Deborah L. Kedy, Legal Representative for the Estate of Brian Scallion, et al. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., et al. consolidated with In re Asbestos Litigation

Supreme Court
In re Asbestos Litigation.
Deborah L. Kedy, Legal Representative
for the Estate of Brian Scallion et al.
:
v. 	: 	No. 2005-332-M.P.
(PC 04-1552)
A.W. Chesterton Co. et al. 	:
consolidated with
: 	No. 2005-319-M.P.
(PC 96-9999)
Present: Williams, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Suttell, and Robinson, JJ.
O P I N I O N
Justice Suttell, for the Court. We issued a writ of certiorari to consider the applicability
of 	the 	doctrine 	of 	forum 	non 	conveniens 	in 	Rhode 	Island 	jurisprudence. 	The
petitioners/defendants sought review of Superior Court orders denying their motions to dismiss
in thirty-nine civil actions filed in Rhode Island by Canadian residents. For the reasons set forth
in this opinion, we join forty-six of our sister states and the federal courts by formally
recognizing the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 	We vacate, therefore, the orders of the
Superior Court.
I
Facts and Procedural History
The issue before us arises out of thirty-nine cases filed in the Superior Court that allege
personal injury and wrongful death caused by workplace exposure to products containing
- 1 -

asbestos.1 The plaintiffs are all Canadian residents,2 and their employment, exposure, injuries,
and treatment occurred in Canada. 	The several actions were filed against various corporations,
all of which conduct business in Rhode Island. 	None of the remaining3 corporate defendants,
however, either is incorporated in Rhode Island or has its principal place of business in the state.
On October 27, 2004, defendant General Electric Company moved to dismiss the twenty-
three asbestos actions then before the Superior Court based on the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. 	Several 	other 	defendants 	joined 	General 	Electric’s 	motion 	to 	dismiss.4
Subsequently, sixteen additional similarly situated plaintiffs filed asbestos actions in Rhode
Island, after which defendants moved to dismiss those cases as well.
1 In an administrative order dated January 29, 1996, the Presiding Justice of the Superior Court
directed a single justice to handle all pending and future asbestos-related litigation in Rhode
Island.
2 Two of the plaintiffs are United States citizens residing in Canada.
3 Two of the original defendants, P.I.C. Contractors, Inc., and Packings and Insulations
Corporation, were Rhode Island corporations with their principal places of business in Rhode
Island, but they were dismissed from the case before the petitions for writs of certiorari were
filed. 	Based on the record before us, the remaining codefendants are: A.W. Chesterton
Company; The Anchor Packing Company; Asarco Incorporated; Aventis Cropscience USA, Inc.
(successor 	to 	Amchem 	Products, 	Inc., 	and 	its 	Benjamin 	Foster 	Division); 	Certainteed
Corporation; Crown, Cork & Seal Company USA, Inc., f/k/a Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc.; CSR
America; Dana Corporation; Durabla Manufacturing Company; Durametallic Corporation; The
Flintkoke Company; Foster Wheeler Corporation; Garlock Sealing Technologies LLC (in its
own right and as successor in interest to Garlock, Inc.); General Electric Company; General
Refractories Company; Georgia-Pacific Corporation; Grefco Incorporated; Hobart Brothers
Company; Industrial Holding Corporation; Ingersoll-Rand Company; John Crane, Inc.; The
Lincoln Electric Company; Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; 3M Company; Owens-
Illinois, Inc.; Rapid American Corporation; Rhone-Poulenc AG Company (successor to Amchen
Products, Inc., and its Benjamin Foster Division); Union Carbide Chemicals and Plastics
Company, Inc.; Uniroyal, Inc.; Viacom, Inc. (successor by merger to CBS Corporation, f/k/a
Westinghouse Electric Corporation); and John Doe (fictitious name).
4 Other defendants that joined the motion to dismiss included The Anchor Packing Company;
Garlock Sealing Technologies LLC, Successor by Merger to Garlock, Inc.; General Refractories
Company; Grefco, Inc.; Durametallic Corporation; Hobart Brothers Company; and The Lincoln
Electric Company. 	We refer to these corporations and General Electric Company, collectively,
as “defendants” in this opinion.
- 2 -

On 	May 	27, 	2005, 	the 	Superior 	Court 	filed a 	consolidated 	decision 	that 	denied
defendants’ motions to dismiss. Defining the doctrine of forum non conveniens as “allow[ing] a
court to dismiss a case when a chosen forum—despite the existence of jurisdiction and venue—is
so inconvenient that it would be unfair to the defendant to conduct its defense of the claim in that
location,” the trial justice explained that Rhode Island was one of the few states in which neither
its Legislature nor the state’s highest court had recognized the doctrine of forum non conveniens
generally. 	She noted, however, that the General Assembly had adopted the doctrine for the
specific circumstance of child-custody cases when it enacted the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) in 1978. The trial justice began her analysis by noting that the court
had jurisdiction over the case and that venue was proper. 	The trial justice also discussed the
status of asbestos litigation in Rhode Island, finding that “no litigation crisis exists” at present,
that the court was not “mired in asbestos litigation,” and that there had been no deluge of
asbestos cases over the last two decades. 	To the contrary, the court found that the asbestos
docket had been neither unmanageable nor unwieldy. 	The trial justice reasoned that it was of
“paramount importance” that the parties have their cases heard as promptly as possible and that
asbestos-related litigation defied containment by boundaries. 	Although the court denied the
defendants’ motions to dismiss, the trial justice stated that the issue might be revisited if the
asbestos docket became too burdensome or inefficient or if the management of the docket
changed.
On October 12, 2005, the court entered thirty-nine orders denying defendants’ motions to
dismiss.5 General Electric Company, Garlock Sealing Technologies LLC, The Lincoln Electric
5 On December 7, 2005, the trial justice entered an order to clarify that the court’s reasoning was
based on its May 27, 2005 written decision, and not any other version of the court’s decision.
Apparently, a version of the decision published online contained wording which differed from
the wording in the version entered on May 27, 2005.
- 3 -

Company, Hobart Brothers Company, and The Anchor Packing Company filed petitions for
writs of certiorari in this Court in the thirty-nine cases, each of which were opposed by the
various plaintiffs. 	The petitions presented two questions. 	First, whether this Court should
expressly recognize the common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens and set the standard for
its application. Second, if the doctrine does exist, whether the Superior Court erred by exercising
jurisdiction over the thirty-nine Canadian-resident plaintiffs’ claims alleging injuries that
occurred in Canada. This Court consolidated the defendants’ petitions, and we granted certiorari
on May 18, 2006.
II
Standard of Review
As this Court often has stated, our review “on writ of certiorari is limited ‘to examining
the record to determine if an error of law has been committed.’” Crowe Countryside Realty
Associates Co., LLC v. Novare Engineers, Inc., 891 A.2d 838, 840 (R.I. 2006) (Crowe) (quoting
State v. Santiago, 799 A.2d 285, 287 (R.I. 2002)). “Questions of law * * * are not binding upon
the court and may be reviewed to determine what the law is and its applicability to the facts.”
Hometown Properties, Inc. v. Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management, 592
A.2d 841, 843 (R.I. 1991) (quoting Narragansett Wire Co. v. Norberg, 118 R.I. 596, 607, 376
A.2d 1, 6 (1977)). 	We review questions of law de novo. Crowe, 891 A.2d at 840 (citing
Carnevale v. Dupee, 783 A.2d 404, 408 (R.I. 2001)).
We do not weigh the evidence on certiorari. Crowe, 891 A.2d at 840. 	“‘If legally
competent evidence exists to support th[e] determination, we will affirm it unless one or more
errors of law have so infected the validity of the proceedings as to warrant reversal.’” Cullen v.
Town Council of Lincoln, 893 A.2d 239, 244 (R.I. 2006) (quoting Cullen v. Town Council of
Lincoln, 850 A.2d 900, 903 (R.I. 2004)).
- 4 -

III
Discussion
A. The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens
We granted certiorari to review what appears to be a question of first impression in
Rhode Island and one upon which our trial courts have split. Compare Goelet v. Goelet, C.A. No.
03-496 (R.I. Super. Ct. June 14, 2006) (hearing justice dismissed the petition on the grounds of
forum non conveniens) with Perusse v. AC&S, Inc., No. C.A. 00-5768, slip op. at 4, 2001 WL
668548, at *2 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 31, 2001) (declining to apply forum non conveniens because
neither the Rhode Island Supreme Court nor the Legislature had formally recognized the
doctrine). 	We undertake to clarify this uncertainty fully cognizant of Justice Frankfurter’s
instruction that “the highest court of a State * * *, [a]ccording to its own notions of procedural
policy, * * * may reject, as it may accept, the doctrine [of forum non conveniens] for all causes
of action begun in its courts.” State of Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1,
3 (1950).
The doctrine of forum non conveniens is “an equitable principle by which ‘a court having
jurisdiction may decline to exercise it on considerations of convenience, efficiency, and justice.’”
AT&T Corp. v. Sigala, 549 S.E.2d 373, 375 (Ga. 2001). The doctrine derives, in the absence of
statutory authority, from the courts’ inherent judicial powers, id. at 376, powers “which are
incontestably necessary to the effective performance of judicial functions.” Paxton Blair, The
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1929).
The doctrine of forum non conveniens stands for the simple proposition that “a court may
resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a
general venue statute.” Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947). The principle allows
a court to decline to exercise jurisdiction when the plaintiff’s chosen forum is significantly
- 5 -

inconvenient and the ends of justice would be better served if the action were brought and tried
in another forum. See, e.g., Howe v. Goldcorp Investments, Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir.
1991); Volt Delta Resources, Inc. v. Devine, 740 P.2d 1089, 1094 (Kan. 1987); Qualley v.
Chrysler Credit Corp., 217 N.W.2d 914, 915 (Neb. 1974). 	Before this Court, defendants
acknowledge, and we agree, that the trial justice correctly found that the thirty-nine underlying
cases meet the jurisdictional requirements of G.L. 1956 § 8-2-146 and the venue provisions of
G.L. 1956 § 9-4-5.7 Thus the only issue before this Court is the vitality and scope of the doctrine
of forum non conveniens in Rhode Island.
6 General Laws 1956 § 8-2-14 entitled “Jurisdiction of actions at law” provides in part:
“(a) 	The superior court shall have original jurisdiction of all
actions at law where title to real estate or some right or interest
therein is in issue, except actions for possession of tenements let or
held at will or by sufferance; and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction of all other actions at law in which the amount in
controversy 	shall 	exceed 	the 	sum 	of 	ten 	thousand 	dollars
($10,000); and shall also have concurrent original jurisdiction with
the district court in all other actions at law in which the amount in
controversy exceeds the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000) and
does not exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000); provided, that the
plaintiff shall not recover costs unless he or she shall recover in
such action not less than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or unless
the action is one in which the title to real estate or some right or
interest therein is in question, or unless in the discretion of the
court, on motion, costs are awarded. If an action is brought in the
superior court which is within the jurisdiction conferred by this
section, the superior court shall have jurisdiction of all other
actions arising out of the same transaction or occurrence, provided
the other actions are joined with the action within the jurisdiction
conferred by this section or are subsequently made a part thereof
under applicable procedural rules.”
7 General Laws 1956 § 9-4-5 reads as follows:
“Venue of actions between nonresident parties. – If no one
of the plaintiffs or defendants dwell within the state, and a
corporation established out of the state be a party, personal or
transitory actions or suits by or against it may, if brought in the
superior court, be brought in the court for any county, or if in the
district court, in any division.”
- 6 -

The plaintiffs contend that forum non conveniens has not existed in Rhode Island for
more than two centuries, and that it is not part of the common law of this state. They allege that
forum non conveniens is a flawed doctrine that has led to confusion and inconsistency in federal
and state courts. They further argue that the General Assembly is the appropriate body to adopt
the doctrine, and they point out that it has not enacted the doctrine in any form, except for child-
custody cases. See G.L. 1956 § 15-14.1-19. The plaintiffs allege that if forum non conveniens is
an inherent part of Rhode Island’s common law, there would have been no need to specifically
enumerate the doctrine in the UCCJA.
The defendants argue that forum non conveniens is a doctrine developed at common law
that is recognized by the federal courts and the other forty-nine states. The defendants allege that
the common law encompasses the inherent judicial power to “protect defendants and the public
from injurious and unnecessary forum choices by plaintiffs.” They dispute plaintiffs’ contention
that the forum non conveniens doctrine lacks uniformity throughout the states, contending that
there are only minor variations among the states and at the federal level.
After carefully considering the written and oral submissions of the parties, as well as the
submissions of amici curiae,8 it is our conclusion that the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
although heretofore formally acknowledged in Rhode Island only in the context of child-custody
cases, is indeed part of our jurisprudential landscape. 	We take this opportunity, therefore, to
recognize the doctrine formally and to delineate its standards.
8 We take this opportunity to thank amici curiae, Products Liability Advisory Council, Inc.,
International Association of Defense Counsel, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America, American Tort Reform Association, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America, Coalition for Litigation Justice, National Association of Manufacturers, and American
Insurance Association for their helpful briefs.
- 7 -

The doctrine of forum non conveniens “is founded in considerations of fundamental
fairness and sensible and effective judicial administration,” Adkins v. Chicago, Rock Island and
Pacific Railroad Co., 301 N.E.2d 729, 730 (Ill. 1973), and it is widely recognized to be of
common law origin. Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 507; Price v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 268
P.2d 457, 461 (Cal. 1954) (citing Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 507-09); McDonnell-Douglas Corp.
v. Lohn, 557 P.2d 373, 374 (Colo. 1976); Picketts v. International Playtex, Inc., 576 A.2d 518,
524 (Conn. 1990) (citing Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518,
527 (1947)); Yost v. Johnson, 591 A.2d 178, 182 (Del. 1991); Kinney System, Inc. v.
Continental Insurance Co., 674 So.2d 86, 87 (Fla. 1996); Torres v. Walsh, 456 N.E.2d 601, 605
(Ill. 1983); Gonzales v. Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 371 P.2d 193, 196, 198
(Kan. 1962) (“The doctrine of forum non conveniens is of ancient common law origin and has
been recognized and applied in the federal courts and in the courts of most of the states.”);
Beaven v. McAnulty, 980 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Ky. 1998); Radeljak v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 719
N.W.2d 40, 42 (Mich. 2006); Johnson v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., 66
N.W.2d 763, 767 (Minn. 1954) (citing Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 507); Clark v. Luvel Dairy
Products, Inc., 731 So.2d 1098, 1099-1101 (Miss. 1998); Qualley, 217 N.W.2d at 915; Civic
Southern Factors Corp. v. Bonat, 322 A.2d 436, 438 (N.J. 1974); Islamic Republic of Iran v.
Pahlavi, 467 N.E.2d 245, 247 (N.Y. 1984); Chambers v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 519
N.E.2d 370, 372 (Ohio 1988); Rothluebbers v. Obee, 668 N.W.2d 313, 317 (S.D. 2003); Dow
Chemical Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 677 (Tex. 1990); Norfolk & Western Railway
Co. v. Tsapis, 400 S.E.2d 239, 243-44 (W. Va. 1990).
Inherent judicial power is “governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily
vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious
- 8 -

disposition of cases.” Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962). The inherent
power of courts includes the authority to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens.
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (describing forum non conveniens as an
inherent power); In re Prevot, 59 F.3d 556, 565-66 (6th Cir. 1995) (dismissal on forum non
conveniens is an inherent power); Running v. Southwest Freight Lines, Inc., 303 S.W.2d 578,
580 (Ark. 1957) (describing the forum non conveniens inquiry as an inherent power); AT&T
Corp., 549 S.E.2d at 376; Johnson v. G.D. Searle & Co., 552 A.2d 29, 31 (Md. 1989); Universal
Adjustment Corp. v Midland Bank Ltd. of London, England, 184 N.E. 152, 159 (Mass. 1933);
Elliot v. Johnston, 292 S.W.2d 589, 593 (Mo. 1956); St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. v.
Superior Court, 276 P.2d 773, 778 (Okla. 1954); Zurick v. Inman, 426 S.W.2d 767, 771 (Tenn.
1968); Mooney v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 221 P.2d 628, 631 (Utah 1950); Werner v. Werner,
526 P.2d 370, 378 (Wash. 1974).9
9 Our survey of sister jurisdictions reveals that forty-six states have recognized the doctrine of
forum non conveniens for cases not involving child custody disputes.
At least twenty-two states have enacted forum non conveniens statutes or promulgated rules
of civil procedure: Ala. Code § 6-5-430 (2005); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-4-101 D. (1999); Cal. Civ.
Proc. Code § 410.30 (2004); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-20-1004 (West 2005); Ga. Code Ann.
§ 9-10-31.1 (2007); La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. Art. 123 (2007); Md. Code. Ann., Cts. & Jud.
Proc. § 6-104(a) (2006); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 5 (West 2000); Miss. Code Ann.
§ 11-11-3(4) (1972); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-538 (1995); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 327(a) (McKinney 2001);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.12 (2007); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 1701.05 (1993); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 5322(e) (West 1981); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 71.051 (Vernon 1997); Va. Code
§ 8.01-265 (2000); W. Va. Code § 56-1-1a (Lexis Nexis 2007); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 801.63 (West
1994); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.061; Ill. S. Ct. R. 187; Ind. R. Trial P. 4.4 (C)-(E); N.D. R. Civ. P.
4(b)(5).
In Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi,
New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia the doctrine was recognized by
the state’s highest court before the enactment or promulgation of the respective statute or rule of
civil procedure. 	Including these states, thirty-eight states have recognized the doctrine through
case law. See Crowson v. Sealaska Corp., 705 P.2d 905, 907-08 (Alaska 1985); First National
Bank & Trust Co. v. Pomona Machinery Co., 486 P.2d 184, 188 (Ariz. 1971); Running v.
Southwest Freight Lines, Inc., 303 S.W.2d 578, 580-81 (Ark. 1957); Price v. Atchison, T. & S.
F. Ry. Co., 268 P.2d 457, 458-63 (Cal. 1954); McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Lohn, 557 P.2d 373,
374 (Colo. 1976); Union Carbide Corp. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 562 A.2d 15, 19-21
- 9 -

The plaintiffs’ contention that the General Assembly’s enactment of the UCCJA’s (now
UCCJEA) forum non conveniens provision, § 15-14.1-19, in 1978 precludes the application of
(Conn. 1989); General Foods Corp. v. Cryo-Maid, Inc., 198 A.2d 681, 683-84 (Del. 1964);
Kinney System, Inc. v. Continental Insurance Co., 674 So.2d 86, 87-94 (Fla. 1996); AT&T Corp.
v. Sigala, 549 S.E.2d 373, 375-77 (Ga. 2001); Lesser v. Boughey, 965 P.2d 802, 804-06 (Haw.
1998); 	Whitney 	v. 	Madden, 	79 	N.E.2d 	593, 	595-96 	(Ill. 	1948); 	Rath 	Packing 	Co. 	v.
Intercontinental Meat Traders, Inc., 181 N.W.2d 184, 189-90 (Iowa 1970); Gonzales v. Atchison
Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 371 P.2d 193, 196-200 (Kan. 1962); Beaven v. McAnulty,
980 S.W.2d 284, 285-88 (Ky. 1998); MacLoed v. MacLoed, 383 A.2d 39, 41-43 (Me. 1978);
Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, Ltd. of London, England, 184 N.E. 152, 157-62
(Mass. 1933); Cray v. General Motors Corp., 207 N.W.2d 393, 395-99 (Mich. 1973); Johnson v.
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co., 66 N.W.2d 763, 767-76 (Minn. 1954); Strickland
v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 11 So.2d 820, 822-23 (Miss. 1943); State ex rel. Chicago, Rock
Island & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Riederer, 454 S.W.2d 36, 37-40 (Mo. 1970); Qualley v.
Chrysler Credit Corp., 217 N.W.2d 914, 915-16 (Neb. 1974); Eaton v. Second Judicial District
Court, 616 P.2d 400, 401-02 (Nev. 1980); Thistle v. Halstead, 58 A.2d 503, 505-07 (N.H. 1948);
Gore v. United States Steel Corp., 104 A.2d 670, 672-76 (N.J. 1954); Buckner v. Buckner, 622
P.2d 242, 243-44 (N.M. 1981); Silver v. Great American Insurance Co., 278 N.E.2d 619, 621-23
(N.Y. 1972); Chambers v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 519 N.E.2d 370, 372-78 (Ohio
1988); St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. v. Superior Court, 276 P.2d 773, 775-79 (Okla.
1954); Plum v. Tampax, Inc., 160 A.2d 549, 552-54 (Pa. 1960); Nienow v. Nienow, 232 S.E.2d
504, 507-08 (S.C. 1977); Rothluebbers v. Obee, 668 N.W.2d 313, 316-21 (S.D. 2003); Zurick v.
Inman, 426 S.W.2d 767, 768-72 (Tenn. 1968); Dow Chemical Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d
674, 676-79 (Tex. 1990); Mooney v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 221 P.2d 628, 638-49 (Utah
1950); Burrington v. Ashland Oil Co., 356 A.2d 506, 509-11 (Vt. 1976); Werner v. Werner, 526
P.2d 370, 377-78 (Wash. 1974); Norfolk and Western Railway Co. v. Tsapis, 400 S.E.2d 239,
242-45 (W. Va. 1990), abrogated by State ex rel. Smith v. Maynard, 454 S.E.2d 46, 50-54 (W.
Va. 1994) (holding that intrastate forum non conveniens is regulated by statute); West Texas
Utilities Co. v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 807 P.2d 932, 935 (Wyo. 1991).
Three states have yet to definitively recognize the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 	The
Montana Supreme Court has not seen fit to adopt the doctrine. See Rule v. Burlington Northern
and Santa Fe Railway Co., 106 P.3d 533, 536 (Mont. 2005) (“this Court does not recognize the
doctrine of forum non conveniens in FELA actions”); State ex rel. Burlington Northern Railroad
Co. v. District Court, 891 P.2d 493, 498 (Mont. 1995) (explaining that the court has “neither
accepted nor rejected the application of forum non conveniens in non-FELA cases and we have
neither denied nor recognized the existence of that doctrine in cases where there is no strong
policy favoring plaintiff’s forum selection”). The Supreme Court of Idaho has mentioned the
doctrine only in passing. See Marco Distributing, Inc. v. Biehl, 555 P.2d 393, 396-97 (Idaho
1976) (deciding the case on personal jurisdiction grounds and not addressing the lower court’s
forum non conveniens inquiry). 	Similarly, the Supreme Court of Oregon has not ruled on the
matter definitively, but Oregon appellate courts have employed the doctrine. See State ex rel.
Hydraulic Servocontrols Corp. v. Dale, 657 P.2d 211, 216 n.5 (Or. 1982) (mentioning forum non
conveniens in dicta); Maricich v. Lacoss, 129 P.3d 193, 195 n.1 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (“We
assume, for purposes of this case, that the doctrine can be applied in Oregon courts.”).
- 10 -

the doctrine generally is of no moment.10 The provision applies only to child custody cases and
allows a court to “decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time if it determines that it is an
inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of another state is a more
appropriate forum.” Section 15-14.1-19. 	The plaintiffs argue that § 15-14.1-19 is the only time
the doctrine of forum non conveniens appears in a Rhode Island statute and that, if forum non
conveniens were already part of the common law, there would have been no need for the
Legislature to confer special authority in child-custody cases. We disagree.
The UCCJEA addresses the doctrine of forum non conveniens only in the limited context
of child custody litigation. 	“Although specific statutes codifying the doctrine will prevail over
the common law, the absence of a statute generally permitting dismissal based on forum non
conveniens does not prohibit us from adopting the doctrine * * *.” AT&T Corp., 549 S.E.2d at
377-78 (holding that the UCCJA does not preclude adoption of forum non conveniens). Further,
in the specific instance of child-custody litigation, we applied the principles of forum non
conveniens even before the UCCJA (now UCCJEA) went into effect in Rhode Island. See
Paolino v. Paolino, 420 A.2d 830, 835-36 (R.I. 1980). At most, the UCCJEA mends the fabric
of the common law, rather than weakening it. Cf. O’Sullivan v. Rhode Island Hospital, 874 A.2d
179, 184 n.9 (R.I. 2005) (discussing how wrongful death acts do not take away common law
rights, rather, “they were designed to mend the fabric of the common law, not to weaken it”).
Indeed, there is no indication that the common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens conflicts
with a state statute or that this Court has ever refused to adopt the doctrine. See Rothluebbers,
668 N.W.2d at 317.
10 The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, enacted in 1978, was replaced by the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) in 2003. G.L. 1956 chapter 14.1 of
title 15; see also P.L. 2003 ch. 307; P.L. 2003 ch. 322.
- 11 -

B. The Forum Non Conveniens Legal Standard
Having recognized that forum non conveniens has vitality in Rhode Island, we take the
opportunity to set forth the standard for applying the doctrine. 	When our own procedural rules
and our case law are silent on a particular issue, “[i]t makes eminent good sense to consider the
experience and the reasoning of the judges in other jurisdictions both as federal judges and
judges of other state courts whose rules are patterned after the federal rules.” Ciunci, Inc. v.
Logan, 652 A.2d 961, 962 (R.I. 1995); see also Landmark Medical Center v. Gauthier, 635 A.2d
1145, 1150 (R.I. 1994) (“we look for guidance to the various approaches of our sister states that
have considered this [common law] question”). The vast majority of states adhere to a test that is
similar to the federal doctrine.11 We therefore will look to the federal courts as well as to our
sister states, although, “[b]y doing so we do not subject ourselves to the[ir] authority * * *.”
Ciunci, Inc., 652 A.2d at 962.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, “when an alternative forum has jurisdiction
to hear [a] case, and when trial in the chosen forum would ‘establish * * * oppressiveness and
vexation to a defendant * * * out of all proportion to plaintiff’s convenience,’ or when the
‘chosen 	forum 	[is] 	inappropriate 	because 	of 	considerations 	affecting 	the 	court’s 	own
administrative and legal problems,’ the court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, dismiss
the case” on forum non conveniens grounds, “even if jurisdiction and proper venue are
11 Legal commentators are in general agreement that most states follow the federal forum non
conveniens test. See Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens
Analysis, 77 Tul. L. Rev. 309, 315 (2002) (thirty states have “effectively identical” analyses to
the federal test, and thirteen other states employ a “very similar” test); David W. Robinson &
Paula K. Speck, Access to State Courts in Transnational Personal Injury Cases: Forum Non
Conveniens and Antisuit Injunctions, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 937, 950 (1990) (as of 1990, thirty-two
states recognized “something very closely resembling” the federal doctrine, and four other states
indicated they would follow the federal doctrine); see also AT&T Corp., 549 S.E.2d at 376 (“the
vast majority of states now follow a standard similar to the federal rule”).
- 12 -

established.” American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 447-48 (1994) (quoting Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981)).
Before embarking on a forum non conveniens inquiry, a court must determine the
existence of proper jurisdiction and venue. See Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 504 (“the doctrine of
forum non conveniens can never apply if there is an absence of jurisdiction or mistake of
venue”). 	A court never can apply forum non conveniens once it determines that jurisdiction is
lacking. Sinochem International Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp., 127 S. Ct.
1184, 1193 (2007). Nevertheless, a court may “dispose of an action by a forum non conveniens
dismissal, bypassing questions of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, when considerations
of convenience, fairness, and judicial economy so warrant.” Id. at 1192. Such a scenario occurs,
for example, when discovery concerning personal jurisdiction would burden a defendant with
expense and delay for “scant purpose” because a court would inevitably dismiss on the basis of
forum non conveniens. Id. at 1194. 	However, in most cases, when a court can “readily
determine that it lacks jurisdiction over the cause or the defendant, the proper course would be to
dismiss on that ground.” Id.
The forum non conveniens inquiry consists of a two-prong analysis. First, the court must
decide whether an alternative forum exists that is both available and adequate to resolve the
disputed legal issues. Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 255 n.22. Second, the court must determine
the inconvenience of continuing in the plaintiff’s chosen forum by weighing private- and public-
interest factors. Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 255; Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 508-09. 	“A
defendant invoking forum non conveniens ordinarily bears a heavy burden in opposing the
plaintiff’s chosen forum.” Sinochem International Co. Ltd., 127 S. Ct. at 1191. It is well settled
- 13 -

that the defendant carries the burden of persuasion at each stage of the forum non conveniens
inquiry. Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 862 F.2d 38, 43-44 (3d Cir. 1988).
The first prong of the forum non conveniens analysis requires a determination of the
existence of an available and adequate alternative forum. 	If the alternative forum is not
available, a court cannot dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. 	The availability of the
alternative forum rests upon whether “the defendant is ‘amenable to process’ in the other
jurisdiction.” Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 255 n.22 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 507).
To guarantee availability, a court can condition a forum non conveniens dismissal on the
defendant’s consent to submit to jurisdiction in the alternative forum. See Kinney System, Inc.,
674 So.2d at 92. For example, in Johnson, 552 A.2d at 34, 37, the court conditioned a forum non
conveniens dismissal on a waiver of the statute of limitations. See also Shewbrooks v. A.C. and
S., Inc., 529 So.2d 557, 562-63 (Miss. 1988) (collecting cases).
Even where the alternative forum is available, a court cannot dismiss on forum non
conveniens grounds if the alternative forum is inadequate. In performing the adequacy calculus,
“[t]he possibility of a change in substantive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or
even substantial weight,” Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 247, because “[i]f substantial weight
were given to the possibility of an unfavorable change in law * * * dismissal might be barred
even where trial in the chosen forum was plainly inconvenient.” Id. at 249. 	However, “if the
remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no
remedy at all, the unfavorable change in law may be given substantial weight * * *.” Id. 	at 	254.
As Wright & Miller point out:
“[T]he bar for establishing that the alternative forum is adequate
historically has been quite low. 	Thus, according to a number of
decisions, the alternative forum is adequate as long as the plaintiff
will 	not 	be 	deprived 	of 	all 	remedies 	or 	subjected 	to 	unfair
- 14 -

treatment. 	A mere decrease in the amount potentially recoverable
or the loss of the availability of contingent fee arrangements, the
absence of the right to a jury trial, or the loss of various other
procedural advantages such as the alternative forum’s restrictions
on the scope or nature of discovery and the lack of a class action or
other aggregation procedures normally will not prevent dismissal.
Likewise, 	general 	accusations 	of 	corruption, 	delay, 	or 	other
problems with the alternative forum’s judicial system normally
will not suffice * * *.” 14D Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal
Practice & Procedure § 3828.3 at 677-82 (3d ed. 2007).
The second prong of the forum non conveniens inquiry focuses on the inconvenience of
continuing in the chosen forum by weighing private- and public-interest factors. 	It is not
possible to catalogue all the circumstances that may or may not lead to a forum non conveniens
dismissal. Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 508. 	Because the doctrine requires flexibility, central
emphasis should not be placed on any one private- or public-interest factor. Piper Aircraft Co.,
454 U.S. at 249-50. 	Nevertheless, the most relevant private- and public-interest factors have
been clearly and repeatedly identified by the United States Supreme Court. See Gulf Oil Corp.,
330 U.S. at 508; see also American Dredging Co., 510 U.S. at 448-49; Van Cauwenberghe v.
Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 528 (1988); Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 241 n.6.
The private interests of the litigants include the following factors:
“Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources
of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of
unwilling, 	and 	the 	cost 	of 	obtaining 	attendance 	of 	willing,
witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be
appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that
make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Gulf Oil
Corp., 330 U.S. at 508.12
Other factors that may be relevant to the private-interest assessment include the
enforceability of a judgment in the alternative forum, and the advantages and obstacles to a fair
12 The weight to be given to a plaintiff’s willingness to bring witnesses to the chosen forum is in
the sound discretion of the trial justice. Myers v. Boeing Co., 794 P.2d 1272, 1278 (Wash. 1990).
- 15 -

trial. Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 508. 	Also, a “plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient
forum, ‘vex,’ ‘harass,’ or ‘oppress’ the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not
necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy.” Id. The private interest of a plaintiff should be
afforded more weight when the forum choice appears to be based on legally valid reasons such
as convenience and expense. Conversely, the private interest of a defendant should be afforded
more weight when a plaintiff’s choice of forum seems motivated by forum-shopping objectives
such as tactical attempts to harness more favorable laws and damages remedies, taking advantage
of jurisdictions with generous jury verdicts, or causing inconvenience and expense to a
defendant. Cf. Iragorri v. United Technologies Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 71-72 (2d Cir. 2001)
(discussing deference afforded to plaintiff’s forum choice). 	The convenience of access by
counsel to a plaintiff’s chosen forum ordinarily is not given appreciable weight in the private-
interest calculus. Johnson, 552 A.2d at 33 (citing cases in other states).
The United States Supreme Court also has identified several public-interest factors:
“Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is
piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin.
Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people
of a community which has no relation to the litigation. 	In cases
which touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for
holding the trial in their view and reach rather than in remote parts
of the country where they can learn of it by report only. There is a
local interest in having localized controversies decided at home.
There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a diversity
case in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern
the case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle
problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself.” Gulf Oil
Corp., 330 U.S. at 508-09.
Some courts have proceeded to analyze the public-interest factors only when the balance
of the private-interest factors is close or in equipoise. See, e.g., Friends for All Children, Inc. v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 717 F.2d 602, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting Pain v. United
- 16 -

Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 784-85 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); Kinney System, Inc., 674 So.2d at
91. 	Many other courts consider the private- and public-interest factors collectively without
making a preliminary inquiry into the private factors. See generally 14D Charles Alan Wright et
al., § 3828.4. 	Wright & Miller advocate the latter approach and argue that “there is no sound
basis” for making a preliminary inquiry into the private factors. Id. § 3828.4 at 692. They point
to language in Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 257, which states that a trial court must consider
“all relevant public and private interest factors.” See Charles Alan Wright et al., § 3828.4 at 692.
We agree with this latter approach and conclude that a trial court should consider both the
private- and public-interest factors in ruling on a motion to dismiss on the grounds of forum non
conveniens. See Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 508-09 (considering both private- and public-interest
factors 	to 	make 	the 	forum 	non 	conveniens 	determination); 	Watson 	v. 	Merrell-Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 769 F.2d 354, 356 (6th Cir. 1985); Cowan v. Ford Motor Co., 713 F.2d
100, 102-03 (5th Cir. 1983).
C. The Standard of Review
The application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens leaves much to the discretion of
the trial court. Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 508. 	A forum non conveniens dismissal is not a
decision on the merits, rather “it is a determination that the merits should be adjudicated
elsewhere.” Sinochem International Co. Ltd., 127 S. Ct. at 1192. A trial court’s decision to grant
or deny a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 257; Durkin v. Intevac, Inc., 782
A.2d 103, 111 (Conn. 2001) (“A ruling on a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.”); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Co., 555 N.E.2d 214, 217-18 (Mass. 1990). 	“[W]here the court has considered all
- 17 -

relevant public and private interest factors, and where its balancing of these factors is reasonable,
its decision deserves substantial deference.” Piper Aircraft Co, 454 U.S. at 257.
D. Forum Non Conveniens Applied to These Cases
This Court has previously said that we will not fault a trial justice for lack of
clairvoyance. State v. Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 829 (R.I. 2008). 	Nor do we expect a trial justice to
apply standards that have yet to be pronounced. 	Nevertheless, it is our conclusion that the
doctrine of forum non conveniens does exist in Rhode Island as an inherent judicial power, albeit
heretofore we have never had occasion to recognize it formally. 	We further conclude that the
circumstances of these thirty-nine cases present compelling reasons for the application of the
doctrine. Accordingly, we vacate the orders denying defendants’ motions to dismiss.
The Superior Court in these cases found that jurisdiction and venue were proper and that
Rhode Island was not mired in asbestos litigation, a condition we attribute in no small measure to
the efficiency of the trial justice currently presiding over the asbestos calendar. 	The court also
noted that although “the asbestos docket has been active, it has been neither unmanageable nor
unwieldy.” 	Beyond these limited observations, however, the trial justice made no findings
relevant to the forum non conveniens inquiry that we have pronounced herein. 	We have
considered remanding these cases for further development of the facts and review in accordance
with the standards set forth in this opinion. 	We are persuaded, however, that the significant
factors pertinent to the relevant inquiry weigh so heavily in favor of dismissal that such a remand
is unnecessary. 	We proceed, therefore, to decide the issue in the exercise of our supervisory
powers. See Tanner v. Town Council of East Greenwich, 880 A.2d 784, 801 (R.I. 2005).
The defendants concede that the Superior Court has proper jurisdiction and venue, so we
proceed directly to the forum non conveniens inquiry. 	The defendants must establish that
- 18 -

plaintiffs have an adequate alternative forum available to them. 	The plaintiffs stated in the
Superior Court that “we could file these cases in Canada, certainly we could file a complaint; but
* * * these plaintiff’s [sic] cannot get the kind of discovery in Canada that they can get here.”
The plaintiffs therefore acknowledge that Canada stands ready as an available alternative forum.
Further, Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 254, teaches that differences in discovery standards are
not enough to establish the inadequacy of the forum. The remedy in the alternative forum must
be clearly inadequate, which is certainly not the case here. It cannot be disputed that Canada has
a legal system capable of affording the possibility of remedies to the plaintiffs in the underlying
cases. See generally David S. Morritt & Sonia L. Bjorkquist, Product Liability in Canada:
Principles and Practice North of the Border, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 177 (2000). 	At oral
argument, there was some disagreement about the running of the statute of limitations in another
forum. 	To ensure the availability of another adequate forum, we will condition the forum non
conveniens dismissals upon defendants’ agreement to waive any statute of limitations defense in
such alternative forum. See Johnson, 552 A.2d at 37; Shewbrooks, 529 So.2d at 562-63.
The second prong of the inquiry requires a weighing of the private- and public-interest
factors. 	Relevant private factors include: (1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof;
(2) the availability of compulsory process for unwilling witnesses and the cost of obtaining
attendance for willing witnesses; (3) the possibility of a view of premises when relevant; and
(4) all 	other 	practical 	problems 	that 	might make 	trial 	of 	a 	case 	easy, 	expeditious, 	and
inexpensive. Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 508. 	Other relevant factors may include the
enforceability of the judgment in the alternative forum and a plaintiff’s vexation, harassment, or
oppression of a defendant by choosing an inconvenient forum. Id.
- 19 -

In the Superior Court, plaintiffs said that “Rhode Island provides the best opportunity for
these plaintiffs to have their cases heard,” and that plaintiffs “have a better shot in this courtroom
[in Rhode Island] than in anyplace in Canada * * *.” 	The plaintiffs also acknowledged that in
Canada they would receive damage awards only in an amount over and above any money
awarded to Canadian workers’ compensation boards, who are unnamed in the underlying cases
but remain “true parties in interest” to the litigation. 	The plaintiffs described the situation as
“almost a reverse lien,” in which “[o]nce the plaintiffs satisfy the lien that the workers’ comp
boards have on the plaintiff’s case, the plaintiff gets anything over and above that; so the
plaintiffs here * * * are true parties in interest.”
We note, however, that neither plaintiffs nor defendants in the underlying cases are
residents of Rhode Island or domiciled here. 	Much of the evidence necessarily is in Canada or
other United States jurisdictions. 	The trial justice observed that the injuries and treatment
occurred in Canada, where plaintiffs are residents. 	The complaint in the appellate record13
contains a long recitation of tortious acts, none of which are alleged to have occurred in Rhode
Island. No witnesses, workplace sites, or any other relevant evidence appear to be situated in the
Ocean State.14 Moreover, most if not all of the relevant information on the issue of damages is
in Canada or jurisdictions other than Rhode Island. 	Access to proof is clearly less convenient
here than in any jurisdiction where any of the defendants or plaintiffs are situated or where the
13 On July 6, 2006, this Court granted a joint motion of the parties to designate portions of the
trial record for transmittal under Article I, Rule 10(c) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate
Procedure. 	Accordingly, by agreement of the parties, the appellate record includes only one
complaint.
14 Tellingly, plaintiffs’ brief does not identify a single example of discoverable evidence that
exists in Rhode Island. The plaintiffs argued before the trial justice that forum non conveniens is
not appropriate for asbestos litigation because expert witnesses are deposed across the United
States. 	The plaintiffs did not identify any expert witnesses, however, within the borders of
Rhode Island.
- 20 -

injury or allegedly tortious conduct occurred. 	Moreover, if the view of any premises were
relevant and desirable, it would not occur in Rhode Island.
Turning to the availability of witnesses, “only Canadian courts, not courts within the
United States, have the legal power to compel the testimony of * * * Canadian potential
witnesses who are not under the control of any party.” Howe, 946 F.2d at 951. Because no one
other than the attorneys involved actually is located in Rhode Island, literally all the witnesses
and parties would have to travel to Rhode Island for the trial or other proceedings. We are of the
opinion, therefore, that the relevant private-interest factors militate in favor of dismissal and
counterbalance the deference to which plaintiffs’ choice of forum is entitled. Cf. Stewart v. Dow
Chemical Co., 865 F.2d 103, 107 (6th Cir. 1989) (affirming forum non conveniens dismissal
when evidence pertaining to injuries, treating physicians, the site of the injury, and witnesses
were all in Canada); 3M Co. v. Johnson, 926 So.2d 860, 865 (Miss. 2006) (dismissing an
asbestos action on forum non conveniens grounds for parties that had no connection with the
plaintiff’s chosen forum).
We now turn to the public-interest factors. 	They include: (1) administrative difficulties
associated with court congestion; (2) the burden of jury duty when the community has no
relation to the litigation; (3) the interest in having cases involving many people heard nearby the
people affected and in having localized controversies decided at home; and (4) avoiding
problems in conflict of laws and the application of foreign law. Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 508-
09.
Without question, the public-interest factors weigh heavily toward dismissal. 	Although
the Superior Court found that asbestos litigation has not congested Rhode Island courts, the other
public-interest factors far outweigh this consideration. In the case at bar, a jury may have to sit
- 21 -

through a complicated trial that literally has no connection to Rhode Island besides a generalized
interest that is constant throughout the entire United States and beyond, viz., the interest in
preventing asbestos-related diseases. Further, the likelihood that Canadian or other foreign law
would apply in these cases would place additional, although not insurmountable, burdens upon
our courts. Also, significant administrative difficulties may arise with respect to compelling the
attendance of witnesses and the production of documents. 3M Co., 926 So.2d at 865-66.
We recognize that modern technology truly has brought to fruition the “global village”
envisioned by Marshall McLuhan in 1962.15 The advent of electronic data discovery, computer
technology, electronic communication, video depositions, and the relative ease of travel have
greatly relieved the burdens of long-distance litigation. Nevertheless, we must also be cognizant
of the strains such litigation places on Rhode Island’s judicial resources. 	Courts across the
country have experienced a burgeoning of products-liability and negligence litigation, much of
which, as the trial justice noted, transcends geographical boundaries. Our courts in Rhode Island
must stand open to provide remedies to those who have been injured and to treat all litigants
fairly. 	Our courts, however, need not resolve disputes of all persons who choose to file suit in
Rhode Island. See Pain, 637 F.2d at 791 (“the central question which a court must answer when
weighing the public interests in the outcome and administration of a case such as this is whether
the case has a general nexus with the forum sufficient to justify the forum’s commitment of
judicial time and resources to it”); Kinney System, Inc., 674 So.2d at 88 (“Nothing in our law
establishes a policy that Florida must be a courthouse for the world, nor that the taxpayers of the
15 Ironically, Marshall McLuhan (1911-1980) was a Canadian educator, philosopher, and
communications theorist. Although he popularized the term “the global village” in his book The
Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man, 31 (1962), the concept is attributed to
Wyndham Lewis, who wrote in his 1948 book “[T]he earth has become one big village, with
telephones laid on from one end to the other, and air transport, both speedy and safe * * *.”
Wyndham Lewis, America and Cosmic Man, ch. II, 14, 16 (1948).
- 22 -

state must pay to resolve disputes utterly unconnected with this state’s interests.”). In the thirty-
nine cases under review, we are unable to discern any nexus with the State of Rhode Island.
We are satisfied, therefore, that the private- and public-interest factors clearly favor the
application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we vacate the orders of the Superior Court. 	To
ensure the availability of an adequate alternative forum, we direct the Superior Court to enter in
each case an order dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint upon the condition that the defendants
stipulate to waive any statute of limitations defense in the alternative forum. The record shall be
remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
- 23 -

- 1 -
Supreme Court
v 	In re Asbestos Litigation. 	v 	: 	v 	No. 2005-319-
M.P.
v 	v 	v 	(PC 96-9999)
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst,
Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island
02903, at Telephone 222-3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in
order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Deborah L. Kedy, Legal Representative
for the Estate of Brian Scallion et al.
:
v. 	: 	No. 2005-332-M.P.
(PC 04-1552)
A.W. Chesterton Co. et al. 	:
consolidated with

- 2 -
COVER SHEET
TITLE OF CASE: 	Deborah L. Kedy, Legal Representative for the Estate
of Brian Scallion et al. v. A.W. Chesterton Co. et al.,
consolidated with In re Asbestos Litigation
DOCKET SHEET NO.:2005-332-MP and 2005-319-MP
COURT:Supreme
DATE OPINION FILED:May 9, 2008
Appeal from
SOURCE OF APPEAL:SuperiorCounty: Providence
JUDGE FROM OTHER COURT: 	Judge Alice B. Gibney
JUSTICES:Williams, CJ., Goldberg, Flaherty, Suttell, and Robinson, JJ.
WRITTEN BY:Justice Paul A. Suttell, for the Court
ATTORNEYS:
For Petitioners:Gerald Petros, Esq., for General Electric
Robert J. Quigley, Esq., for Lincoln
Electric and Hobart Bros.
Garland Cassada, Esq., for Garlock
Sealing Technologies, LLC
ATTORNEYS:
For Respondents:Donald A. Migliori, Esq.