Van Epps v. Stewart

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD
NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED
BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Susan F. Van Epps,       
Appellant/Respondent,

v.

Leslie D. Stewart,       
Respondent/Appellant.

Appeal From Darlington County

Roger E. Henderson, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2004-UP-170

Submitted February 9, 2004 – Filed March
16, 2004

AFFIRMED

H. Fred Kuhn, Jr., of Beaufort, for Appellant-Respondent.

Cheryl Turner Hopkins, of Florence, for Respondent-Appellant.

PER CURIAM:  Leslie D. Stewart and Susan
F. Van Epps cross appeal the family court’s order granting Van Epps a temporary
reduction in child support payments, awarding Stewart partial attorney’s fees,
and declining to sanction Van Epps for contempt.  We affirm [1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR, and the following authorities: 
As to all issues:  Allen v. Allen, 347 S.C. 177, 181-182, 554
S.E.2d 421, 423 (Ct. App. 2001) (“In appeals from the family court, the appellate
court has authority to find the facts in accordance with its own view of the
preponderance of the evidence.  However, this broad scope of review does not
require us to disregard the findings of the family court.  Neither are we required
to ignore the fact that the trial judge, who saw and heard the witnesses, was
in a better position to evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight
to their testimony.”  (internal citations omitted)). 

As to Van Epps’ Issue: Calvert v. Calvert,
287 S.C. 130, 336 S.E.2d 884 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding a substantial or material
change of circumstances must occur to warrant a modification of child support.);
Miller v. Miller, 299 S.C. 307, 384 S.E.2d 715, 717 (1989) (holding a
reduction in child support cannot be based on a decrease in the noncustodial
parent’s income absent a strong showing by the latter that he or she can no
longer make the support payments required by the earlier order); Engle v.
Engle, 343 S.C. 444, 449, 539 S.E.2d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2000) (“Where a
parent voluntarily lessens his or her earning capacity, this Court will closely
scrutinize the facts to determine the parent’s earning potential, rather than
the parent’s actual income.”).

As to Stewart’s Issue I:  Smith v. Smith,
308 S.C. 492, 495, 419 S.E.2d 232, 234-235 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that an
award of attorney’s fees is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion); Glasscock v. Glasscock,
304 S.C. 158, 161, 403 S.E.2d 313, 315 (1991) (holding the trial court must
consider six factors in determining the amount of an award of attorney’s fees: 
“(1) the nature, extent, and difficulty of the case; (2) the time necessarily
devoted to the case; (3) professional standing of counsel; (4) contingency of
compensation; (5) beneficial results obtained; [and] (6) customary legal fees
for similar services.”).

As to Stewart’s Issue II:  Am. Fed. Bank
v. Kateman, 335 S.C. 273, 277, 516 S.E.2d 1, 2 (Ct. App. 1999) (“Contempt
results from the willful disobedience of a court order.”); Jackson v. Jackson,
241 S.C. 1, 126 S.E.2d 855 (1962) (holding a determination of contempt should
be imposed sparingly and within the sound discretion of the trial judge); Taylor
v. Taylor, 294 S.C. 296, 299, 363 S.E.2d 909, 911 (Ct. App. 1987) (“The
determination of contempt is within the discretion of the trial judge and will
not be disturbed in the absence of plain abuse of that discretion [and] [a]lthough
a family court is empowered to find and punish for contempt, there is no requirement
that sanctions be imposed upon such a finding.”). 

AFFIRMED.

HUFF and STILWELL, JJ., and CURETON, A.J., concur.

[1]        We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule
215, SCACR.