Nicole Solas v. South Kingstown School Committee

Supreme Court

No. 2025-6-Appeal.
(PC 22-4727)

Nicole Solas :

v. :

South Kingstown School Committee. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical
or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court

No. 2025-6-Appeal.
(PC 22-4727)

Nicole Solas :

v. :

South Kingstown School Committee. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court. The plaintiff, Nicole Solas, appeals

from a Superior Court entry of judgment in favor of the defendant, the South

Kingstown School Committee. This case comes before the Court pursuant to an

order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this

appeal should not be summarily decided. After considering the parties’ written and

oral submissions and reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been

shown and that this case may be decided without further briefing or argument. The

issue presented on appeal is whether the Black, Indigenous, People of Color

(BIPOC) Advisory Board is a “public body” subject to the Open Meetings Act

(OMA), G.L. 1956 § 42-46-3. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm

the judgment of the Superior Court.

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Facts and Travel

On June 23, 2020, Robin Wildman, executive director of Nonviolent Schools

Rhode Island (NSRI), gave a presentation to the South Kingstown School

Committee (the school committee) on the mission of NSRI and how the organization

could help improve the “climate and culture” of the South Kingstown school district.

On July 22, 2020, the school committee unanimously voted to create the “equity and

anti racist advisory board” which later became known as the BIPOC Advisory Board

(the Board) facilitated by Wildman and Jonathan Lewis, a training director at NSRI.

The school committee authorized Wildman and Lewis to facilitate Board meetings

in response to numerous community members expressing their concerns about the

lack of diversity in district staff members and racial inequity in the district’s student

disciplinary policies. Community members also shared that students were

experiencing acts of racism to such a degree that the school district should implement

anti-racist professional development training and provide conflict-resolution

training to promote a more equitable school district.

On October 27, 2020, the school committee unanimously voted to continue

the Board and executed an agreement with NSRI to facilitate twenty-five meetings

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from February through August 2021. Thereafter, the school committee allotted

$5,000 of its funds to the Board to facilitate these meetings. 1

In May 2021, plaintiff learned of the Board’s existence and asked the

superintendent of the school district, Linda Savastano, for permission to attend its

meetings. Savastano directed plaintiff to Wildman, who informed plaintiff that the

school district hired the NSRI as a private vendor and that at that time, the Board’s

meetings were not open the public.2

Subsequently, plaintiff filed an administrative complaint with the Rhode

Island Office of the Attorney General under § 42-46-8(a) against the BIPOC Board,

alleging that the Board was a public body that did not hold open meetings, in

violation of the OMA. 3 The school committee filed a response denying plaintiff’s

1
The record reveals that NSRI was paid $7,474 for the July 1, 2020, through June
30, 2021, fiscal year. This amount included $5,000 for the facilitation of twenty-five
Board meetings and other services performed by NSRI unrelated to facilitation of
the Board.
2
Wildman testified at her deposition that, in the preliminary stage of the Board’s
formation, participation on the Board was open only to members of the community
who identified as BIPOC. This effort was intended to facilitate a safe space for
members to share personal stories about how the school district’s policies affected
them. Wildman also testified that after the preliminary stage, membership on the
Board would be open to the larger community. Wildman testified, however, that she
rejected Solas’s requests to attend the meetings because of Solas’s persistent emails
and social media remarks to Wildman demanding that the meetings be open to the
public and requesting names of individual Board members.
3
General Laws 1956 § 42-46-8 provides a remedial cause of action for citizens or
entities of the state who are aggrieved as a result of a public body operating in
violation of the OMA.

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allegations. The school committee declared that the Board’s mission was “to

advocate for equity in the education of students who identify as [BIPOC] in South

Kingstown schools, inspiring a healthier and just community and school system for

everyone.” Additionally, the Board was to “review[] current [s]chool [c]ommittee

policies through the lens of inclusivity and equity. If the Board finds facts to lead it

to believe that the policy being reviewed does not meet these goals, they bring those

concerns to the School Committee Policy Sub-Committee.” The School Committee

Policy Sub-Committee (the policy sub-committee) would then meet to discuss and

vote on the Board’s policy proposals and submit said proposals to the school

committee for further review.

On May 10, 2022, the Attorney General notified plaintiff that the Board was

not a public body under the OMA. Consequently, plaintiff filed a complaint in

Superior Court pursuant to the OMA against the school committee. Thereafter,

plaintiff filed an amended complaint and moved for summary judgment, arguing that

the plain language of the OMA and this Court’s holding in Solas v. Emergency

Hiring Council of the State, 774 A.2d 820 (R.I. 2001), required that the Board be

subject to the OMA because, according to plaintiff, the Board possessed advisory

power over matters of significant public interest. The plaintiff sought declaratory

relief that any actions taken by the Board be deemed null and void. The school

committee responded with a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that the

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Board was not a public body under the OMA, citing to this Court’s holding in

Pontarelli v. Rhode Island Board Council on Elementary and Secondary Education,

151 A.3d 301 (R.I. 2016).

The hearing justice concluded that the school committee “did not evade its

own bylaws or state laws,” because the Board “[did] not possess any voting or veto

power to override the [s]chool [c]ommittee’s or the [p]olicy [s]ubcommittee’s

decision[s] * * *.” The hearing justice reasoned that there was a structured process

where the Board provided suggestions to the policy sub-committee for its review,

which was then subject to further review by the school committee. The hearing

justice determined that this framework “provide[d] the public two opportunities to

stay informed and voice concerns about the Board’s policy proposals * * *.”

Furthermore, the hearing justice found that, because there was a review process

where recommendations or suggestions made by the Board to the policy

sub-committee were not “blanketly adopted” by the school committee, “the Board

[wa]s analogous to the [Compensation Review Committee] in Pontarelli.” See

Pontarelli, 151 A.3d at 308. Accordingly, the hearing justice denied plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment, and granted defendant’s cross-motion. Final

judgment in favor of defendant entered on October 23, 2024. The plaintiff filed a

timely notice of appeal.

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Standard of Review

“This Court reviews a decision granting a party’s motion for summary

judgment de novo.” Citizens Bank, N.A. v. Palermo, 247 A.3d 131, 133 (R.I. 2021)

(quoting Boudreau v. Automatic Temperature Controls, Inc., 212 A.3d 594, 598

(R.I. 2019)). “We assess the matter ‘from the vantage point of the trial justice,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and if we

conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we will affirm.’” Felkner v. Rhode Island

College, 291 A.3d 1001, 1008 (R.I. 2023) (brackets and deletions omitted) (quoting

Citizens Bank, N.A., 247 A.3d at 133).

Additionally, “[a] Superior Court decision granting or denying declaratory

relief is reviewed with great deference by this Court.” LMG Rhode Island Holdings,

Inc. v. Office of McKee, 335 A.3d 444, 448 (R.I. 2025) (quoting Estrella v. Janney

Montgomery Scott LLC, 296 A.3d 97, 106 (R.I. 2023)). “When deciding an action

for declaratory judgment, a Superior Court justice makes all findings of fact without

a jury.” Id. (quoting Estrella, 296 A.3d at 106). “Such factual findings are afforded

great weight by this Court, and will not be disturbed absent a showing that the trial

justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence or was otherwise clearly

wrong.” Id. (quoting Estrella, 296 A.3d at 106). Nevertheless, “a trial justice’s

findings on ‘questions of law and statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo by

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this Court.’” Id. (quoting Westconnaug Recovery Company, LLC v. U.S. Bank

National Association as Trustee for ARMT 2007-2, 290 A.3d 364, 366 (R.I. 2023)).

Discussion

On appeal, plaintiff maintains that the Board is a public body, and thus its

meetings are mandated to be open to the public. The plaintiff argues that Solas is

controlling law because, according to plaintiff, the Board “meets all the criteria this

Court has set to determine whether an entity is a ‘public body’ under the OMA.”

The plaintiff contends that the Board is comparable to the Emergency Hiring Council

(EHC) in Solas. See Solas, 774 A.2d at 825. The plaintiff alleges that the Board was

created by the South Kingstown School Committee specifically to exercise

“advisory power,” which included making policy decisions on matters of significant

public interest. The plaintiff cites to this Court’s holding in Solas to assert that an

entity’s exercise of advisory power is sufficient to invoke the OMA and subject the

entity to its regulations.

In response, defendant argues that the Board is not a public body subject to

the OMA. The defendant contends that this Court’s holding in Pontarelli controls

because the Board operates as an “informal ad hoc working group,” distinguishable

from the EHC in Solas. The defendant avers that the Board is more akin to the

Compensation Review Committee (CRC) in Pontarelli. See Pontarelli, 151 A.3d at

301. The defendant asserts that, under the OMA, a public body must convene to

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discuss a matter over which the body has advisory power; defendant alleges that the

Board does not have such power. The defendant points to the hearing justice’s

finding that although the Board submitted proposals to the policy sub-committee,

the Board “did not possess veto or voting power to override” any of the policy sub-

committee or the school committee’s decisions. Likewise, that “any

recommendation or suggestion made by the Board to the Policy Subcommittee [was]

never blanketly adopted by the School Committee.”

The defendant further argues that for the Board to be properly subjected to the

regulations of the OMA, the Board must be a public body and its meetings must have

a quorum. Thus, according to defendant, the irregularity of the Board’s meetings

and membership combined with the ad hoc nature of the Board’s existence fail to

establish that the OMA is properly invoked.

Accordingly, the issue presented to this Court is whether the Board is a public

body within the meaning of the OMA, such that its meetings must be open to the

public pursuant to § 42-46-3. We answer this question in the negative.

This Court has stated that “[w]hen a municipality’s actions are challenged as

being violative of the Open Meetings Act, we are presented with ‘a mixed question

of law and fact.’” Anolik v. Zoning Board of Review of City of Newport, 64 A.3d

1171, 1174 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Tanner v. Town Council of Town of East Greenwich,

880 A.2d 784, 791 (R.I. 2005)). Accordingly, our examination of whether the

-8-
Board’s meetings “violated the Open Meetings Act will be carried out in a de novo

manner with respect to the ‘application of the law to the facts.’” Id. at 1174 (quoting

Tanner, 880 A.2d at 791).

Additionally, “[i]n matters of statutory interpretation our ultimate goal is to

give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature.” LMG Rhode

Island Holdings, Inc., 335 A.3d at 449 (quoting Sosa v. City of Woonsocket, 297

A.3d 120, 124 (R.I. 2023)). Therefore, “when the language of a statute is clear and

unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words

of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.” Id. (quoting Sosa, 297 A.3d at 124).

Accordingly, “[w]hen interpreting a statute, this Court’s task is to ‘determine and

effectuate the General Assembly’s intent and attribute to the enactment the meaning

most consistent with its policies or obvious purposes.’” Cullen v. Lincoln Town

Council, 960 A.2d 246, 249 (R.I. 2008) (brackets omitted) (quoting Tanner, 880

A.2d at 796); see In re J.T., 252 A.3d 1276, 1280 (R.I. 2021).

The General Assembly enacted the Open Meetings Act “to ensure that ‘public

business be performed in an open and public manner and that the citizens be advised

of and aware of the performance of public officials and the deliberations and

decisions that go into the making of public policy.’” Cullen, 960 A.2d at 249

(quoting § 42-46-1). To effectuate its purpose, the act requires that “[e]very meeting

of all public bodies shall be open to the public unless closed pursuant to §§ 42-46-4

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and 42-46-5.” Section 42-46-3. Under the OMA, a public body is defined as “any

department, agency, commission, committee, board, council, bureau, or authority,

or any subdivision thereof, of state or municipal government * * * that funded at

least twenty-five percent (25%) of its operational budget in the prior budget year

with public funds * * *.” Section 42-46-2(5). Further, a meeting is “the convening

of a public body to discuss and/or act upon a matter over which the public body has

supervision, control, jurisdiction, or advisory power.” Section 42-46-2(1) (emphasis

added).

Indeed, this Court has established that “[a] literal reading of the act

demonstrates that all meetings to discuss or act upon matters over which the council

has supervision, control, or advisory power, are required to be open to the public.”

Solas, 774 A.2d at 825. Likewise, in Solas, this Court stated that “[w]hether

supervisory or advisory, both functions are regulated by the act. As the plain

language of the statute provides, a council’s exercise of advisory power is enough to

bring it under the act’s umbrella.” Id.

In Solas, the plaintiff requested to attend a meeting held by the EHC to

“consider the hiring of a hearing officer for the State Building Commission * * *.”4

Solas, 774 A.2d at 821. The EHC informed the plaintiff that he could not attend

4
We note that the plaintiff in Solas is not the same plaintiff in this case. See Solas v.
Emergency Hiring Council of the State, 774 A.2d 820, 821 (R.I. 2001).

- 10 -
because the meeting was closed to the public. Id. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a

complaint in Superior Court seeking a declaration that the EHC was subject to and

governed by the OMA. Id. at 821-22. In rendering our decision, this Court

contemplated four primary considerations: (1) the EHC’s creation; (2) the

consistency of the EHC’s meetings; (3) the composition and selection of EHC

members; and (4) the EHC’s “advisory capacity with veto power over a subject of

significant public interest.” Id. at 823-24.

First, the Court noted that the EHC was created by executive order “to manage

and control the state’s hiring practices and its fiscal resources.” Solas, 774 A.2d at

823. Under the Governor’s instruction, “no new positions, vacant positions, or

promotions could be created or filled without authorization from the EHC.” Id.

Second, we considered that members of the EHC were “required to meet at least

biweekly[,]” demonstrating consistent and regularly scheduled meetings. Id. at 824.

Third, we noted that the EHC was “composed of a group of high level state

officials[5] that convene[d] to discuss and/or act upon matters of great interest to the

citizens of this state” (i.e., hiring state employees). Id. at 825. The EHC’s

membership of high-level public officials who received their positions by

5
Members of the EHC included “the director of the Department of Administration
or a designee, a department director appointed by the Governor * * *, the governor’s
executive counsel or a designee, the governor’s cabinet secretary, and the special
assistant to the chief of staff for boards and commissions.” Solas, 774 A.2d at 824.

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appointment reinforced that the EHC was a public body. See id. Lastly, the Court

concluded that, because the EHC “possesse[d] significant supervisory and executive

veto power over creating or filling state employment positions[,] * * * [a]t the very

least the [EHC] function[ed] in an advisory capacity in state hirings.” Id.

By contrast, in Pontarelli, a plaintiff, employed as a hearing officer for the

Rhode Island Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (RIDE), alleged

that the RIDE and the Rhode Island Board Council on Elementary and Secondary

Education (the council) violated the OMA when they failed to provide the public

with adequate notice of CRC meetings, as required by the act. Pontarelli, 151 A.3d

at 302. This Court held that the CRC was not a “‘public body’ and, consequently,

[was] not subject to (nor was it in violation of) the OMA.” Id. at 308.

In analyzing many of the same factors contemplated in Solas, this Court

reasoned that, “[u]nlike the EHC in Solas, the CRC in this case d[id] not meet on a

regular basis, nor was the CRC created by an executive order.” Pontarelli, 151 A.3d

at 308; see Solas, 774 A.2d at 824. Rather, the CRC was created by the council “to

review requested and proposed salary adjustments for RIDE employees.” Pontarelli,

151 A.3d at 302-03. Likewise, “the CRC d[id] not have regular meetings; rather, it

schedule[d] meetings when a CRC member request[ed] one.” Id. at 303.

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Additionally, although this Court recognized that “the CRC was composed of

a group of high-level state officials[6] and operated under a charter,” we ultimately

determined that “these two factors alone [were] insufficient to place [the CRC] into

the ‘public body’ umbrella.” Pontarelli, 151 A.3d at 308. There, this Court noted

that CRC membership was not established by appointment, “instead, serving on the

CRC [was] just an additional task for people that [were] on the leadership team.” Id.

at 303 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the CRC operated under a

charter, this Court determined that this factor was not sufficient to invoke the OMA.

Pontarelli, 151 A.3d at 308. Likewise, the CRC neither took nor kept written

meeting minutes. Id. at 303.

Notably, in Pontarelli, this Court pointed out that in Solas “the EHC’s

advisory power over the matter to be discussed at a meeting alone required that the

meeting be open to the public.” Pontarelli, 151 A.3d at 308. Conversely, we

determined that the CRC did not have such advisory power. Id. The CRC received

salary compensation recommendations from RIDE division chiefs, which the CRC

then submitted to the commissioner of RIDE. Id. at 303. It was then in the

commissioner’s discretion to present any of the CRC’s recommendations to the

6
“The CRC [wa]s composed of six RIDE employees: three division chiefs, the chief
of staff, the human resources coordinator, and the deputy commissioner.” Pontarelli
v. Rhode Island Board Council on Elementary and Secondary Education, 151 A.3d
301, 303 (R.I. 2016).

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council. Id. at 308. The Court reasoned that, because any recommendations made

by the CRC were subject to a review process, “the public would have [had] an

opportunity to be informed of and object to such proposal[s].” Id.

In the instant case, we conclude that the Board is an amorphous, ad hoc group

that is more akin to the CRC in Pontarelli; it is not a “public body” subject to the

OMA. See Pontarelli, 151 A.3d at 308; see also § 42-46-3. The Board was not a

subdivision of local government, but a sporadic group of volunteers created by the

South Kingstown School Committee. See Pontarelli, 151 A.3d at 302 (stating that

the CRC was created by the council); see also Solas, 774 A.2d at 823 (noting that

the EHC was created by the governor through an executive order). The school

committee contracted with NSRI to permit Wildman and Lewis to facilitate meetings

for members of the BIPOC community to discuss their personal experiences with

and concerns about inequity in the school district. It is evident that any rules

pertaining to the Board were created by the NSRI under its contract with the school

committee. Similarly, the Board did not operate under a charter or bylaws; the NSRI

and Board members made meeting agendas informally.

Additionally, the relaxed nature of the Board’s membership and meetings

evidence that it served as more of an advocacy or affinity group than a board with

“advisory capacity.” Contra Solas, 774 A.2d at 825. Board members were merely

volunteers from the community. They did not receive compensation, medical, or

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any other benefits, for their service on the Board. As the hearing justice iterated, the

school committee allocated funds to pay NSRI for its facilitation of Board meetings;

the funds were not used to compensate members for their participation. Moreover,

in her deposition, Wildman testified that she gathered people to attend the meetings

by “word of mouth.” Unlike the EHC in Solas, Board members were not appointed

by a subdivision of state or municipal government or elected by the public. See id.

at 824 (noting the “senior executive branch staff members” on the EHC). The record

shows that, in essence, initially anyone who identified as a member of the BIPOC

community and, later, the broader community, was welcome to attend the meetings

to participate on the Board.

It is clear from the record that the nature of the Board’s membership was

voluntary and that the Board did not have consistent membership. The record also

reveals that meetings occurred weekly for a period but that over time membership

reduced and was informal. Wildman attested that the Board’s membership started

with about fifteen members and that “[d]ue to the personal nature of the stories that

were shared, over time, the members began to call each other family.” After which,

the group’s attendance declined to seven or eight regular members. Similarly, an

active member of the Board, Mwangi Gitahi, testified that the Board “didn’t really

have a membership, like, the same number of people who would attend each

meeting. It just kind of depended on who was available and who could make it.”

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Indeed, the inconsistency of the Board’s membership leads us to conclude that the

Board could not meet a quorum requirement if its membership was indeterminable.

See § 42-46-2(6).

The plaintiff alleges that the Board possessed advisory power over matters of

significant public interest to the citizens of this state. We disagree. The school

committee specifically charged Wildman and Lewis with facilitating meetings for

members of the BIPOC community to “inspir[e] a healthier and just community and

school system for everyone.” Naturally, this directive permitted the Board to review

specific school policies and provide feedback to the policy sub-committee on how

those policies could be amended to influence a more progressive and inclusive

school district, but the Board itself had no ability to implement changes to school

policies.

Here, the proposal review system, like the CRC’s in Pontarelli, was a

dual-step procedure. See Pontarelli, 151 A.3d at 308. The Board would submit

policy suggestions, notably on anti-racist, anti-discrimination, and anti-harassment

policies to the policy sub-committee, to address issues that Board members and the

relevant community were facing in the school district. The policy sub-committee

would then either send the suggestions back to the Board for reconsideration or offer

the ideas to the school committee for further review. See Pontarelli, 151 A.3d at 308

(“[T]he CRC’s sole function [was] to advise the commissioner of RIDE, who in turn

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has to make a recommendation to the council.”). The policy sub-committee was not

obligated to accept the Board’s suggestions in whole or in part. The policy

sub-committee’s decision whether to forward the Board’s suggestions to the school

committee was entirely discretionary. Furthermore, both the policy sub-committee

and the school committee were public bodies subject to the OMA, and held open

meetings. See § 42-46-3. Accordingly, interested district members had an

opportunity to stay informed about the district’s policy determinations at both stages

of the process. See Pontarelli, 151 A.3d at 308 (“[I]f the commissioner decided to

present any proposal to the council for the council’s required approval, the public

would have an opportunity to be informed of and object to such proposal.”).

The plaintiff contends that the Board possessed “advisory power” because,

according to plaintiff, the school committee appointed at least two members of the

Board to the policy sub-committee, which did have voting and veto power. See

§ 42-46-2. Based on the record, that assertion is inaccurate. Indeed, the policy

sub-committee had voting power on proposals to school policies; however, the

school committee did not appoint any members of the Board to the policy

sub-committee. The record indicates that, after the Board’s creation, the school

committee reserved one seat on the policy sub-committee for a Board member. The

seat was designated so that a Board member could be present at policy

sub-committee meetings to discuss the proposed suggestions. After a successful

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petition by the Board, this number was increased to two. Nonetheless, the seats were

not established for a particular member of the Board; they were for any Board

member who was available and willing to attend the policy sub-committee meeting.

Contra Solas, 774 A.2d at 824 (noting that the EHC was composed of members

appointed by the Governor). Consequently, anyone who volunteered to be a

representative occupied the reserved seat. Moreover, no Board members were

members of the school committee. Accordingly, the fact that the school committee

reserved two spots for Board representation on the policy sub-committee does not

advance plaintiff’s argument because members of the public had access to the policy

sub-committee and the school committee meetings, both of which were open to the

public. See Pontarelli, 151 A.3d at 308 (stating that council meetings were open to

the public when it deliberated salary adjustments proposed by the CRC). Therefore,

we discern no error in the hearing justice’s determination.

Finally, plaintiff avers that the hearing justice’s decision circumvents the

policy behind the OMA, which mandates transparency for matters of significant

public interest, and permits the school committee to use third-party vendors to evade

the statute. The plaintiff contends that Solas requires a broad interpretation of §

42-46-1, in favor of meetings being public, and that the hearing justice’s

interpretation improperly narrows its reach. Section 42-46-1; see Solas, 774 A.2d at

- 18 -
825. Indeed, this Court has stated that the statute requires a broad interpretation,7

however, the Board does not convene on matters over which it has veto power or

advisory capacity. See Solas, 774 A.2d at 824. The Board was not comprised of

public officials who formally convened to make deliberations and decisions on

public policy, such that adherence to the statute was required. Contra id. (“The EHC

combines senior executive branch staff members with employees for assistance with

the functions and objectives set forth in both executive orders * * *. It is clear that

the council has been granted significant influence and veto power over creating

positions in state government * * *.”).

It is clear that that the Board was a sporadic, ad hoc group of community

members who volunteered to meet to share their experiences and make suggestions

about how to create a more inclusive school community. Upon receipt of Board

suggestions, the policy sub-committee would deliberate and advise the school

committee on what, if any, changes might be implemented. Certainly, Solas had the

opportunity to attend policy sub-committee and school committee meetings to learn

of or object to such changes. Accordingly, the hearing justice was correct in his

7
“[J]urisdictions have enacted open meeting or ‘sunshine’ laws for the public
interest to protect the public from ‘closed door’ politics; and, as such, these
enactments should be broadly construed and interpreted in the light most favorable
to public access to achieve their remedial and protective purpose.” Solas, 774 A.2d
at 824.

- 19 -
determination that the Board is not a public body subject to the open meetings

requirement of the OMA.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, the Superior Court judgment is affirmed. The

papers may be remanded thereto.

Justice Goldberg participated in the decision but retired prior to its

publication.

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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case Nicole Solas v. South Kingstown School Committee.

No. 2025-6-Appeal.
Case Number
(PC 22-4727)

Date Opinion Filed May 29, 2026

Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Erin Lynch Prata

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Christopher K. Smith

For Plaintiff:

Jonathan Riches, Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Defendant:

Deidre E. Carreno, Esq.

SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)