SC Second Injury Fund v. Liberty Mutual

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The South Carolina Second Injury Fund,       
Appellant

v.

Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,       
Respondent.

In Re:/Elmer F. Stewart,       
Claimant

v.

Bowater Incorporated,       
Employer.

Appeal From York County

John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-052

Submitted November 20, 2002 – Filed
January 16, 2003

AFFIRMED

Brooks Shealy, of Columbia; for Appellant.

Pope D. Johnson, of Columbia; for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Employer brought suit seeking
reimbursement from the South Carolina Second Injury Fund for payment made to
Elmer Stewart under a clincher agreement.  The single commissioner ordered the
fund to pay part of the costs, and the full commission and circuit court both
affirmed.  The fund appeals, arguing there could have been no aggravation of
the preexisting condition by the present injury. 

We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2),
SCACR and the following authorities: S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp.
2001) (substantial evidence standard); Lark v. Bi-Lo, 276 S.C. 130, 276
S.E.2d 304 (1981) (substantial evidence standard set forth in Administrative
Procedures Act governs appeals from Worker’s Compensation Commission); Tiller
v. Nat’l Health Care Ctr., 334 S.C. 333, 339-341, 513 S.E.2d 843, 846 (1999)
(Commission can review both lay and expert evidence and assign such weight as
it finds credible.); S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-400 (1976 & Supp. 2001) (requirements
for reimbursement from Second Injury Fund); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. S.C.
Second Injury Fund, 318 S.C. 516, 458 S.E.2d 550 (1995) (If carrier incurs
greater liability for compensation or medical payments as a result of preexisting
injury, he is entitled to reimbursement for greater payments.); State Workers’
Compensation Fund v. S.C. Second Injury Fund, 313 S.C. 536, 443 S.E.2d 546
(1994) (Reimbursement was proper where claimant would not have been disabled
“but for” preexisting conditions and total disability qualified as subsequent
disability arising out of employment.).
[1]

AFFIRMED.

CONNOR, STILWELL, and HOWARD, JJ., concur.

[1]           We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule
215, SCACR.