Miranda J. Llano v. Corey T. Llano

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Miranda J. Llano, Appellant,
v.
Corey T. Llano, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2025-001524
Appeal From Greenville County
Marcelo Torricos, Family Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-449
Heard September 15, 2026 – Filed October 9, 2026
AFFIRMED
Melissa D. Spivey, of The Spivey Law Group, LLC, of
Mauldin, for Appellant.
John M. Mussetto, of Law Offices of John M. Mussetto,
LLC, of Greenville, for Respondent.
Megan G. Burke, of Law Office of Megan Burke, LLC, of
Greenville, as the Guardian ad Litem.

PER CURIAM: 	Miranda Llano (Mother) appeals the family court's denial of her
request to modify the custody arrangement and award her sole custody on the basis
of a substantial change in circumstances. We affirm.
FACTS
Mother and Corey Llano (Father) were granted a divorce in 2022. The decree,
which was entered by consent of the parties, provided that the parents would have
joint custody of their minor child (Child)—who was born in 2016—and would
operate under a 2-2-3 schedule with a preapproved alternating holiday visitation
schedule. 	The decree further provided that the parties were to attend mediation if
they disagreed as to any decision affecting Child. If mediation failed, Mother had
final authority as to Child's religious and extracurricular decisions while Father had
final authority as to Child's medical and education decisions. The decree designated
Dr. Keith Stafford as Child's primary care physician.
As 	early 	as 	February 	2022—before 	the 	divorce 	decree—Mother 	had
expressed concern to Dr. Stafford that Child may have autism. Sometime thereafter,
in late 2022, Mother reached out to Jennifer McCaskill, a certified relationship
development interventionist.1 Though the exact timeline is unclear, both McCaskill
and Dr. Stafford referred Child to Andrew Hartley, an occupational therapist.2 On
October 20, 2022, Child had his first of many appointments with Hartley. 	At the
trial for this modification action, Hartley explained that he observed that Child had
well-below-average fine motor skills, noted that this did not necessarily call for a
diagnosis of any sort, and proposed a treatment plan—primarily rooted in play-based
therapy—to improve Child's abilities. Hartley explained that although Father had a
lot of questions when Hartley recommended that Child undergo the treatment
program, Father agreed to the treatment plan after reading Hartley's assessment
report. Child attended weekly appointments with Hartley from this point forward.
Later, in 2022, the parents had a meeting with Dr. Stafford wherein Mother
reported behavioral issues from Child dating back two or more years. Dr. Stafford
1 Relationship development interventionists, or RDIs, work with children who have
autism or exhibit autism-like characteristics. 	They also work with the parents to
equip them with knowledge and training for parenting their children.
2 Occupational 	therapists 	help 	people develop 	or improve skills 	needed 	for
day-to-day life.

noted that Mother wanted Child evaluated for autism, but Father did not. However,
Dr. Stafford also noted that "[Father] agree[d] to a local eval[uation]" and that Father
canceled a previously scheduled evaluation only because it was in Atlanta.
In January 2023, Dr. Stafford drafted a letter explaining that he suspected
Child was on the autism spectrum and recommended that Child see a specialist. Dr.
Stafford noted that Father opposed having Child evaluated and had been blocking
Mother's efforts to secure an evaluation.
Thereafter, 	Mother 	took 	Child 	to 	be 	evaluated 	as 	a 	candidate 	for
myofunctional therapy because of issues related to Child's tongue resting posture
and unproductive swallowing. 	Child underwent a sleep study, which Mother
reported showed signs of sleep apnea. 	The myofunctional therapy assessments
resulted in a diagnosis of Orofacial Myofunctional Disorder and Pediatric Feeding
Disorder. It was recommended that Child receive one therapy session per week to
help address these concerns.
In May 2023, Child's occupational therapist, Hartley, reassessed him and
reported "significant improvements" in fine motor capacity. According to Hartley,
he advised the parents that he would "diminish his services if they got the right
counsel[or] for [Child]" because he "felt like [Child] needed [that] more at that
point."
In June 2023, Mother commenced the underlying action in the family court
alleging, among other things, that Father was interfering with Child's medical
treatment and refusing to follow recommendations from doctors because Child still
had not been evaluated for autism. 	Mother sought sole custody on the basis of a
substantial change in circumstances. Father counterclaimed for sole custody.
In September 2023, Anne Spearman, a professional counselor, consulted with
Father over the phone about obtaining counseling for Child. Shortly thereafter, the
family court held a hearing on Mother's motion for temporary relief and, in
November 2023, issued a temporary order requiring that Father allow Child to
receive myofunctional therapy and have him evaluated for autism at Emory
University. The court also appointed Megan Goodwin Burke as guardian ad litem
for Child.
In January 2024, Mother took Child to a primary care physician other than Dr.
Stafford 	for 	purported 	"meltdowns" 	and 	stomach 	issues, 	and 	the 	physician
recommended that Child undergo a full psychological evaluation. Mother then filed

a contempt action alleging that Father had failed to comply with the temporary order
because 	Child 	still 	had 	not 	been 	evaluated 	for 	autism 	and 	had 	not 	begun
myofunctional therapy. In March 2024, the family court entered a consent order in
lieu of contempt wherein it ordered that Mother would be allowed to schedule an
autism evaluation for Child at Emory and that the plan proposed by the myofascial
clinic would be adopted as Child's treatment plan for those issues.
Between May and July 2024, the Emory autism evaluation was completed,
and the ensuing report stated that it was inconclusive as to whether Child had autism.
Rather, the report explained that the autism-like symptoms Child exhibited were
unable to be conclusively identified as evidence of autism because of other
confounds that could plausibly cause the symptoms, especially Child's stress with
trying to please both parents. 	The report stated that Child's difficulties were best
explained 	by 	diagnoses 	of 	Adjustment 	Disorder, 	ADHD, 	Specific 	Learning
Disorder, and characteristics of Autism Spectrum Disorder.
Child had been attending counseling sessions with Spearman up until May
2024, when Father had Child evaluated by Dr. Yadira Baez Lockard, a forensic
psychologist. Dr. Lockard observed Child's interactions with both parents and later
testified at the trial that while she would normally have recommended that Father
have sole custody based on her observations of alienating behavior from Mother, her
assessment was that changing the custody arrangement from joint custody would
"more likely than not . . . increase or exacerbate [Child's] mental[-]health[-]related
issues and symptoms." Combining this with Child's stated preference of continuing
joint custody, Dr. Lockard recommended continuing joint custody. Child resumed
counseling sessions with Spearman after receiving Dr. Lockard's approval to do so
up until August 2024, when Spearman's schedule changed and she could no longer
accommodate Child's after-school appointments.
In 2025, the parents had another dispute over Child's medical treatment.
Mother attempted to purchase an orthodontic device for palate expansion that Child's
dentist had recommended. 	Father, who had final decision-making authority on
medical decisions, was under the impression that the device was not urgent. Father
received emails from the orthodontist asking him to sign a contract and acknowledge
a receipt, prompting him to contact the orthodontist and protest because he had not
authorized the treatment to go forward.
During the trial, both parties called a litany of witnesses, some of whose
testimony we outlined above. Of note, besides the parents themselves, only two of
the witnesses criticized the joint custody arrangement: Dr. Lockard and Child's RDI,

McCaskill. 	Although McCaskill did criticize the joint custody arrangement, she
answered affirmatively when the family court asked her whether maintaining the
joint custody arrangement but scaling back the transitions would be beneficial to
Child. And, as we explained above, Dr. Lockard ultimately recommended that joint
custody continue. Virtually all of the witnesses painted a similar picture of Child's
situation, describing him as a bright, intelligent, and active eight-year-old torn
between two loving and devoted parents with vastly different parenting styles.
Father was portrayed as a rigid disciplinarian while Mother was portrayed as overly
deferential and passive. Child was described by multiple witnesses as a "masker" or
"double-bookkeeper," which refers to someone who alters their behaviors and
responses to questions based on their perception of what the listener wishes to see
and hear. 	At the conclusion of the trial, guardian ad litem Burke opined that the
parents' communication was "so fractured and so frustrating" that "without some
parenting coordination and coparenting intervention," there was little hope of either
parent "get[ting] to the truth of very many situations," which is a sentiment echoed
throughout most of the witnesses' testimony in the record.
For their own parts, each parent testified to considerably different versions of
events. 	Mother explained that her educational background was in counseling and
that she was certified as an autism spectrum disorder clinical specialist after the
divorce. 	Mother explained that Child had "meltdowns," which she distinguished
from "poor behavior outbursts" because while both look alike, they do not have "the
same root cause." Mother noted that these meltdowns sometimes include concerning
behaviors like Child "hitting himself in the head." 	She explained that Child
frequently exhibited "anxious behavior."
Father, on the other hand, explained that while he was careful not to say that
Mother was wrong about Child's purported issues, neither he nor any of his family
or friends had witnessed any of the issues Mother described. Father reiterated that
he was not against having Child evaluated for autism, but such evaluations "need to
make sense and [be] within reason." 	Father attributed Child's anxiety to the result
of him being removed from a stable environment. Father affirmed that Mother loved
Child but expressed uncertainty as to her ability to provide him with a stable home
environment and alleged that Mother believed that "if she was able to get certain
diagnoses and get certain things proven by doctors," she would get sole custody.
After the trial, the family court refused to grant sole custody to either parent,
finding that both failed to establish a substantial change in circumstances such that
eliminating the joint custody arrangement was warranted. However, the family court
recognized the intense pressure that the parents' constant conflict put Child under

and sought to resolve this by altering the custody rotation from 2-3-3 to alternating
on a week-to-week basis, ordering the parents to attend a ten-hour coparenting
course, and ordering the parents to communicate using OurFamilyWizard.3 It also
declared 	Father 	"the 	primary 	custodial 	parent" 	and 	granted 	him 	final
decision-making authority over all major decisions, including medical, educational,
religious, and extracurricular decisions with Mother designated as the "visiting
parent." 	Nevertheless, the family court required Father to ensure Child continues
attending individual counseling to address his anxiety and Adjustment Disorder and
required that both parents follow all recommendations and treatment plans made by
Child's counselor, which Father had the discretion to select. 	It also enjoined both
parents from allowing Child unsupervised access to knives or any other pointed
object that could cause Child to be suspended or expelled from school.4 The family
court denied Mother's motion for reconsideration. This appeal followed.5
ISSUES ON APPEAL
I. 	Whether the family court erred by not finding a substantial change in
circumstances had occurred such that Child's best interests would have
been served by giving sole custody to Mother.
II. 	Whether 	the 	family 	court 	erred 	by 	awarding 	Father 	primary
decision-making authority over Child.
III. 	Whether 	the 	family 	court 	erred 	by 	taking 	Child's 	preferences 	into
consideration when deciding whether to change the custody arrangement.
IV. 	Whether the family court erred by finding Child's health had improved
since the divorce.6
3 OurFamilyWizard is a coparenting mobile application that allows either parent to
send the other parent secure, documented messages, organize schedules, and track
expenses.
4 The family court ordered each side to bear its own attorney fees.
5 Father did not appeal the family court's denial of his request for sole custody.
6 We have combined Mother's issues IV and V into a single issue.

V. 	Whether the family court erred by ordering joint and divided custody.
VI. 	Whether the family court erred by refusing to find Father's care for Child
presented safety issues.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellate courts review the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the
family court de novo. See Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593, 594, 813 S.E.2d 486, 486
(2018) (per curiam). 	Evidentiary or procedural rulings by the family court are
reviewed using an abuse of discretion standard. 	Id. at 594 n.2, 813 S.E.2d at 486
n.2. 	"The appellate court generally defers to the findings of the family court
regarding credibility because the family court is in a better position to observe the
witnesses and their demeanor." Hagood v. Hagood, 427 S.C. 642, 649, 832 S.E.2d
609, 613 (Ct. App. 2019).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. 	Substantial Change in Circumstances
Mother's first argument is that the family court erred by not finding that a
substantial change in circumstances had occurred that justified giving her sole
custody.7 We disagree.
"In cases involving child custody, the controlling factor is the best interest of
the child." Grungo-Smith v. Grungo, 444 S.C. 556, 567, 910 S.E.2d 455, 462 (2024).
The family court considers several factors in determining
the best interest of the child, including: who has been the
7 During oral argument, Mother argued that the family court erred by finding that
neither party had met its burden of establishing a substantial change in circumstances
but nevertheless altering the custody arrangement anyway. This argument was not
made in Mother's brief and is not preserved for appellate review. See State v. Nelson,
336 S.C. 186, 193, 519 S.E.2d 786, 789 (1999) (per curiam) ("It is axiomatic that
oral argument may not be used as a vehicle to argue issues not argued in the appellate
brief."). 	Even if it were preserved, we interpret the family court's order as
recognizing that Child's circumstances have changed but finding that neither parent's
proposed change (i.e., eliminating joint custody) was appropriate.

primary caretaker; the conduct, attributes, and fitness of
the 	parents; 	the 	opinions 	of 	third 	parties 	(including
[guardians ad litem], expert witnesses, and the children);
and the age, health, and sex of the children.
Id. at 568, 910 S.E.2d at 462 (quoting Patel v. Patel, 347 S.C. 281, 285, 555 S.E.2d
386, 388 (2001)). 	"[T]here exist no hard and fast rules [for determining when to
change custody,] and the totality of circumstances peculiar to each case constitutes
the only scale upon which the ultimate decision can be weighed." 	Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting Davenport v. Davenport, 265 S.C. 524, 527, 220 S.E.2d 228, 230
(1975)). 	"The party seeking to alter a prior custody agreement has the burden of
establishing a substantial change in circumstances subsequent to the entry of divorce
that affects the child's welfare." Id. "A change in circumstances justifying a change
in the custody of a child simply means that sufficient facts have been shown to
warrant the conclusion that the best interests of the child[] would be served by the
change." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Stutz v. Funderburk, 272 S.C. 273, 278,
252 S.E.2d 32, 34 (1979)).
Mother's intuition about Child's health issues was vindicated to some extent,
specifically with regard to Child's myofunctional health and some aspects of his
behavioral health. However, we agree with the family court that Child's behavioral
health issues did not emerge after the divorce. 	As the family court pointed out,
several witnesses, including Dr. Stafford, spoke to the presence of various behavioral
symptoms before the divorce decree was finalized. A modification action based on
a substantial change in circumstances is not a second bite at the apple with the same
facts 	the 	family 	court 	originally 	weighed 	in 	approving 	the 	original 	custody
arrangement; rather, it must be predicated on a change in circumstances after the
entry of divorce that justifies giving the parent seeking modification the relief they
desire. See Grungo, 444 S.C. at 568, 910 S.E.2d at 462 ("The party seeking to alter
a prior custody agreement has the burden of establishing a substantial change in
circumstances subsequent to the entry of divorce that affects the child's welfare."
(emphasis added)).8
8 To the extent Mother argues we should base this determination solely on when
Child was diagnosed, we disagree. 	The time at which someone is medically
diagnosed is not necessarily the same as when the underlying condition itself
actually emerged. See generally Ark. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc. v. Fudge, 669
S.W.2d 914, 916 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that the date of a medical diagnosis
was immaterial to determining when a medical condition emerged because there was
evidence that symptoms of the condition had manifested prior to the diagnosis).

Regardless of their timing, we do not believe these issues mean that Child's
best interests would be served by giving sole custody to Mother. 	See Fossett v.
Fossett, 440 S.C. 576, 583, 891 S.E.2d 515, 519–20 (Ct. App. 2023) ("Because the
best interest of the child is the overriding concern in all child custody matters, [one
seeking a change in custody] must establish the following: (1) a substantial change
in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child and (2) a change in custody is in
the overall best interests of the child." 	(emphasis added) (quoting Latimer v.
Farmer, 360 S.C. 375, 381, 602 S.E.2d 32, 35 (2004) (citation modified)). 	The
picture Mother paints of Father's management of Child's healthcare does not comport
with the record. 	Even though Mother claims all of the medical providers "agreed
with [her] and not [Father]," most of the witnesses did not recommend ceasing joint
custody. Instead, a theme across each witness's testimony was that both parents are
devoted to meeting Child's needs. Although McCaskill did criticize the joint custody
arrangement, she answered affirmatively when the family court asked her whether
maintaining the joint custody arrangement but scaling back the transitions would be
beneficial 	to 	Child. 	Similarly, 	Dr. 	Lockard 	explained 	that 	her 	normal
recommendation under these circumstances would be sole custody to Father, but
because Child's sincere preference was to be with both parents, she recommended
continuing joint custody. 	While Father did delay in securing Child an autism
evaluation, the Emory report ultimately affirmed Father's longstanding view that
much of Child's issues stem from being stuck between two parents with vastly
different approaches to parenting. 	We conclude that Child's medical issues, and
Father's handling of them, did not warrant assigning sole custody to Mother and that
Mother 	failed 	to 	meet 	her 	burden 	of 	establishing 	a 	substantial 	change 	in
circumstances such that sole custody was appropriate.
II. 	Authority Over Medical Decisions
Additionally, the family court found Mother's testimony about the timing of the
emergence of Child's symptoms to be uncredible, and because we recognize the
family court was better situated to observe Mother's demeanor as a live witness, we
defer to its assessment of her credibility on this issue. See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs.
v. Scott, 438 S.C. 400, 412, 883 S.E.2d 229, 235 (Ct. App. 2023) ("The appellate
court generally defers to the findings of the family court regarding credibility
because the family court is in a better position to observe the witness and his or her
demeanor.").

Mother argues the family court erred by granting Father full decision-making
authority over Child's medical decisions. 	Mother mostly reiterates her arguments
from the first issue on this point, characterizing Father as unfit to have such authority
because he allegedly ignored Child's health issues and stymied Mother's efforts to
secure treatment for Child. We disagree.
Following our de novo review of the record, we affirm the family court's
decision. 	Father had final decision-making authority over Child's healthcare
decisions, yet Mother scheduled dozens of appointments for Child that Father did
not approve of. 	Further, only a handful of these appointments actually resulted in
actionable diagnoses. 	We agree with the family court that Father's approach to
Child's healthcare was merely a different style of parenting rather than an absence
of parental responsibility, and we are not persuaded by Mother's arguments that
Father is unable to meet Child's healthcare needs.
Furthermore, many of the medical reports in the record identify the tumult of
trying to please two parents with vastly different views of what Child needs as the
likely cause of Child's behavioral and emotional issues. We conclude that the family
court's decision to grant exclusive decision-making to Father helps to mitigate these
concerns, particularly when paired with its decision to scale back the number of
handoffs between the parents in their joint custody arrangement. For these reasons,
we affirm as to this issue.
III. 	Consideration of Child's Own Preferences for Custody
Mother argues the family court erred by considering Child's wishes when
deciding to modify—but not eliminate—the joint custody arrangement. 	Mother
argues the record reflects that Child is immature and impulsive such that his input
should not have been considered by the family court in the custody determination.
To support this, Mother notes that the Emory report described Child as "impulsive,"
and that Mother's friend, who testified at the trial, portrayed Child as lacking insight
into how his behaviors affect other people and as not realizing when his behavior
was irritating or upsetting others. Mother also points out that various professionals
involved with Child agreed that he would change his preference based on what he
thought the person talking to him wanted him to say. 	We disagree with Mother's
arguments on this point.
The family court explicitly stated that in light of its perception of Child's
"maturity level and his sensitivity to change, the court did give his preference some
weight." (emphasis added). 	And, "[i]n determining the best interests of the child,

the court must consider the child's reasonable preference for custody." 	S.C. Code
Ann. § 63-15-30 (2010) (emphasis added). This mandate is balanced by the further
charge that the family court "shall place weight upon the preference based upon the
child's age, experience, maturity, judgment, and ability to express a preference."
§ 63-15-30; see also Fossett, 440 S.C. at 584, 891 S.E.2d at 519 (surveying the case
law discussing the weight to be given to children of various ages). Here, the family
court did precisely what it was supposed to do: it considered Child's preference and
then decided to afford it "some" weight based on the court's view of Child's maturity.
Based on our de novo review of the record, we similarly conclude Child's preference
was entitled to a small amount of weight.
To the extent Mother contends the family court assigned too much weight to
Child's preference, we disagree. 	Child's stated preference was hardly controlling.
The family court's primary motivation for modifying the joint custody arrangement
was to lessen the friction of handoffs between the parents; the family court order
makes it clear that the court perceived both parents as devoted and caring and that it
thought Child's best interests would be served by joint custody. 	Thus, even if we
agreed with Mother that the assignment of a modicum of weight to Child's
preference was error, the error was harmless because the family court's decision was
clearly based on the totality of Child's circumstances in this specific case. See Payne
v. Payne, 382 S.C. 62, 69, 674 S.E.2d 515, 518 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When determining
issues of custody, 'the court should consider all the circumstances of the particular
case[,] and all relevant factors must be taken into consideration.'" (quoting Pirayesh
v. Pirayesh, 359 S.C. 284, 296, 596 S.E.2d 505, 512 (Ct. App. 2004))); see also id.
at 70, 674 S.E.2d at 518 (noting that the family court "acknowledged [the child's]
preference in the final order[] but clearly took other factors . . . into consideration in
its decision to modify the custody arrangement," and that the family court therefore
did not err).
IV. 	Child's Health
Mother argues the family court erred by finding that Child's health had
improved rather than declined since the entry of the divorce decree. We agree that,
reviewing the evidence in its totality, the family court erred by concluding Child's
health had improved since the entry of the divorce decree. 	However, the family
court's finding on this issue was an alternative ground supporting its order.
Therefore, any error in its analysis on this point was harmless. See Owners Ins. Co.
v. Clayton, 364 S.C. 555, 563, 614 S.E.2d 611, 615 (2005) ("Error without prejudice
does not warrant reversal."). As we explained above, regardless of whether Child is
technically healthier compared to when the divorce decree was entered, we agree

with the family court that neither parent demonstrated that Child's best interests
would be served by eliminating the joint custody arrangement altogether.
V. 	Joint Custody
Mother argues the family court erred by modifying, rather than eliminating,
the joint custody arrangement because no exceptional circumstances existed to
justify joint custody. 	Mother contends that the family court, in the absence of
exceptional circumstances, was required to grant sole custody to one of the parents,
and she insists that such a grant should have been to her. We disagree.
Section 63-15-230(B) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2025) provides
simply that the family court "may award joint custody to both parents or sole custody
to either parent." 	Further, section 63-15-230(C) (Supp. 2025) provides that "[i]f
custody is contested or if either parent seeks an award of joint custody, the court
shall consider all custody options, including, but not limited to, joint custody."
"[J]oint or divided custody should only be awarded where there are exceptional
circumstances." 	Lewis v. Lewis, 400 S.C. 354, 365, 734 S.E.2d 322, 327 (Ct. App.
2012) (quoting Patel v. Patel, 359 S.C. 515, 528, 599 S.E.2d 114, 121 (2004)).
However, the paramount consideration in all custody matters is the best interests of
the child. See Greene v. Greene, 439 S.C. 427, 443, 887 S.E.2d 157, 166 (Ct. App.
2023) ("Considering [the c]hild's best interest as the paramount concern, we find the
family court properly awarded the parties joint custody.").
We affirm because we share the family court's view that Child's best interests
are served by joint custody. 	See id. at 443, 887 S.E.2d at 166 ("Considering [the
c]hild's best interest as the paramount concern, we find the family court properly
awarded the parties joint custody."). The record reflects that both parents are fit and
able and that severing Child from one parent's custody would ultimately harm Child.
We are also concerned by Dr. Lockard's testimony that eliminating the joint custody
arrangement would "more likely than not . . . increase or exacerbate [Child's] mental
health related issues and symptoms." We recognize that much of Child's struggles
are seemingly the result of the back and forth between the parents and their vastly
different philosophies of parenting, but we conclude that the family court's decision
under these difficult circumstances to scale back the transitions is sufficient to
mitigate these concerns while preserving the benefits of joint custody under these
facts.
VI. 	Safety Issues

Mother argues the family court erred by refusing to go further than an
injunction with regard to purported safety issues while Child was in Father's care.
Because of testimony expressing that Child had an "obsession" with knives, the
family court enjoined both parents from allowing Child access to knives. 	Mother
asserts that an injunction is insufficient and that Father's behavior—which she
alleged included sending Child to school or church with a "fire starter" that Mother
had to take away and allowing Child to have access to a BB gun in the backseat
while Father was driving—showed that Father was not appropriately monitoring
Child.
We reject this argument. Mother does not explain how this issue maps on to
her custody modification claim, but presumably she intends it to support the notion
that she should be given sole custody over Child. To the extent Child's interest in
knives presents a safety issue, we conclude that the family court's decision to enjoin
the parties from allowing Child to have unsupervised access to knives is sufficient
and mitigates any concern.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we affirm the family court's order modifying the joint
custody arrangement instead of awarding Mother sole custody.
AFFIRMED.
GEATHERS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.