Discount Auto Center v. Jonas

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD
NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED
BY RULE 239(D)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Discount Auto Center,       
Respondent,

v.

Nancy D. Jonas,       
Appellant

Appeal From Beaufort County

Curtis L. Coltrane, Special Circuit
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2005-UP-128

Submitted January 1, 2005 – Filed February
18, 2005

AFFIRMED

Nancy D. Jonas, of Beaufort, for Appellant.

James A. Grimsley, III and Ralph E. Tupper, both of Beaufort,
for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Nancy Jonas appeals
a circuit order denying her motion to dismiss.  We affirm.
[1]

FACTS

In January 2003, Jonas filed a motion
to dismiss in the Beaufort County Circuit Court, apparently with the intention
of having a judgment entered against her in 1996 dismissed.  A hearing on the
motion was scheduled for 10 a.m. on September 15, 2003.  Jonas was advised of
the date and time of the hearing, and informed the court that she was ready
to proceed.

The hearing was called at the scheduled
time, but Jonas was not present.  The court placed a call to her residence and,
after failing to reach her, left a message reminding her of the hearing.  As
of 10:30 a.m., Jonas had still not appeared.  The circuit court denied the motion
for lack of prosecution and ordered the “case ended.”

After contact from Jonas later that afternoon,
the circuit court allowed her to file a motion to reconsider the denial of her
motion.  Following reconsideration, the circuit court again denied Jonas’s motion
to dismiss.  This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

Jonas argues the trial court erred
in denying her motion due to, among other things, a vast conspiracy of corruption
and collusion involving this state’s circuit and appellate courts and Discount
Auto Center.  We disagree.

As Jonas’s present appeal and underlying
motion attempt to retry issues previously resolved and not properly before the
circuit court, we briefly re-cap this case’s procedural history.  In 1996, Discount
Auto Center obtained a judgment against Jonas in magistrate’s court for nonpayment
of a bill arising from work done to her vehicle.  In 1997, Jonas appealed the
judgment to the circuit court, which affirmed the magistrate’s decision.  She
then appealed the circuit court’s decision to this court.  Her appeal was dismissed
as untimely.  This court did, however, grant Jonas leave to petition the trial
court for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60, SCRCP.  Jonas filed this
motion in the magistrate’s court, but specifically requested in the petition
that the motion not be decided until future matters concerning her appeal were
resolved.  Following the resolution of various motions regarding her appeal
in this court (e.g. a petition to reinstate), a writ of certiorari was filed
with the state supreme court.  This petition was denied in September 1998. 
Following this court’s issuance of remittitur, Jonas filed a motion in the state
supreme court to recall the remittitur.  This motion was likewise denied.  She
then appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which finally dismissed her
case on December 3, 1999.

More than three years after the United
States Supreme Court dismissed her appeal, Jonas filed the present motion, styled
oddly as a “motion to dismiss.”  Nevertheless, a hearing was scheduled on the
matter.  Jonas was properly notified, but did not appear for the hearing.

A trial judge possesses the inherent power
to dismiss actions sua sponte for a party’s failure to prosecute
with due diligence.  Crestwood Golf Club, Inc. v. Potter, 328 S.C. 201,
211-212, 493 S.E.2d 826, 832 (1997); Small v. Mungo, 254 S.C. 438, 442-443,
175 S.E.2d 802, 803-804 (1970).  On appeal, Jonas raises several matters regarding
the substance of her long-resolved case, but only addresses her absence from
the hearing by vaguely referencing some alleged filings with our state’s supreme
court.  The only evidence in the record of any attempted availment of our supreme
court’s original jurisdiction is dated January 1999, more than three years prior
to the scheduled hearing.  As Jonas is challenging the trial court’s denial
of her motion, she bears the burden on appeal of producing a record sufficient
to illustrate the alleged error.  See McElveen v. McElveen, 332
S.C. 583, 601 n.4, 506 S.E.2d 1, 10 n.4 (Ct. App. 1998).  “This court will not
consider facts that do not appear in the transcript of record.”  Windham
v. Honeycutt, 290 S.C. 60, 64, 348 S.E.2d 185, 187 (Ct. App. 1986).  

Because we find no evidence supporting
Jonas’s claim that her absence from the hearing was justified, the circuit court’s
denial of her motion to dismiss is

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., GOOLSBY and WILLIAMS,
JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant
to Rule 215, SCACR.