In the Matter of the Care ant Treatment of Bennington

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of James Bennington,

Appeal From Lexington County

Alison Renee Lee, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-725

Submitted October 15, 2003 – Filed December
16, 2003

AFFIRMED

Jonathan R. Hendrix, of Lexington, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Deputy Attorney General Treva Ashworth, Assistant
Attorney General Deborah R. J. Shupe, and Assistant Attorney General R. Westmoreland
Clarkson, all of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  James Bennington appeals the circuit
court’s denial of his request for two separate annual review hearings on his
status as a sexually violent predator.  We affirm. [1]

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1989, Bennington pled guilty to three counts of
contributing to the delinquency of a minor.  In 1992, he pled guilty to one
count of criminal sexual conduct with a minor, second degree, and one count
of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.  At the conclusion of his sentence,
Bennington was committed to the Department of Mental Health as a sexually violent
predator pursuant to a petition by the State.

Approximately a year later, Bennington’s mental status
was reviewed as required by South Carolina’s Sexually Violent Predator Act. 
At that time, he was determined to still be a very high risk for re-offending. 
Nevertheless, Bennington exercised his right to petition for release against
the recommendation of his treatment providers.  His petition and the annual
review report were forwarded to the circuit court.  A hearing was not scheduled
until after a second annual review report was prepared.   Bennington, once again
against the recommendation that he remain confined despite his progress, filed
a second petition to be released. 

Bennington moved to have separate hearings on his
two annual review reports.  In the interest of judicial economy, the court denied
the request for separate hearings but determined separate rulings would be made
for each report.  In its ruling, the court noted there was no indication Bennington
would suffer prejudice because only one hearing was held.  In its order, the
court found no probable cause to believe based on the 2001 report that Bennington’s
mental abnormality had so changed that he is safe to be released.  Thus the
court concluded there was no basis for a trial on the issue.  The court reached
the same finding and conclusion regarding the 2002 report.

LAW/ANALYSIS

The Sexually Violent Predator Act requires an annual
examination of the mental condition of each person committed pursuant to the
act.  S.C. Code Ann. § 44-48-110 (2002).  The annual report must be provided
to the court that committed the person, which must then hold an annual hearing
to review the person’s status.  Id.  Bennington argues the trial court
erred in failing to hold two separate hearings on his 2001 and 2002 annual reviews. 
We find no error. 

Bennington does not challenge the court’s failure
to hold a hearing in 2001 on his 2001 annual review, contending only that he
was entitled to two separate hearings.  Although the court held one hearing,
it considered each annual review and Bennington’s status for that year separately. 
We cannot determine how Bennington would have benefited from receiving two separate
hearings after his 2002 annual review report was already completed.  Because
he has not argued he suffered any prejudice by the court’s refusal to hold separate
hearings, a reversal of the court’s decision to hold one hearing is not warranted. 
McKissick v. J.F. Cleckley & Co., 325 S.C. 327, 350, 479 S.E.2d 67,
78 (Ct. App. 1996) (noting that an appellant must show both error and prejudice
for reversal).  Therefore, the order on appeal is

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, STILWELL, and BEATTY, JJ., concur.

[1]        We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule
215, SCACR.