Joao Neves v. State of Rhode Island Keith Nunes v. State of Rhode Island Pablo Ortega v. State of Rhode Island Mario Monteiro v. State of Rhode Island

Supreme Court

(Dissent begins on Page 50)

Joao Neves : No. 2022-92-M.P.
(PM 22-259)
v. :

State of Rhode Island. :

Keith Nunes : No. 2022-93-M.P.
(PM 22-901)
v. :

State of Rhode Island. :

Pablo Ortega : No. 2022-94-M.P.
(PM 22-260)
v. :

State of Rhode Island. :

Mario Monteiro : No. 2023-167-M.P.
(PM 23-921)
v. :

State of Rhode Island. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email: opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any
typographical or other formal errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court

(Dissent begins on Page 50)

Joao Neves : No. 2022-92-M.P.
(PM 22-259)
v. :

State of Rhode Island. :

Keith Nunes : No. 2022-93-M.P.
(PM 22-901)
v. :

State of Rhode Island. :

Pablo Ortega : No. 2022-94-M.P.
(PM 22-260)
v. :

State of Rhode Island. :

Mario Monteiro : No. 2023-167-M.P.
(PM 23-921)
v. :

State of Rhode Island. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Justice Goldberg, for the Court. The United States Supreme Court has held

that it is unconstitutional to impose upon individuals who were under eighteen years

old at the time of their crimes: sentences of death, life imprisonment without parole

-1-
for a nonhomicide offense, or mandatory life imprisonment without parole. 1 In

arriving at these decisions, the Supreme Court “relied on three significant gaps

between juveniles and adults”; namely, individuals under eighteen years of age

possess a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” which

often leads “to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking”; younger persons

“are more vulnerable * * * to negative influences and outside pressures,” including

peer pressure, “have limited ‘control over their own environment’ and lack the

ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings”; and a

juvenile’s “character is not as ‘well formed’ as an adult’s[,] his traits are ‘less fixed’

and his actions less likely to be ‘evidence of irretrievable depravity.’” Miller v.

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012) (brackets omitted) (quoting Roper v. Simmons,

543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005)). As explained, “[t]hese salient characteristics mean

that ‘it is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile

offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare

1
See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012) (“We therefore hold that
mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes
violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”);
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (“The Constitution prohibits the
imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not
commit homicide.”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (“The Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who
were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.”).

-2-
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’” Graham v. Florida,

560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (brackets omitted) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573).

Here, we are confronted with a different dynamic as set forth in G.L. 1956

§ 13-8-13(e) (Subsection (e) or the amendment), but it embodies many of the same

principles discussed in Miller, Graham, and Roper—“the distinctive attributes of

youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on

juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 472.

Enacted in 2021, notably as part of the FY 2022 state budget, Subsection (e) states

in full:

“Any person sentenced for any offense committed prior to
his or her twenty-second birthday, other than a person
serving life without parole, shall be eligible for parole
review and a parole permit may be issued after the person
has served no fewer than twenty (20) years’ imprisonment
unless the person is entitled to earlier parole eligibility
pursuant to any other provisions of law. This subsection
shall be given prospective and retroactive effect for all
offenses occurring on or after January 1, 1991.” (Emphasis
added.)

The parties—the State of Rhode Island (petitioner or state) and Joao Neves,

Keith Nunes, Pablo Ortega, and Mario Monteiro (collectively, respondents)—offer

conflicting interpretations of Subsection (e). The state contends that because

Subsection (e) employs the phrase “any offense”—in the singular—Subsection (e)

is intended to reduce parole eligibility for a single sentence and that qualified

offenders serving multiple sentences, such as respondents, are not eligible for a
-3-
reduction in parole eligibility pursuant to the amendment’s terms. (Emphasis added.)

The respondents counter that Subsection (e) applies to “any offense,” and thus

submit that based upon the meaning and breadth of the term “any,” the amendment

requires aggregating (or combining) multiple sentences for qualified offenders,

including consecutive sentences. (Emphasis added.)

For the reasons discussed below, we hold that Subsection (e) mandates the

aggregation of a qualified offender’s sentences, including consecutive sentences,

and the Court further concludes that Subsection (e), as interpreted, does not violate

the separation-of-powers doctrine. However, the Court declares that although

Subsection (e) applies to respondents, the trial justice erred when he ordered each

respondent immediately paroled to the community. We explain herein.2

Facts and Travel

We first consider the aggregation of prison sentences for parole eligibility.

For those incarcerated and serving multiple terms, whether or not the sentences are

aggregated can mean the difference between serving a sentence in prison and serving

a sentence outside the prison walls, such as on parole. In this context, aggregation

2
We express our gratitude for the amici curiae briefs submitted by the Rhode Island
Department of Corrections; the Rhode Island Parole Board; the Rhode Island Public
Defender; the Roger Williams University School of Law Prisoners’ Rights Clinic;
the Juvenile Law Center, the Sentencing Project, the Gault Center, the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the Prison Policy Initiative; the
Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth, Human Rights for Kids, and Aliza
Hochman Bloom; and the Center for Law, Brain and Behavior.
-4-
means combining the sum total of all pending sentences. To illustrate, an offender

receiving three consecutive ten-year terms would be sentenced to imprisonment for

thirty years, but in accordance with § 13-8-10(a), the offender is eligible for parole

after serving “a term equal to one-third (⅓) of the aggregate time which he or she

shall be liable to serve under his or her several sentences,” in other words, ten years.

The parties agree that the prerequisites to Subsection (e) are satisfied: Each

respondent committed his crimes after January 1, 1991, the crimes were committed

before each respondent was twenty-two years old, none of the respondents were

sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, and each respondent has served at

least twenty years at the Adult Correctional Institutions. They also agree that three

respondents (Neves, Ortega, and Nunes) have been sentenced to life imprisonment,

and a specified term (a number of years) of incarceration, to be served consecutively

to the life sentence; and that Monteiro is serving two consecutive life sentences. The

parties disagree whether Subsection (e) requires these sentences to be aggregated,

thus resulting in the determination of a single parole eligibility date for each

respondent on all sentences; or whether Subsection (e) prohibits aggregation, thus

resulting in each respondent receiving a parole eligibility date on the controlling

sentence only, i.e., the life sentence. The difference is self-evident: If the sentences

are aggregated, each respondent may be paroled to the community; if the sentences

are nonaggregated and a respondent is granted parole on the life sentence (whenever

-5-
that may occur), he must begin serving the consecutive sentence. Only after

becoming eligible for parole on the consecutive sentence—and being granted parole

on that sentence—may each respondent be paroled to the community. We note at

the outset that based on the dates these crimes were committed, parole eligibility for

each life sentence was twenty years. See § 13-8-13(a)(3).

A

Joao Neves

On February 4, 2000, Neves entered a plea of guilty to first-degree murder

and was sentenced to life in prison. In five separate cases, Neves later pled guilty to

seven counts of robbery and one count of assault with intent to commit robbery. He

received ten-year sentences on the convictions for robbery and assault with intent to

commit robbery, with all ten-year sentences to run concurrently with each other, but

consecutively to the life sentence. Effectively, Neves was sentenced to life in prison,

and a ten-year consecutive sentence. Neves committed all offenses in January 1999,

when he was sixteen years old.

Neves appeared before the parole board on August 21, 2019, nearly two years

before Subsection (e) was enacted. The parole board minutes set forth a thoughtful

analysis and provide, in relevant part:

“[T]he Board unanimously votes to parole him August
2021 to his next consecutive sentence. * * * The reason
for the staggered date is the amount of time the Board
believes Mr. Neves should serve on the LIFE sentence.
-6-
We will consider him when he is next eligible on his ten
year consecutive sentence and we will also schedule a
review date in August 2021 to review and assign any
special conditions of parole for his Life sentence.”

On August 23, 2021, approximately two months after the enactment of

Subsection (e), Neves again appeared before the parole board. The parole board

minutes indicate, in relevant part:

“This is a Review as requested in Mr. Neves[’s] August
2019 parole decision so the Board can check in with him
and discuss conditions of parole for his Life Sentence. We
commend Mr. Neves for staying positive and on track. We
would like to see him participate in programming to
address anger management and mindfulness during the
next year.”

A parole permit issued for Neves in August 2021, which included the special

condition that Neves be “Parole[d] to Consecutive Sentence.” The Department of

Corrections (DOC) subsequently determined that Neves would be eligible for parole

from his consecutive sentence and to the community in December 2024. 3

3
General Laws 1956 § 13-8-9(a) provides as follows:

“The parole board, in the case of any prisoner whose
sentence is subject to its control, unless that prisoner is
sentenced to imprisonment for life, and unless that
prisoner is confined as a habitual criminal under the
provisions of § 12-19-21, may, by an affirmative vote of a
majority of the members of the board, issue to that prisoner
a permit to be at liberty upon parole, whenever that
prisoner has served not less than one-third (⅓) of the term
for which he or she was sentenced. The permit shall entitle
the prisoner to whom it is issued to be at liberty during the
-7-
B

Keith Nunes

A jury convicted Nunes of first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit

murder, three counts of felony assault, carrying a pistol without a license, and a

drive-by shooting. Nunes was sentenced to life in prison on the first-degree murder

conviction and ten-year concurrent sentences on the remaining counts, to be served

consecutively to the life sentence. This Court affirmed the conviction. See State v.

Nunes, 788 A.2d 460, 465 (R.I. 2002). Effectively, Nunes was sentenced to life in

prison, and a ten-year consecutive term. Nunes committed his crimes on June 13,

1999, when he was eighteen years old.

On June 17, 2019, approximately two years before the enactment of

Subsection (e), Nunes appeared before the parole board. The parole board minutes

state, in relevant part:

“[T]he Board votes to parole him from this Life Sentence
to his next Consecutive Sentence of ten years. We will see
him when he is next eligible on that sentence. * * *
Conditions of parole on this Life Sentence will include
mental health and substance abuse treatment assessments
and counseling as needed for the duration of parole. The
Board will set more specific conditions when we see him
when he is next eligible. Parole is contingent upon this
offender remaining booking free and in any program or
educational course in which he is currently enrolled.”

remainder of his or her term of sentence upon any terms
and conditions that the board may prescribe.”
-8-
The parole board further indicated that Nunes “will be reviewed in November 2022

to determine conditions of parole on the Life Sentence.”4 A parole permit issued for

Nunes in September 2019, which included the special condition that Nunes be

“Parole[d] to his consecutive sentence.” The DOC subsequently determined that

Nunes would be eligible for parole from his consecutive sentence and to the

community in November 2022.

C

Pablo Ortega

On March 20, 2002, Ortega entered a guilty plea to first-degree murder and

conspiracy to commit a felony. Ortega was sentenced to life in prison on the

first-degree murder conviction and five years on the conspiracy conviction,

consecutive to the life imprisonment sentence. Ortega committed his crimes in

November 2001, when he was nineteen years old.

On November 8, 2021, after the enactment of Subsection (e), Ortega appeared

before the parole board. This is the first parole hearing in which the provisions of

Subsection (e) are addressed. The parole board minutes evince, in relevant part:

“We find that Mr. Ortega has achieved a level of
rehabilitation and served sufficient time to meet statutory
parole release from this Life sentence. We acknowledge
that he has a consecutive sentence of five years and that

4
As discussed, infra, Nunes did not appear before the parole board on that date
because the trial justice had already ordered that Nunes be released to the
community.
-9-
there is an existing legal debate in court on the application
of this term whether it is aggregated and parole is to the
community or whether he must serve his consecutive
sentence imposed by the court. * * * For our part, the Board
votes unanimously [to] parole Mr. Ortega from his Life
sentence to the community or to his next sentence, the same
to be determined by the Department of Corrections.”

A subsequent parole board entry indicates that Ortega was paroled from his life

sentence to the five-year consecutive sentence. A parole permit issued for Ortega in

December 2021, which included the special condition that he was paroled “[t]o the

community or to his next sentence, the same to be determined by the Department of

Corrections.” Ortega would be eligible for parole from his consecutive sentence and

to the community in or around July 2023.

D

Mario Monteiro

On May 3, 2002, a jury convicted Monteiro of first-degree murder, conspiracy

to commit murder, discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence

resulting in death, numerous counts of felony assault, and various other related

charges. We affirmed the conviction. See State v. Monteiro, 924 A.2d 784, 796 (R.I.

2007). As relevant, Monteiro was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life

imprisonment. Monteiro committed his offenses in July 2001, when he was

seventeen years old.

- 10 -
On October 19, 2022, after the enactment of Subsection (e), Monteiro

appeared before the parole board. The parole board minutes state, in relevant part:

“Mr. Monteiro is serving two mandatory consecutive
LIFE sentences for Murder and the Use of a Firearm
During a Violence Crime. He has been serving since
November 29, 2001. * * * We understand that he has a
mandatory consecutive life sentence and that there is an
existing legal debate in court on the application of this
consecutive term – whether it is aggregated and consumed
by the first life sentence eligibility or whether he has yet
to and must serve this next term. * * * For our part, the
Board votes unanimously to parole Mr. Monteiro from his
first life sentence. If it is determined that he must serve
another consecutive life term, then the effective parole
release date shall be the date of this decision (December
15, 2021). If it is determined that he is eligible for
immediate release to the community, then the effective
parole release date shall be no sooner than December
2022. The reason for the staggered release (if to the
community) is the Board believes there should be some
time for Mr. Monteiro to transition to a lower security and
preparation for eventual release.”

A subsequent DOC entry indicates that Monteiro was paroled to the consecutive

sentence and is not eligible for parole from his consecutive sentence until January

2037.

E

The Postconviction-Relief Proceedings

On January 14, 2022, Neves and Ortega filed applications for postconviction

relief in the Superior Court; on February 15, 2022, Nunes filed an application for

postconviction relief; and on February 24, 2023, Monteiro followed. The
- 11 -
applications filed by Neves, Ortega, and Nunes were treated as consolidated and the

consolidated applications, as well as the application filed by Monteiro, were

assigned to a single justice of the Superior Court.

General Laws 1956 chapter 9.1 of title 10 governs the statutory remedy for

postconviction relief. The state and respondents5 filed cross-motions for summary

disposition or summary judgment pursuant to § 10-9.1-6(c) and/or Rule 56 of the

Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, respectively.6 On March 31, 2022, the trial

5
Neves, Ortega, Nunes, and Monteiro were the petitioners in the Superior Court but
are the respondents in the Supreme Court. To avoid confusion, we continue to
reference Neves, Ortega, Nunes, and Monteiro as respondents despite their status in
the Superior Court proceedings.
6
General Laws 1956 § 10-9.1-6(c) states:

“The court may grant a motion by either party for
summary disposition of the application when it appears
from the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact,
together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

This Court has observed that “summary dismissal under § 10-9.1-6(c) ‘closely
resembles’ a grant of summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules
of Civil Procedure” and that “the standards for granting a § 10-9.1-6(c) summary
dismissal are identical to those utilized in passing on a summary judgment motion.”
See Reyes v. State, 141 A.3d 644, 652 (R.I. 2016) (brackets omitted) (quoting
Palmigiano v. State, 120 R.I. 402, 405, 406, 387 A.2d 1382, 1384, 1385 (1978)).

- 12 -
justice heard oral arguments in the Neves/Ortega/Nunes consolidated applications

for postconviction relief and issued a bench decision, granting respondents’ motion

for summary disposition or summary judgment and denying the state’s cross-motion

for summary judgment. In so doing, the trial justice rejected what he characterized

as the state’s “disaggregation method” to calculate parole eligibility and concluded

that “as of July 6, 2021, each [respondent] was entitled to be paroled to the

community as they each had served 20 years and they were each 22 years or younger

at the time of the commission of their crimes.” The trial justice added that:

“Based upon the unanimous decisions of the [p]arole
[b]oard that each [respondent] satisfied the criteria for
parole, Neves and Nunes should have been issued a parole
permit to the community on or shortly after July 6, 2021
and Ortega should have been issued a parole permit to the
community when the [p]arole [b]oard issued its permit on
December 10, 2021.

“* * *

“The terms of [Subsection (e)] entitles each [respondent]
to immediate release. Therefore, the [c]ourt orders that
each [respondent] shall be immediately released from
incarceration at the Adult Correctional Institutions to
parole, to be at liberty in the community, upon such terms
and conditions as previously or hereinafter set by the
[p]arole [b]oard.”

Subsequently, an order issued that Neves be “immediately released from

incarceration to be at liberty on parole upon the terms and conditions set by the

[p]arole [b]oard by unanimous vote on August 21, 2021”; that Ortega be

- 13 -
“immediately released from incarceration to be at liberty on parole upon the terms

and conditions set by the [p]arole [b]oard by unanimous vote on November 8, 2021”;

and that Nunes be “immediately brought before the [p]arole [b]oard to determine the

terms and conditions for his release from incarceration to be at liberty on parole and

to be thereafter released from incarceration to be at liberty on parole in accordance

with such terms and conditions.” On March 31, 2022, judgment entered on the

Neves/Ortega/Nunes consolidated cases.

On May 17, 2023, the trial justice issued a written decision, granting

Monteiro’s motion for summary disposition and denying the state’s cross-motion for

summary disposition. In so doing, the trial justice concluded that Subsection (e)

applied to respondent and he further rejected the state’s argument that, as interpreted,

Subsection (e) modifies a judicial sentence and therefore represented an

impermissible encroachment by the General Assembly into powers constitutionally

reserved to the judicial branch of government. A subsequent order issued that

Monteiro be “immediately brought before the [p]arole [b]oard to confirm the terms

and conditions for his release from incarceration to be at liberty on parole set in

December 2021 with review after December 2022 and to be thereafter released from

incarceration to be at liberty on parole in accordance with such terms and

conditions.” Judgment entered on May 22, 2023.

- 14 -
F

The Supreme Court Proceedings

On April 4, 2022, the state filed three separate petitions for a writ of certiorari,

seeking review of the judgments entered with respect to Neves, Ortega, and Nunes.

Thereafter, on April 7, 2022, the state filed an emergency motion seeking a stay of

the trial justice’s decision and order that each respondent (Neves, Ortega, and Nunes)

be immediately released on parole. A single justice of this Court granted the

emergency stay, pending consideration by the full Court. Upon consideration, this

Court ordered that the Neves and Nunes cases “shall be remanded to the Superior

Court for the sole purpose of the Superior Court setting bail on the consecutive

sentence to which respondent was paroled by the [p]arole [b]oard.” This Court also

denied the emergency motion to stay with respect to Ortega. It is our understanding

that upon his release from the ACI, Ortega was taken into federal custody on an

immigration detainer and ultimately deported. In due course, we granted the state’s

petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the trial justice’s judgments with respect

to Neves, Ortega, and Nunes.7

7
Because Ortega has been deported, is no longer in the United States, his return to
the United States is, at best, speculative, and he is no longer under the control of the
parole board, we conclude that review of the trial justice’s judgment granting
Ortega’s postconviction-relief application is moot. See Boyer v. Bedrosian, 57 A.3d
259, 272 (R.I. 2012) (“A case is moot if there is no continuing stake in the
controversy, or if the court’s judgment would fail to have any practical effect on the
- 15 -
On May 23, 2023, the state filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, seeking

review of the judgment entered with respect to Monteiro. Thereafter, on May 26,

2023, the state filed an emergency motion seeking a stay of the trial justice’s decision

and order that Monteiro be released on parole. A single justice of this Court granted

the emergency stay, pending consideration by the full Court. Upon consideration,

this Court granted the emergency motion to stay the decision and order. Monteiro

remains incarcerated at the ACI. In due course, we granted the state’s petition for a

writ of certiorari and ordered all matters consolidated.

Standard of Review

“The postconviction remedy, set forth in § 10-9.1-1, provides that ‘one who

has been convicted of a crime may seek collateral review of that conviction based

on alleged violations of his or her constitutional rights.’” Brown v. State, 32 A.3d

901, 907 (R.I. 2011) (quoting Lynch v. State, 13 A.3d 603, 605 (R.I. 2011)). The

applicant carries “‘the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

such relief is warranted’ * * *.” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Laurence,

18 A.3d 512, 521 (R.I. 2011)). This Court reviews “de novo any post-conviction

relief decision involving questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact

controversy.”). Consequently, further reference to Ortega within this opinion is
unnecessary.
- 16 -
pertaining to an alleged violation of an applicant’s constitutional rights.” Id. at 908

(quoting Cote v. State, 994 A.2d 59, 63 (R.I. 2010)).

In this respect, “[t]he construction of legislative enactments is a matter

reserved for the courts and, as final arbitrator on questions of construction, it is this

[C]ourt’s responsibility in interpreting a legislative enactment to determine and

effectuate the Legislature’s intent and to attribute to the enactment the meaning most

consistent with its policies or obvious purposes.” State v. Badessa, 869 A.2d 61, 65

(R.I. 2005) (deletion omitted) (quoting Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 633, 637 (R.I.

1987)). “This Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo.” Rose v.

State, 92 A.3d 903, 906 (R.I. 2014) (brackets omitted) (quoting McCulloch v.

McCulloch, 69 A.3d 810, 819 (R.I. 2013)).

“When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must

interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and

ordinary meanings.” Rose, 92 A.3d at 906 (brackets omitted) (quoting State v.

Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 485 (R.I. 2013)). As we have stated on innumerable

occasions, “it is generally presumed that the General Assembly intended every word

of a statute to have a useful purpose and to have some force and effect.” State v.

Briggs, 58 A.3d 164, 168 (R.I. 2013) (brackets omitted) (quoting Curtis v. State, 996

A.2d 601, 604 (R.I. 2010)). Thus, we “consider the entire statute as a whole;

individual sections must be considered in the context of the entire statutory scheme,

- 17 -
not as if each section were independent of all other sections.” Id. (quoting Mendes

v. Factor, 41 A.3d 994, 1002 (R.I. 2012)). Finally, “under no circumstances will

this Court construe a statute to reach an absurd result.” State v. Morrice, 58 A.3d

156, 160 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Mendes, 41 A.3d at 1002).

Discussion

A

Parole Eligibility

It is well settled that “there is no constitutional or inherent right to parole

* * *.” Bishop v. State, 667 A.2d 275, 278 (R.I. 1995) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459

U.S. 460, 467 (1983)). Instead, parole accrues to an offender “through legislative

grace and can be withheld or withdrawn by the legislature at will.” State v. Fazzano,

96 R.I. 472, 478, 194 A.2d 680, 684 (1963).

In Rhode Island, parole is governed by chapter 8 of title 13, and within that

chapter the General Assembly “has provided a statutory scheme that creates a parole

board and generally empowers the parole board to grant parole to any prisoner within

its control upon completion of a specified portion of the sentence imposed.”

Skawinski v. State, 538 A.2d 1006, 1007 (R.I. 1988). In determining whether the

parole eligibility calculation under Subsection (e) requires aggregation of sentences,

we focus on three provisions.

- 18 -
For offenders serving a single sentence, except a sentence of life

imprisonment or a habitual-criminal sentence pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 12-19-21, the

parole board may “issue to that prisoner a permit to be at liberty upon parole,

whenever that prisoner has served not less than one-third (⅓) of the term for which

he or she was sentenced.” Section 13-8-9(a).8 Because § 13-8-9 applies only to

offenders serving single sentences, aggregation has no application.

For offenders serving more than one sentence, parole eligibility is generally

calculated through § 13-8-10(a). This provision expressly mandates the method of

calculation when multiple sentences are imposed, either concurrently or

consecutively:

“If a prisoner is confined upon more than one sentence, a
parole permit may be issued whenever he or she has served
a term equal to one-third (⅓) of the aggregate time which
he or she shall be liable to serve under his or her several
sentences, unless he or she has been sentenced to serve two
(2) or more terms concurrently, in which case the permit
shall be issued when he or she has served a term equal to
one-third (⅓) of the maximum term he or she is required
to serve.” (Emphases added.)

This Court has observed that under § 13-8-10, “[a] prisoner serving consecutive

sentences is eligible for parole after serving a term equal to one-third of the total

8
Notwithstanding this provision, “in the case of a conviction for a first- or
second-degree murder committed after July 1, 2015, when the prisoner has not been
sentenced to life, the prisoner shall not be eligible for a parole permit until he or she
has served at least fifty-percent (50%) of his or her sentence.” Section 13-8-9(b).
- 19 -
amount of the sentences,” that is, the sentences are aggregated. See Lerner v. Gill,

463 A.2d 1352, 1364 (R.I. 1983). We also expressed that “[i]t is clear that §§ 13-8-9

and -10 address themselves to prisoners serving a sentence or sentences the length

of which was known at the time of imposition. * * * [I]t is obvious that the

concurrent and consecutive provisos of § 13-8-10 refer to those sentences whose

terms are definite.” Id. at 1365; see also DeCiantis v. State, 666 A.2d 410, 412 (R.I.

1995) (“The applicant seeks to invoke § 13-8-10, entitled ‘Prisoners subject to more

than one sentence.’ The applicant in fact is subject to more than one sentence. But

because the sentences he must serve are life sentences, his parole eligibility is

governed by § 13-8-13, entitled ‘Life prisoners and prisoners with lengthy

sentences.’”).

Lastly, for offenders serving an indeterminate sentence of life imprisonment,

or offenders serving sentences in which the offender is ineligible for a permit in less

than ten years pursuant to §§ 13-8-9 and 13-8-10, parole eligibility is calculated in

accordance with § 13-8-13, entitled “Life prisoners and prisoners with lengthy

sentences.” That provision provides, in relevant part:

“(a) In the case of a prisoner sentenced to imprisonment
for life, a parole permit may be issued at any time after the
prisoner has served not less than ten (10) years’
imprisonment; provided that:

“(1) In the case of a prisoner serving a sentence or
sentences of a length making him or her ineligible for a
permit in less than ten (10) years, pursuant to §§ 13-8-9
- 20 -
and 13-8-10, the permit may be issued at any time after the
prisoner has served not less than ten (10) years’
imprisonment;

“* * *

“(3) In the case of a prisoner sentenced to imprisonment
for life for a first- or second-degree murder committed
after June 30, 1995, the permit may be issued only after
the prisoner has served not less than twenty (20) years’
imprisonment;

“* * *

“(d) * * * [I]n the case of a prisoner sentenced
consecutively to more than one life term for crimes
occurring after June 30, 1995, the permit may be issued
only after the prisoner has served not less than fifteen (15)
years consecutively on each life sentence.” Section
13-8-13(a)(1), (a)(3), (d).

In stark contrast to these amendments, which radically extended the time for parole

eligibility, Subsection (e) falls directly below § 13-8-13(d) and amalgamates definite

and indeterminate sentences and reduces the time for parole eligibility.

In DeCiantis, we considered the parole eligibility of an offender sentenced to

serve two concurrent life sentences, as well as “another life sentence to be served

consecutively to the concurrent sentences.” DeCiantis, 666 A.2d at 411. When

DeCiantis was convicted, a prisoner was eligible for parole on a life sentence after

ten years. Id. at 412-13. On postconviction relief, DeCiantis sought to invoke

§ 13-8-10; and we held that because the sentences were indeterminate life sentences,

- 21 -
what was then codified as § 13-8-13(b) controlled.9 Id. In so doing, this Court

aggregated the sentences and expressed that then-§ 13-8-13(b) “require[d] that

applicant serve [a single term of ten years on] the concurrent life sentences and an

additional ten years on the consecutive life sentence before becoming eligible for

consideration for parole.” Id. at 412 (emphasis added); see also id. at 413 (observing

that “a prisoner who is serving only one life sentence consecutively to another life

sentence must serve twenty years before even seeking parole”); In re Advisory

Opinion to the Governor, 421 A.2d 535, 536 (R.I. 1980) (“[A]n individual who has

been sentenced to serve two or more consecutive life sentences must serve ten years

on each sentence before seeking parole.”). 10

9
This provision is currently codified as § 13-8-13(d).
10
Since its enactment in 1915, § 13-8-13 has been the subject of numerous
amendments. At the time DeCiantis was sentenced, § 13-8-13 consistently provided
that “a prisoner sentenced to imprisonment for life” was eligible for parole after
serving not less than ten years imprisonment; “a prisoner serving a sentence or
sentences of a length making him ineligible for a permit in less than ten (10) years
pursuant to 13-8-9 and 13-8-10” was eligible for parole after serving not less than
ten years imprisonment; and “a prisoner sentenced consecutively to more than one
life term, for crimes occurring after the effective date of this statute,” was eligible
for parole after serving “not less than ten (10) years consecutively on each life
sentence * * *.” Section 13-8-13, as enacted by P.L. 1981, ch. 36, § 1. Over time,
parole eligibility has continued to evolve. Currently, “[i]n the case of a prisoner
sentenced to imprisonment for life for a first- or second-degree murder committed
after July 10, 1989, the permit may be issued only after the prisoner has served not
less than fifteen (15) years’ imprisonment”; “[i]n the case of a prisoner sentenced to
imprisonment for life for a first- or second-degree murder committed after June 30,
1995, the permit may be issued only after the prisoner has served not less than twenty
(20) years’ imprisonment”; and “[i]n the case of a prisoner sentenced to
- 22 -
The focus of the parole statute scheme and this Court’s opinion is parole

eligibility, not attainment of a parole permit. This Court has never held that a

prisoner must be granted parole on one sentence to then begin serving the next

consecutive sentence.

Our conclusion that the structure and statutory framework governing parole

mandates aggregating an offender’s multiple definite and indeterminate sentences in

order to calculate parole eligibility, including consecutive sentences, accords with

the practice of the DOC in certain respects. In its amicus brief, the DOC avers that

“[a]ny prisoner who is sentenced to multiple sentences, is eligible for consideration

of parole after serving one-third (1/3) of the aggregate time which he or she shall be

required to serve under his or her sentence.” (Citing § 13-8-10(a).) The DOC also

represents that “[w]hen ascertaining the initial parole eligibility date on multiple life

sentences, the Department aggregates the term of years using the mandatory

minimums provided in § 13-8-13,” except that the DOC has interpreted

Subsection (e) “as prohibiting [aggregating] * * * multiple consecutive life

sentences, specifically where the minimum mandatory term(s) of imprisonment

pursuant to § 13-8-13 were greater than twenty (20) years.” Despite generally

aggregating an offender’s multiple definite and indeterminate sentences, the DOC

imprisonment for life for a first- or second-degree murder committed after July 1,
2015, the permit may be issued only after the prisoner has served not less than
twenty-five (25) years’ imprisonment[.]” See § 13-8-13(a)(2)-(a)(4).
- 23 -
acknowledges that “a distinction [is made] that a life sentence with a consecutive

term of years sentence, is not aggregated when calculating parole eligibility dates.” 11

That is the crux of this case. We see no statutory authority for this ad hoc policy in

general and particularly with respect to Subsection (e). This policy conflates parole

eligibility with the actual attainment of parole. In the context of Subsection (e), we

conclude that this distinction, which has the antithetical result of prolonging parole

eligibility for qualified offenders, is unwarranted. When the parole board grants

parole, the “inmate should be released from confinement,” subject to the parole

board’s conditions. See Dinkins v. Massachusetts Parole Board, 160 N.E.3d 613,

620 (Mass. 2021); see also § 13-8-14(a)(3), (a)(4) (requiring parole board to

consider, inter alia, the “reasonable probability that the prisoner, if released, would

live and remain at liberty without violating the law” and the prisoner’s “role in the

city or town in which he or she is to reside”); Dinkins, 160 N.E.3d at 623

(“‘[R]equiring the board to make a series of decisions granting parole from one

sentence to the next rather than a single decision on the basis of one parole eligibility

date for all sentences’ would ‘make little sense since the decision to grant parole is

to be based on whether the board believes the prisoner can live freely outside of

11
We are advised that, prior to 2018, the DOC practice was to determine parole
eligibility by aggregating a life sentence with a consecutive sentence. The DOC
unilaterally changed this practice in the absence of statutory authority. See, e.g.,
Lerner v. Gill, 463 A.2d 1352, 1365 (R.I. 1983).
- 24 -
prison without violating the law.’”) (brackets omitted) (quoting Henschel v.

Commissioner of Correction, 330 N.E.2d 480, 484 (Mass. 1975)). We turn our

attention to this amendment.

B

Statutory Construction

Subsection (e) states:

“Any person sentenced for any offense committed prior to
his or her twenty-second birthday, other than a person
serving life without parole, shall be eligible for parole
review and a parole permit may be issued after the person
has served no fewer than twenty (20) years’ imprisonment
unless the person is entitled to earlier parole eligibility
pursuant to any other provisions of law. This subsection
shall be given prospective and retroactive effect for all
offenses occurring on or after January 1, 1991.” (Emphasis
added.)

This amendment is not a model of clarity because, although its clear intent is to

reduce the period of incarceration for qualified offenders, it fails to address

consecutive sentences.12

The state submits that because Subsection (e) employs the phrase “any

offense”—in the singular—the amendment applies only to qualified offenders

serving a single sentence, not offenders serving multiple sentences, such as

respondents. (Emphasis added.) Under the state’s interpretation, when a qualified

12
There are additional infirmities in Subsection (e), which are not before us. See
infra.
- 25 -
offender must serve more than twenty years’ incarceration on a single sentence

before becoming eligible for parole, Subsection (e) operates to reduce the eligibility

to twenty years’ incarceration. The state’s argument continues that if a qualified

offender is granted parole on the single sentence, he or she would be paroled to the

next consecutive sentence and required to serve the statutory minimum sentence on

the consecutive sentence before the parole eligibility process would begin anew.

The respondents counter that Subsection (e) applies to “any offense,” and they

focus on the breadth of the word “any.” (Emphasis added.) Based on the usage and

plain meaning of the term “any,” respondents contend that when determining parole

eligibility, Subsection (e) contemplates aggregating multiple sentences, including

consecutive sentences. Since aggregation of each respondent’s sentences would

result in a parole eligibility date exceeding twenty years, respondents posit that the

amendment provides for parole eligibility at no fewer than twenty years’

incarceration, which they have served. Under this interpretation, a qualified offender

could be granted parole on all pending sentences, including consecutive sentences,

and would be paroled to the community. We agree with respondents and set forth

our reasoning.

First, although the narrow issue before this Court concerns the interpretation

of Subsection (e), “we must consider the entire statute as a whole; individual sections

must be considered in the context of the entire statutory scheme, not as if each

- 26 -
section were independent of all other sections.” Briggs, 58 A.3d at 168 (quoting

Mendes, 41 A.3d at 1002). In so doing, we have determined that the statutory

scheme pertaining to the calculation of parole eligibility for offenders serving

multiple definite or indeterminate sentences, including consecutive sentences,

requires aggregation. See supra. Recognizing that because the statutory scheme

generally requires that offenders serving multiple definite sentences or multiple

indeterminate sentences must have their terms aggregated for parole eligibility

purposes, it would be inconsistent with the General Assembly’s overall intent and

the structure of the parole statutes to conclude that chapter 8 prohibits aggregating

an offender’s sentences for parole eligibility purposes when those sentences contain

both definite and indeterminate terms.

In construing the overall statutory scheme, we also note that in 2021, also as

part of the FY 2022 state budget, the General Assembly mandated that when a person

“serving a sentence imposed as the result of an offense or offenses committed when

he or she was less than eighteen years of age becomes eligible for parole,” the parole

board must “provide[] a meaningful opportunity to obtain release” and must consider

“the diminished culpability of juveniles as compared to that of adults and any

subsequent growth and increased maturity of the prisoner during incarceration.”

Section 13-8-14.2. The General Assembly’s efforts resulting in the simultaneous

enactment of § 13-8-14.2 and Subsection (e) must be read in tandem and evince an

- 27 -
overall intent to afford juvenile offenders a meaningful opportunity for parole to the

community, if deemed appropriate by the parole board.

Second, we are mindful of the breadth of the language utilized by the General

Assembly; most notably, the word “any” appears twice within the first six words.

See § 13-8-13(e). Consistent with its plain language and meaning, this Court has

interpreted “any” in its broadest sense.

In State v. Mann, 119 R.I. 720, 382 A.2d 1319 (1978), the defendant, a

certified osteopath, claimed he was exempt from the Uniform Controlled Substances

Act, which, unless lawfully obtained, prohibited “any person knowingly or

intentionally to possess a controlled substance * * *.” Mann, 119 R.I. at 721-22, 382

A.2d at 1320 (quoting G.L. 1956 § 21-28-4.01(C)). We rejected the defendant’s

argument that as a certified osteopath, he was exempt from the prohibition,

explaining: “The language is clear. It is well settled that, in the absence of

ambiguity, words used in a statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning

unless a contrary intention appears on the face of the statute.” Id. at 724, 382 A.2d

at 1321. Accordingly, we concluded that “‘any person’ * * * includes physicians.”

Id. (quoting § 21-28-4.01(C)(1)).

In State v. Caprio, 477 A.2d 67 (R.I. 1984), we employed a similar

plain-meaning analysis. The defendant was convicted of committing first-degree

arson, a crime that provided, in relevant part, that “[a]ny person who knowingly

- 28 -
causes, procures, aids, counsels or creates by means of fire or explosion, a

substantial risk of serious physical harm to any person * * * shall, upon conviction,

be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than five (5) years * * *.” Caprio, 477

A.2d at 69 (emphasis added) (quoting G.L. 1956 § 11-4-2).

On appeal, Caprio argued that despite the scope and meaning of “any,” the

phrase “substantial risk of serious physical harm to any person” should not be

interpreted to include responding firefighters because doing so would transform any

arson crime into “first degree merely by the arrival of members of the fire

department.” Caprio, 477 A.2d at 70 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). This

Court rejected the defendant’s argument and adhered to the plain language,

recognizing that “the very breadth of the term ‘any person’ defies the exclusion of

any class of persons. That term is so broad as to require exclusion, not specific

inclusion.” Id. at 71.

The state does not dispute the breadth of the phrase “any offense,” but rather

suggests that it “simply means that an individual convicted of any criminal offense

identified in the General Laws before he or she turned twenty-two is eligible to see

the parole board after serving twenty years.”13 While plausible, the state’s argument

13
We interpret the state’s argument to mean “any offense,” except in which “a
person [is] serving life without parole,” as stated in Subsection (e). See § 13-8-13(e).

- 29 -
misses the mark that when it enacted Subsection (e), the General Assembly

effectuated its intent through the broadest possible language.

Third, we address the state’s main interpretative argument, that the inclusion

of the word “offense”—in the singular—demonstrates that “the General Assembly

intended [S]ubsection (e) to apply to individuals serving a single sentence and not

to individuals such as [respondents] who are serving consecutive sentences.” While

the state attributes great importance to the singular usage of the term “offense,” we

conclude that this emphasis is misplaced.14

General Laws 1956 § 43-3-4 contemplates the state’s argument and addresses

the General Assembly’s usage of singular and plural words. In such circumstances,

§ 43-3-4 provides the following rule of construction: “Every word importing the

singular number only may be construed to extend to and to include the plural number

also, and every word importing the plural number only may be construed to extend

to and to embrace the singular number also.” In other words, § 43-3-4 directs that a

singular word may be interpreted as plural, and a plural word may be interpreted as

singular.

14
As will be discussed infra, individuals imprisoned on a single offense are few in
number and, additionally, anyone convicted of a crime involving a firearm faces
additional mandatory consecutive imprisonment. See Weapons, G.L. 1956 chapter
47 of title 11.
- 30 -
In Pierce v. Providence Retirement Board, 15 A.3d 957 (R.I. 2011), a

Providence firefighter applied for accidental disability retirement, which required

the applicant to demonstrate, inter alia, that the incapacity was “a natural and

proximate result of an accident while in the performance of duty * * *.” Pierce, 15

A.3d at 962 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). After receiving

several medical opinions that concluded Pierce’s injury was not the result of “an

accident,” but instead the result of multiple accidents, the Providence Retirement

Board rejected Pierce’s accidental disability retirement claim. Id.

This Court examined Providence Code § 1-2, the city’s version of § 43-3-4.

See Pierce, 15 A.3d at 966. Similar to the state analogue, the city code provided that

“a word importing the singular number only may extend and be applied to several

persons and things as well as to one person and thing.” Id. (brackets omitted).

Applying this rule of construction, this Court concluded that “an accident must be

read to include multiple accidents.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Likewise, in O’Connell v. Walmsley, 156 A.3d 422 (R.I. 2017), the plaintiffs

argued that because the Wrongful Death Act “used the singular form, ‘he or she or

it’ rather than ‘they,’ [the General Assembly] must have intended § 10-7-2’s

minimum-damages amount to apply to each individual defendant.” O’Connell, 156

A.3d at 426. As such, the plaintiffs maintained that they were entitled to recover the

$250,000 statutory minimum from each named defendant. Id. We acknowledged

- 31 -
that “a strict reading of the above language might arguably suggest a

minimum-damages amount of $250,000 per defendant because the statute uses

singular language when referencing defendants,” but nonetheless concluded that

“such an interpretation [was] unreasonable.” Id. at 428. In so doing, we expressed

that “[b]ecause application of [§ 43-3-4] would not ‘lead to a construction

inconsistent with the manifest intent of the General Assembly, or be repugnant to

some other part of the statute’ * * * we read § 10-7-2 to apply to multiple actors.”

Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting § 43-3-2). Thus, despite the statutory reference in

the singular, we held that the $250,000 minimum damage award applied to all the

defendants, jointly and severally. Id. at 429; see also State v. Ros, 973 A.2d 1148,

1165 (R.I. 2009) (“If we were to adhere to defendants’ logic, and hold that use of

singular pronouns in a criminal statute prevented the application of vicarious

liability, there could hardly be vicarious liability for any crime.”); Brogno v. W & J

Associates, LTD, 698 A.2d 191, 193 (R.I. 1997) (“[E]ven though § 28-29-6.1 uses

the term ‘subcontractor,’ we can, in a manner consistent with § 43-3-4, construe that

term to mean ‘subcontractors.’”).

Consistent with § 43-3-4 and our precedent, we conclude that “any offense”

may be interpreted to include any offenses, provided such an interpretation does not

lead to a construction “inconsistent with the manifest intention of the legislature,” or

is otherwise repugnant to some other portion of the statute. See O’Connell, 156 A.3d

- 32 -
at 428 (quoting Van Arsdale, et al., 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 145 at 381 (2012)).

As noted, supra, interpreting Subsection (e) to require the aggregation of

respondents’ offenses, whether definite or indeterminate sentences, is consistent

with the overall framework of chapter 8, the General Assembly’s ameliorative

efforts in 2021, and the breadth of language employed in Subsection (e).

Fourth, in light of the state’s contention that Subsection (e) applies to a single

offense and reduces parole eligibility for only that single offense to twenty years’

imprisonment, the state was asked during oral argument to identify any crime to

which this argument would apply and that would require an offender to serve more

than twenty years in prison before becoming eligible for parole. The state offered

only one offense, which we set forth in the following: “In the case of a prisoner

sentenced to imprisonment for life for a first- or second-degree murder committed

after July 1, 2015, the permit may be issued only after the prisoner has served not

less than twenty-five (25) years’ imprisonment * * *.” Section 13-8-13(a)(4). In our

opinion, this response conclusively demonstrates the General Assembly’s intention

that Subsection (e) mandates aggregating an offender’s multiple definite and

indeterminate sentences to determine parole eligibility.

It is axiomatic that the General Assembly “is presumed to have intended each

word or provision of a statute to express a significant meaning, and the Court will

give effect to every word, clause, or sentence, whenever possible.” In re B.H., 194

- 33 -
A.3d 260, 264 (R.I. 2018) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Clark, 974 A.2d 558,

571 (R.I. 2009)). We have also expressed that “this Court will not construe a statute

to reach an absurd result.” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Long v. Dell, Inc., 984

A.2d 1074, 1081 (R.I. 2009)). The state’s analysis contravenes these canons.

Under the state’s reasoning, the General Assembly’s entire—and sole—

purpose for enacting Subsection (e) was to reduce the parole eligibility for a qualified

offender who committed a first- or second-degree murder after July 1, 2015.

Seemingly, such a narrow construction conflicts with the state’s prior argument that

Subsection (e) was intended to apply to “any offense” and requires this Court to

conclude that, despite Subsection (e)’s remedial nature, see infra, the General

Assembly intended to benefit only qualified offenders who committed first- or

second-degree murder after July 1, 2015, and intended to bestow no benefit on other

otherwise qualified offenders who committed any offense(s) (including first- or

second-degree murder) on or before July 1, 2015. Such a conclusion is inconsistent

with the plain language of Subsection (e), which provides that “[t]his subsection

shall be given prospective and retroactive effect for all offenses occurring on or after

January 1, 1991.” Section 13-8-13(e) (emphasis added).

The state’s construction also requires this Court to determine that, despite the

legislative efforts undertaken in 2021, resulting in the enactment of Subsection (e),

the General Assembly had no intention to actually benefit any qualified offender

- 34 -
until at least the year 2035 for this specific crime committed after July 1, 2015.15

The state’s hypothesis effectively renders Subsection (e) meaningless for another

decade and conflicts with longstanding canons that the General Assembly “is

presumed to have intended each word or provision of a statute to express a

significant meaning,” Clark, 974 A.2d at 571 (quoting State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776,

779 (R.I. 1996)), and that “no construction of a statute should be adopted that would

demote any significant phrase or clause to mere surplusage,” id. at 572 (quoting State

v. DeMagistris, 714 A.2d 567, 573 (R.I. 1998)).

Finally, we recognize that this amendment is remedial in nature. See Esposito

v. O’Hair, 886 A.2d 1197, 1203 (R.I. 2005) (“In the parlance of statutory

construction, a remedial statute is ‘one which affords a remedy, or improves or

facilitates remedies already existing for the enforcement [of] rights [or] redress of

wrongs * * *.’”) (quoting Ayers-Schaffner v. Solomon, 461 A.2d 396, 399 (R.I.

1983)). Although the parties disagree on the scope of the remedial relief provided

by Subsection (e), the parties do agree—and we so conclude—that the plain

language and meaning of Subsection (e) affords, improves, or facilitates already

existing rights or redress for qualified offenders, namely, an earlier parole eligibility

date. See State v. Vera, 334 P.3d 754, 759 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (“Section 13-716

15
At that point, nearly fifteen years after its enactment, Subsection (e) would reduce
parole eligibility for a qualified offender from twenty-five years, with an eligibility
date in 2040, to twenty years, with an eligibility date in 2035.
- 35 -
affects only the implementation of Vera’s sentence by establishing his eligibility for

parole after he has served the minimum term of twenty-five years. It is a remedial

statute that affects future events * * *.”); People v. Elliott, 216 N.E.3d 1101, 1116

(Ill. App. Ct. 2022) (“[O]ur legislature’s 2019 enactment providing parole eligibility

for offenders under age 21 convicted of serious crimes seems to have been a remedial

response to the constitutional issues recognized in Miller for both juveniles and

young adults.”).

When a statute or amendment, such as Subsection (e), is deemed remedial,

this Court interprets the provision liberally. See Prew v. Employee Retirement

System of City of Providence, 139 A.3d 556, 563 (R.I. 2016). In so doing, “[w]e will

not construe a remedial statute in a manner that would ‘defeat its evident purpose.’”

Id. (quoting McCarthy v. Environmental Transportation Services, Inc., 865 A.2d

1056, 1062 (R.I. 2005)). Interpreting Subsection (e) liberally, and in accord with its

plain language, leads to the conclusion that the General Assembly intended

Subsection (e) to provide broad relief to qualified offenders.

For all these reasons, we conclude that in the context of this case, Subsection

(e) mandates aggregating an offender’s multiple definite and indeterminate

sentences, including consecutive sentences, in order to calculate a single parole

eligibility date in which “a parole permit may be issued after the person has served

no fewer than twenty (20) years’ imprisonment * * *.” Section 13-8-13(e).

- 36 -
C

Separation of Powers

It is beyond dispute that “the [G]eneral [A]ssembly cannot under our

constitution rightfully exercise judicial power.” State v. Garnetto, 75 R.I. 86, 90, 63

A.2d 777, 779 (1949). Judicial power “is conferred only upon the courts and is

necessarily prohibited to the [G]eneral [A]ssembly.” Id.; see also Taylor v. Place, 4

R.I. 324, 363 (1856). The question we confront is whether the General Assembly’s

enactment of Subsection (e), which reduces the amount of time a qualified offender

must serve in prison before becoming eligible for parole, modifies a judicial sentence

or otherwise encroaches upon the judicial power. We begin with two legal

principles.

First, this Court has recognized that “it is the prerogative of the General

Assembly to define criminal offenses and set forth the sentences for those crimes

and that when it does so, the Legislature is not intruding upon the judicial function.”

Sosa v. State, 949 A.2d 1014, 1016 (R.I. 2008) (quoting Monteiro, 924 A.2d at 793).

In this respect,

“[a] person imprisoned by a court is turned over to an
administrative agency for the execution of the sentence.
The imprisonment can, if so authorized by the legislature,
be ameliorated by allowing it to be served beyond the
confines of the penal institution on parole. * * * This is not
a right of a prisoner, but accrues to him through
legislative grace and can be withheld or withdrawn by the
legislature at will. As part of the act of grace it is within
- 37 -
the legislative power to attach conditions to the grant of
parole and to provide for the administration thereof.”
Fazzano, 96 R.I. at 478, 194 A.2d at 684 (emphasis
added).

Thus, it is beyond peradventure that the General Assembly may constitutionally

enact “a statutory scheme that creates a parole board and generally empower[] the

parole board to grant parole to any prisoner within its control upon completion of a

specified portion of the sentence imposed.” See Skawinski, 538 A.2d at 1007.

Second, we have observed that “the imposition of a sentence by the court in a

criminal case is clearly an exercise of judicial power.” Garnetto, 75 R.I. at 91, 63

A.2d at 779. In so doing, this Court has recognized that “[t]he [G]eneral [A]ssembly

has no power, since the adoption of the constitution, to annul [a] sentence * * *

because that is an exercise of judicial power * * *.” Taylor, 4 R.I. at 363; see also

Opinion of Supreme Court upon the Act to Reverse the Judgment against Dorr, 3

R.I. 299, 301 (1854) (“The exercise, by the General Assembly, of the power to

reverse the judgments of the Courts, is inconsistent with this distribution of powers,

and with the existence of a distinct judicial department.”); Rose, 92 A.3d at 907

(brackets omitted) (“‘[T]he Legislature has provided by statute several methods of

mitigating a defendant’s sentence: suspension, probation, good-time credits, and

parole,’ among others.”) (quoting State v. O’Rourke, 463 A.2d 1328, 1331 (R.I.

1983)). Against this legal landscape, we examine whether Subsection (e) annuls or

modifies a judicial sentence. We conclude that it does not.
- 38 -
In Rose, the defendant was sentenced to a mandatory minimum twenty-year

sentence, with eight years to serve and twelve years suspended, with probation. Rose,

92 A.3d at 905. After receiving credit for time served, as well as good behavior and

institutional industries, Rose was released from incarceration less than four years

after the imposition of his sentence and argued that his probationary period ended

twelve years later. Id. at 905-06. Effectively, Rose argued that his full sentence

expired before the twenty-year sentence imposed by the court. Id. at 907.

We rejected Rose’s argument and invoked separation-of-powers’ principles,

explaining:

“While the Legislature in § 42-56-24 clearly gave the
DOC the discretion to mitigate that sentence by providing
for Rose’s early release from the ACI, it did not endow the
DOC with the power to modify the overall length of a
judicially imposed sentence * * *. Indeed, we doubt
whether the General Assembly could lawfully direct the
DOC to make such a reduction. While the executive
branch may execute a sentence, the power to reduce the
length of a sentence imposed by a justice of the Superior
Court is a judicial one. * * * As a judicial power, it may
not be exercised by the Legislature, either directly or
indirectly.” Rose, 92 A.3d at 910-11.

We thus recognized that were we to agree with Rose’s argument, “the combined

length of time that [he] will spend incarcerated and on probation will fall below

twenty years,” a conclusion for which there was “no authority.” Id. at 909 n.10.

Here, Subsection (e), as interpreted, neither modifies nor alters respondents’

judicial sentences. The respondents acknowledge as much, arguing to this Court
- 39 -
that “Monteiro will always be sentenced to consecutive life terms, regardless of

whether he is imprisoned or paroled to the community.” We agree and observe that

in Rhode Island, it has long “been assumed * * * that parole acts, using the term

generically, are constitutional and that it is clearly within the legislative power to

ameliorate a judicial sentence.” Fazzano, 96 R.I. at 480, 194 A.2d at 685.

It is true, as the state submits, that Subsection (e), as interpreted, may allow a

qualified offender to be paroled to the community before a consecutive sentence

becomes operative. Rhode Island permitted such a scenario long before Subsection

(e) was enacted. See, e.g., § 13-8-10(a) (“If a prisoner is confined upon more than

one sentence, a parole permit may be issued whenever he or she has served a term

equal to one-third (⅓) of the aggregate time which he or she shall be liable to serve

under his or her several sentences * * *.”). This result, the state contends, alters or

modifies the judicially imposed consecutive sentence and offends the

separation-of-powers doctrine. The state is mistaken.

In this context, we examine Subsection (e) for its constitutionality, not its

wisdom. When viewed through this lens, “[t]he imprisonment can, if so authorized

by the legislature, be ameliorated by allowing it to be served beyond the confines of

the penal institution on parole.” Fazzano, 96 R.I. at 478, 194 A.2d at 684; see also

Graham, 560 U.S. at 70 (“‘[P]arole is an established variation on imprisonment of

convicted criminals,’ it was evident that an analysis of the petitioner’s sentence

- 40 -
‘could hardly ignore the possibility that he will not actually be imprisoned for the

rest of his life.’”) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S 263, 280-81 (1980));

Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 (1923) (“The parole authorized by the statute

does not suspend service or operate to shorten the term. While on parole the convict

is bound to remain in the legal custody and under the control of the warden until the

expiration of the term * * *.”); State v. Desjarlais, 731 A.2d 716, 718 (R.I. 1999)

(“[S]entencing a person to home confinement as opposed to incarceration in a

correctional facility is merely a ‘change in the place where he or she is confined.’”)

(quoting State v. Mariano, 648 A.2d 803, 804 (R.I. 1994)); State v. McCleese, 215

A.3d 1154, 1180 (Conn. 2019) (“The legislature did not change the length of the

defendant’s sentence, but rather provided him with the possibility of parole.”).

Because a prisoner at liberty under Subsection (e) remains in the custody of the

warden outside the confines of the prison, Subsection (e) does not alter the judicially

imposed sentence, nor does the amendment infringe upon the judicial power. As

such, it is the responsibility of the DOC to determine a single parole eligibility date

for all offenders and the responsibility of the parole board to grant a parole permit

to prisoners to be at liberty on parole, not to another sentence. 16

16
In light of this conclusion and with the benefit of this opinion, we expect that the
DOC will recalculate parole eligibility for any qualified offender “eligible for parole
review” pursuant to § 13-8-13(e) and refer those prisoners to the parole board for
review.

- 41 -
We recognize that “[i]n a sophisticated sentencing scheme, such as ours, there

are many permutations of possible sentences. We confine ourselves, however, to

our proper role of resolving only the questions presented to us in the instant [matter]

* * *.” Rose, 92 A.3d at 913. Accordingly, our interpretation and constitutional

conclusions are limited to the cases before us. As an example, in State v. Mattatall,

219 A.3d 1288 (R.I. 2019), the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder

and sentenced to sixty years’ imprisonment, with fifty years to serve and ten years

suspended, with probation. See Mattatall, 219 A.3d at 1290. Significantly, the

defendant in that case “also received an additional sentence of twenty years to serve

as a habitual offender, which, importantly and as expected, was ordered to be served

consecutively to the sentence for second-degree murder. The habitual offender

sentence was to be nonparolable for the first eighteen years of the sentence.” Id.

(emphasis added); see also § 12-19-21.

This Court explained in Mattatall that, due to an error in the judgment, after

the defendant served more than thirty-two years in prison for a fifty-year sentence,

he was granted parole but “the minutes from that parole board hearing reflect[ed]

uncertainty concerning whether defendant was eligible for release or whether he was

- 42 -
to be paroled to begin serving the nonparolable eighteen-year habitual offender

sentence.” Mattatall, 219 A.3d at 1291. 17

Although we deem it unnecessary to provide an exhaustive list of statutes that

similarly allow or require a trial justice to impose a nonparolable sentence, the

habitual offender statute does not stand alone. See, e.g., G.L. 1956 § 11-47-3.2(a)

(“Any sentence imposed upon a person pursuant to this section shall be imposed

consecutively to and not concurrently with any sentence imposed for the underlying

crime or attempted crime, and the person shall not be afforded the benefits of

deferment of sentence or parole; provided, that unless sentenced to life without the

possibility of parole pursuant to subdivision (3) of this subsection, a person

sentenced to life under this section may be granted parole.”) (emphasis added). 18 In

17
In an exercise of our supervisory authority, this Court ameliorated the error in the
judgment by permitting Mattatall to file a motion to reduce that sentence within 120
days of the date of the opinion. See State v. Mattatall, 219 A.3d 1288, 1294 (R.I.
2019).
18
We pause to note that in an effort to curb gun violence, the General Assembly has
enacted mandatory consecutive sentence provisions for firearm offenses, which
critically allow no discretion to the judicial officer imposing these lengthy sentences.
One such provision, § 11-47-3.2 pertains to the use of a firearm during the
commission of a crime of violence and mandates, inter alia, that “[a]ny sentence
imposed upon a person * * * shall be imposed consecutively to and not concurrently
with any sentence imposed for the underlying crime or attempted crime * * *.” We
observe that both the current version of this provision, and its precursor upon which
Monteiro was convicted and sentenced, provide that unless sentenced to life in
prison, a “person shall not be afforded the benefits of deferment of sentence or parole
* * *.” See § 11-47-3.2; P.L. 2000, ch. 158, § 2; P.L. 2000, ch. 285, § 2. Because
Monteiro was sentenced to life imprisonment pursuant to then-§ 11-47-3.2,
- 43 -
such circumstances, the DOC must calculate a single parole eligibility date by

aggregating an offender’s sentences; thus, in Mattatall’s situation, parole eligibility

on the second-degree murder conviction (ten years’ imprisonment) would be

aggregated with the mandatory term on the habitual offender conviction (eighteen

years of which was ordered to be nonparolable). But for the scrivener’s error in the

judgment, the result should have been a single parole eligibility date for the potential

release to the community on all offenses after twenty-eight years.

Statutes or judicial sentences imposing nonparolable prison terms or

mandatory minimum incarceration terms present additional issues not specifically

contemplated in this opinion. As one court has noted, while “‘the precise time at

which the offender becomes eligible for parole is not part of the sentence,’ where

the statute defining the offense precludes parole eligibility for a mandatory period

of time, ‘it is implicit in the terms of the sentence’ and, thus, affects the prosecution.”

Fields v. Missouri Board of Probation and Parole, 559 S.W.3d 12, 19 (Mo. Ct. App.

2018) (quoting Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 658

(1974)). Accordingly, although we are cognizant of this analysis, we take no

position on issues that are not before us and abide by the mandatory eligibility period

set forth by the General Assembly and our judgments.

Monteiro’s eligibility for parole posed no constitutional infringement on the
separation-of-powers doctrine.

- 44 -
D

The Orders Immediately Paroling Respondents

Finally, although we agree with the trial justice that Subsection (e) requires

aggregating an offender’s multiple definite and indeterminate sentences, including

consecutive sentences, in order to calculate parole eligibility; and that Subsection (e)

does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine, we nonetheless are of the opinion

that the trial justice exceeded his authority by ordering each respondent immediately

paroled to the community. This Court has staunchly adhered to “the ‘hands-off’

policy which has traditionally been invoked when dealing with [p]arole [b]oard

proceedings and the overall reluctance to interfere with what must necessarily be

highly discretionary decisions.” State v. Ouimette, 117 R.I. 361, 363, 367 A.2d 704,

706 (1976). We continue to adhere to that policy.

In his bench decision, the trial justice explained that “[b]ased upon the

unanimous decisions of the [p]arole [b]oard that [Neves and Nunes] satisfied the

criteria for parole, [each] should have been issued a parole permit to the community

on or shortly after July 6, 2021 * * *.” The trial justice added that Subsection (e)

“entitles each [respondent] to immediate release. Therefore, the [c]ourt orders that

each [respondent] shall be immediately released from incarceration at the Adult

Correctional Institutions to parole, to be at liberty in the community, upon such terms

- 45 -
and conditions as previously or hereinafter set by the [p]arole [b]oard.” This was

clear error.

The trial justice ordered that Neves “is hereby ordered immediately released

from incarceration to be at liberty on parole upon the terms and conditions set by the

[p]arole [b]oard by unanimous vote on August 21, 2021.” The parole board ordered

no such relief. Instead, the record indicates that on or about August 21, 2019, the

parole board

“vote[d] to parole [Neves] August 2021 to his next
consecutive sentence. * * * We will consider him when he
is next eligible on his ten year consecutive sentence and
we will also schedule a review date in August 2021 to
review and assign any special conditions of parole for his
Life sentence.” (Emphasis added.)

As the trial justice noted, on or about August 23, 2021, the parole board conducted

a review, but it never voted to parole Neves to the community and instead issued a

parole permit that Neves was paroled to his consecutive sentence.

The trial justice also decreed that Nunes “is hereby ordered to be immediately

brought before the [p]arole [b]oard to determine the terms and conditions for his

release from incarceration to be at liberty on parole and to be thereafter released

from incarceration to be at liberty on parole in accordance with such terms and

conditions.” Nunes last appeared before the parole board on or about June 17, 2019,

approximately two years before the enactment of Subsection (e). At that time, the

parole board voted to parole Nunes “from this Life Sentence to his next Consecutive
- 46 -
Sentence of ten years.” (Emphasis added.) A parole permit issued in September

2019, directing that Nunes be paroled to his consecutive sentence, not the

community. The parole board further indicated that Nunes “will be reviewed in

November 2022 to determine conditions of parole on the Life Sentence,” but the

record does not reflect that a subsequent review ever materialized.

Finally, the trial justice ordered that Monteiro be “immediately brought before

the [p]arole [b]oard to confirm the terms and conditions for his release from

incarceration to be at liberty on parole set in December 2021 with review after

December 2022 and to be thereafter released from incarceration to be at liberty on

parole in accordance with such terms and conditions.” When Monteiro last appeared

before the parole board on or about October 19, 2022, the parole board

acknowledged “an existing legal debate in court on the application of this

consecutive term – whether it is aggregated and consumed by the first life sentence

eligibility or whether he has yet to and must serve this next term.” The parole board

voted

“to parole Mr. Monteiro from his first life sentence. If it
is determined that he must serve another consecutive life
term, then the effective parole release date shall be the date
of this decision (December 15, 2021). If it is determined
that he is eligible for immediate release to the community,
then the effective parole release date shall be no sooner
than December 2022.” (Emphasis added.)

- 47 -
The parole board further detailed its reasoning for the staggered release date, if

Monteiro was paroled to the community: “[T]he Board believes there should be

some time for Mr. Monteiro to transition to a lower security and preparation for

eventual release.”

In applying Subsection (e), the trial justice improperly equated each

respondent’s grant of parole to a consecutive sentence with a vote by the parole

board, after due consideration, that each respondent be at liberty on parole. To the

contrary, this Court has previously recognized:

“Pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 13-8-21, all permits and orders
of the parole board issued under chapter 8 of title 13 must
be signed by the chairperson and one other member of the
parole board and must be affixed with the seal of the board.
Only at the point when the permit has been signed, sealed,
and issued is the permit for parole given full recognition.”
Yang v. State, 703 A.2d 754, 756 (R.I. 1997) (affirming
parole board decision to rescind parole when permit had
not been signed or issued) (emphasis added).

Because Neves and Nunes19 each possessed a “signed, sealed, and issued” permit

granting parole to each of their respective consecutive sentences, and not the

community, the trial justice was without authority to order the parole board to order

19
The record does not contain a parole permit for Monteiro but we presume that if
one was issued, the terms are consistent with the parole board’s minutes.

- 48 -
these respondents to be immediately released when the parole board itself had not

issued a permit to be at liberty on parole.20

In this sense, we offer a critical reminder that Subsection (e), as interpreted,

provides a qualified offender only the opportunity to appear before the parole board;

it does not provide a qualified offender the right to be paroled. Accordingly, the trial

justice erred when he ordered the parole board to immediately parole respondents to

the community.

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed herein, the judgments are affirmed in part and

vacated in part. On remand, the Superior Court is directed to dismiss the

postconviction-relief application filed by Ortega as moot. With respect to Neves,

Nunes, and Monteiro, the Superior Court is directed to remand these cases to the

parole board, which shall, if necessary, consider Neves, Nunes, and Monteiro for a

permit to be at liberty on parole and set any conditions it deems fit. The papers in

this case are remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

20
See § 13-8-9(a) (“The parole board * * * may, by an affirmative vote of a majority
of the members of the board, issue to that prisoner a permit to be at liberty upon
parole, whenever that prisoner has served not less than one-third (⅓) of the term for
which he or she was sentenced.”) (emphasis added).
- 49 -
Justice Robinson, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. Try as I might, I am

simply unable to agree with the majority’s reading of G.L. 1956 § 13-8-13(e)

(Subsection (e)).

I hasten to acknowledge in all sincerity that the majority opinion is as

scholarly as it is exhaustive, and it has caused me to think long and hard before

penning this brief dissent. I also wish to state that I have found this to be an

extraordinarily close case, and I readily admit that I could be wrong. Upon first

reading the statute at issue, it certainly was not immediately apparent to me, as a

matter of statutory interpretation, that the inherently ambiguous term “any offense”

in the phrase “[a]ny person sentenced for any offense committed prior to his or her

twenty-second birthday”1 applies to the named respondents in this case. In addition,

and very importantly, I do not perceive any indication in the text of the statute that

the General Assembly deliberately opted to base such a radical new change in some

aspects of the law regarding parole on so minimal a linguistic basis. Although the

majority’s efforts to broadly construe the term “any offense” in Subsection (e) are

thought-provoking, they have failed to convince me. While admitting that it is a

close call, I have concluded that “any offense” means one single offense.

1
I am aware that the referenced sentence in Subsection (e) goes on to exempt
from its reach “a person serving life without parole.” However, that additional
language is not at issue in this case.
- 50 -
While the majority opinion does not expressly state that the term in question

(“any offense”) is ambiguous, it is clear to me that that is how the majority views

that term before embarking on its extensive and impressive foray into statutory

interpretation. Indeed, I believe that we are confronted with a classic instance of

ambiguity. See, e.g., Drs. Pass and Bertherman, Inc. v. Neighborhood Health Plan

of Rhode Island, 31 A.3d 1263, 1269 (R.I. 2011) (“Ambiguity exists * * * when a

word or phrase in a statute is susceptible of more than one reasonable meaning.”);

see also Middle Creek Farm, LLC v. Portsmouth Water & Fire District, 252 A.3d

745, 751 (R.I. 2021) (noting that a “statute is ambiguous if one of its words or

phrases is susceptible to more than one meaning”). 2

2
The opinion of Justice Breyer in the case of Small v. United States, 544 U.S.
385 (2005), strikingly illustrates the inherent ambiguity in many situations where
“any” is used to modify a noun. In that case, Mr. Small had been convicted under a
federal criminal statute that makes it “unlawful for any person * * * who has been
convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year * * * to * * * possess * * * any firearm.” Small, 544 U.S. at 387 (emphasis
in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)). It was uncontested that Mr. Small had
previously been convicted in a Japanese court of attempting to “smuggle several
pistols, a rifle, and ammunition into Japan.” Id. He was sentenced to five years’
imprisonment. Id. In spite of the arguably definitive nature of the term “convicted
in any court,” the Supreme Court held that “the phrase ‘convicted in any court’ refers
only to domestic courts, not to foreign courts.” Id. at 394. The Small case is relevant
to the case at bar in its own right and for its discussion of the ambiguity of the word
“any” and for its citation to a number of Supreme Court opinions discussing that
word. Id. at 388-89. Notable among those cited cases is Nixon v. Missouri Municipal
League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004), wherein the Court comments that “any” means
“different things depending upon the setting.” Id.; Nixon, 541 U.S. at 132; see
generally United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610 (1818) (Marshall, C.J.).

- 51 -
In my judgment, when the General Assembly opted to exercise legislative

grace3 by decreeing that certain youthful offenders might be eligible for parole

consideration earlier than would otherwise be the case, that grace applied only to a

youthful offender who had been sentenced for a single offense. I am unable to agree

that the words “any offense” should be read to apply to a person who was sentenced

for having committed more than one offense. If the General Assembly had

deliberately opted to exercise legislative grace towards youthful offenders serving

sentences for having committed multiple offenses, it would have been a

straightforward and easy task to draft statutory language that would make reference

to a youthful offender sentenced to “any offense or offenses,” but the undeniable fact

is that the statute before us speaks only in the singular: “any offense.”4 I certainly

3
See State v. Fazzano, 96 R.I. 472, 478, 194 A.2d 680, 684 (1963) (stating that
the possibility of parole is extended to certain offenders “through legislative grace
and can be withheld or withdrawn by the legislature at will”).
4
It appears to be undisputed that the word “any” has two different permissible
uses in standard English—always dependent on context. See generally Alliance to
End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007, 1013 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc)
(Posner, J.) (“[C]ontext, in the broadest sense, is the key to understanding
language.”).
Subsection (e) is illustrative of that point. I think that there would be universal
agreement that the words “Any person” at the beginning of the sentence in question
do not signify that only one person would be entitled to invoke the provisions of
Subsection (e). On the other hand, I am confident that even those who disagree with
this dissent would not contend that my reading of “any offense” as applying only to
an offender sentenced for just one single offense is completely implausible.

- 52 -
do not question the right of the General Assembly to have enacted a statute referring

to “any offense or offenses,” but that is not how the statute before us reads.

It is not customary for the General Assembly to be less than completely clear

when enacting such an important piece of legislation as Subsection (e) quite

obviously is—especially if one reads it as the majority does. As just one example

of how the General Assembly ordinarily takes pains to be very clear when enacting

major changes to existing legal criteria, I would point to what this Court said with

respect to the legislative repeal of the “illusory transfer test” in the realm of trust and

estates. In that instance, this Court went out of its way to note that, in mandating

that repeal, the General Assembly had employed “clear, precise, and broad

language * * *.” Barrett v. Barrett, 894 A.2d 891, 898 (R.I. 2006). With all due

respect, I doubt that any objective commentator would use those adjectives to

describe the language at issue in the instant case.

When one considers the gravity of the several offenses for which the

respondents were sentenced, I am unable to conclude that, simply by employing the

inherently ambiguous term “any offense,” the General Assembly intended to declare

them all to be eligible for parole consideration. I concede that legislating to that

effect would be within the General Assembly’s competence, but I am simply unable

to conclude that the General Assembly did so in this instance in such an abbreviated

and unclear manner. I do not exclude the possibility that that is what the General

- 53 -
Assembly actually intended; however, I would need much more explicit language

before I could reach that conclusion—even employing the liberal reading that is to

be used in the interpretation of remedial legislation. See Grasso v. Raimondo, 177

A.3d 482, 491 (R.I. 2018) (referring to “the oft-repeated metaphorical maxim * * *

to the effect that a legislature, in enacting statutes, is not wont to ‘hide elephants in

mouseholes’”) (quoting Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 531 U.S.

457, 468 (2001)); see also Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson

Tobacco Corporation, 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000) (“[W]e are confident that Congress

could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political

significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”).

I see nothing absurd in my reading of the statute. It would not be at all illogical

for the General Assembly to exercise grace vis-à-vis individuals who had been found

guilty and sentenced for one single instance of bad judgment while being far less

lenient vis-à-vis individuals who were sentenced for numerous offenses—as is the

situation of the instant respondents.5 And it should be remembered that Subsection

5
I certainly do not contend that the majority’s interpretation of the ambiguous
term “any offense” is arbitrary or irrational. Instead, it is my position that that
interpretation too readily assumes that the General Assembly would base so
sweeping a policy change on an inherently ambiguous term that consists of just two
words.

- 54 -
(e) applies not only to the present respondents but also to other youthful offenders

in the future.

For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the phrase in Subsection (e) “[a]ny

person sentenced for any offense committed prior to his or her twenty-second

birthday” does not apply to a person in that age group who has been sentenced for

having committed more than one offense.6 In my judgment, the term “any offense”

in the context of Subsection (e) means any one offense. 7

I conclude this dissent as I began it—by stating that I have genuine respect for

the majority’s careful analysis and its articulate explanation of how it understands

Subsection (e). Nevertheless, after considerable soul-searching, I remain

unpersuaded. I am simply unable to conclude that the inherently ambiguous term

“any offense” can properly be read in the broad manner in which the majority has

opted to read it. I repeat that I readily acknowledge that the General Assembly has

the power to legislate in the manner in which the majority has construed Subsection

6
The General Assembly is, of course, free to amend Subsection (e) if the
thoughts set forth in the majority opinion or in this dissent persuade it to do so. See
Air Distribution Corp. v. Airpro Mechanical Company, Inc., 973 A.2d 537, 542 (R.I.
2009); Brown & Sharpe Manufacturing Company v. Dean, 89 R.I. 108, 117, 151
A.2d 354, 359 (1959).
7
Since I disagree with the majority as to the meaning of Subsection (e), I need
not and do not express any view as to the other issues addressed in the majority
opinion.

- 55 -
(e); it is just that I do not believe that the General Assembly has exercised that power

in this instance. I could be wrong, but this is my view.

- 56 -
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Joao Neves v. State of Rhode Island.
Keith Nunes v. State of Rhode Island.
Title of Case
Pablo Ortega v. State of Rhode Island.
Mario Monteiro v. State of Rhode Island.
No. 2022-92-M.P. (PM 22-259)
No. 2022-93-M.P. (PM 22-901)
Case Number
No. 2022-94-M.P. (PM 22-260)
No. 2023-167-M.P. (PM 23-921)

Date Opinion Filed July 2, 2024

Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Stephen P. Nugent

For Petitioner:

Christopher R. Bush
Attorney(s) on Appeal Department of Attorney General
For Respondents:

Lynette J. Labinger, Esq.

SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)