El Bebe Day Care Center, Inc. v. Rhode Island Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, through its chair Patricia DiCenso, in her official capacity only

Supreme Court

No. 2024-331-Appeal.
(PC 22-2182)

El Bebe Day Care Center, Inc., et al. :

v. :

Rhode Island Department of Elementary :
and Secondary Education, through its
chair Patricia DiCenso, in her official
capacity only.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical
or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court

No. 2024-331-Appeal.
(PC 22-2182)
El Bebe Day Care Center, Inc., et al. :

v. :

Rhode Island Department of Elementary :
and Secondary Education, through its
chair Patricia DiCenso, in her official
capacity only.

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court. The plaintiffs, El Bebe Daycare Center,

Inc., Luis Briceno, and Yulissa Junco (collectively, plaintiffs) appeal from a

Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendant, the Rhode Island Department of

Elementary and Secondary Education (RIDE), following the entry of an order

granting RIDE’s motion to dismiss. This case came before the Supreme Court

pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues

raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After considering the parties’

written and oral submissions and carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that

cause has not been shown and that this case may be decided without further briefing

or argument. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior

Court.

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Facts and Travel

For over three years, plaintiffs participated in the Child and Adult Care Food

Program (CACFP), a federal program operated by RIDE. The CACFP assists states

through grants and other means “to initiate, maintain, and expand nonprofit food

service programs for children and adult participants in non-residential institutions

which provide care.” 7 C.F.R. § 226.1. The CACFP “is intended to provide aid to

child and adult participants and family or group day care homes for provision of

nutritious foods that contribute to the wellness, healthy growth, and development of

young children, and the health and wellness of older adults and chronically impaired

persons.” Id. In May of 2019, plaintiffs received a notice of proposed termination

from the CACFP alleging serious deficiencies in their compliance with the program,

including inaccurate daily meal counts and noncompliance with meal pattern

requirements.

The plaintiffs, through counsel, requested an administrative review of the

proposed termination, which RIDE provided. RIDE designated an administrative

review official (ARO) to review the proposed termination. Upon reviewing

documentation submitted by RIDE and plaintiffs, the ARO ultimately determined

that plaintiffs’ serious deficiencies had not been fully and permanently corrected.

The ARO noted in her decision that plaintiffs had not attended the last two annual

training sessions for CACFP participants and had ignored a letter from RIDE

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offering targeted training. Ultimately, the ARO upheld RIDE’s termination

decision.

On July 22, 2019, plaintiffs appealed the ARO’s decision to the Superior

Court (PC 19-7716). In their amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the ARO’s

decision was unsupported by the record and that she had failed to consider mitigating

evidence. The plaintiffs also alleged that the notice of proposed termination did not

inform them of their right to a hearing, in violation of 7 C.F.R. § 226.6(k). The

plaintiffs sought reinstatement to the CACFP, declaratory relief, and attorneys’ fees.

RIDE answered the amended complaint, and both parties filed supporting

memoranda in 2020. However, the appeal was never set for decision.

The plaintiffs filed a second complaint against RIDE in the Superior Court on

April 18, 2022. The new complaint asserted only one count, alleging disparate

treatment and disparate impact under G.L. 1956 § 42-112-1, the Rhode Island Civil

Rights Act (RICRA). Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that RIDE engaged in

discriminatory actions against plaintiffs by failing to provide them with (1) the same

level of instruction and feedback as entities owned by white individuals and (2)

materials in Spanish. The plaintiffs alleged that RIDE’s discriminatory treatment

resulted in a disparate impact on them because they are Hispanic. The plaintiffs

sought damages for their emotional distress, lost income, damage to reputation,

attorneys’ fees, and costs.

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In response, RIDE filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that plaintiffs’ complaint

should be dismissed under the doctrines of res judicata, administrative finality, and

the raise-or-waive rule. RIDE contended that plaintiffs’ complaint must be

dismissed under res judicata principles because the ARO’s review was a

quasi-judicial proceeding, involving the same transaction and the same parties, and

culminating in a final agency decision, prior to which plaintiffs could have raised

their discrimination claims. RIDE also argued that the doctrine of administrative

finality barred plaintiffs’ complaint because they had already received a final agency

decision and there had been no change in material circumstances. Lastly, RIDE

contended that the raise-or-waive rule should bar plaintiffs’ complaint because they

could have raised their discrimination claims before the ARO or in their 2019 agency

appeal but failed to do so.

The plaintiffs objected to RIDE’s motion, arguing that the complaint was not

barred by res judicata because before the ARO: (1) they had fewer procedural

safeguards; (2) the relief now sought was not available; and (3) the facts alleged in

the instant action could not have been raised. The plaintiffs did not dispute that they

had not raised their discrimination claims in the administrative appeal, but they

argued that because the administrative body did not have the authority to hear those

claims, res judicata did not apply. The plaintiffs argued that the ARO could

determine only whether RIDE properly terminated their enrollment in the CACFP,

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not whether RIDE had treated plaintiffs equally. Further, plaintiffs stated that

because the ARO could not have awarded them damages, she could not have

remedied their claims. Furthermore, plaintiffs pointed out that RIDE’s procedures

for appealing an adverse CACFP action (hereinafter, the appeal procedures) do not

mention discrimination and that neither the Code of Federal Regulations nor Rhode

Island law requires that those issues be raised.

Next, plaintiffs argued that they did not have a full and fair opportunity to

litigate their discrimination claims before the ARO, and that, therefore, res judicata

should not apply. The plaintiffs contended that the time constraints and evidentiary

limitations imposed on their appeal by 7 C.F.R. § 226.6(k) deprived them of the

ability to prove a discrimination claim. Because plaintiffs were seeking a different

remedy (damages) than they had sought before the ARO (reinstatement), they argued

that administrative finality did not bar their action. Lastly, plaintiffs argued that the

raise-or-waive rule did not apply because there was no jurisdiction for the ARO to

grant the relief now sought in the administrative appeal, and no discovery was

available to develop their discrimination claims.

RIDE filed a reply memorandum, arguing that neither exception to res

judicata applied to plaintiffs’ complaint. RIDE argued that the ARO was delegated

with the jurisdiction and authority to hear all claims relating to schools or education,

which would necessarily include plaintiffs’ discrimination claims. Moreover, RIDE

-5-
argued that the ARO did have the authority to award plaintiffs damages relating to

their discrimination claims, and thus no formal barriers existed. RIDE stated that

the plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to litigate their discrimination claims

because the relevant regulations and procedures permitted plaintiffs to raise the

claims before the ARO, and that the alleged acts stemmed from plaintiffs’

termination from the CACFP, which was the sole issue before the ARO.

A hearing on the motion to dismiss commenced on June 6, 2023. RIDE

emphasized the points raised in its memorandum, stating that plaintiffs’ lawsuit was

an impermissible attempt to get a second bite at the apple. The plaintiffs reiterated

that the administrative appeal was governed by 7 C.F.R. § 226.6 and that, due to

time and discovery constraints, expecting a plaintiff to proceed with a discrimination

claim under that regulation would be absurd.

The hearing justice assessed whether res judicata barred plaintiffs’ action,

noting that, although all three elements (identity of parties, identity of issues, and a

final judgment on the merits) were met, there were two exceptions to the doctrine

that could apply. The hearing justice determined that the first exception, which bars

the application of res judicata when the judgment in the first action was plainly

inconsistent with the fair and equitable implementation of a statutory or

constitutional scheme, did not apply because under the appeal procedures created by

RIDE pursuant to 7 C.F.R. § 226.6(k), the plaintiffs were required to present the

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reasons they disagreed with RIDE’s action. The hearing justice next determined

that the second exception to res judicata, which bars the doctrine’s application when

the procedures available in the initial proceeding constitute formal barriers that

prevent full presentation of a party’s claims, did not apply because plaintiffs had

substantially the same rights before the ARO that they would have had before a

court. Specifically, he explained, plaintiffs had: notice of RIDE’s proposed

termination; an opportunity to respond; the ability to be represented by counsel; the

ability to access any information on which RIDE’s action was based; the opportunity

to prepare and submit written arguments to the hearing officer; the right to a hearing

before an independent and impartial hearing officer; the right to receive a final

decision with the basis for the decision; and the right to seek judicial review of the

decision. Therefore, the hearing justice determined there had been no formal barriers

to the presentation of plaintiffs’ discrimination claims. Accordingly, the hearing

justice ruled that res judicata barred plaintiffs’ complaint and granted RIDE’s

motion to dismiss.1 An order to that effect entered on June 14, 2023; judgment

entered in favor of RIDE on June 15, 2023. The plaintiffs timely appealed.

1
Because he ruled on the basis of res judicata, the hearing justice declined to address
RIDE’s other arguments.

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Standard of Review

“The sole function of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the

complaint.” Rosario v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, 332 A.3d 173, 176 (R.I. 2025)

(quoting Maltais v. Maltais, 306 A.3d 449, 452 (R.I. 2024)). “In passing on a Rule

12(b) dismissal, this Court applies the same standard as the trial justice. * * * We

are thus confined to the four corners of the complaint and must assume all allegations

are true, resolving any doubts in plaintiffs’ favor.” Id. (quoting Maltais, 306 A.3d at

452). “Nevertheless, ‘allegations that are more in the nature of legal conclusions

rather than factual assertions are not necessarily assumed to be true.’” In re CVS

Health Corporation Securities Litigation, 328 A.3d 614, 621 (R.I. 2025) (quoting

DiLibero v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 108 A.3d 1013, 1016

(R.I. 2015)).

When ruling on a motion to dismiss “a court may not consider any documents

that are outside of the complaint, or not expressly incorporated therein, unless the

motion is converted into one for summary judgment.” Montaquila v. Flagstar Bank,

FSB, 288 A.3d 967, 971 (R.I. 2023) (quoting Chase v. Nationwide Mutual Fire

Insurance Company, 160 A.3d 970, 973 (R.I. 2017)). “There is, however, a narrow

exception for documents the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties;

for official public records; for documents central to plaintiffs’ claim; or for

-8-
documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint.” Id. (quoting Chase, 160 A.3d

at 973).

Discussion

On appeal, plaintiffs assert that the trial justice erred in determining that no

exception to res judicata applied because (1) the ARO could not have addressed

their discrimination claim, (2) formal barriers prevented them from proceeding with

their discrimination claim before the ARO, and (3) plaintiffs were not given a full

and fair opportunity to litigate their claims due to deficient procedures. The parties

do not dispute that the three elements of res judicata (identity of parties, identity of

issues, and finality of judgment) are met.2 Therefore, the issue before this Court is

whether an exception to res judicata bars the application of the doctrine to plaintiffs’

complaint.

“Res judicata serves as a bar to a second cause of action where there exists:

(1) identity of parties; (2) identity of issues; and (3) finality of judgment in an earlier

2
A review of the lower court docket reveals that, to date, no final judgment has
entered in the agency appeal. The last action in the case, a stipulation for an
extension of time for RIDE to answer plaintiffs’ complaint, was filed on August 5,
2022. Neither party has requested to assign the case for hearing. However, the
parties do not dispute that there was a final judgment even though the administrative
appeal is still pending. See Restatement (Second) Judgments § 13 (Oct. 2024
Update) (“The rules of res judicata are applicable only when a final judgment is
rendered. * * * ‘[F]inal judgment’ includes any prior adjudication of an issue in
another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive
effect.”).

-9-
action.” Runey v. Faring, 336 A.3d 16, 20 (R.I. 2025) (quoting Mello v. Killeavy,

242 A.3d 53, 56 (R.I. 2020)). “The doctrine of res judicata bars the relitigation of

all issues that were tried or might have been tried in an earlier action.” Town of

Warren v. Bristol Warren Regional School District, 159 A.3d 1029, 1036 (R.I. 2017)

(quoting Huntley v. State, 63 A.3d 526, 531 (R.I. 2013)). We apply res judicata not

only to judgments of a court but also to quasi-judicial administrative decisions.

Department of Corrections of State of Rhode Island v. Tucker, 657 A.2d 546, 549

(R.I. 1995).

Res judicata does not apply “when ‘the judgment in the first action was plainly

inconsistent with the fair and equitable implementation of a statutory or

constitutional scheme, or it is the sense of the scheme that the plaintiff should be

permitted to split his claim.’” Plunkett v. State, 869 A.2d 1185, 1190 (R.I. 2005)

(brackets omitted) (quoting Restatement (Second) Judgments § 26(1)(d)). Res

judicata also does not apply “when ‘formal barriers in fact existed and were

operative against a plaintiff in the first action,’ preventing full presentation of his or

her claim.” Plunkett, 869 A.2d at 1190 (quoting Restatement (Second) Judgments §

26 at cmt. c).

The plaintiffs contend that under the appeal procedures, they could not have

properly brought their discrimination claims before the ARO. Because the ARO

could not provide them with a jury trial or the same relief and discovery mechanisms

- 10 -
as the Superior Court, plaintiffs argue that res judicata should not apply. The

plaintiffs further argue that their agency appeal was governed by 7 C.F.R.

§ 226.6(k), which makes no mention of discrimination.

In response, RIDE argues that the hearing justice properly applied res judicata

because the ARO did have the authority and jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’

discrimination claims, as the alleged adverse actions were taken in connection with

RIDE’s decision to terminate plaintiffs’ participation in the CACFP. RIDE argues

that neither 7 C.F.R. § 226.6(k) nor the appeal procedures precluded plaintiffs from

raising their discrimination claims or seeking additional relief associated with those

claims. RIDE contends that the appeal procedures require that plaintiffs’ appeal

must include any reasons for which they disagreed with RIDE’s action and any

additional relief sought from CACFP. Further, RIDE points to G.L. 1956 §§ 16-39-1

and 42-87-5(c), which, it argues, grant the ARO authority to award plaintiffs

damages related to their discrimination claims.

Contrary to plaintiffs’ contentions, no exception to res judicata applies to their

claims. The appeal procedures provided plaintiffs with an opportunity to raise their

discrimination claims before the ARO and the right to appeal that decision to the

Superior Court.3 Indeed, as the hearing justice explained, the appeal procedures

3
The plaintiffs argue that only 7 C.F.R. § 226.6(k) governs their agency appeal, and
that “[t]here are no other procedures set forth by RI Law [sic] which govern these
proceedings.” However, 7 C.F.R. § 226.6(k)(1) plainly states that the “State agency

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included a non-discrimination statement; therefore, requiring plaintiffs to raise their

discrimination claims was not inconsistent with the implementation of the scheme.

The plaintiffs had the right to appeal “any other action by CACFP affecting a

Sponsor’s participation” in the program. Rhode Island Department of Education,

Appealing an Adverse Action by CACFP Procedures § V(K) at 3 (2023). The

plaintiffs claim that RIDE’s alleged discriminatory acts negatively impacted their

ability to participate in and comply with the CACFP. Because plaintiffs argue that

these discriminatory acts adversely affected their participation in the CACFP, those

claims should have been brought before the ARO.4 See DiBattista v. State, 808 A.2d

must develop procedures for offering administrative reviews * * * consistent with
paragraph (k) of this section.” The RIDE appeal procedures direct participants to
include, among other things, the reason(s) they disagree with RIDE’s action, the
relief they are seeking, and the type of review they are seeking. See Rhode Island
Department of Education, Appealing an Adverse Action by CACFP Procedures §
II(A) at 2 (2023).
4
The plaintiffs argue that 7 C.F.R. § 226.6(k), which promulgates the requirements
for administrative review, makes no mention of discrimination. This is true;
however, subsection 7 C.F.R. § 226.6(m)(1) provides:

“The State agency must provide technical and supervisory
assistance to institutions and facilities to facilitate
effective Program operations, monitor progress toward
achieving Program goals, and ensure compliance with all
requirements of title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
title IX of the Education amendments of 1972, section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Age Discrimination
Act of 1975, and the Department’s regulations concerning
nondiscrimination (parts 15, 15a, and 15b of this title).
The State agency must maintain documentation of
supervisory assistance activities, including reviews

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1081, 1086-87 (R.I. 2002) (holding that the plaintiffs’ due process claims, which

could have been properly raised in a prior administrative appeal reviewing the

plaintiffs’ foster-care license revocation, were barred by res judicata). Although

plaintiffs now seek money damages rather than reinstatement to the CACFP, res

judicata bars any claim that “could have been litigated” in the prior action. ElGabri

v. Lekas, 681 A.2d 271, 279 (R.I. 1996); see also Town of Richmond v. Wawaloam

Reservation, Inc., 850 A.2d 924, 934 (R.I. 2004) (“Because the proceeding before

the zoning board of review involved an administrative agency acting in a

quasi-judicial capacity, we hold that res judicata precludes defendants from

relitigating issues or reasserting defenses that were or could have been argued before

and decided by that board.”). The plaintiffs could have raised their discrimination

allegations before the ARO; however, they chose not to do so, and are thus precluded

from raising them in a separate suit. See Goodrow v. Bank of America, N.A., 184

A.3d 1121, 1128 (R.I. 2018) (“[W]hile [the plaintiff] did not raise these claims in

the first action, he should have, and he should have done so in accordance with the

procedural guidelines provided by the relevant rules.”).

conducted, corrective actions prescribed, and follow-up
efforts.” 7 C.F.R. § 226.6(m)(1).

The plaintiffs’ allegations fall squarely into the program-assistance requirements
imposed upon RIDE by the CACFP regulations, further evidencing that bringing
discrimination claims before the ARO would have been consistent with the relevant
regulatory scheme.

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The plaintiffs contend that the time limitations concerning the hearing before

the ARO imposed an absurd burden on them and eliminated their right to a jury trial

or discovery. In response, RIDE argues that neither the CACFP regulations or the

appeal procedures constricted plaintiffs’ ability to raise and litigate their

discrimination claims before the ARO. RIDE states that because the ARO could

have awarded plaintiffs damages and, under §16-39-8, the ARO has the authority to

issue subpoenas compelling the attendance of witnesses or the production of

documents, plaintiffs’ argument that formal barriers barred their discrimination

claims is without merit.5

At the hearing before the ARO, there were no formal barriers that prevented

the full presentation of plaintiffs’ claims. The plaintiffs were entitled to notice of

the proposed action, representation, review of the record, and a hearing or review of

written documents by an impartial official. 7 C.F.R. § 226.6(k)(5); Appealing an

Adverse Action by CACFP Procedures §§ III, IV. Moreover, plaintiffs had judicial

5
General Laws 1956 § 16-39-8 provides, in relevant part:

“In any hearing conducted within the department of
elementary and secondary education, the commissioner of
elementary and secondary education or the hearing officer
shall have the power to issue subpoenas to compel the
attendance of witnesses and the production of documents
or other material. Subpoenas shall also be issued by the
commissioner or hearing officer at the request of any party
participating in any hearing.”

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review of the ARO decision available to them, which they did pursue. Sections

16-39-4, 42-35-15. However, plaintiffs elected not to allege their discrimination

claims before the ARO, instead filing a separate action three years after their agency

appeal was filed with the Superior Court. See Plunkett, 869 A.2d at 1191 (“We are

satisfied that it was respondent’s own choices, not the operation of a formal barrier,

that prevented [the respondent] from litigating all his issues in one lawsuit.”).

Accordingly, plaintiffs’ complaint is barred by res judicata, and no exception

applies.

Before this Court, the parties also dispute whether the doctrine of

administrative finality and the raise-or-waive rule apply to the plaintiffs’ claims.

Because we discern no error in the trial justice’s determination that the complaint

was barred by res judicata, we decline to address the parties’ other arguments.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, the judgment of the Superior Court is

affirmed. The papers in this case are remanded to the Superior Court.

Justice Goldberg participated in the decision but retired prior to its

publication.

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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

El Bebe Day Care Center, Inc., et al. v. Rhode Island
Department of Elementary and Secondary Education,
Title of Case
through its chair Patricia DiCenso, in her official
capacity only.
No. 2024-331-Appeal.
Case Number
(PC-2022-02182)

Date Opinion Filed May 21, 2026

Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Erin Lynch Prata

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Kevin F. McHugh

For Plaintiffs:

Sonja l. Deyoe, Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Defendant:

Kaelyn R. Phelps Prigge, Esq.

SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)