State v. Sumpter

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State,       
Respondent,

v.

Alvin William Sumpter,       
Appellant.

Appeal From Orangeburg County

James C. Williams, Jr., Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP- 545

Submitted July 15, 2003 – Filed September
25, 2003   

AFFIRMED

Senior Assistant Appellate Defender Wanda H. Haile, of Columbia, for Appellant

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster; Chief Deputy Attorney General John
W. McIntosh;  Assistant Deputy Attorney General Charles H. Richardson, of Columbia,
Walter M. Bailey, Jr., of Summerville, for Respondent(s).

PER CURIAM:  Alvin William Sumpter was indicted
for attempted armed robbery.  He was convicted and sentenced to twenty years
imprisonment. Sumpter appeals, arguing the trial judge erred in denying his
motion for a directed verdict where there was no evidence of intent to commit
attempted armed robbery.  We affirm.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Catherine E. Winningham worked for Home
Insurance Agency.  Her office was divided into two distinct offices:  one room
with a waist-high counter where she handled insurance matters and a separate
room where Western Union exchanges were handled.   At around 4:00 p.m. on the
afternoon of September 24, 2001, a tall black male and a short black male walked
into the insurance agency.  The tall male stood by the front door while the
short male approached the counter and asked Winningham for a quote on insurance.  
Winningham walked to her computer to get a quote, and she turned around to ask
the short male some information.  At that point, the short male jumped over
the counter and pointed a gun in Winningham’s face.  Winningham began to scream,
ignoring the short male’s orders to be quiet and get on the floor.  Her screams
alerted Mary Jane Goodine in the parking lot, and the two males fled the building
without taking anything.   Nearby police officers witnessed the two men running
from the office and a chase ensued.  Sumpter, who had a gun, and John Henry
Chancy were arrested a short time thereafter.   The next day, Winningham identified
Sumpter as the short male and Chancy as the tall male from a photo lineup.  

Winningham testified at trial that she
observed the short male wearing a blue shirt and dark jeans and the tall male
wearing jeans and a light gray sweatshirt.   Winningham testified that after
the short male jumped over the counter, she knew that the man did not want a
quote and she was going to be robbed.  She stated that cash was not kept in
the insurance office because there was a separate room where it was kept.  When
asked whether the gunman ever asked her for cash or her purse, Winningham stated:
“He couldn’t get me to stop screaming enough, I don’t think, to ask me anything.”  

Mary Jane Goodine testified that as
she was leaving the insurance agency, she passed the two males entering.  She
stated she was standing in the parking lot when she heard Winningham start to
scream.   Goodine screamed “robbery, robbery, robbery,” to get the attention
of the nearby police officer directing traffic before she approached the insurance
office.  The two men bumped into Goodine as they ran out of the insurance agency. 
Goodine described the two men to police as a short male wearing a blue jogging
jacket or shirt and a taller male wearing a dark gray sweatshirt.  In court,
Goodine identified Sumpter as the short male.    

After the presentation of the State’s case,
Sumpter moved for a directed verdict, arguing there was no evidence of intent
to commit a robbery because there was no request for money. The trial judge
denied the motion, finding there was substantial circumstantial evidence that
Sumpter’s intent was to commit a robbery.  Sumpter renewed his motion after
testifying and presenting the testimony of two alibi witnesses.   The trial
judge again denied the motion.   Sumpter was convicted of the charge and he
appeals.  

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in denying Sumpter’s
motion for a directed verdict on the charge of attempted armed robbery because
there was no proof of any attempt to take goods from the victim?

DISCUSSION

Sumpter argues the
trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for a directed verdict because
there was no evidence that the gunman intended to take money or goods or that
there was any money or goods to take in order to commit a robbery. 

On appeal from the denial of a directed
verdict, an appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the State.  State v. Lollis, 343 S.C. 580, 583, 541 S.E.2d 254, 256
(2001); State v. Burdette, 335 S.C. 34, 46, 515 S.E.2d 525, 531 (1999);
State v. Kelsey, 331 S.C. 50, 62, 502 S.E.2d 63, 69 (1998).  When ruling
on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence
of evidence, not its weight.  Burdette, 335 S.C. at 46, 515 S.E.2d at
531; State v. Wakefield, 323 S.C. 189, 196, 473 S.E.2d 831, 835 (Ct.
App. 1996).  “If there is any direct or any substantial circumstantial evidence
reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, an appellate court must
find the case was properly submitted to the jury.”  Lollis, 343 S.C.
at 584, 541 S.E.2d at 256.  Conversely, a trial court should grant a motion
for a directed verdict when the evidence merely raises a suspicion the accused
is guilty.  Id. 

“Robbery is defined as the felonious
or unlawful taking of money, goods or other personal property of any value from
the person of another or in his presence by violence or by putting such person
in fear.”  State v. Bland, 318 S.C. 315, 317, 457 S.E.2d 611, 612 (1995)
(citations omitted).  It is a felony to commit robbery while armed with a deadly
weapon.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-330(A) (2003).  Attempted armed robbery
is also a felony.  S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-330(B) (2003) (“A person who commits
attempted armed robbery while armed with a pistol . . . or other deadly weapon,
is guilty of a felony . . . .”).  Attempted armed robbery is defined as acts
towards the commission of a robbery with the intent to commit the robbery, but
the act falls short of actual completion.  See State v. Hiott,
276 S.C. 72, 80, 276 S.E.2d 163, 167 (1981).  The “act” towards the commission
of the robbery is to be liberally construed, and it is sufficient if the act
goes “far enough toward accomplishment of the crime to amount to the commencement
of its consummation.”  State v. Quick, 199 S.C. 256, 259, 19 S.E.2d 101,
102 (1942).

This Court has addressed acts sufficient
to constitute attempted armed robbery.  In State v. Nesbitt, 346 S.C.
226, 550 S.E.2d 864 (Ct. App. 2001), an armed and masked man approached the
front door of a convenience store, waiving a gun.  The gunman did not point
the gun at anyone, he did not enter the store, and he fled the scene within
seconds.  Nesbitt was charged and convicted of attempted armed robbery.  In
affirming the trial court’s denial of Nesbitt’s motion for a directed verdict,
we addressed the intent requirements of attempt crimes:

Attempt crimes are generally ones of specific intent such
that the act constituting the attempt must be done with the intent to commit
that particular crime.  State v. Sutton, 340 S.C. 393, 532 S.E.2d 283
(2000).  “In the context of an ‘attempt’ crime, specific intent means that the
defendant consciously intended the completion of acts comprising the choate
offense.  In other words, the completion of such acts is the defendant’s purpose.” 
Id. at 397, 532 S.E.2d at 285 (citing United States v. Calloway,
116 F.3d 1129 (6th Cir.1997)).  Additionally, the State must prove that the
defendant’s specific intent was accompanied by some overt act, beyond mere preparation,
in furtherance of the intent, and there must be an actual or present ability
to complete the crime.  State v. Evans, 216 S.C. 328, 57 S.E.2d 756 (1950); 
State v. Quick, 199 S.C. 256, 19 S.E.2d 101 (1942).  “The preparation
consists in devising or arranging the means or measures necessary for the commission
of the crime; the attempt or overt act is the direct movement toward the commission,
after the preparations are made.”  Quick, 199 S.C. at 260, 19 S.E.2d
at 103.

Nesbitt, 346 S.C. at 231, 550 S.E.2d at 866. 
This Court determined a jury could infer from the evidence that “an armed robbery
was immediately forthcoming, or that the attempt had begun.”  Id. at
234, 550 S.E.2d at 868.

Viewing the evidence
in this case in the light most favorable to the State, substantial evidence
existed that Sumpter had the intent to commit armed robbery.  Sumpter jumped
over the counter, pointed a gun at Winningham, and demanded that she get down
on the floor.  Although Sumpter fled the scene prior to making a demand for
money and any money available was located in another room, the act of pointing
the gun at Winningham was an overt act towards completing the crime of armed
robbery.  As in Nesbitt, the jury in the present case could infer from
the evidence that the gunman was attempting to commit armed robbery. 

Because the intent to commit armed robbery can
be inferred from the circumstantial evidence in this case, we find the trial
judge did not abuse his discretion in submitting this case to the jury.

Accordingly, the trial court’s decision to deny
the motion for a directed verdict is

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., CONNOR and ANDERSON,
JJ., concur.