State v. Robinson

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Lou Ann Robinson, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2009-148966

Appeal From Williamsburg County
R. Ferrell Cothran, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-574
Submitted October 1, 2012 – Filed October 24, 2012

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED IN PART

Appellate Defender Elizabeth Anne Franklin-Best, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy
Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Senior Assistant
Attorney General Harold M. Coombs, Jr., all of
Columbia; and Solicitor C. Kelly Jackson, of Sumter, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Lou Ann Robinson appeals her conviction of voluntary
manslaughter, arguing the trial court erred in charging voluntary manslaughter.
Additionally, she argues the trial court erred in failing to make a finding under
section 16-25-90 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2011), which provides early
parole eligibility for an inmate convicted of an offense against a household
member, when evidence is presented of criminal domestic violence suffered at the
hands of the household member.

1. As to whether the trial court erred in charging voluntary manslaughter, we
affirm pursuant to the following authorities: State v. Miller, 397 S.C. 630, 634-35,
725 S.E.2d 724, 727 (Ct. App. 2012) ("In criminal cases, appellate courts review
only errors of law and will not reverse a trial court's decision concerning jury
instructions unless the trial court abused its discretion."); id. at 635, 725 S.E.2d at
727 ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the [trial] court's decision is unsupported
by the evidence or controlled by an error of law."); State v. Moore, 374 S.C. 468,
473-74, 649 S.E.2d 84, 86 (Ct. App. 2007) ("This [c]ourt does not re-evaluate the
facts based on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence but simply
determines whether the trial [court's] ruling is supported by any evidence."); State
v. Johnson, 333 S.C. 62, 65, 508 S.E.2d 29, 31 (1998) ("To warrant a court's
eliminating the offense of manslaughter, it should very clearly appear that there is
no evidence whatsoever tending to reduce the crime from murder to
manslaughter."); State v. Tyson, 283 S.C. 375, 379, 323 S.E.2d 770, 772 (1984)
("Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being in the heat of
passion upon sufficient legal provocation."); State v. Starnes, 388 S.C. 590, 598,
698 S.E.2d 604, 609 (2010) ("[F]ear immediately following an attack or
threatening act may cause the person to act in a sudden heat of passion.").

2. As to whether the trial court erred in failing to make a finding regarding
Robinson's eligibility for early parole: Section 16-25-90 of the South Carolina
Code (Supp. 2011) states an inmate shall be eligible for parole after serving one-
fourth of his or her prison sentence when the inmate was convicted of a crime
against a household member and presents credible evidence of a history of criminal
domestic violence suffered at the hands of the household member. "The circuit
court must make specific findings in ruling on parole eligibility or ineligibility
under § 16-25-90." State v. Blackwell-Selim, 392 S.C. 1, 4, 707 S.E.2d 426, 428
(2011). "Such a history must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence." Id.
at 3-4, 707 S.E.2d at 428. We hold the trial court erred in failing to make a finding
regarding Robinson's eligibility for early parole under section 16-25-90.
Accordingly, we remand for a determination of whether Robinson presented a
preponderance of evidence showing she suffered criminal domestic violence
inflicted by the victim.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED IN PART.1

SHORT, KONDUROS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.