State v. Morgan

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT
BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE
239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In
The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Daron Morgan, Appellant.

Appeal
From Beaufort County

Howard
P. King, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished
Opinion No. 2007-UP-396

Submitted
September 1, 2007 – Filed September 25, 2007

AFFIRMED

Chief
Attorney Joseph L. Savitz, III, of Columbia, for Appellant. 

Attorney
General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh,
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Special Assistant
Attorney General Amie L. Clifford, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Isaac
McDuffie Stone, III, of Hampton, for Respondent.

PER
CURIAM:  Daron Morgan appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for
mistrial.  We affirm.[1]

FACTS

Morgan was
convicted of the common law offense of escape.  Testimony at trial revealed
that police officers received a call regarding a possible burglary at a
residence.  Police proceeded to the scene where they found the back door of the
residence partially open.  After announcing themselves and receiving no
response, the officers entered the residence.  Inside, they discovered Morgan
and another man sleeping and a substance that appeared to be marijuana in a
nearby bowl.  The two were placed under arrest, but as they were leaving the
scene, the arresting officer was distracted by a disturbance, and Morgan
“snatched away” and ran. 

Later, Morgan
was arrested by a different officer, Jeff Purdy, at a nearby home.  He was
found hiding under the kitchen sink.  When apprehended, Morgan indicated the
police would never find the missing handcuffs.  

At trial, Morgan
made a motion in limine seeking to suppress the introduction of any evidence
related to his subsequent arrest after his escape. He argued that the
circumstances of that arrest and any statements he made were irrelevant and prejudicial.
 The trial court granted Morgan’s request in part. 

[W]ith regard to
the circumstances surrounding the arrest, I think it is [of] very questionable
relevance.  But even if relevant . . . the prejudicial effect outweighs the
probative value and so I would not permit the testimony surrounding the
circumstances of his arrest other than to say that he was later located on such
and such a day at such and such a location and placed under arrest for escape. 
That would be the extent of the testimony that would be allowed there, not with
regard to all the other circumstances.

On direct
examination, Officer Purdy testified that Morgan was discovered “hiding under
the kitchen sink.”  Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, but the trial court
denied the motion reasoning that the literal interpretation of its ruling was
followed although the spirit of the ruling was violated.  The trial court gave
a curative instruction telling the jury to disregard any testimony concerning
Morgan hiding under the sink. 

STANDARD OF
REVIEW

The decision to grant
or deny a motion for mistrial is in the sound discretion of the trial judge.  State
v. Beckham, 334 S.C. 302, 310, 513 S.E.2d 606, 610 (1999).  That decision
will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.  Id.

LAW/ANALYSIS

Morgan
argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial.  He contends
the solicitor’s intention to obey or disobey the court’s ruling is irrelevant. 
Instead, the prejudice to the defendant is the paramount consideration.  We
agree, but conclude that there was no prejudice to Morgan.

The motion in
limine pointed to several things the defense wanted to exclude from testimony. 
The trial court’s ruling restricted admission of the “circumstances”
surrounding Morgan’s second arrest, but approved testimony regarding the date
and location of his arrest.  Both the motion in limine and the trial court’s
ruling are somewhat ambiguous and subject to misinterpretation.  The trial
court recognized as much in acknowledging that Officer Purdy’s testimony was
technically proper because it was limited to the location.  Notably, Officer
Purdy did not testify regarding any statements made by Morgan upon his
apprehension.

After
denying Morgan’s motion for mistrial, the court offered a curative instruction
telling the jury to “disregard any testimony that the defendant was found,
quote, hiding under the sink.  That issue is not relevant to any issue in this
case and I instruct you to disregard and dismiss that from your mind, as I am
striking that testimony from the testimony in this case.”  “Generally, a trial
judge’s curative instruction is deemed to cure any error.”  State v. Simmons,
352 S.C. 342, 354, 573 S.E.2d 856, 863 (Ct. App. 2002).  We see no special
circumstances in this case whereby the curative instruction was not effective
to remove any taint Officer Purdy’s testimony may have caused.

Based on
the foregoing, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in
denying Morgan’s motion for mistrial.  Therefore the ruling of the trial court
is

AFFIRMED.

STILWELL,
SHORT, and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.

[1]  We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.