SCDSS v. Hamlin

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT
BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE
239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina Department of Social Services,       
Respondent,

v.

Carlos L. Hamlin,       
Appellant.

Appeal From Colleton County

Robert S. Armstrong, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2004-UP-363

Submitted March 19, 2004 – Filed June
7, 2004

AFFIRMED

Carlos L. Hamlin, Pro Se, for Appellant.

Harry O. Shaw, III, of the South Carolina Department of Social
Services, Child Support Enforcement Division, Charleston, S.C., for Respondents.

PER CURIAM:  The family court ordered
$6,330 held by the Colleton County Sheriff’s Department as proceeds from the
collection of a civil judgment in favor of Carlos L. Hamlin to be applied to
Hamlin’s four overdue child support obligations, three of which had been reduced
to child support judgments.  Hamlin appeals.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Hamlin fathered five children raised in four separate
custodial families. Each time, the custodial parent received assistance from
SCDSS and assigned child support rights to SCDSS.  SCDSS brought actions for
support and Hamlin was ordered to pay support for each child by the family court.

Subsequently, one custodial parent terminated subsistence
through SCDSS, and an order was entered by the family court on February 9, 1999,
determining the amount still owed in support for that child up to that time.
Thereafter, Hamlin began receiving Supplemental Social Security, and Hamlin
and SCDSS entered into a consent order on August 8, 2001, terminating the support
obligations as to the remaining custodial households.  In this consent order,
the court determined the amount of unpaid support for each case due and owing
by Hamlin, reducing those amounts to judgments. No appeal was taken from either
order.

On October 7, 2002, SCDSS learned from the sheriff’s
department that Hamlin would be receiving $6,330 in payment of a civil judgment
on October 10, 2002. SCDSS applied to the family court and obtained an order
requiring the funds to be paid to the clerk of the family court pending any
objection by Hamlin. The order recited the amount of each unpaid child support
obligation, and gave Hamlin ten days in which to file any objection he had to
applying the funds to those overdue obligations.

Hamlin received a copy of the order from the Sheriff’s Office
and thereafter objected. A hearing was held before Judge Armstrong pursuant
to notice. At the hearing, Hamlin appeared and argued he had not received notice
prior to the issuance of the initial order. He further argued one of the overdue
obligations had not been reduced to a judgment.

Concluding Hamlin failed to give any reasons why the funds
should not be paid to the custodial families in partial satisfaction of the
debts, the court ordered payment to the custodial families on a pro-rata basis.

DISCUSSION

I.      Notice

Hamlin first argues he did not receive notice as required
under S.C. Code Ann. section 20-7-1295 (2003).  We disagree. 

The initial notice requirements of section 20-7-1295
deal with notice to the child support obligor of past due child support. See
S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-1295 (B) (“When the division determines that child support
is unpaid in an amount equal to or greater than one thousand dollars, it shall
send written notice to the obligor by first-class mail to the obligor's last
known address, as filed with the tribunal pursuant to Section 20-7-854.”). 
However, this notice is not necessary here because the child support as to three
of the obligations was already reduced to a judgment by consent order on August
8, 2001.  As to the fourth obligation, it was reduced to a sum certain
by previous final order. Therefore, Hamlin had actual notice of the amounts
equal to or exceeding one thousand dollars claimed in unpaid child support.

Hamlin also argues notice was required in accordance
with section 20-7-1295 (C).   He specifically argues this was necessary to perfect
a lien against real property.  However, there is nothing in the record to suggest
a lien was obtained against real property owned by Hamlin.  Furthermore, this
issue was not raised to or ruled on by the family court. Bakala v. Bakala,
352 S.C. 612, 576 S.E.2d 156 (2003)(ruling an issue not raised and ruled upon
by the family court will not be addressed on appeal).       

In any event, subsection (C) deals with the manner
of perfecting liens by filing the requisite notice in the correct office responsible
for recording and maintaining liens in respect to the type of property involved. 
It does not add a notice requirement to the obligor.

The other pertinent notice provision in § 20-7-1295
states:         

(H) The division shall send timely written notice
to the obligor by first-class mail of any action taken to perfect a lien, execute
a levy, or seize any property.  The notice shall specify the amount due, the
steps to be followed to release the property so placed under lien, levied, or
seized, and the time period within which to respond to the notice and shall
include the name of the court or administrative agency of competent jurisdiction
which entered the child support order.

Clearly this provision is designed to
give the obligor notice of “any action taken” to perfect a lien or execute a
levy, and to provide an opportunity to be heard.  Here, the court provided that
notice and Hamlin was afforded an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, this argument
is without merit.

Finally, Hamlin argues the lack of proper notice
constituted a Due Process violation.  However, Hamlin provided no analysis or
authority for this argument.  Issues are deemed abandoned and thus not presented
for appellate review where they are argued using only short, conclusory statements,
without supporting authority.  Glasscock, Inc. v. United States Fid. &
Guar. Co., 348 S.C. 76, 81, 557 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Ct. App. 2001); see
also First Sav. Bank v. McLean, 314 S.C. 361, 363, 444 S.E.2d 513,
514 (1994) (holding appellant was deemed to have abandoned issues on appeal,
where he failed to provide any argument or supporting authority); R &
G Constr., Inc. v. Lowcountry Reg’l Transp. Auth., 343 S.C. 424, 437, 540
S.E.2d 113, 120 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding where no authority is cited and argument
is brief and conclusory, issue is deemed abandoned).  Therefore, we deem this
issued abandoned.

II.     Notice Under Family Court Rule 17(a)

Hamlin next argues SCDSS failed to comply with Rule 17, SCRFC. 
However, this rule is clearly inapplicable, as it deals with notice to a non-answering
defendant of the time and date of the hearing on the merits.  In any event,
as stated previously, Hamlin received notice and attended the hearing.  Therefore,
this issue is manifestly without merit.

III.     Jurisdiction

Hamlin couches his last argument
as jurisdictional, claiming the family court did not have jurisdiction to “supercede”
a prior court order directing a judgment “without due process.”  However, his
argument does not pertain to the stated exception.  Instead, Hamlin alludes
to the fact that the applicant was SCDSS as opposed to the individual obliges. 
He then repeats his assertion that no timely notices were afforded him, thereby
violating Due Process.  Lastly, he argues the initial order seizing the funds
“got the cart before the horse” because no determination had been made that
he was the obligor and that the money seized was his.

We conclude Hamlin presents no discernable argument
and no authority for his position.  Issues are deemed abandoned and thus not
presented for appellate review where they are argued using only short, conclusory
statements, without supporting authority.  Glasscock, Inc. v. United States
Fid. & Guar. Co., 348 S.C. 76, 81, 557 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Ct. App. 2001);
see also First Sav. Bank v. McLean, 314 S.C. 361, 363, 444 S.E.2d
513, 514 (1994) (holding appellant was deemed to have abandoned issues on appeal,
where he failed to provide any argument or supporting authority); R &
G Constr., Inc. v. Lowcountry Reg’l Transp. Auth., 343 S.C. 424, 437, 540
S.E.2d 113, 120 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding where no authority is cited and argument
is brief and conclusory, issue is deemed abandoned).  Therefore, these issues
are deemed abandoned on appeal. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the order
of the family court is

AFFIRMED. [1]

GOOLSBY, HOWARD, and BEATTY, JJ., concurring.

[1] Because oral argument would not aid the Court in resolving any issue
on appeal, we decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215
and 220(b)(2), SCACR.