St Helena Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Heirs of Major

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

St. Helena Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses,       
Appellant,

v.

The Heirs at Law and the Distributees of Joe Major, a/k/a Joe Major,
Sr., Louise Major, and the Following Individuals or Entities Believed
to be Living or in Existence:  Joe Major, Jr. a/k/a Joe Major, II, James
L. Daise, Elizabeth Anderson, Ruth D. Terry, Mamie Washington, Margaret
P. Fraser, James C. Sang, Ibis, Inc., Joy Logan, Beaufort County Treasurer,
John Doe and Mary Roe,        Respondents.

Appeal From Beaufort County

Thomas Kemmerlin, Master in Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2004-UP-013

Submitted November 19, 2003 – Filed
January 15, 2003

AFFIRMED

Gary Lewis, of Beaufort, for Appellant.

No Appearance by Respondents. 

PER CURIAM:  St. Helena’s Congregation of Jehovah’s
Witnesses appeals the order of the master in equity refusing to quiet title
to certain property in the City of Beaufort.  We affirm. [1]

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

St. Helena’s brought an action to quiet title and
confirm boundaries to two separate, adjoining lots in the City of Beaufort. 
All named defendants were served, failed to answer, and were held in default.
 The circuit court referred the matter to the master in equity with finality. 
During the hearing, the master noted the complaint mentioned two lots but only
described one and permitted counsel to amend as to every person served under
the order of publication to conform to proper notice requirements. 

Shortly into the hearing, the master suggested
the case was proven and that he was inclined to sign a final decree in St. Helena’s
favor.  Counsel for St. Helena’s relied on these favorable comments and informed
both St. Helena’s and a prospective purchaser of the lots that the case had
been proven and the matter would be concluded shortly.  The purchaser, in reliance
on counsel’s assurances, proceeded to tear down a house located on one of the
lots.  Unfortunately, the master later realized he could not quiet title in
favor of St. Helena’s based upon the evidence before him and issued an order
denying the request to quiet title. 

Prior to drafting the order, the master telephoned
counsel for St. Helena’s, giving him the choice of an adverse ruling or accepting
a voluntary dismissal.  Counsel responded by letter reminding the master of
his remarks at trial and of the parties’ reliance on counsel’s relay of those
remarks.  Counsel also insisted the master’s concerns about whether the property
consisted of two lots rather than one and whether the tax deed was accurate
were resolved in post-trial discussions among counsel, the master, and a title
abstractor.  

Upon receipt of the order, counsel wrote to the
master, claiming a factual inaccuracy in the order in the identification of
a predecessor in title, and urging reconsideration.  The master returned the
letter requesting counsel make a formal motion for reconsideration.  A motion
for reconsideration was made and promptly denied.

LAW/ANALYSIS

St. Helena’s argues the master erred by issuing
a written order inconsistent with his remarks at the reference hearing and by
refusing to reopen the case “to allow Plaintiff to convince him that he should
not have changed his mind.”  We disagree.

St. Helena’s acknowledges in its brief that the
master was entitled to change his mind, merely claiming such a reversal is uncommon. 
Uncommon or not, “[n]o order is final until it is written and entered.”  First
Union Nat’l Bank v. Hitman, Inc., 306 S.C. 327, 329, 411 S.E.2d 681, 682
(Ct. App. 1991) (citing Rule 58(a), SCRCP).  “Until written and entered, the
trial judge retains discretion to change his mind and amend his oral ruling
accordingly.”  Ford v. State Ethics Comm’n, 344 S.C. 642, 646, 545 S.E.2d
821, 823 (2001); Case v. Case, 243 S.C. 447, 451, 134 S.E.2d 394, 396
(1964) (holding even if the trial judge made an oral ruling in favor of one
party, “such pronouncement is not a final ruling on the merits nor is it binding
on the parties until it has been reduced to writing, signed by the judge, and
delivered for recordation”); First Union Nat’l Bank, 306 S.C. at 329,
411 S.E.2d at 682. 

A trial judge’s decision not to reopen a case for
additional testimony is a matter within his sound discretion, and the decision
will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.  Wright v.
Strickland, 306 S.C. 187, 410 S.E.2d 596, 597 (Ct. App. 1991).  We find
no abuse of discretion under the circumstances.  St. Helena’s made no proffer
of testimony or documents it sought to present.  As the master indicated, there
is nothing in the transcript indicating St. Helena’s had further evidence it
would have offered but for the master’s remarks.  St. Helena’s argues a new
hearing would permit the introduction of another deed into evidence that would
clarify the description of the property in question.  The master addressed this
deed in his original order and determined it would only further confuse the
issues.  Thus, St. Helena’s made no showing that additional documents would
make a difference in the outcome of the case. 

St. Helena’s argues the master erred on the merits
when he denied its claim to quiet title and confirm boundaries for two lots. 
We disagree. 

Since this action was heard by a master in equity
who entered final judgment, we must review the entire record and make our own
findings of fact in accordance with our view of the preponderance of the evidence. 
Townes Associates, Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 221 S.E.2d
773 (1976).  However, this broad scope of review does not require us to disregard
the findings of the master, who saw and heard the evidence and was in a better
position to evaluate its credibility.  Tiger, Inc. v. Fisher Agro, Inc.,
301 S.C. 229, 391 S.E.2d 538 (1989). 

St. Helena’s argues a deed it informally presented
to the master subsequent to trial reveals St. Helena’s predecessors in title
held two lots despite the fact that the complaint references a deed showing
the conveyance of only one lot.  St. Helena’s also attempts to advance new arguments
supporting the validity of a tax sale in opposition to the master’s finding
that the tax deed revealed the transfer of substantially less than two lots. 
Again, St. Helena’s urges that but for the master’s favorable comments at the
trial, it would have entered supporting documentation into evidence and advanced
these arguments at the hearing. 

We agree with the master’s ruling that St. Helena’s
relied upon a deed referenced in its complaint which clearly conveyed only one
lot to a predecessor in its chain of title.  Moreover, the single lot was later
held as tenants in common due to a death.  A tax deed indicates that one of
the tenant’s shares became subject to a tax levy, was sold, and later passed
by quitclaim deed to St. Helena’s.  Thus, St. Helena’s held, at most, a one-half
undivided interest with the other tenant or his heirs.  Nothing else appearing
in the record, we cannot say the master erred in determining he could not quiet
title in favor of St. Helena’s for two lots.  We also agree that the production
of a deed subsequent to trial describing a transfer of two adjacent lots within
St. Helena’s chain of title is insufficient to overcome the problems created
by the deed referenced in the original complaint.  The new deed does not expand
the original grant of one lot nor does it sweep in the one-half share not transferred
by the tax deed. 

Finally, St. Helena’s requests that the master’s
order be vacated because of purported bias against counsel.  In response to
counsel’s request, which occurred almost a year after the master issued his
final order in this case, he recused himself from all of counsel’s cases.  Counsel
claims the master admitted to bias against him by agreeing to his request; however,
the master merely did as he was asked, in a routine order and without acrimony. 
There is simply nothing in the record to indicate the master was in violation
of any canon of judicial conduct and should have recused himself.  His later
recusal was purely voluntary.  See Canon 3(E)(1)(a) of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, Rule 501, SCACR (requiring a judge to recuse himself when “he has a
personal bias or prejudice concerning a party. . . .”).  We accordingly find
any claim of bias in this case frivolous.

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, STILWELL, and BEATTY, JJ., concur.

[1]        We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule
215, SCACR.