Green v. Frigidaire

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Dorothy Green, Employee,       
Respondent,

v.

Frigidaire Home Products/American Yard Products,
Employer and Frigidaire Home Products, Carrier,       
Defendants,

Of whom, Frigidaire Home Products is the,       
Appellant.

Appeal From Richland County

J. Ernest Kinard, Jr., Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-521

Heard June 11, 2003 – Filed September
2, 2003

AFFIRMED

E. Ros Huff, Jr., of Columbia, for Appellant.

Stacey Tarte Meyer, of Columbia and Stephen B. Samuels, of
Lexington, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Dorothy Green filed this Workers’
Compensation claim, alleging she injured her knee when she fell while working
at Frigidaire Home Products (“Frigidaire”) in 1996.  Frigidaire denied the claim
and asserted it was not filed within two years of the accident as required by
South Carolina Code Annotated section 42-15-40 (Supp. 2002).  The commissioner
found she timely filed the claim, concluding she did not discover her compensable
injury until 1999.  The Appellate Panel of the Workers’ Compensation Commission
(“the Full Commission”) affirmed the decision of the commissioner and adopted
the commissioner’s order.  The circuit court affirmed the decision, finding
the claim was not barred by the statute of limitations.  We affirm.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 13, 1996, Green injured her right knee
while working at Frigidaire.  The following day, Green saw her family physician,
and he diagnosed her as having a contusion to the knee. 

When Green returned to work, Frigidaire
referred her to James Brunson, the plant’s physician.  On February 20, 1996,
Brunson diagnosed her as having a contusion to the knee. 

On March 19, 1996, after Green’s pain continued,
Brunson referred Green to Orangeburg Orthopedic & Sports Medicine Clinic
(“ORS”) for examination. 

On March 22, 1996, Green saw Bernard Kirol,
a physician at ORS.  Kirol diagnosed her with patellofemoral syndrome, a condition
he told her would completely resolve with a few weeks of restricted activity. 
Additionally, he referred Green for physical therapy for her knee.  Green attended
one session of therapy and was subsequently discharged due to non-attendance. 

Green testified after she finished her physical
therapy, her knee “[felt] pretty good.”  Additionally, she testified over the
next several months she had pain in her knee, reported the pain to her direct
supervisor, Shirley Gilford, and received “pills” from the on-site nurse.  Furthermore,
she testified she returned to her family physician approximately six times between
the end of 1998 and the beginning of 1999 for “shots” both in her hip and her
knee. 

On February 4, 1999, Green saw Kevin Nahigian,
an orthopedic surgeon.  He diagnosed her with “Right knee pain and probable
lateral meniscal tear vs lateral synovial plica.”  Following surgery, on March
3, 1999, Nahigian confirmed the diagnosis as a complex tear of the lateral meniscus,
as well as degenerative arthrosis in the knee. 

On July 2, 1999, Green filed a Form 50, request
for hearing, seeking a determination of compensability, payment of medical treatment,
and payment of temporary total disability.  In response, Frigidaire filed a
Form 51, asserting a general denial of the claim and asserting section 42-15-40
barred the claim. 

The commissioner ruled Green timely filed the claim
because Green did not discover she had a compensable injury until February 29,
1999, when Nahigian gave her the correct diagnosis.  Furthermore, he awarded
her temporary total compensation from February 19, 1999, through December 23,
1999; compensation for permanent partial loss of the use of her right leg; and
payment of all causally-related-medical treatment, including any future knee
replacement.  The Full Commission affirmed the commissioner’s decision and summarily
adopted his order.  The circuit court affirmed the decision of the Full Commission,
finding Green timely brought the claim pursuant to Mauldin v. Dyna-Color/Jack
Rabbit, 308 S.C. 18, 416 S.E.2d 639 (1992).  Frigidaire appeals.

LAW/ANALYSIS

I.          Jurisdiction of the Full Commission

As a threshold matter, Frigidaire argues the circuit
court erred in affirming the decision of the Full Commission because the Full
Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim.  Frigidaire
supports its jurisdictional argument on its contention Green failed to file
her claim within the applicable statute of limitations. 

Frigidaire’s argument is without merit, as failure
to file a claim within the applicable statute of limitations is not a jurisdictional
defect.  McLendon v. South Carolina Dep’t. of Highways and Pub. Transp.,
313 S.C. 525, 525-26, 443 S.E.2d 539, 540 (1994).  Furthermore, the Full Commission
had subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.

“Subject matter jurisdiction is ‘the power to hear
and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question
belong.’”  Dove v. Gold Kist, Inc., 314 S.C. 235, 237-38, 442 S.E.2d
598, 600 (1994) (quoting Bank of Babylon v. Quirk, 472 A.2d 21, 22 (Conn.
1984)).  “In South Carolina, ‘[a]ll questions arising under’ the South Carolina
Workers’ Compensation Act . . . shall be determined by the Commission.”  Labouseur
v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 298 S.C. 213, 215, 379 S.E.2d 291, 292 (Ct.
App. 1989) (quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 42-3-180 (1976)).  An injury is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Full Commission if it arises by accident out
of and in the course of employment.  Sabb v. South Carolina State Univ.,
350 S.C. 416, 422, 567 S.E.2d 231, 234 (2002).

 The record indicates Green sustained an accidental
injury to her right knee while employed by Frigidaire.  The injury occurred
during working hours, on Frigidaire’s property, and in the course of Green’s
work for Frigidaire. [1]   Thus, reviewing the uncontested
facts in the record, we conclude the Full Commission had subject matter jurisdiction
over Green’s claim for the injury to her right knee. [2]  

II.          Factual Findings

Frigidaire argues the circuit court erred by ruling
sufficient evidence exists within the record to support the Full Commission’s
finding Green did not discover her injury until February 29, 1999. We disagree.

Section 42-15-40 (Supp. 2002) provides
in pertinent part, “The right to compensation . . . is barred unless a claim
is filed with the [Worker’s Compensation] [C]ommission within two years after
an accident . . . .”  The statute of limitations on a worker’s compensation
claim does not begin to run until the claimant either knew or should have known
of a compensable injury.   Mauldin, 308 S.C. at 22, 416 S.E.2d at 641. 
Whether a claimant knew or should have known a cause of action existed is a
question for the factfinder.  Johnston v. Bowen, 313 S.C. 61, 64, 437
S.E.2d 45, 47 (1993).

“In workers’ compensation cases, the Full Commission is the
ultimate fact finder.”  Shealy v. Aiken County, 341 S.C. 448, 455, 535
S.E.2d 438, 442 (2000).  The appellate court can reverse or modify the Full
Commission’s decision only if the decision is affected by an error of law or
is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
on the whole record.  S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2002).  “Substantial
evidence is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor evidence viewed from one side,
but such evidence, when the whole record is considered, as would allow reasonable
minds to reach the conclusion the Full Commission reached.”  Shealy,
341 S.C. at 455, 535 S.E.2d at 442.

“The statute of limitations applicable
to workers’ compensation claims, like the Workers’ Compensation Act as a whole,
should be given liberal construction, and any reasonable doubts should be resolved
in favor of coverage.”  Rogers v. Spartanburg Reg’l Med. Ctr., 328 S.C.
415, 418, 491 S.E.2d 708, 710 (Ct. App.1997).  

Green was initially diagnosed with a contusion
to the knee.  Subsequently, Brunson saw her and diagnosed her with a contusion
to the knee.  Eventually, he referred her to an orthopedic physician, Kirol. 
Kirol diagnosed her as having patellofemoral syndrome, a condition he told her
would resolve itself within a few weeks. 

Green testified that after she saw Kirol,
her knee “[felt] pretty good.”  Over the course of the next several months,
Green explained she continued having pain in her knee and would inform her supervisor. 
Her supervisor would send Green to the nurse, who would “give . . . [her] some
pills.”  Eventually, when Green’s knee “swell[ed] up so big,” she saw Nahigian. 
He diagnosed her as having “a complex tear of the lateral meniscus as well as
significant degenerative arthrosis in the knee.”

The facts in this case are substantially
similar to the facts in Mauldin.  In Mauldin, the claimant injured
her knee in an accident at work.  Id. at 20, 416 S.E.2d at 640.  An emergency
room physician initially misdiagnosed her as having a medial collateral sprain. 
Id. Subsequently, the claimant continued having knee problems.  Her physician
told her it was arthritis and kept her employer informed of the condition. 
Two years later, an orthopedic surgeon diagnosed her with a torn medial meniscus. 
Id.

On appeal, the supreme court held the claimant
timely filed her claim because evidence existed within the record to support
a finding the claimant was unaware she had a compensable injury until she was
correctly diagnosed.  Similarly, sufficient evidence exists within the record
to support the Full Commission’s finding Green had no reason to believe her
claim existed until Nahigian diagnosed her in February of 1999.

Initially, the pain in Green’s knee subsided, as
Kirol told her it would.  Subsequently, the pain returned.  However, Green kept
her supervisor aware of the problem and visited both Frigidaire’s on-site nurse
and her family physician.  The record does not reflect either of these physicians
believed Kirol’s diagnosis to be incorrect.  Rather, it was not until Green
saw Nahigian, in February of 1999, that a physician informed her the original
diagnosis was incorrect.

Viewing the evidence within the record in light
of our standard of review and Mauldin, sufficient evidence exists to
support the Full Commission’s finding the statute of limitations did not begin
to run until Green was correctly diagnosed on February 29, 1999.  Because Green
did not discover her injury until February 29, 1999, when she filed her Form
50 on July 2, 1999, it was timely.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the order of the
circuit court, affirming the decision of the Full Commission, is

AFFIRMED.

HOWARD and BEATTY, JJ., and JEFFERSON, Acting Judge,
concur.

[1] Although evidence exists within the record indicating Green subsequently
fell in Food Lion, injuring her back and left knee, evidence does not exist
within the record indicating this accident either contributed to or exacerbated
the injury to her right knee.  

oMoreover,
the circuit court had appropriate appellate jurisdiction.  See S.C.
Code Ann. § 42-17-60 (Supp. 2002) (“[E]ither party . . . may appeal from the
decision of the commission to the court of common pleas . . . .”); Dove,
314 S.C. at 238, 442 S.E.2d at 600 (holding the statute grants the court of
common pleas throughout the state subject matter jurisdiction to hear appeals
from the Full Commission).