishment provided for the principal crime."); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-1-60 (Supp.
2012) (classifying trafficking in cocaine base as a violent crime).

AFFIRMED.

SHORT and THOMAS, JJ., and CURETON, A.J.