SCDSS v. Jodi H.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina Department of Social Services,
Respondent,

v.

Jodi H., Roshell B., and Anthony B., Defendants,

Of whom Roshell B. is the Appellant.

In the interest of minors under the age 18.

Appellate Case No. 2011-203687

Appeal From Orangeburg County
Anne Gue Jones, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-650
Submitted December 3, 2012 – Filed December 5, 2012

AFFIRMED

Ladson H. Beach, Jr., of Beach Law Office, LLC, of
Orangeburg, and John D. Elliott, of Law Offices of J.
Elliott, of Columbia, both for Appellant.

Patrick L. Wright, of the South Carolina Department of
Social Services, of Orangeburg, for Respondent.
D'Anne Haydel, of Orangeburg, and R. Bentz Kirby, of
Glen Walters & Associates, PA, Orangeburg, Guardians
ad Litem.

PER CURIAM: Roshell B. (Father) appeals the family court order terminating
his parental rights to his minor children (Children). Father argues the family court
erred in finding (1) the Department of Social Services (DSS) provided services to
him; (2) clear and convincing evidence supported grounds for termination of
parental rights (TPR); and (3) TPR was in the best interest of Children. We affirm.

The family court may order TPR upon finding one or more of eleven statutory
grounds is satisfied and also finding that TPR is in the best interest of the child.
S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2570 (2010 & Supp. 2011). The grounds for TPR must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Parker, 336
S.C. 248, 254, 519 S.E.2d 351, 354 (Ct. App. 1999). On appeal from the family
court, this court reviews factual and legal issues de novo. Simmons v. Simmons,
392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011). Although this court reviews the
family court's findings de novo, we are not required to ignore the fact that the trial
court, who saw and heard the witnesses, was in a better position to evaluate their
credibility. Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 385, 709 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2011). "[T]he
best interests of the children are the paramount consideration." S.C. Dep't of Soc.
Servs. v. Smith, 343 S.C. 129, 133, 538 S.E.2d 285, 287 (Ct. App. 2000). "The
interests of the child shall prevail if the child's interest and the parental rights
conflict." S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2620 (2010).

We find clear and convincing evidence shows Father failed to remedy the
conditions which caused the removal of Children. Father argues DSS failed to
provide meaningful services to remedy the conditions that led to Children's
removal because DSS operated under an existing treatment plan. DSS has three
responsibilities with providing services, including (1) identifying the condition that
led to DSS removing the child; (2) identifying appropriate rehabilitative services;
and (3) making a meaningful offer of those services. See McCutcheon v.
Charleston Co. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 302 S.C. 338, 343, 396 S.E.2d 115, 118
(1990). DSS is not "responsible for insuring successful outcomes." Id. (finding if
the treatment plan requires parents "to both acquire and retain housing and
employment, this implicates stability and responsibility, and DSS is limited in its
ability to provide those characteristics"). The condition that threatened Children
with harm was Father's inability to provide Children with a suitable home. Father
admits the treatment plan required him to acquire stable employment and housing
to support Children. Moreover, DSS sent Father on several interviews and
provided counseling to Father. However, Father has not "develop[ed] the
responsibility and stability required to comply with the treatment plan." Id.

We find clear and convincing evidence shows Father neglected Children and "it is
not reasonably likely that the home can be made safe within twelve months." S.C.
Code Ann. §63-7-2570(1) (2010). Section 63-7-20(4)(c) of the South Carolina
Code of Laws (2010) defines "child abuse or neglect" as failing "to supply the
child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or education . . . ." Father neglected
Children by failing to provide an adequate home. Moreover, it is not likely Father
will make the home safe within twelve months. Father's oldest child entered foster
care in November 2007 because DSS believed the home was not safe. Children
entered foster care two other times because Father could not provide Children with
a home. Father only recently restored electricity to the home after living without
electricity for almost a year. Anne Williamson, a DSS foster care supervisor, and
guardian ad litem (GAL) D'Anne Haydel testified Father has a history of failing to
provide a safe home for Children and they worried this pattern would continue into
the future. Mother believes they could not provide for Children if DSS returned
them to their care. Accordingly, we believe Father has neglected Children and it is
not reasonably likely the home will be made safe in twelve months.

We find clear and convincing evidence proves Father willfully failed to support
Children. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2570(4) (2010) (providing a statutory
ground for TPR is met when "[t]he child has lived outside the home of either
parent for a period of six months, and during that time the parent has willfully
failed to support the child"). Father argues he did not know he was expected to pay
child support because DSS never ordered him to pay. However, DSS is not
required to notify Father of his duty to support Children before "failure to
discharge those duties may serve as grounds for termination of parental rights."
See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Parker, 336 S.C. 248, 258, 519 S.E.2d 351, 356
(Ct. App. 1999). Father has not supported Children since they entered foster care
other than buying small gifts, snacks, and some clothing, which are not material
contributions. See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. M.R.C.L., 393 S.C. 387, 394, 712
S.E.2d 452, 456 (2011) (finding parent occasionally providing child with food,
drinks, medicine, diapers, wipes, and toys does not merit a material contribution);
S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2570(4) (2010) ("Failure to support means that the parent
has failed to make a material contribution to the child's care. A material
contribution consists of either financial contributions according to the parent's
means or contributions of food, clothing, shelter, or other necessities for the care of
the child according to the parent's means."). Accordingly, we find clear and
convincing evidence shows Father willfully failed to support Children.

Because only one ground for TPR needs to be proven, we do not address the
remaining ground. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2570 (Supp. 2011) (providing the
family court may order TPR upon finding one or more of eleven statutory grounds
is satisfied).

Finally, the record supports the family court's finding TPR is in Children's best
interests. Children continued to languish in foster care while Father attempted to
develop the stability and responsibility needed for Children to return home.
Father's oldest child has been in foster care on three separate occasions. Father had
custody of his youngest child for only several weeks before he was arrested and
Mother voluntarily surrendered Children. The GALs believed TPR and adoption
was in the best interests of Children. Children have adoption placements and are
thriving in their placements. Thus, TPR and adoption are in the best interests of
Children to provide stability and permanence to their lives.

AFFIRMED.1

HUFF, THOMAS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.