William Willis v. A.T. Wall, et al.

Supreme Court
No. 2006-28-Appeal.
(PM 03-3253)
William Willis 	:
v. 	:
A.T. Wall et al. 	:
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before
publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are
requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of
Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island
02903, at Telephone 222-3258 of any typographical or
other formal errors in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is published.

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Supreme Court
No. 2006-28-Appeal.
(PM 03-3253)
William Willis 	:
v. 	:
A.T. Wall et al. 	:
Present: Williams, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Suttell, and Robinson, JJ.
O P I N I O N
Justice Suttell, for the Court. 	The applicant, William Willis, appeals from the
Superior Court’s denial of his application for postconviction relief. 	This case came
before the Supreme Court for oral argument pursuant to an order directing the parties to
show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be decided summarily. After
reviewing the record and considering the memoranda and arguments of the parties, we
conclude that this case may be decided without the necessity of further briefing or
argument. We affirm the order of the Superior Court.
Facts and Procedural History
On October 30, 2002, Mr. Willis pled nolo contendere to two counts of second-
degree child molestation and was sentenced to an aggregate of twenty years in prison,
twelve of which were suspended, with probation.
On June 17, 2003, Mr. Willis filed a pro se application for postconviction relief
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, and a motion for appointment of counsel.
Attorney Kenneth Vale was appointed as counsel for Mr. Willis. 	After reviewing the
case, however, Mr. Vale moved to withdraw, explaining that he found “the issues raised

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in defendant’s petition for post conviction relief to be wholly frivolous, without merit,
and neither supported by existing law, nor by a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law.” To support his motion to withdraw, Mr. Vale
filed a sixty-seven page “no-merit” memorandum in accordance with the requirements set
forth by this Court in Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000).
The hearing justice granted Mr. Vale’s motion to withdraw, and Mr. Willis was
allowed to proceed pro se.1 After a hearing on multiple dates, the hearing justice denied
the application on the ground that Mr. Willis failed to present sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that his counsel’s level of service was objectively unreasonable. An order to
that effect was entered on June 10, 2004.
From that point on, as the hearing justice later noted, Mr. Willis’s case became
“rife with a procedural quagmire.” 	Although a note in the Superior Court file indicates
that the hearing justice informed Mr. Willis of his right to appeal, the record is devoid of
any notice of appeal. Nevertheless, on January 13, 2005, Mr. Willis filed a motion in the
Supreme Court for appointment of counsel to “represent [my] interests in this appeal
from denial of Post Conviction Relief.” We granted the motion and appointed Attorney
Judith Crowell to represent the applicant with respect to his “appeal.” 	Ms. Crowell
assessed the viability of a petition for certiorari in an attempt to cure Mr. Willis’s failure
to file a timely notice of appeal, but she found “no basis in law or in fact for such an
argument.” 	Concluding that Mr. Willis had “no arguably meritorious appellate issues”
and that the reinstatement of his “appellate rights would be an exercise in futility,” Ms.
Crowell moved to withdraw as court-appointed counsel. 	This Court granted the motion
1 The applicant proceeded pro se, but later attempted to secure another appointed
attorney, which request the hearing justice denied.

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on August 19, 2005, “without prejudice, however, to Willis’ filing pro se a petition for a
common law writ of certiorari to review the Superior Court’s denial of his application for
postconviction relief.” 	In the meantime, on April 8, 2005, applicant, through Ms.
Crowell, moved to remand the case “to the Superior Court in the interests of justice, for
the reason that defendant-appellant seeks to present to the trial court newly discovered
evidence in support of his petition for postconviction relief.” We granted the motion on
April 21, 2005, stating, “The defendant’s motion to remand this case to the Superior
Court in order that defendant may seek to present newly-discovered evidence in support
of 	his 	postconviction 	application, 	as 	prayed, 	is 	granted. 	Following 	hearing 	on
defendant’s request, the case shall be returned to this Court forthwith.”
On remand, Mr. Willis sought the appointment of counsel to represent him in the
Superior Court, and Ms. Crowell was again appointed. A hearing was held on November
29 and December 6, 2005, at which Mr. Willis and one of his neighbors testified. 	Mr.
Willis also submitted medical records indicating that he underwent a vasectomy shortly
before the alleged molestation.
At the end of the hearing, Mr. Willis conceded that the evidence presented to the
Superior Court was known to him at the time of his trial, and thus it did not meet the legal
standard for newly discovered evidence set forth in State v. Hazard, 797 A.2d 448, 463-
64 (R.I. 2002). 2 He argued, however, that he should be allowed to raise the issue of
2 As State v. Hazard, 797 A.2d 448 (R.I. 2002) instructs:
“‘When a motion for a new trial is based on newly
discovered evidence, that evidence must satisfy a two-
pronged test.’ 	* * * 	The first part is a four-prong inquiry
that requires that the evidence be (1) newly discovered
since trial, (2) not discoverable prior to trial with the
exercise of due diligence, (3) not merely cumulative or

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ineffective assistance of his trial attorneys. 	Specifically, he contended that his trial
counsels’ failure to procure and present the testimony of his neighbor and the medical
records was relevant to his entry of a nolo contendere plea.
The hearing justice rejected applicant’s entreaties that he be permitted to press a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 	The hearing justice explained that the
Supreme Court had remanded the case to the Superior Court for the sole purpose of
assessing newly discovered evidence, and he also noted that Mr. Willis had not submitted
a motion to expand or amend his postconviction-relief application. 	The hearing justice
declined to expand the scope of the inquiry beyond the Supreme Court’s limited remand.
He then ruled that the evidence was not newly discovered and he ordered the papers
transferred back to the Supreme Court. On December 9, 2005, Mr. Willis filed a notice
of appeal.
Mr. Willis then moved in the Supreme Court for the appointment of Ms. Crowell
as appellate counsel for his postconviction-relief appeal, which we granted on February
16, 2006.3 On March 29, 2006, however, attorney Crowell again moved to withdraw “for
the reason that there exists an irreconcilable conflict” between herself and Mr. Willis.
Mr. Willis moved for the appointment of new counsel, which we granted and allowed
impeaching but rather material to the issue upon which it is
admissible, (4) of the type which would probably change
the verdict at trial. * * * Once this first prong is satisfied,
the second prong calls for the hearing justice to determine
if the evidence presented is ‘credible enough to warrant a
new trial.’” Id. at 463-64 (quoting State v. L’Heureux, 787
A.2d 1202, 1207-08 (R.I. 2002)).
3 The Rhode Island Office of the Public Defender declined to represent Mr. Willis in his
appeal because the office represented him at the trial level, and since he alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel in his postconviction-relief application, the office would
have had an irreconcilable conflict of interest with respect to the appeal.

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Ms. 	Crowell 	to 	withdraw. 	We 	noted, 	however, 	that 	“[n]o 	further 	motions 	for
appointment of counsel will be entertained by the Court in this matter.”
Before this Court, Mr. Willis concedes that the evidence he presented does not
meet the legal standard for newly discovered evidence set forth in Hazard, 797 A.2d at
463-64, and that his express waiver precludes appellate review of the issue by this Court.
Instead, he frames the question presented as whether the Superior Court had the authority
to consider his request to reopen his postconviction application. 	Mr. Willis argues that
the Superior Court should have reopened the case to consider the effect of the newly
proffered evidence on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. He contends that the
Superior Court was never divested of jurisdiction after it issued its first denial of his
postconviction-relief application on May 3, 2004. 	Because the Superior Court never
entered a final judgment as required by Rule 58 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure and because he never appealed the denial of his original postconviction-relief
application, Mr. Willis asserts that the Superior Court had authority to reopen the case to
examine his ineffective assistance of counsel claim after the Supreme Court remanded the
case for the limited purpose of assessing newly discovered evidence.
Discussion
In the Superior Court, as well as in this Court, Mr. Willis has conceded that the
evidence presented after remand does not meet the legal standard for newly discovered
evidence. Thus, the only issue we now consider is the hearing justice’s determination not
to expand this Court’s remand order so as to consider Mr. Willis’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.

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As we have observed, “the opinions of this Court speak forthrightly and not by
suggestion or innuendo.” Fracassa v. Doris, 876 A.2d 506, 509 (R.I. 2005). 	“[I]t is not
the role of a trial justice to attempt to read ‘between the lines’ of our decisions.” Id. Our
cases make clear that the lower courts and administrative bodies that receive our remand
orders may not exceed the scope of the remand or open up the proceeding to legal issues
beyond the remand. See Lemek v. Washington Oaks, Inc., 524 A.2d 597, 598 (R.I. 1987);
Valley Gas Co. v. Burke, 415 A.2d 165, 165 (R.I. 1980) (mem.); Wood v. Picillo, 431
A.2d 432, 432 (R.I. 1981) (mem.); State v. Clark, 118 R.I. 907, 907, 374 A.2d 552, 552
(1977) (mem.).
In this case, the only issue pending before the Superior Court was by virtue of our
remand order. Mr. Willis’s original application for postconviction relief had been denied
but not appealed. 	Notwithstanding this seemingly insurmountable procedural barrier,
counsel was appointed; that counsel assessed and rejected the viability of filing a petition
for writ of certiorari. 	Nevertheless, we granted Mr. Willis’s motion to remand so he
could seek to present newly discovered evidence. Conceding, however, that his proffered
evidence does not qualify as newly discovered, he has, in effect, waived the issue,
precluding appellate review. 	Plainly stated, the hearing justice appropriately limited the
inquiry on remand to the issue of newly discovered evidence. 	Accordingly, he did not
commit error by refusing to entertain Mr. Willis’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the order and remand the papers
to the Superior Court.

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COVER SHEET
TITLE OF CASE: 	William Willis v. A.T. Wall et al.
DOCKET SHEET NO.: 	2006-28-A
COURT: 	Supreme
DATE OPINION FILED: 	February 4, 2008
Appeal from
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 	Superior 	County: Providence
JUDGE FROM OTHER COURT: 	Judge Edward C. Clifton
JUSTICES: 	Williams, CJ., Goldberg, Flaherty, Suttell, and Robinson, JJ.
WRITTEN BY: 	Justice Paul A. Suttell, for the Court
ATTORNEYS:
For Plaintiff: 	James T. McCormick, Esq.
ATTORNEYS:
For Defendant: 	Aaron L. Weisman, Esq.