State v. Durant

12449

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE
239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State,       
Respondent,

v.

Celeste Durant,       
Appellant.

Appeal From Horry County

Paula H. Thomas, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2004-UP-422

Submitted June 8, 2004 – Filed June
30, 2004

AFFIRMED

Assistant Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek, of S.C. Office
of Appellate Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry D. McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Charles H. Richardson
and Assistant Attorney General W. Rutledge Martin, all of Columbia; and Solicitor
John Gregory Hembree, of Conway, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  In April 2001, the Horry County
grand jury indicted Celeste Durant and Chad Smith for homicide by child abuse
and aiding and abetting homicide by child abuse in the death of Durant’s twenty-month-old
daughter.  Following a jury trial, both Durant and Smith were convicted and
sentenced to twenty years on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. 
In this appeal, Durant argues the trial court erred in (1) failing to direct
a verdict for her on both charges based on the insufficiency of evidence and
(2) by refusing to dismiss the charges against her based on the State’s loss
of certain evidence and the State’s refusal to stipulate as to the loss of the
evidence.  We affirm [1] pursuant
to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR and the following authorities:  Issue 1:  State
v. Lindsey, 355 S.C. 15, 20, 583 S.E.2d 740, 742 (2003) (“On an appeal from
the trial court’s denial of a motion for a directed verdict, the appellate court
may only reverse the trial court if there is no evidence to support the trial
court’s ruling.”); State v. Kelsey, 331 S.C. 50, 62, 502 S.E.2d 63, 69
(1998) (“In reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict, the evidence
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the State, and if there is any
direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending
to prove the guilt of the accused, an appellate court must find that the case
was properly submitted to the jury.”); State v. Smith, Op. No. 3804 (S.C.
Ct. App. filed June 1, 2004) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 23 at 36) (holding in the
co-defendant’s case, given the evidence submitted by the State (1) on the severity
and number of injuries to the victim; (2) that both Smith and Durant were the
only two people with the child during the timeframe that she sustained her devastating
injuries; (3) that her impairment should have been obvious to these two adults;
and (4) that there was a possible cover-up, there was substantial circumstantial
evidence on both charges such that the case was properly submitted to the jury);
Issue 2:  State v. Cheeseboro, 346 S.C. 526, 538-39, 552 S.E.2d 300,
307 (2001) (“The State does not have an absolute duty to preserve potentially
useful evidence that might exonerate a defendant.  To establish a due process
violation, a defendant must demonstrate (1) that the State destroyed the evidence
in bad faith, or (2) that the evidence possessed an exculpatory value apparent
before the evidence was destroyed and the defendant cannot obtain other evidence
of comparable value by other means.”).

AFFIRMED.

ANDERSON, HUFF, and KITTREDGE, JJ., concur.

[1] We
decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.