McDaniel v. SC Department of Motor Vehicles

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE
239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

William Robert McDaniel,       
Respondent,

v.

South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles,       
Appellant.

Appeal From Charleston County

Thomas L. Hughston, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2004-UP-391

Submitted April 21, 2004 – Filed June
21, 2004

REVERSED

Senior Assistant General Counsel Patrick M. Teague, General
Counsel Frank L. Valenta; South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Timothy Clay Kulp, of North Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  We reverse the trial court’s ruling
reversing the administrative decision and ordering the South Carolina Department
of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to restore McDaniel’s driver’s license.

FACTS

William McDaniel was arrested for driving under the influence of
alcohol.  After he was arrested, McDaniel was transported to the police station
where he was offered a DataMaster breath test. McDaniel refused to submit to
the breath test. As a result of refusing to take the breath test, McDaniel’s
driver’s license was suspended for a period of 90 days pursuant to S.C. Code
Ann. § 56-5-2950.

McDaniel requested an administrative
hearing through the DMV. After hearing the matter, the hearing officer sustained
the action taken by the DMV. McDaniel appealed the administrative decision to
the circuit court, which reversed the administrative hearing officer’s decision
finding that evidence presented at the hearing did not establish that McDaniel
was advised in writing of his rights enumerated in section 56-5-2950. The DMV
appeals the circuit court’s ruling.

ISSUE

Did the trial court err by substituting its judgment for
that of the administrative agency on a question of fact when substantial evidence
existed to support the administrative decision?

STANDARD OF
REVIEW

The findings of an administrative agency are presumed
correct and will be set aside only if unsupported by substantial evidence. Kearse
v. State Health & Human Servs. Fin. Comm'n, 318 S.C. 198, 199, 456 S.E.2d
892, 893 (1995).  Substantial evidence is defined as “such evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc.,
276 S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 307 (1981).  A court may not substitute its
judgment for that of an agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions
of fact unless the agency's findings are clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative and substantial evidence on the whole record. Rodney v. Michelin
Tire Corp., 320 S.C. 515, 519, 466 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1996).

LAW/ANALYSIS

The DMV asserts the trial court exceeded its scope
of review when the trial court substituted its judgment regarding a question
of fact when there was substantial evidence in the record to support administrative
agency’s findings.  We agree. 

Section 56-5-2950(a)(1) sets forth the procedures regarding
implied consent to testing for drugs or alcohol.  The statute mandates, in pertinent
part, that:

No tests may be administered or samples obtained unless
the person has been informed in writing that:

…

1)    he does not have to take the test
or give the samples, but that his privilege to drive must be suspended or denied
for at least ninety days if he refuses to submit to the tests and that his refusal
may be used against him in court;

2)    his privilege to drive must be suspended
for at least thirty days if he takes the tests or gives the samples and has
an alcohol concentration of fifteen one-hundredths of one percent or more;

3)    he has the right to have a qualified
person of his own choosing conduct additional independent tests at his expense;

4)    he has the right to request an administrative
hearing within thirty days of the issuance of the notice of suspension; and

5)    if he does not request an administrative
hearing or if his suspension is upheld at the administrative hearing, he must
enroll in an Alcohol and Drug Safety Action Program.

S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2950(a) (Supp. 2003).

In reviewing Officer Usry’s testimony, we believe
there was substantial evidence to support the administrative officer’s ruling. 
Officer Usry testified that she read the Implied Consent Rights form to McDaniel
and issued a copy of the rights to McDaniel prior to attempting to administer
the DataMaster test. Accordingly, McDaniel was advised, in writing of his rights
as they are enumerated in section 56-5-2950.  It is not required that the administrative
officer enumerate that each portion of the statute has been satisfied, only
that substantial evidence exist to support his decision.  Therefore, the trial
court erred in reversing the administrative officer’s decision.

CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, the decision of the circuit
court is

REVERSED.

GOOLSBY, BEATTY, and KITTREDGE, JJ., concur.