Kaveh v. Parton Land & Timber

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD
NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS

PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED
BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

David Kaveh, Respondent,

v.

Parton Land & Timber Company, Inc., and Custom Grading & Construction,
Inc., d/b/a Carolina Earth Movers, Defendants,

of Whom Parton Land & Timber Company, Inc. is,
Appellant.

Appeal From York County

John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2005-UP-024

Submitted November 1, 2004 – Filed January
13, 2005

AFFIRMED

Douglas F. Gay, of Rock Hill, for Appellant. 

Lucy London McDow, of Rock Hill, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Parton Land & Timber Company, Inc. appeals the jury’s
award of punitive damages to David Kaveh on his claim for conversion of timber
arguing the court erred by denying its motions for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial absolute.  We affirm [1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR, and the following authorities:

As to the trial court’s denial of the motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict:  Rule 50(b), SCRCP (“A party who has moved for a directed verdict
may move to have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon set aside and
to have judgment entered in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict[.]”)
(emphasis added); Johnson v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 317 S.C. 415, 420,
453 S.E.2d 908, 911 (Ct. App. 1995) (“If a party fails to make a directed verdict
motion before the jury retires, the party cannot subsequently move for JNOV.”).

As to the trial court’s denial of the motion for new trial absolute: 
Vick v. South Carolina Dep’t of Transp., 347 S.C. 470, 481, 556 S.E.2d
693, 699 (Ct. App. 2001) (“The jury’s determination of damages is entitled to
substantial deference.”); Rush v. Blanchard, 310 S.C. 375, 379-80, 426
S.E.2d 802, 805 (1993) (“The trial court should grant a new trial based on the
excessiveness of the verdict only if the amount is not merely different from
that which he would have awarded, but is so grossly excessive so as to shock
the conscience of the court and clearly indicates that the figure reached was
the result of caprice, passion, prejudice, partiality, corruption or other improper
motives.”); Vinson v. Hartley, 324 S.C. 389, 404, 477 S.E.2d 715, 723
(Ct. App. 1996) (“The grant or denial of new trial motions rests within the
discretion of the trial judge and his decision will not be disturbed on appeal
unless his findings are wholly unsupported by the evidence or the conclusions
reached are controlled by error of law.”); McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Sys.,
321 S.C. 340, 346, 468 S.E.2d 633, 637 (1996) (holding an appellant’s allegations
of error by the trial court in reviewing an award of punitive damages pursuant
to Gamble v. Stevenson, 305 S.C. 104, 406 S.E.2d 350 (1991) are unpreserved
where the issue was not raised to the trial court). 

AFFIRMED.

ANDERSON, STILWELL, and SHORT, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule
215, SCACR.