Misty Lake v. Bridleridge

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Misty Lake Association, Inc., Appellant,

v.

Bridleridge Homeowners' Association, Inc., Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2011-202086

Appeal From Lexington County
James O. Spence, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-011
Heard December 13, 2012 – Filed January 9, 2013

AFFIRMED

D. Ryan McCabe and Stephanie Trotter, McCabe, Trotter
& Beverly, P.C., Brian C. Gambrell, Rogers Townsend &
Thomas, P.C., all of Columbia, for Appellant.

James R. Snell and Jennifer M. Clinkscales, Law Office
of James R. Snell, L.L.C., of Lexington, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Misty Lake Association, Inc. seeks unpaid assessments allegedly
owed to it by Bridleridge Homeowners' Association for use of a manmade lake.
Misty Lake Association claims the trial court erred when it found (1) the Misty
Lake restrictive covenants did not form an enforceable contract creating a servitude
on Bridleridge Homeowners' Association, (2) the Misty Lake restrictive covenants
did not create a reciprocal negative easement, and (3) Misty Lake Association
could not recover on the theory of quantum meruit. We affirm pursuant to Rule
220(b), SCACR.

1. On appeal of an action at law tried without a jury, an appellate court will not
disturb the trial court's findings of fact unless no evidence reasonably supports the
findings. Byrd v. Livingston, 398 S.C. 237, 241, 727 S.E.2d 620, 622 (Ct. App.
2012). For a contract to arise, "[t]here must be an offer, there must be an
acceptance, and there must be a meeting of the minds of the parties involved."
Rushing v. McKinney, 370 S.C. 280, 290, 633 S.E.2d 917, 922 (Ct. App. 2006)
(citation omitted). The trial court correctly found that Bridleridge Homeowners'
Association lacked the capacity to make a unilateral acceptance because its own
covenants required a two-thirds vote of the membership to accept Misty Lake
Association's offer, which did not occur. Moreover, the record supports the trial
court's finding that there was not a meeting of the minds between the parties
because the documents that allegedly created the contract show a lack of
understanding regarding the essential terms of the agreement.

2. "The determination of the existence of an easement is a question of fact in a
law action and subject to an any evidence standard of review when tried by a judge
without a jury." Pittman v. Lowther, 363 S.C. 47, 50, 610 S.E.2d 479, 480 (2005).
"Restrictive covenants on the use of property may be created in express terms or by
implication. Where they arise by implication, the restrictions are said to create a
reciprocal negative easement." Bomar v. Echols, 270 S.C. 676, 679, 244 S.E.2d
308, 310 (1978) (internal citations omitted). "For a reciprocal negative easement
to arise by implication, the implication must be plain and unmistakable." Shoney's,
Inc. v. Cooke, 291 S.C. 307, 313, 353 S.E.2d 300, 304 (Ct. App. 1987). Four
elements must be established to show a reciprocal negative easement: (1) a
common grantor, (2) a designation of the land or tract subject to restrictions, (3) a
general plan or scheme of restriction in existence for the designated land or tract,
and (4) restrictive covenants that run with the land. Gambrell v. Schriver, 312 S.C.
354, 358, 440 S.E.2d 393, 395 (Ct. App. 1994). The relevant timeframe for
determining whether the Bridleridge tract was subject to restrictions is the date the
property was conveyed to the developer of Bridleridge subdivision. See id.
("Generally, the developer must establish the general scheme of development
before any lots are sold." (emphasis added)); Edwards et. al. v. Surratt, 228 S.C.
512, 518-19, 90 S.E.2d 906, 909 (1956) (emphasizing that an implied easement
arises when a common grantor implements a general scheme of improvement
before selling the lots of land). The evidence supports the conclusion of the trial
court that these elements were not met because (1) the deed that conveyed the
Bridleridge tract contained no restrictions on lake maintenance, (2) the Bridleridge
tract was conveyed before Misty Lake Association created its restrictive covenants,
and (3) there was no general scheme or plan in place at the time of conveyance.

3. In an action in equity, an appellate court reviews the evidence to determine
the facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence.
Denman v. City of Columbia, 387 S.C. 131, 140, 691 S.E.2d 465, 470 (2010).
"The elements of a quantum meruit claim are: (1) a benefit conferred upon the
defendant by the plaintiff; (2) realization of that benefit by the defendant; and (3)
retention by the defendant of the benefit under conditions that make it unjust for
him to retain it without paying its value." Earthscapes Unlimited, Inc. v. Ulbrich,
390 S.C. 609, 616-17, 703 S.E.2d 221, 225 (2010). Misty Lake Association argues
it conferred a benefit on Bridleridge Homeowners' Association when it allowed
Bridleridge Homeowners' Association to construct a dock and use the lake for
fishing, which in turn increased the value of the homes in the Bridleridge
subdivision. However, the trial court found there was minimal testimony regarding
the use of the dock, there was no credible valuation testimony as to the value of the
use, and there was no testimony about how the dock use damaged the lake or dam.
Furthermore, the court found there was a lack of "persuasive testimony" regarding
how the lake increased the value of the property. In addition, we believe the
annual assessment paid by Bridleridge Homeowners' Association for use of the
lake is sufficient to satisfy any benefit conferred by Misty Lake Association.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding Misty Lake Association was not
entitled to recover on the theory of quantum meruit.

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and WILLIAMS and PIEPER, JJ., concur.