State v. Edward Mather

Supreme Court

No. 2021-109-M.P.
(N2/18-121A)

No. 2021-110-M.P.
(N2/18-264A)

State :

v. :

Edward Mather. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical
or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court

No. 2021-109-M.P.
(N2/18-121A)

No. 2021-110-M.P.
(N2/18-264A)

State :

v. :

Edward Mather. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Justice Long, for the Court. These consolidated cases came before the

Supreme Court after we granted two identical petitions filed by the defendant,

Edward Mather (defendant or Mr. Mather), for a writ of certiorari. Mr. Mather seeks

review of interlocutory orders of the Superior Court that denied his petitions to

discharge from detention orders of commitment pursuant to G.L. 1956 chapter 5.3

of title 40.1, filed in two underlying criminal matters. This Court issued the writ and

assigned the matter for full briefing. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we

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quash the orders of the Superior Court and remand this matter for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion. 1

Facts and Procedural History

This matter arises out of the attempted prosecution of Mr. Mather in two

separate criminal matters filed in Newport County Superior Court. On April 11,

2018, the state filed a four-count criminal information charging Mr. Mather with (1)

violating a no-contact order after prior convictions of domestic assault; (2) two

counts of vandalism; and (3) simple assault. Thereafter, on April 26, 2018, a trial

justice arraigned Mr. Mather on the foregoing charges, set his bail in the amount of

$5,000, and ordered that he undergo a psychiatric evaluation at Eleanor Slater

Hospital, a facility managed by the Department of Behavioral Healthcare,

Developmental Disabilities and Hospitals (BHDDH), to determine his competency

to stand trial. Less than six months later, on October 3, 2018, the state filed a second,

five-count criminal information charging Mr. Mather with (1) domestic assault by

strangulation; (2) one count of simple domestic assault; (3) two counts of violating

a no-contact order after prior convictions of domestic assault; and (4) refusing to

relinquish, or damaging or obstructing, a telephone needed for emergency use. Mr.

Mather was never arraigned pursuant to this second information.

1
We acknowledge and thank the Office of the Mental Health Advocate for its
submission as amicus curiae in this matter.
-2-
Following Mr. Mather’s psychiatric evaluation, BHDDH submitted a

competency report to the Superior Court; and on June 29, 2018, the trial justice

ordered that Mr. Mather could not stand trial due to his incompetency and that he

required hospitalization at Eleanor Slater Hospital. According to the trial justice, the

conclusion of the competency report stated that Mr. Mather would become

competent prior to the dismissal of charges under the four-count information and

ordered a semiannual review and report in six months.

At a commitment hearing held on February 13, 2019, a second trial justice

found, based upon a subsequent report issued by BHDDH, that Mr. Mather remained

incompetent to stand trial. The trial justice ordered that Mr. Mather remain

committed to the custody of BHDDH but found that he could be placed in an

outpatient facility without imperiling the peace and safety of himself or others. The

trial justice ordered his discharge to LaBelle House Group Home (the outpatient

facility) pursuant to § 40.1-5.3-3(i)(2)2 subject to certain conditions, including

2
General Laws 1956 § 40.1-5.3-3(i)(2) provides the following:

“If the court finds that a defendant who is incompetent
may be placed on outpatient status without imperiling the
peace or safety of the public or the safety of himself or
herself, it may commit the defendant to an appropriate
outpatient facility that agrees to provide treatment to the
defendant and adhere to the requirements of this section,
in order that the defendant may receive treatment to restore
or establish his or her competency.”

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compliance with the rules and regulations of the outpatient facility and its treatment

plan, and abstinence from alcohol or the consumption of other unauthorized

substances. The trial justice further ordered that the appropriate supervisory

authority immediately return Mr. Mather to Eleanor Slater Hospital should he violate

the conditions of the order, engage in threatening or aggressive behavior, or require

hospitalization. The trial justice also authorized the outpatient facility to initiate Mr.

Mather’s return to Eleanor Slater Hospital if he were to leave the group home

without informing the outpatient facility. Lastly, the trial justice converted Mr.

Mather’s District Court bail on his second, five-count criminal information from

$10,000 with surety to $10,000 personal recognizance.

On July 6, 2020, Christine Montross, M.D., of the forensic unit at Eleanor

Slater Hospital issued a written semiannual review and opined as follows regarding

Mr. Mather’s competency to stand trial on the charge of domestic assault by

strangulation:

“In my opinion, with a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, Mr. Mather remains mentally incompetent to
stand trial. He has only had a partial response to treatment
during his group home residency and has not, in my
opinion, sufficiently improved to the point of being
restored to competency. At present, his disorganized
thoughts, tangential speech, and tendency toward mood
lability impair his ability to participate in discussions and
decision-making regarding his case. I therefore continue
to recommend him to the court as incompetent to stand
trial because he does not have sufficient present ability to
work with his attorney on his case.
-4-
“In my opinion, it is increasingly unlikely that Mr. Mather
will become competent prior to the dismissal of the
charges pursuant to the statute. Psychotic disorders
usually respond to treatment. With nearly two years of
treatment with antipsychotic medication and mood
stabilizing medication in supervised treatment settings,
Mr. Mather’s symptoms of unspecified schizophrenia
spectrum or other psychotic disorder have improved, but
they have not improved to the point that he is able to
discuss his plea options with his attorney, make logical
decisions about his case, and understand the implications
of the charge. Therefore, in my opinion, his competency
to stand trial is non-restorable.”

Doctor Montross further opined that Mr. Mather could remain on outpatient

status without imperiling the peace and safety of himself or others because he lived

in a supervised group home and continued to adhere to treatment. She therefore

recommended that Mr. Mather continue to reside at the outpatient facility, the best

and least restrictive placement option.

Mr. Mather subsequently filed a petition to discharge from the detention order

of commitment in both of his pending criminal matters. Mr. Mather argued that,

based on the undisputed determination by Dr. Montross that his competency to stand

trial was nonrestorable prior to the dismissal of the charges, § 40.1-5.3-3(m) and

principles of due process, as discussed in State v. Morin, 606 A.2d 681 (R.I. 1992),

-5-
compelled the termination of the order of detention and dismissal of the pending

charges within thirty days of a hearing on the petition.3

The trial justice held a hearing on Mr. Mather’s petitions on

December 9, 2020. The state acknowledged that Mr. Mather’s competency to stand

trial was nonrestorable prior to the dismissal of the charge of domestic assault by

strangulation. Nevertheless, the state argued that Mr. Mather’s confinement was not

“detention” within the meaning of § 40.1-5.3-3(m) because the outpatient facility

was unlocked; as such, the state argued, Mr. Mather’s confinement was

distinguishable from Morin, wherein an incompetent defendant was hospitalized,

and thus did not raise due-process concerns. Counsel for Mr. Mather stipulated that

Mr. Mather possessed the ability to come and go from the outpatient facility

according to its rules but argued that such fact was irrelevant to the question before

the court.

3
Section 40.1-5.3-3(l) authorizes a defendant committed pursuant to
§ 40.1-5.3-3(i)(2) to seek a competency review hearing. Section 40.1-5.3-3(m)
provides the following, in relevant part:

“If the court finds that the defendant is incompetent and
that a reasonable likelihood does not exist that the
defendant will become competent prior to the dismissal of
the charges pursuant to subsection (j), it shall order that
thirty (30) days thereafter the defendant be discharged
from detention under the order of commitment. Upon
entry of the order, the state may commence proceedings
seeking to commit the defendant pursuant to § 40.1-5-8.”
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The court denied Mr. Mather’s petitions in a decision issued from the bench.

The trial justice reasoned that § 40.1-5.3-3(m) was not applicable to Mr. Mather

because his commitment to the outpatient facility did not constitute “detention”

pursuant to that subsection. The trial justice also concluded that Mr. Mather’s

commitment to the outpatient facility did not present the due-process concerns

discussed in Morin or those contemplated by the Supreme Court in Jackson v.

Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), based on his determination that the statute provided

for Mr. Mather’s eventual discharge, as opposed to an indefinite period of

commitment. A succinct order denying Mr. Mather’s petition to discharge from

detention order of commitment entered in each of Mr. Mather’s underlying criminal

matters on March 23, 2021.4

4
On February 28, 2021, Paul Baker, M.D., of the forensic unit at Eleanor Slater
Hospital issued a written semiannual review and stated the following concerning Mr.
Mather’s competency to stand trial on the charge of violation of a no-contact order
with prior convictions of domestic assault:

“In my opinion, with a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, Mr. Mather remains mentally incompetent to
stand trial. Mr. Mather continues to demonstrate
significant thought disorganization which impairs his
competency-related abilities. He cannot describe the
charges or their potential consequences. His ability to
learn and retain new information, such as with a review of
the nolo plea, is impaired. He cannot identify any
information that would be important to convey to his
attorney, and he cannot describe how he would approach
potential decisions in his case, such as a hypothetical plea
bargain.
-7-
Mr. Mather subsequently sought review of the March 23, 2021 order via

identical petitions for writ of certiorari, arguing that his continued

institutionalization at the outpatient facility restricted his liberty and violated due

process and that § 40.1-5.3-3(m) compelled his discharge from the outpatient facility

and the dismissal of the charges pending against him. This Court granted the

petitions, consolidated the cases for review, and issued the writ on February 21,

2022.

We consider whether the trial justice erred in denying Mr. Mather’s petitions

to discharge from detention orders of commitment pursuant to § 40.1-5.3-3.

“In my opinion, Mr. Mather will not become competent
prior to the dismissal of the charges pursuant to the statute.
Mr. Mather has now had consistent treatment with a robust
regimen of antipsychotic and mood-stabilizing
medications. He has also been receiving an injectable
formulation of an antipsychotic medication, which further
supports his medication adherence. While some of his
symptoms of psychosis have improved, he continues to
have significant residual thought disorganization. In my
opinion, it is unlikely that Mr. Mather’s mental status will
improve beyond his current baseline. Therefore, I do not
believe his competency is restorable.”

Doctor Baker recommended that Mr. Mather continue (1) to reside at the outpatient
facility as the best and least restrictive placement option and (2) to work with the
outpatient facility regarding his care and treatment.

The trial justice accepted the reports of Drs. Montross and Baker by order
dated March 19, 2021.
-8-
Standard of Review

This Court reviews a trial justice’s determination regarding a defendant’s

competency for an abuse of discretion. State v. Buxton, 643 A.2d 172, 175 (R.I.

1994). However, we review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. State v.

Bienaime, 263 A.3d 77, 83 (R.I. 2021). Finally, trial justices decidedly abuse their

discretion when they make a material error of law. See Votolato v. Merandi, 747

A.2d 455, 460 (R.I. 2000).

Discussion

The state asserts that the trial justice properly denied Mr. Mather’s petitions

to discharge from detention orders of commitment, and correctly applied

§ 40.1-5.3-3(m), when he concluded that the provision does not apply to individuals

committed to outpatient facilities because their confinement does not constitute

“detention” pursuant to the statute. We disagree.

In conducting our de novo review of a statute, this Court must achieve its

principal goal of giving effect to the purpose of the statute as the Legislature

intended. See State v. McGuire, 273 A.3d 146, 152 (R.I. 2022). When this Court

determines that a statute’s language is both clear and unambiguous, we must

interpret the statute in a literal manner, give its words their plain and ordinary

meaning, and refrain from interpreting the statute in a way that reaches an absurd

result or otherwise thwarts its purpose. See id. Additionally, we construe the instant

-9-
statutory scheme in a liberal fashion based on our prior determination that it serves

a remedial purpose. In re Tavares, 885 A.2d 139, 149 (R.I. 2005).

In accordance with these principles of statutory interpretation, we must give

effect to the purpose of § 40.1-5.3-3, a pretrial commitment statute. This Court has

previously explained that, in enacting § 40.1-5.3-3, “the Legislature intended that

incompetent defendants be treated so that competency would be restored, and that

competent defendants would be tried.” In re Tavares, 885 A.2d at 149. Additionally,

while the Legislature undoubtedly intended for § 40.1-5.3-3 to protect the rights of

criminal defendants and to serve the public’s interest in the prosecution of crimes,

the “paramount goal” is to protect the rights of defendants accused of criminal

wrongdoing after the state has obtained their pretrial commitment. Id. Ultimately,

this Court must ensure that the length of an individual’s commitment complies with

due process:

“[A] person charged by a State with a criminal offense
who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to
proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable
period of time necessary to determine whether there is a
substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in
the foreseeable future. If it is determined that this is not
the case, then the State must either institute the customary
civil commitment proceeding that would be required to
commit indefinitely any other citizen, or release the
defendant.” Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738.

Section 40.1-5.3-3, entitled “Competency to stand trial[,]” provides the

procedural framework for determining whether a defendant has the mental ability to
- 10 -
face criminal charges brought by the state and establishes various procedural

safeguards to protect the rights of the accused and the safety of the public. See

generally § 40.1-5.3-3. The provisions of § 40.1-5.3-3 pertaining to the issue under

consideration state, in relevant part, as follows:

“(a)(2) ‘Competent’ or ‘competency’ means mental ability
to stand trial. A person is mentally competent to stand trial
if he or she is able to understand the character and
consequences of the proceedings against him or her and is
able properly to assist in his or her defense.

“* * *

“(a)(5) ‘Incompetent’ or ‘incompetency’ means mentally
incompetent to stand trial. A person is mentally
incompetent to stand trial if he or she is unable to
understand the character and consequences of the
proceedings against him or her and is unable properly to
assist in his or her defense.

“* * *

“(g) Hearing. Upon receipt of the report and appropriate
notice to the parties, the court shall hold a hearing unless
the report concludes that the defendant is competent and
the defendant and the attorney for the state in open court
state their assent to the findings on the record. At the
hearing, the report shall be introduced; other evidence
bearing on the defendant’s competence may be introduced
by the parties; and the defendant may testify, confront
witnesses, and present evidence on the issue of the
defendant’s competency. On the basis of the evidence
introduced at the hearing, the court shall decide if the
defendant is competent.

“* * *

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“(h)(2) If the court finds that a defendant is incompetent,
it shall commit him or her to the custody of the director [of
BHDDH] for the purpose of determining whether or not
the defendant is likely to imperil the peace and safety of
the people of the state or the safety of himself or herself
and whether the defendant will regain competency within
the maximum period of any placement under this chapter.

“* * *

“(i)(2) If the court finds that a defendant who is
incompetent may be placed on outpatient status without
imperiling the peace or safety of the public or the safety of
himself or herself, it may commit the defendant to an
appropriate outpatient facility that agrees to provide
treatment to the defendant and to adhere to the
requirements of this section, in order that the defendant
may receive treatment to restore or establish his or her
competency.

“* * *

“(j) Period of commitment. When a court commits a
defendant pursuant to subsection (i)(2) * * *, it shall
compute, counting from the date of entry to the order of
commitment, the date of the expiration of the period of
time equal to two thirds (2/3) of the maximum term of
imprisonment for the most serious offense with which the
defendant is charged. * * * In the order of commitment,
the court shall provide that if, on the date so computed, the
defendant is still committed under the order, the charges
against the defendant shall be dismissed.

“* * *

“(l) Defendant’s right to petition. A defendant
committed pursuant to subsection (i)(2) * * * may at any
time petition the court to review the state of the
defendant’s competency.

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“(m) Hearing on petition. Upon receipt of a petition
pursuant to subsection * * * (l) and appropriate notice to
the defendant, the state, and the director [of BHDDH], the
court shall hold a hearing at which the parties may
introduce evidence as to the defendant’s competency,
including any reports of the director, and the defendant
may testify, confront witnesses, and present evidence as to
the defendant’s competency and prognosis. On the basis
of the evidence, the court shall make a finding as to the
defendant’s competency and, if the defendant is found to
be incompetent, whether a reasonable likelihood exists
that the defendant will become competent prior to the
dismissal of the charges pursuant to subsection (j). If the
court finds that the defendant is competent, it shall enter
an order to that effect. If the court finds that the defendant
is incompetent and that a reasonable likelihood exists that
the defendant will become competent prior to the
dismissal of the charges pursuant to subsection (j), it shall
order continuation of the commitment of the defendant. If
the court finds that the defendant is incompetent and that
a reasonable likelihood does not exist that the defendant
will become competent prior to the dismissal of the
charges pursuant to subsection (j), it shall order that thirty
(30) days thereafter the defendant be discharged from
detention under the order of commitment. Upon entry of
the order, the state may commence proceedings seeking to
commit the defendant pursuant to § 40.1-5-8.”

Section 40.1-5.3-3(i)(2) sets forth the requirements for determining whether

an incompetent defendant may be committed to an outpatient facility, “in order that

the defendant may receive treatment to restore or establish his or her competency.”

Section 40.1-5.3-3(i)(2) (emphasis added). Notwithstanding commitment to an

outpatient facility, a defendant may, pursuant to § 40.1-5.3-3(l), seek judicial review

of his or her competency status at any time. Section 40.1-5.3-3(m) governs such

- 13 -
review hearing, providing a defendant with an opportunity to be heard regarding her

or his competency and prognosis. Section 40.1-5.3-3(m). Importantly, the plain

language of § 40.1-5.3-3(m) provides the court with only three possible dispositions

following the hearing: (1) a finding that the defendant is competent and entry of an

order to that effect; (2) a finding that the defendant is incompetent but that

competency is likely restorable prior to dismissal of the charges pursuant to

subsection (j), thereby necessitating an order that continues pretrial commitment; or

(3) a finding that the defendant is incompetent and that competency is likely

nonrestorable prior to dismissal of the charges pursuant to subsection (j), thereby

compelling that the defendant “be discharged from detention” thirty days thereafter.

Id. Finally, § 40.1-5.3-3(j) limits the duration of a defendant’s commitment: the

period of commitment expires after two-thirds of the maximum term of

imprisonment for the most serious offense, or thirty years in the event that the state

charges a defendant with an offense that carries a life sentence. Section

40.1-5.3-3(j).

The record reveals that from April 26, 2018, the date of Mr. Mather’s

arraignment on the four-count criminal information, § 40.1-5.3-3 operated as

intended: Mr. Mather was subject to “a series of procedures, evaluations, and

hearings designed to ensure that [he would be] competent to stand trial.” In re

Tavares, 885 A.2d at 149. Although he was not arraigned on the five-count criminal

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information filed on October 3, 2018, the court held a commitment hearing pursuant

to § 40.1-5.3-3(g) and (h)(2) on February 13, 2019. Mr. Mather remained committed

to the custody of BHDDH and was subsequently placed at the outpatient facility with

a treatment plan “in order that [he could] receive treatment to restore or establish his

* * * competency.” Section 40.1-5.3-3(i)(2).

The order that entered following the February 13, 2019 commitment hearing

evinces Mr. Mather’s detention: although Mr. Mather could be placed at the

outpatient facility without imperiling the peace and safety of the public, the order

compels his return to Eleanor Slater Hospital—a location that the state concedes

constitutes “detention” pursuant to the statute—in the event that he fails to comply

with the rules of the outpatient facility or behaves in an inappropriate manner. That

the outpatient facility is unlocked is of no moment because Mr. Mather is not at

complete liberty to come and go from the outpatient facility without informing staff;

to do so would also subject him to a return to Eleanor Slater Hospital.

Following the issuance of the July 6, 2020 semiannual review by Dr.

Montross, wherein she opined that Mr. Mather’s symptoms of unspecified

schizophrenia spectrum or other psychotic disorder had not improved to the point

where he could discuss plea options, make decisions about his case, or understand

the implications of the charge of domestic assault by strangulation, Mr. Mather

exercised his right to seek judicial review of his competency status. In petitioning

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for judicial review of his competency to stand trial for the pending charges, he sought

to test whether his continued commitment is consistent with the “paramount goal”

of the pretrial commitment statute: the protection of his due-process rights. See In

re Tavares, 885 A.2d at 149.

The trial justice committed a reversible error of law when he denied the

petitions to discharge from detention orders of commitment. Notwithstanding the

undisputed conclusion by Dr. Montross that Mr. Mather’s competency to stand trial

is nonrestorable prior to the dismissal of the charge of domestic assault by

strangulation, the trial justice nevertheless ordered Mr. Mather’s continued

commitment to the outpatient facility based on an erroneous conclusion that the

commitment did not constitute detention within the meaning of § 40.1-5.3-3(m).

However, the focus on “detention” was misplaced. The plain language of

§ 40.1-5.3-3(m) authorizes only three possible dispositions for defendants who are

subject to a commitment order, whether placed in an inpatient facility or at an

outpatient facility. When reading § 40.1-5.3-3 liberally to effectuate its purpose as

a remedial statute, it is clear that defendants who are committed and placed at

outpatient facilities pursuant to § 40.1-5.3-3(i)(2) are subject to detention within the

meaning of § 40.1-5.3-3(m).

Moreover, as Morin instructs, the trial justice’s acceptance of the undisputed

conclusion by Dr. Montross—that Mr. Mather’s competency to stand trial is

- 16 -
nonrestorable prior to the dismissal of the pending charges—triggers the due-process

principles established by Jackson. See Morin, 606 A.2d at 682. On the record in this

case, it is clear that Mr. Mather’s continued commitment no longer bears a

reasonable relationship to the purpose of his commitment under § 40.1-5.3-3(i)(2).5

As a result, we reject the state’s attempt to distinguish Morin on the basis that it

involved a defendant who was confined in a hospital: Mr. Mather is clearly detained

pursuant to § 40.1-5.3-3, irrespective of his outpatient status. Based on the trial

justice’s determination that Mr. Mather’s competency to stand trial is nonrestorable

prior to the dismissal of the pending charges pursuant to subsection (j), the Supreme

Court’s holding in Jackson confirms that due process requires discharge from the

detention orders of commitment thirty days after such determination. See Jackson,

406 U.S. at 738; Morin, 606 A.2d at 682.

Finally, we acknowledge the state’s concern with discharging individuals who

are subject to detention orders of commitment pursuant to § 40.1-5.3-3, but who

may pose a danger to the community upon discharge; and the state’s attendant

request to provide trial justices with flexibility when holding a hearing pursuant to

§ 40.1-5.3-3(m). We recognize the delicate and difficult balance that exists when

5
The state conceded at oral argument that Mr. Mather has missed six periodic
reviews because his competency is no longer restorable; and further, that the state
does not plan to seek any additional reviews in the future based on the conclusion
that his competency is nonrestorable.
- 17 -
weighing the rights of the accused and the state’s interest in public safety; and

consequently, we emphasize that § 40.1-5.3-3(m) does not require discharge from

the detention order of commitment until thirty days after the court determines that a

defendant is incompetent and that competency to stand trial is nonrestorable. It

further provides that “the state may commence proceedings seeking to commit the

defendant pursuant to § 40.1-5-8.” Section 40.1-5.3-3(m). As such, the statute offers

the possibility of pursuing civil commitment as a means of safeguarding the public

from a potentially dangerous defendant. Accordingly, we hold that where, as here,

a defendant is found to be incompetent to stand trial and competency is nonrestorable

prior to the statutory dismissal period contained in § 40.1-5.3-3(j), the defendant is

entitled to be discharged from detention under the order of commitment thirty days

thereafter pursuant to § 40.1-5.3-3(m). 6

Based on our review of the record, this Court concludes that the trial justice

erroneously denied Mr. Mather’s petitions to discharge him from the outpatient

facility.

6
In the identical petitions for writ of certiorari, Mr. Mather sought review of the
March 23, 2021 orders of the Superior Court, which simply and concisely denied his
petitions to discharge from detention order of commitment in the two criminal
matters pending in Newport County Superior Court. We limit our review
accordingly and decline to consider Mr. Mather’s request to order the dismissal of
the pending charges on the record before us.
- 18 -
Conclusion

We quash the orders of the Superior Court and remand the record in this case

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

- 19 -
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case State of Rhode Island v. Edward Mather.

No. 2021-109-M.P. (N2/18-121A)
Case Number
No. 2021-110-M.P. (N2/18-264A)

Date Opinion Filed July 2, 2024

Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Melissa A. Long

Source of Appeal Newport County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Brian Van Couyghen

For State:

Sean Paul Malloy
Department of Attorney General
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Defendant:

Kara J. Maguire
Rhode Island Public Defender

SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)