William Felkner v. Rhode Island College

April 20, 2023
Supreme Court

No. 2021-267-Appeal.
(PC 07-6702)

William Felkner :

v. :

Rhode Island College et al. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 222-3258 or Email
opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov of any typographical or
other formal errors in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court

No. 2021-267-Appeal.
(PC 07-6702)

William Felkner :

v. :

Rhode Island College et al. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme

Court on December 6, 2022, on appeal by the plaintiff, William Felkner (Felkner or

plaintiff), from entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Rhode Island

College (RIC), John Nazarian (Nazarian), Carol Bennett-Speight (Dean Bennett-

Speight), James Ryczek (Professor Ryczek), Roberta Pearlmutter (Professor

Pearlmutter), and S. Scott Mueller (Professor Mueller), (collectively, defendants).1

Before this Court, the plaintiff argues that the hearing justice erred in granting

1
More specifically, defendants are: John Nazarian, President of RIC at the time
Felkner was enrolled at the School of Social Work (SSW); Carol Bennett-Speight,
Dean of the SSW at relevant times; James Ryczek, an adjunct professor at the SSW
at relevant times; Roberta Pearlmutter, a professor of social work at the SSW at
relevant times; and S. Scott Mueller, an assistant professor of social work at the SSW
at relevant times. Felkner v. Rhode Island College, 203 A.3d 433, 440 n.2 (R.I. 2019)
(Felkner I).
-1-
summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. The plaintiff also

contends that the hearing justice disregarded this Court’s mandate when the case was

remanded to the Superior Court. Finally, the plaintiff argues that the hearing justice

improperly resolved questions of material fact in granting summary judgment. For

the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

Facts and Travel

This is not the first time Felkner has appeared before this Court. A full

rendition of the original facts and travel can be found at Felkner v. Rhode Island

College, 203 A.3d 433 (R.I. 2019) (Felkner I). We will, however, recite the facts

and travel pertinent to the instant appeal. Felkner, who describes himself as a

“conservative libertarian,” began pursuit of a Master of Social Work degree at RIC

in 2004. Shortly thereafter, he learned that the School of Social Work (the SSW)

would be sponsoring a showing of the movie Fahrenheit 9/11.2 Felkner objected to

the showing of the film to Professor Ryczek, his instructor for a foundational course,

and requested that the SSW show a rebuttal film that represented the conservative

view-point. Professor Ryczek responded that the SSW has a mission dedicated to

social and economic justice and suggested that:

2
Fahrenheit 9/11 is a documentary film written and directed by filmmaker, author,
and political commentator Michael Moore that takes a liberal, critical look at the
presidency of George W. Bush, the war in Iraq, and its coverage in the media.
Fahrenheit 9/11 (Michael Moore 2004).
-2-
“[I]f a student finds that they are consistently and regularly
experiencing opposite views from what is being taught and
espoused in the curriculum, or the professional ‘norms’
that keep coming up in class and in field, then their fit with
the profession will not get any more comfortable, and in
fact will most likely become increasingly uncomfortable.”

The sponsor of the film presentation, Professor Daniel Weisman (Professor

Weisman), responded to Felkner that the SSW was “not committed to balanced

presentations” and that, “[f]or the most part, Republican ideology is oppositional”

to the fundamental values of the social work profession. Nevertheless, Professor

Weisman did show the rebuttal film suggested by Felkner to the same classes that

saw the first film because he felt it was “the reasonable thing to do.”

In Professor Ryczek’s course, students were assigned a group project in which

they were to advocate for a social welfare issue in class and compose a policy paper

promoting the group’s position. According to Felkner, Professor Ryczek provided

a list of issues the students could choose from, all of which involved, in Felkner’s

words, “a leftist position on social welfare issues.” Professor Ryczek indicated that

the students would advocate on behalf of their selected issue and lobby the General

Assembly in the next semester’s course. Felkner joined a class group advocating for

passage of Senate Bill 525 (SB 525), a proposed amendment to a “temporary cash

assistance program for Rhode Islanders having a difficult time making ends meet.”

Felkner later requested permission from Professor Ryczek to advocate in opposition

to SB 525 in the class debate because, according to Felkner, “SB 525 did not actually
-3-
help people get off welfare with higher-paying jobs * * *.” Professor Ryczek

refused to allow Felkner to change his debate position and required Felkner to argue

in favor of SB 525. According to Felkner, Professor Ryczek told him that RIC was

a “perspective school” and that if Felkner was to lobby on SB 525, it would need to

be “in [RIC’s] perspective.”3 Additionally, Felkner wrote his policy paper from a

perspective opposing the passage of SB 525.

After complaints from group members that Felkner was not participating in

accordance with class expectations, Professor Ryzcek disaggregated Felkner’s grade

from the group. He went on to give Felkner a failing grade for the debate and on his

paper, and ultimately gave Felkner a C-plus grade for the course. Felkner appealed

his failing grades for the paper and the debate to the Academic Standing Committee

(ASC).

On January 20, 2005, a hearing was held before the ASC on Felkner’s appeal

of his grades. According to Felkner, he did not have the opportunity to question

Professor Ryczek at the hearing because Professor Ryczek left the room immediately

after his testimony. Felkner believed that Professor Ryczek had given inaccurate

testimony to the ASC regarding conversations between them and announced that he

3
This issue was ultimately resolved as stated in Felkner I: “There is no dispute that,
although Professor Ryczek initially told Felkner he would be required to lobby from
a perspective contrary to his own views, Felkner never was compelled to lobby or
testify at a public hearing.” Felkner I, 203 A.3d at 452.
-4-
would hereafter record all of his conversations with RIC professors in order to

document them accurately. The ASC denied Felkner’s appeal, and he further

pursued the case to the chair of the Master of Social Work (MSW) program, Dr.

Lenore Olsen, and then to the dean of the SSW, Dean Bennett-Speight.

The decision of the ASC was upheld in both instances. Felkner approached

the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE)4 about his alleged

mistreatment. RIC’s then-President, Nazarian, received a letter from FIRE, dated

January 28, 2005, stating that RIC should reconsider the appeal and withdraw its

policies because they are unconstitutional. In a letter, Nazarian replied to FIRE that

no RIC student had been punished for failing to embrace a certain political position.

At the end of the course, Professor Ryczek informed Dr. Olsen that he would

not teach the second half of the class the next semester because, as an adjunct faculty

member, managing Felkner required too much of his time. Felkner was moved to a

section of the course taught by a full-time instructor. In an assignment that required

approval by Professor Pearlmutter, Felkner proposed that he would form a group

with students from other colleges to lobby RIC for an Academic Bill of Rights.

4
FIRE describes itself as a tax-exempt nonprofit organization under Section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code with a mission to defend and promote the
value of free speech for all Americans in courtrooms, on campuses, and in American
culture. FIRE’s Mission, https://www.thefire.org/about-us/mission (last visited
December 15, 2022). FIRE has since modified its name to the Foundation for
Individual Rights and Expression.
-5-
Professor Pearlmutter rejected this proposal. Felkner then submitted a project

request to lobby in favor of the then-governor’s proposed welfare-reform program.

This suggestion was also rejected.

Subsequently, Professor Pearlmutter permitted Felkner to work on a project

lobbying for the defeat of SB 525. Professor Pearlmutter told Felkner that she would

penalize his grade on the project if he did not work on it with students from her class.

Felkner, however, chose to work in a group with two individuals from outside of

RIC. 5 Additionally, Felkner audio-recorded an exchange with Professor Pearlmutter

without her knowledge and went on to post a rough transcript of the conversation to

the website he had created to expose what he characterized as the “liberal bias” at

RIC. Several students approached Professor Pearlmutter about the confidentiality

of the class being compromised by Felkner’s website postings. She allowed students

to discuss their concerns about the website one day in class. Felkner asserted that

his political ideology was “assail[ed]” in the classroom and that Professor

Pearlmutter would not give him the opportunity to respond. Felkner further asserted

that Professor Pearlmutter unmistakably communicated that only liberal ideas could

help the poor and advance the cause of social justice.

5
Felkner partnered with a student from Brown University and a local talk radio
personality.
-6-
Professor Pearlmutter filed a complaint with the ASC, asserting that Felkner

violated the National Association of Social Workers (NASW) Code of Ethics. On

April 27, 2005, the ASC held a hearing on Professor Pearlmutter’s complaint, that

Felkner committed unethical and unprofessional conduct. Thereafter, the ASC

issued a written decision determining that Felkner’s deceptive conduct in recording

his conversation with Professor Pearlmutter violated one of the three sections of the

Code of Ethics alleged by Professor Pearlmutter in her complaint. The ASC

recommended that Felkner declare immediately, in writing, that he would refrain

from any deceptive audio or video copying of conversations with social work

colleagues and refrain from any audio or video copying without express permission.

The ASC further advised that Felkner be dismissed from the MSW program if he

failed to carry out such a declaration. Felkner wrote a letter to Dean Bennett-

Speight, dated May 11, 2005, indicating that he would refrain from making audio or

video recordings of his conversations with his SSW colleagues unless he first

obtained their consent to record.

At the end of the spring semester, Felkner selected the Social Work

Organizing and Policy (SWOP) concentration for completion of his degree. As a

MSW student, Felkner was required to complete a field placement and integrative

project in order to fulfill the program requirements. For Felkner’s field placement

and integrative project, he obtained an internship in then-Governor Donald L.

-7-
Carcieri’s office, assigned to welfare-reform legislation. Felkner alleged that

Professor Ryczek, who coordinated field placements, denied Felkner’s placement

because it would not promote progressive social change. Felkner claimed that

Professor Ryczek informed him that the SWOP-concentration objectives required

him to defend liberal policies and that Felkner’s views might be best served in

another academic discipline, such as political science. Felkner met with Dean

Bennett-Speight about his challenges in the SWOP-concentration field placement

process, claiming he was singled out because of his conservative views. Thereafter,

Dean Bennett-Speight assigned Professor Mueller to be Felkner’s field placement

supervisor. Professor Mueller initially rejected Felkner’s proposed field placement

and project, but eventually RIC approved the field placement in the Governor’s

office.

According to Felkner, Professor Mueller refused to authorize Felkner’s

submission of an integrative project on welfare reform because it was a “toxic”

subject. Felkner reluctantly conceded to initiate work on health care. Felkner alleged

that working on health-care reform put him at a disadvantage relative to other SSW

students because he was unable to use his field placement research for his integrative

project. Felkner worked on his integrative project throughout 2006 and 2007. On

November 26, 2007, Felkner requested more time to complete his integrative project.

In January 2008, Dean Bennett-Speight granted Felkner an extension until May 11,

-8-
2009, to complete his degree requirements. The extension was subject to Felkner

submitting a section of the project by April 15, 2008, a requirement with which he

did not comply. On March 17, 2008, Felkner sought an additional six-week

extension, but both Professor Pearlmutter and Dean Bennett-Speight denied this

request.

In December 2007, Felkner filed the instant action in Providence County

Superior Court, alleging multiple violations of the Rhode Island and United States

constitutions. Felkner sought equitable relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and § 1988, alleging that defendants’ conduct toward him during his enrollment in

the MSW program violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.6 Summary

judgment was entered on November 4, 2015, which was then appealed to this Court.

In Felkner I, the Court affirmed summary judgment on claims of retaliation based

on recording activities; equal protection; procedural due process; and civil

conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Felkner I, 203 A.3d at 452, 456, 458,

460. The Court further affirmed the order granting a motion to strike plaintiff’s

6
This Court stated in Felkner I, “Felkner has not drawn this Court’s attention to any
distinction between the application of Rhode Island and federal law regarding his
free speech and expression, equal protection, and due process claims. Therefore, we
address only the application of federal law to these claims.” Felkner I, 203 A.3d at
446 n.9.
-9-
claim for punitive damages.7 Id. at 461. This Court vacated the judgment as to

claims for violation of Felkner’s First Amendment free-speech and expression rights

based on political viewpoint; retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights,

other than those related to recording; compelled speech contrary to his political

beliefs; and the imposition of unconstitutional conditions for obtaining his Master’s

degree. Id. at 450, 452-53, 462. Additionally, the Court noted that the hearing justice

had not addressed defendants’ qualified immunity arguments. Id. at 460.

Specifically, the Court stated, “[p]art of the Superior Court’s task on remand will be,

therefore, to consider whether any of the defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity, should defendants continue to press this argument.” Id. Subsequently, in

October 2019, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based on qualified

immunity.

After written memoranda from the parties, supplemental briefing, and a

hearing on the issue of qualified immunity, the hearing justice issued a written

decision on defendants’ motion for summary judgment. She applied a two-step

analysis and determined that it was uncontested that Felkner met the first step of a

qualified immunity claim, having alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional

right; thus, the hearing justice proceeded to the first aspect of the second step of the

7
In Felkner I, this Court also determined that all claims pursuant to the Rhode Island
Civil Rights Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 112 of title 42 (“RICRA”), and claims for
equitable relief were waived. Felkner I, 203 A.3d at 446 n.10.
- 10 -
analysis. The hearing justice concluded that defendants’ actions had not been clearly

established as constitutional violations during the relevant time frame and that the

relevant caselaw favored the concept that courts should not intrude into purely

academic matters and should defer to educators. Therefore, she found, the second

step was not satisfied.

With regard to the second aspect of the second step, the hearing justice

proceeded to opine on whether a reasonable defendant would have understood that

his or her conduct violated Felkner’s constitutional rights. She determined that, at

the time of the alleged violations, the law was not clear on the subject matter of

Felkner’s allegations and that, therefore, a reasonable defendant would not have had

fair warning that Felkner’s constitutional rights might be violated by their decisions.

Upon a finding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, the

hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. Felkner thereafter

filed a notice of appeal.8

Standard of Review

“This Court reviews a decision granting a party’s motion for summary

judgment de novo.” Citizens Bank, N.A. v. Palermo, 247 A.3d 131, 133 (R.I. 2021)

8
Felkner filed a premature notice of appeal on September 20, 2021; final judgment
was entered on October 12, 2021. Therefore, we will treat the appeal as timely. See
Goddard v. APG Security-RI, LLC, 134 A.3d 173, 175 (R.I. 2016) (treating a
premature notice of appeal as timely filed).
- 11 -
(quoting Boudreau v. Automatic Temperature Controls, Inc., 212 A.3d 594, 598

(R.I. 2019)). We assess the matter “from the vantage point of the trial justice[,] * *

* view[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and if

we conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we will affirm * * *” Id. (quoting

Boudreau, 212 A.3d at 598). “Although summary judgment is recognized as an

extreme remedy, * * * to avoid summary judgment the burden is on the nonmoving

party to produce competent evidence that proves the existence of a disputed issue of

material fact.” Id. (quoting Boudreau, 212 A.3d at 598).

Discussion

On appeal, Felkner argues that the hearing justice violated the law of the case

by exceeding this Court’s mandate on remand. Felkner asserts that the hearing

justice found that defendants had not violated Felkner’s constitutional rights, in

direct contravention of this Court’s decision. Felkner also maintains that defendants

are not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. Further, Felkner argues

that qualified immunity does not apply to his request for equitable relief and that

defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because Felkner’s constitutional

rights were established by caselaw. Felkner also maintains that defendants’

insurance coverage precludes the application of qualified immunity. Finally,

- 12 -
Felkner suggests that the hearing justice impermissibly resolved questions of

material fact.

In response, defendants argue, inter alia, that the hearing justice correctly

decided that the law was not clearly established as to the alleged constitutional

violation. According to defendants, the facts presented by Felkner did not support

his assertion that defendants violated a clearly established right, and, therefore,

defendants were not given fair warning that they were acting in an unconstitutional

manner.

Qualified immunity is an immunity typically afforded to government officials

on the federal level. Ensey v. Culhane, 727 A.2d 687, 690 (R.I. 1999). The United

States Supreme Court has stated that “government officials performing discretionary

functions generally are granted a qualified immunity and are ‘shielded from liability

for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”

Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.

800, 818 (1982)). “Qualified immunity ‘gives government officials breathing room

to make reasonable but mistaken judgments,’ and ‘protects all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Messerschmidt v. Millender,

565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011)).

This Court has acknowledged that the defense of qualified immunity may be

- 13 -
available in some circumstances. Specifically, former Chief Justice Weisberger

wrote, “[w]e are of the opinion that, in an appropriate case, the doctrine of qualified

immunity might well be applied by this Court.” Ensey, 727 A.2d at 690. We deem

it applicable to the claims remaining in this case.

In a qualified-immunity analysis, “the first step in evaluating a claim * * * is

to ‘determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual

constitutional right at all.’” Monahan v. Girouard, 911 A.2d 666, 674 (R.I. 2006)

(deletion omitted) (quoting Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609). “Second, if the plaintiff has

satisfied this first step, the court must decide whether the right at issue was ‘clearly

established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). A

clearly established constitutional right “means that, at the time of the [official’s]

conduct, the law was ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing’ is unlawful.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138

S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741)). If the answer to the

second question is also yes, then the Court must determine the second aspect of the

second step, whether a reasonable official, situated similarly to the defendants,

would have understood that the conduct at issue, if proven, contravened the clearly

established law. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. The determination of whether

defendants may avail themselves of qualified immunity considers the conduct in

- 14 -
question from the perspective of “objective reasonableness.” See Malley v. Briggs,

475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986).

It is undisputed by the parties, and it was recognized by the hearing justice,

that the first step in the qualified-immunity analysis was satisfied by Felkner when

he alleged that his First Amendment right to free speech was violated. Therefore,

we must determine whether the rights at issue were clearly established at the time of

defendants’ alleged misconduct.

The United States Supreme Court has created certain benchmarks concerning

First Amendment rights in academia as they relate to students and to educational

institutions. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393

U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (ruling that the school could not preclude students from

wearing black armbands in class to demonstrate against the Vietnam War); see also

Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding that

schools may restrict students’ First Amendment rights by exercising editorial power

“so long as [the schools’] actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical

concerns”); Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682-83 (1986)

(noting that students have First Amendment free-speech rights, but that schools may

limit speech that is “lewd, indecent, or offensive”)

This Court noted in Felkner I that, while freedom of speech is vital in

American classrooms, “[r]ights guaranteed by the First Amendment, however, are

- 15 -
not unlimited in the context of academia.” Felkner I, 203 A.3d at 448 (citing

Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273). This Court went on to note that, under Hazelwood,

“educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over

the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so

long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Id.

(quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273).

Generally, academic decisions concerning grades, coursework, and progress

within an academic program are accorded great deference and are not subject to

judicial review. See Board of Curators of University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435

U.S. 78, 89-90 (1978). “University faculties must have the widest range of

discretion in making judgments as to the academic performance of students and their

entitlement to promotion or graduation.” Id. at 96 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring).

Furthermore, courts “should show great respect for the faculty’s professional

judgment. Plainly, [courts] may not override [professional judgment] unless it is

such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that

the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional

judgment.” Felkner I, 203 A.3d at 449 (quoting Regents of University of Michigan

v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985)).

The Supreme Court has stated that “[q]ualified immunity balances two

important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they

- 16 -
exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment,

distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson, 555

U.S. at 231. Thus, the precedent encompassing academic decisions by public

institutions, including Horowitz, Hazelwood, Ewing, and Fraser, convinces us that

the law was not sufficiently clear, such that a reasonable educator would have

understood what they were doing amounted to violations of a student’s constitutional

rights. See Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589. The core of Felkner’s argument is that he was

not allowed to complete Master’s-level assignments on topics he chose, as opposed

to the topics that were assigned to him. Further, that when he pursued his chosen

topic against the wishes of the faculty, he was retaliated against with poor grades.

To expect faculty to decipher “a sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing

precedent” would be improper. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589. Felkner failed to show that

the law is clearly established; furthermore, a reasonable person in defendants’

position would not have had fair warning that their conduct potentially violated his

constitutional rights. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. We decline to disturb the findings

of the hearing justice.

Felkner argues that there are active claims against RIC, for which the defense

of qualified immunity cannot be raised. This Court determined that all claims

pursuant to the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 112 of title 42

(“RICRA”) and for equitable relief were waived. Felkner I, 203 A.3d at 446 n.10.

- 17 -
The only claims against RIC in the amended complaint were for equitable relief.

Accordingly, no claims against RIC remain as an institution because RIC is not a

person, pursuant to § 1983. “This Court has recognized that ‘neither a State nor its

officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983.’” Zab v. Rhode

Island Department of Corrections, 269 A.3d 741, 746 (R.I. 2022) (quoting

Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 868 (R.I. 1997)). Therefore, only the § 1983

claims against the individual defendants remained.

Lastly, Felkner’s contention that the existence of insurance coverage for

defendants precludes the application of qualified immunity is without merit. This

argument is not supported by caselaw and is inconsistent with the underpinnings of

qualified immunity. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814, 818 (noting that qualified immunity

strikes a balance between the need to vindicate constitutional harms and social costs

associated with bringing suit against government officials.). 9

Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the final judgment of the Superior

Court. The papers in this case shall be returned to the Superior Court.

9
Felkner submitted citations of supplemental authorities and defendants submitted
a response after oral argument pursuant to Article I, Rule 16(e) of the Supreme Court
Rules of Appellate Procedure. We acknowledge receipt of those authorities;
however, it has not impacted our analysis.
- 18 -
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case William Felkner v. Rhode Island College et al.

No. 2021-267-Appeal.
Case Number
(PC 07-6702)

Date Opinion Filed April 20, 2023

Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Erin Lynch Prata

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Susan E. McGuirl

For Plaintiff:

Thomas W. Lyons, Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Defendants:

Jeffrey S. Michaelson, Esq.

SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)