Newport School Committee v. Rhode Island Department of Education

Supreme Court

Newport School Committee :

v. : No. 2021-37-M.P.
(PC 19-4024)
Rhode Island Department of :
Education et al.

Cumberland School Committee :

v. : No. 2021-38-M.P.
(PC 20-31)
Rhode Island Council on Elementary :
and Secondary Education et al.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov of any typographical
or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court

Newport School Committee :

v. : No. 2021-37-M.P.
(PC 19-4024)
Rhode Island Department of :
Education et al.

Cumberland School Committee :

v. : No. 2021-38-M.P.
(PC 20-31)
Rhode Island Council on Elementary :
and Secondary Education et al.

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, and Lynch Prata, JJ.

OPINION

PER CURIAM. These consolidated cases came before the Supreme Court

pursuant to writs of certiorari issued upon petitions by the defendant, the Department

of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF), seeking a review of a Superior Court

judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Newport School Committee (Newport) and

Cumberland School Committee (Cumberland) (collectively, plaintiffs). These cases

arise out of the plaintiffs’ decision not to reimburse DCYF at the

“per-pupil special-education” rate for the cost of educating children who were placed

in residential treatment programs by DCYF, but who were not receiving

special-education services. In 2018 the Family Court placed two children, A. Doe
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and M. Doe, in the temporary custody of DCYF.1 The Family Court designated

Newport and Cumberland, respectively, as the residences of the children’s custodial

parents for the purpose of determining the municipalities’ financial responsibility

for the children’s education. DCYF subsequently placed A. Doe at Harmony Hill

School and M. Doe at Meadowridge Academy.

At issue are G.L. 1956 §§ 16-64-1.1 and 16-64-1.2; each of these statutes

underwent substantial revision in 2001. See P.L. 2001, ch. 77, art. 22, § 3.

Previously, reimbursements for the cost of educating children placed in residential

facilities were divided into two categories: reimbursements for “seriously

emotionally disturbed children” and reimbursements for “[a]ll other children placed

by DCYF in group homes, child caring facilities, community residences, or other

residential facilities * * *.” See P.L. 1997, ch. 73, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 68, § 3. For

the former category, the municipality paid “its share of the cost of educational

services to DCYF,” which was defined as “at least its average per pupil cost for

special education for the year in which placement commences * * *.” Public Laws

1997, ch. 73, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 68, § 3. For the latter category, the municipality

where the child’s parents resided paid a “contribution * * * [that was] at least the

amount of the average per pupil cost for general or special education” to DCYF or

1
A. Doe and M. Doe were minors during the Family Court proceedings. We use
pseudonyms to respect their privacy.
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to the municipality where the residential facility was located. Public Laws 1998, ch.

68, § 3.

Since the 2001 amendment, however, reimbursements have been divided into

two different categories: reimbursements for children placed by DCYF in residential

facilities that do not include the delivery of educational services and reimbursements

for children placed by DCYF in residential facilities that do include the delivery of

educational services. 2 See § 16-64-1.1. For the former category, the municipality

where the residential facility is located provides the child with education, and the

municipality is reimbursed by the state based upon the number of “beds” that the

municipality provides in its residential facilities. Section 16-64-1.1(b). For the latter

category, the child

“shall have the cost of their education paid for as provided
for in * * * § 16-64-1.2. The city or town determined to
be responsible to DCYF for a per-pupil special-education
cost pursuant to § 16-64-1.2 shall pay its share of the cost
of educational services to DCYF or to the facility
providing educational services.” Section 16-64-1.1(c).

2
Since the 2001 amendment, G.L. 1956 § 16-64-1.1(b) has been further amended to
change the amount of state aid received by each municipality containing a residential
facility. Compare § 16-64-1.1(b), with P.L. 2001, ch. 77, art. 22, § 3. The essence
of the subsection, however, has remained the same. Compare § 16-64-1.1(b), with
P.L. 2001, ch. 77, art. 22, § 3. Section 16-64-1.1(c) has also been amended since
2001, but only stylistic, not substantive, changes were made. See P.L. 2016, ch. 142,
art. 11, § 6 (adding hyphens, deleting a comma, and deleting an extraneous
prepositional phrase). Section 16-64-1.2 has not been amended since 2001.
Compare § 16-64-1.2, with P.L. 2001, ch. 77, art. 22, § 3.
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Section 16-64-1.2 proceeds to outline the methods of designating the parents’

residence for the purpose of determining a municipality’s financial responsibility

pursuant to § 16-64-1.1. Under § 16-64-1.2(a), an “initial factual determination and

designation of the residence of the parent(s) of a child placed in the care and custody

of the state shall be made by the [F]amily [C]ourt * * *.” Section 16-64-1.2(a). If

no such designation is made, the child has been freed or surrendered for adoption,

the child’s parents do not live in the state, or the parents’ residence cannot be

determined, then under § 16-64-1.2 (b) and (c), “[t]he department of elementary and

secondary education shall designate the city or town to be responsible for the

per-pupil special education cost of education to be paid to DCYF * * *.”

Section 16-64-1.2(b), (c). Under § 16-64-1.2(d), “[t]he designation of a city or town

pursuant to subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section shall constitute prima facie

evidence of parents’ residence in the city or town and/or the city or town’s financial

responsibility for the child’s education as provided in § 16-64-1.1.”

Section 16-64-1.2(d).

These consolidated cases began when DCYF filed two “Request[s] for an

Order for Residency Determination and Designation of Party Responsible for the

Education of a Youth Residing in a Residential Facility” with the Commissioner of

Elementary and Secondary Education (the Commissioner), arguing that the

municipalities were required to pay the per-pupil special-education rate pursuant to

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the unambiguous language of §§ 16-64-1.1 and 16-64-1.2. The Commissioner

agreed with DCYF in each case, issuing two decisions that ordered Newport and

Cumberland to reimburse DCYF for the cost of educational services provided to the

children at the special-education rate. After the Council on Elementary and

Secondary Education denied Newport and Cumberland’s independent appeals of the

Commissioner’s decisions, the municipalities appealed to the Superior Court

pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 35 of title 42.

Thereafter, the trial justice consolidated the two cases and issued a written decision.

The trial justice determined that the clear and unambiguous language of

§ 16-64-1.1(c) required the designated city or town to pay “its share of the cost of

educational services to DCYF” rather than the higher, per-pupil special-education

rate. (Emphasis omitted) (quoting § 16-64-1.1(c)). She found that § 16-64-1.1(c)

was devoid of language that obligated the municipalities to pay more than the actual

cost of educational services for the child. She rejected Cumberland’s argument that

the statute did not require it to pay any of the cost of education, reasoning that “there

is no support in either statute for [that] position * * *.”

Even if the statute were ambiguous, the trial justice determined that the

outcome would not differ because requiring the municipalities to pay almost two and

a half times the cost of the children’s education would be absurd. As such, she

granted the appeals, concluding that Cumberland and Newport were responsible for

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the per-pupil general-education cost, and ordered each municipality to reimburse

DCYF in the amounts due. Thereafter, judgment entered in favor of Cumberland

and Newport, and DCYF filed a petition for writ of certiorari in each case.

“When this Court reviews the judgment of the Superior Court in

administrative proceedings, our review is limited to questions of law.” Rossi v.

Employees’ Retirement System, 895 A.2d 106, 110 (R.I. 2006); see also G.L. 1956

§ 42-35-16 (“Any party in interest, if aggrieved by a final judgment * * * in

proceedings brought under § 42-35-15, may * * * petition the [S]upreme [C]ourt

* * * for a writ of certiorari to review any questions of law involved.”). “[I]n

reviewing the trial justice’s legal determinations, this Court has a ‘prerogative to

affirm a determination of a trial justice on grounds different from those enunciated

in his or her decision,’ as well as a prerogative to overturn such a determination on

different grounds.” Miller v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Co.,

111 A.3d 332, 339 (R.I. 2015) (brackets omitted) (quoting John Marandola

Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Delta Mechanical, Inc., 769 A.2d 1272, 1275 (R.I.

2001)).

This Court is the “final arbiter on questions of statutory construction * * *.”

Ryan v. City of Providence, 11 A.3d 68, 70 (R.I. 2011). Therefore, “[a]lthough this

Court affords the factual findings of an administrative agency great deference,

questions of law—including statutory interpretation—are reviewed de novo.” Iselin

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v. Retirement Board of Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island, 943 A.2d

1045, 1049 (R.I. 2008). “In so doing, the Court’s ultimate goal is to give effect to

the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature.” Koback v. Municipal

Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island, 252 A.3d 1247, 1251 (R.I. 2021)

(brackets omitted) (quoting Lang v. Municipal Employees’ Retirement System of

Rhode Island, 222 A.3d 912, 915 (R.I. 2019)). “If a statute is clear and

unambiguous, ‘we must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the

statute their plain and ordinary meanings.’” Athena Providence Place v. Pare, 262

A.3d 679, 681 (R.I. 2021) (quoting Balmuth v. Dolce for Town of Portsmouth, 182

A.3d 576, 580 (R.I. 2018)).

Our de novo review reveals that there is nothing in § 16-64-1.1 or § 16-64-1.2

that expressly obligates a municipality to pay the per-pupil special-education rate

when the child in question is not actually receiving special-education services. See

§§ 16-64-1.1, -1.2. Section 16-64-1.1(c) provides that the “city or town determined

to be responsible to DCYF for a per-pupil special-education cost pursuant to

§ 16-64-1.2 shall pay its share of the cost of educational services to DCYF * * *.”

Section 16-64-1.1(c) (emphasis added). Section 16-64-1.2 provides that, in

circumstances where the parents’ residency is not determined by the Family Court,

the department of elementary and secondary education “shall designate the city or

town to be responsible for the per-pupil special education cost of education to be

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paid to DCYF * * *.” (Emphasis added.) The term “cost” refers to “the amount or

equivalent paid or given or charged * * * for anything bought or taken in barter or

for service rendered.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 515 (1971).

Thus, when the statute authorizes the department of elementary and secondary

education to designate a municipality to be responsible for the “per-pupil special

education cost,” it is not authorizing DCYF to charge the per-pupil special-education

rate regardless of whether there were special-education costs actually incurred.

Pursuant to the clear and unambiguous language of §§ 16-64-1.1 and 16-64-1.2,

municipalities are not required to reimburse DCYF at the per-pupil special-education

rate when there were no special education services rendered and thus, no special

education costs incurred.

There are two issues presented by DCYF’s petitions. The first is whether the

trial justice erred in finding that the statute did not require the municipalities to pay

the per-pupil special-education rate regardless of whether the children received

special-education services. The second is whether the trial justice erred in finding

that the statute obligated the municipalities to pay the per-pupil general-education

rate even though the reference to general education was removed from the statute.

Having resolved the first issue, the remaining question for us to decide is what

reimbursement, if any, DCYF should receive for the educational cost of

non-special-education students placed in residential treatment programs that include

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the delivery of educational services. Given that the General Assembly removed the

notion of a contribution based upon the average per-pupil cost for general education

in 2001, we are inclined to determine that the General Assembly intended to remove

the obligation to reimburse DCYF in such circumstances. However, we deem

supplemental briefing necessary to resolve this issue.

Therefore, we direct the parties to file supplemental briefs in accordance with

this opinion, and the case may be assigned for further argument thereon. DCYF is

directed to file its supplemental brief within forty days of the date of this opinion.

Thereafter, Cumberland and Newport are directed to file a responsive brief within

thirty days of the date of the filing of DCYF’s brief.

Justice Long did not participate.

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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Newport School Committee v. Rhode Island
Department of Education et al.
Title of Case
Cumberland School Committee v. Rhode Island
Council on Elementary and Secondary Education et
al.
No. 2021-37-M.P. (PC 19-4024)
Case Number
No. 2021-38-M.P. (PC 20-31)

Date Opinion Filed June 28, 2024

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, and Lynch Prata, JJ.

Written By Per Curiam.

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Netti C. Vogel

For Plaintiffs:

William J. Conley, Jr., Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal Stephen Adams, Esq.
For Defendants:

Lauren E. Jones, Esq.

SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)