State v. Williams

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Kenneth Williams, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2010-169031

Appeal From Beaufort County
Thomas W. Cooper, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-573
Submitted October 1, 2012 – Filed October 24, 2012

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Susan B. Hackett, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney
General Donald J. Zelenka, and Senior Assistant
Attorney General William E. Salter, III, all of Columbia;
and Solicitor Isaac McDuffie Stone, III, of Bluffton, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Kenneth Williams appeals his conviction of murder, robbery,
and first-degree burglary, arguing the trial court erred in (1) instructing the jury on
accomplice liability and (2) refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included
offense of involuntary manslaughter. We affirm1 pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on accomplice
liability: State v. Brown, 362 S.C. 258, 261-62, 607 S.E.2d 93, 95 (Ct. App. 2004)
("The law to be charged to the jury is determined by the evidence presented at
trial."); State v. Langley, 334 S.C. 643, 648-49, 515 S.E.2d 98, 101 (1999) ("Under
accomplice liability theory, 'a person must personally commit the crime or be
present at the scene of the crime and intentionally, or through a common design,
aid, abet, or assist in the commission of that crime through some overt act.'"); State
v. Gibson, 390 S.C. 347, 354, 701 S.E.2d 766, 770 (Ct. App. 2010) ("In order to
establish the parties agreed to achieve an illegal purpose, thereby establishing
presence by pre-arrangement, the State need not prove a formal expressed
agreement, but rather can prove the same by circumstantial evidence and the
conduct of the parties.").

2. As to whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-
included offense of involuntary manslaughter: State v. Knoten, 347 S.C. 296, 302,
555 S.E.2d 391, 394 (2001) ("To warrant a court's eliminating the offense of
manslaughter, it should very clearly appear that there is no evidence whatsoever
tending to reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter."); State v. Smith, 391
S.C. 408, 414, 706 S.E.2d 12, 15 (2011) ("Involuntary manslaughter is (1) the
unintentional killing of another without malice, but while engaged in an unlawful
activity not amounting to a felony and not naturally tending to cause death or great
bodily harm or (2) the unintentional killing of another without malice, while
engaged in a lawful activity with reckless disregard for the safety of others."); State
v. Cabrera-Pena, 361 S.C. 372, 381, 605 S.E.2d 522, 526 (2004) (noting unlawful,
felonious, and harmful conduct does not fit within the statutory definition of
involuntary manslaughter).

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, THOMAS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.