State v. William Gilbert

Supreme Court

No. 2025-22-C.A.
(P1/20-1751A)

(Concurrence begins on Page 18)

State :

v. :

William Gilbert. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical
or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court

No. 2025-22-C.A.
(P1/20-1751A)

(Concurrence begins on Page 18)

State :

v. :

William Gilbert. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. The defendant, William Gilbert, appeals

from a Superior Court judgment of conviction after having been found guilty by a

jury of first-degree sexual assault in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-37-2. On appeal,

the defendant contends that the trial justice erred in allowing into evidence

statements that the defendant’s roommate made to the complainant after the assault,

arguing that the testimony was impermissible hearsay. For the reasons set forth in

this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

I

Facts and Travel

The complainant testified to the following. She was thirteen years old when

the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) became involved in her

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life. DCYF removed her from her mother’s care sometime around 2016,1 and for

the next several years, she stayed in various homes. Initially, she lived with a friend’s

grandparents; however, DCYF eventually sought to have her placed in a group home.

The complainant had never been to a group home before and was afraid of going

because she had heard that “it’s tough to live there and a lot of bad things happen

there.” She only stayed for about eleven hours; and after her swift departure, she

was “on the run.” During this time, she lived with an aunt, various friends, and in

June 2018, went to live with her grandmother.

Soon thereafter, the complainant’s grandmother contacted DCYF because she

could no longer care for the complainant. She then went to stay with another one

of her aunts, where she met with her DCYF social case worker. The complainant

testified that she told the case worker that she would run again because “[she] was

too scared to be in a group home.” When the case worker said that she would have

to call the police, the complainant did in fact run away.

The complainant stated that she knew she could not stay with her aunt because

“[t]he police and DCYF were aware of her [aunt’s] house being somewhere where

1
Erin Wertheimer, a social case worker for DCYF at the relevant time, testified that
she “began working with [the complainant’s] family around the year 2016[,]” and at
the time she received the case, the complainant was in DCYF custody and “her
mother’s rights were in the process of being terminated.” When asked when DCYF
sought to place the complainant in a group home, the complainant testified “[i]t was
2016, I believe. Maybe 2017.”
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[she] might have gone, so [she] didn’t want to go back over there.” A few days later,

her aunt took her to defendant’s apartment. The complainant testified that defendant

was a family friend; and, although she had never met him before, “[her] aunt trusted

him, so [she] trusted it.”

The defendant lived in a two-bedroom apartment in Cranston with his two

children and an adult roommate, David Diluglio. The defendant’s children each

occupied one room, and defendant and Diluglio slept in the living room. When the

complainant first began staying at the apartment, she slept on a couch in the living

room. Shortly after her arrival, however, defendant’s children went to live with their

mother; and at that point, defendant told the complainant that she could sleep in one

of their bedrooms. She testified that at this time it was going well, and she felt safe.

She did not spend much time alone with either defendant or Diluglio because she

typically had friends come over to the apartment to hang out with her.

The complainant testified that she had been staying in the apartment for a few

weeks when the assault occurred; specifically, she recalled that it was a couple of

weeks after her sixteenth birthday on July 31, 2018. On the night of the assault,

around midnight, she asked defendant if he could give her a ride to “go get weed and

then pick up [her] boyfriend at the time.” They drove to India Point Park in

Providence to obtain the marijuana. She testified that on the way she was mostly

texting her boyfriend to see if he was ready to be picked up. After they acquired the

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marijuana, she was still waiting for her boyfriend to answer her messages. The

defendant told her that he needed to stop at a friend’s house to “grab something.”

The complainant recalled that defendant pulled into a parking lot behind a building

that had a business on the first floor and apartments on the top floor, leading her to

believe that she was in the Thayer Street area of Providence. She recalled that there

was no one in the parking lot and the area was not lit. They were there for

approximately twenty to thirty minutes, and she was tired, so she placed her head on

the window looking outwards.

Next, the complainant recalled “[feeling] something hard and cold touch [her]

head * * *.” When she turned, she saw that defendant was holding a gun to her. She

stated that defendant told her to pull her pants down; she added that she tried to open

the door and get out of the car, but he climbed on top of her and slammed the door

shut. The defendant told her that if she screamed or left, he would “knock [her] out

and bring [her] to a pimp’s house.”

She testified that “[h]e told me to pull my pants down again, and I refused, so

he did it himself, and -- he used his hands to force himself inside of me.” By this,

she specified that defendant forced his penis into her vagina. She testified that while

this was happening, he “was touching my breasts and kissing my neck and he told

me that I’m a big girl and I can take it.” The complainant stated that she was crying

and kept telling defendant to get off her, and after a few minutes he “just randomly

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stopped and got off, [and] went back into the driver’s seat.” He told her not to tell

anyone, and they drove back to the apartment in silence.

When they returned to the apartment, no one else was there, and defendant

fell asleep on the couch in the living room. The complainant testified that she

immediately locked herself in the bathroom and took a shower. When she was done,

she messaged her boyfriend and told him what had happened.2 She stated that she

did not leave the apartment that night because she was scared; she knew that

defendant had a gun and “he had told [her] not to leave before, so [she] wasn’t going

to risk it then.”

In the morning, Diluglio came back to the apartment, and the complainant

asked if she could talk to him. Her testimony as to their ensuing interaction was as

follows:

“[Prosecutor:] * * * Now, when you saw Dave in the
house, what did you do?

“[Complainant:] I asked him if I could talk to him.

“[Prosecutor:] What did he say?

“[Complainant:] He said yeah.

2
At trial, the state sought to introduce as a full exhibit screenshot photographs of
messages the complainant alleged to have sent to her boyfriend immediately
following the assault. The screenshots were believed to be taken from the
complainant’s phone by a detective at the Cranston police station. Concerned with
their legibility and finding that the foundation had not been properly laid, the trial
justice sustained defendant’s objection and excluded the evidence.
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“[Defense Counsel]: Objection.

“THE COURT: Overruled.

“[Complainant:] He said yeah. He took me out into the
hallway.

“* * *

“[Prosecutor:] How were you feeling at that point?

“[Complainant:] Still anxious and scared.

“[Prosecutor:] What did you do at that point?

“[Complainant:] I told him what had happened to me.

“[Prosecutor:] How did he react to you?

“[Complainant:] He started crying, and he told me that --

“[Defense Counsel]: Objection.

“THE COURT: Overruled. The answer may stand.
Put another question.

“[Prosecutor:] What did Dave do?

“[Complainant:] He told me that I needed to leave.

“[Defense Counsel]: Objection.

“THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer.

“[Complainant:] He told me that I needed to leave and that
I should get out of there as soon as possible.”

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At that point, she texted her mother and then waited for someone to get back

to her. Her mother, cousin, and boyfriend eventually came to get her. She told them

what had happened to her, however she begged them not to tell anyone or go to the

police. She stated that she knew if they went to the police that she would end up in

a group home.

After she left the apartment, the complainant went to stay at her cousin’s

friend’s house. She testified she was on the run for almost two more years. DCYF

eventually located her, from an anonymous tip, at an apartment in Massachusetts in

January 2020. The complainant told them that she wanted to “report something that

had happened to [her] when [she] was on the run.” A few days later, she was taken

to the Cranston police station, where she made a statement.3 When asked why she

waited until that time to tell police what happened, she stated that “I made a promise

to myself and my mom that I would report it the second I wasn’t on the run

anymore.”

Detective Koren Garcia of the Providence Police Department testified that the

complainant informed her that she told Diluglio what happened immediately after

the assault and that there were messages sent by the complainant to her boyfriend at

3
The complainant asked to be taken to the Cranston police station; however, after
she revealed to police that she believed the incident occurred in Providence, they
brought in Providence police. She made a formal recorded statement in the presence
of a Cranston police officer, then had an informal conversation with Detective Koren
Garcia of the Providence Police Department.
-7-
that time that she was able to access on her phone. Detective Garcia saw the

messages; and, while she did not recall the exact date, she testified that she saw a

date on them and believed it was August 2018. An investigation followed.

On June 15, 2020, a grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant

with one count of first-degree sexual assault. A trial by jury was held in the Superior

Court from April 24 to 26, 2023, and defendant was thereafter convicted. He was

sentenced to fifty years, twenty-five to serve and twenty-five suspended, with

probation. The defendant timely appealed to this Court.

II

Standard of Review

“It is well established that decisions concerning the admissibility of evidence

are within the sound discretion of the trial justice, and this Court will not interfere

with the trial justice’s decision unless a clear abuse of that discretion is apparent.”

State v. Alves, 183 A.3d 539, 542 (R.I. 2018) (quoting State v. Adams, 161 A.3d 1182,

1194 (R.I. 2017)). “The trial justice will not have abused his or her discretion as

long as some grounds supporting his or her decision appear in the record.” Id.

(quoting Adams, 161 A.3d at 1194).

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III

Discussion

The defendant advances one argument on appeal: the trial justice erred in

admitting the complainant’s testimony regarding the conversation she had with

Diluglio the morning after the alleged assault. Specifically, defendant points to the

complainant’s testimony that, after she told Diluglio what had happened, he started

crying and “told [her] that [she] needed to leave[,]” adding further that he “told [her]

that [she] needed to leave and that [she] should get out of there as soon as possible.”4

The defendant argues that the complainant’s statements about what Diluglio told her

were inadmissible hearsay offered for their truth, that being “to show that [the

complainant] needed to leave the apartment right away because [he] believed she

had been sexually assaulted by [defendant] * * *.”

Additionally, defendant contends that the admission of these statements was

not harmless error because it was the only evidence that the complainant had made

a contemporaneous disclosure of the incident, corroborating and lending credibility

4
In its papers, the state relates the complainant’s observation and testimony that
Diluglio cried to demeanor evidence, not hearsay, asserting that “[h]er direct
observations of Mr. Diluglio’s demeanor did not stand for any out-of-court statement
from the declarant – because there was no statement.” The defendant refutes this
contention in his reply brief; however, at oral argument counsel stated that defendant
was not challenging the specific testimony that Diluglio cried.

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to her allegations. The defendant maintains that “[t]he jury should have been able

to draw its own conclusions about how to interpret [the complainant’s] delayed

disclosure and the fact no other witness testified to anything that happened

near-in-time to the alleged assault.”

The state argues, preliminarily, that the issue is waived, as defendant did not

sufficiently preserve it for appellate review. By simply stating “objection,” without

articulating the grounds for such, the state contends, defendant’s objections lacked

the specificity required to properly bring it before this Court. The defendant

disagrees, maintaining that it was clear from the context of the testimony that the

grounds for the objections were hearsay, and as such, under Rule 103(a)(1) of the

Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, a specific basis was not required.

“This Court has ‘repeatedly indicated that it adheres to what is commonly

called the raise or waive rule—i.e., we do not consider issues on appeal which were

not raised and properly presented during proceedings in the court below.’” State v.

White, 296 A.3d 692, 702 (R.I. 2023) (quoting DeMarco v. Travelers Insurance

Company, 26 A.3d 585, 628 (R.I. 2011)). “Furthermore, when an evidentiary issue

is raised on appeal, Rule 103(a)(1) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence explicitly

provides that a finding of error must be based upon ‘a timely objection or motion to

strike * * * of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground

- 10 -
was not apparent from the context.’” State v. Colon, 198 A.3d 1249, 1258 (R.I. 2019)

(emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Feliciano, 901 A.2d 631, 646 (R.I. 2006)).

Upon review, we are satisfied that the grounds for defendant’s objections were

readily apparent from the dialogue between the prosecutor and the complainant.

During the complainant’s testimony recounting her interaction with Diluglio,

counsel for defendant objected three times. Although in each instance counsel only

stated “objection[,]” without specifying the grounds, she did so immediately

following the complainant’s statements that began “[h]e said” or “[h]e told me that.”

It is evident that this language introduces reported speech, and thus, is likely to

spawn a hearsay statement.

Additionally, defendant’s second objection was made after the prosecutor

inquired, “How did he react to you?” and the complainant answered, “He started

crying, and he told me that --[.]” The trial justice then responded, “Overruled. The

answer may stand. Put another question.” We have stated that “[t]he central principle

of Rule 103(a)(1) rests on the premise that a trial justice may infer the specific

grounds of an objection, even when an objecting party does not make those grounds

clear.” State v. Barros, 148 A.3d 168, 174 (R.I. 2016). We have no doubt that the

trial justice understood each of defendant’s objections in this colloquy to be made

on hearsay grounds, and we note that this is further evinced by his assertion directing

the prosecutor to “[p]ut another question.” Thus, it is our opinion that, in this case,

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the grounds of hearsay could be properly inferred from the context of the

complainant’s testimony. Accordingly, the issue has not been waived.

The state further responds that, even if the issue were properly preserved for

our review, the trial justice did not err in admitting the testimony because it was not

offered for the truth of the matter asserted and, accordingly, was not hearsay.

Instead, the state argues that the statements were used for their effect on the listener,

to explain why the complainant left the apartment the day after the alleged assault.

The state cites two cases in which this Court held that the admission of out-of-court

statements offered, not for their truth but to explain the witness’s subsequent act,

were not abuses of discretion. See State v. Peckham, 338 A.3d 1064, 1078-79 (R.I.

2025) (determining that a witness’s statement that he overheard the declarant say he

had a gun was not offered for its truth, but to show what prompted him to quickly

drive away from the house he was parked in front of moments before the shooting);

State v. Oliveira, 127 A.3d 65, 83 (R.I. 2015) (stating that an officer’s testimony

regarding what the complainant told his mother was not hearsay because the purpose

of the testimony was to explain why the officer urged the complainant’s mother to

take him to the hospital).

The defendant disagrees, arguing that the state’s explanation is unpersuasive

because (1) no explanation was needed as to why the complainant left the apartment

as it was evident that “a teenager with a history of running away [] would flee the

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apartment of someone who raped her at gun point[,]” (2) the state’s now proffered

reason was not its actual use at trial, and (3) the statements did not actually prompt

the complainant to leave the apartment. Further, defendant attempts to distinguish

the present facts from Peckham and Oliveira by again asserting that, contrary to

those cases, no reason was needed for why the complainant left the apartment, and

that there was no other permissible use for Diluglio’s statements at trial besides their

truth. We cannot agree.

“Hearsay evidence is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while

testifying at a trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter

asserted.” In re J.R., 336 A.3d 42, 56 (R.I. 2025) (quoting State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d

1022, 1030 (R.I. 2004)). However, “an out-of-court statement that is not offered for

the truth of the matter asserted but for some other purpose—such as to show notice

or the effect of the statement upon the listener—is not hearsay.” Oliveira, 127 A.3d

at 82. Statements that are not hearsay “do not require the assistance of an exception

to the hearsay rule in order to be admissible.” State v. Gomes, 764 A.2d 125, 131

(R.I. 2001) (quoting In re Jean Marie W., 559 A.2d 625, 629 (R.I. 1989)). “It is

axiomatic that an out-of-court statement is not hearsay unless it is offered for the

truth of the matter asserted.” Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 667 A.2d 523, 530 (R.I.

1995)).

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At the outset, we seek to address defendant’s assertion that the “truth” of

Diluglio’s statements to the complainant was that “[the complainant] needed to leave

the apartment right away because [he] believed she had been sexually assaulted by

[defendant] * * *.” While the intent of Diluglio’s statements may well have been

that he believed she needed to leave, we are unconvinced that this was because he

believed defendant assaulted her. In our view, it is equally plausible that Diluglio

urged the complainant to leave the apartment for a host of other reasons. For

example, this may have been because he did not want her to call the police or simply

no longer wanted her to stay there. Diluglio was not only defendant’s friend but was

also living in defendant’s apartment both prior to and at the time of the alleged

assault. In contrast, the complainant had only been staying at the apartment for a

few weeks and testified herself that she did not spend much time with Diluglio while

she was there.

Even assuming that the truth of Diluglio’s statements to the complainant was

that she needed to leave because he believed defendant had assaulted her, we do not

agree that it was offered for that purpose. In arguing that Diluglio’s statements were

not offered to explain their effect on the complainant, prompting her to leave the

apartment, defendant makes much of the fact that she was a “teenager with a history

of running away” and “no explanation was needed” as to why she left defendant’s

apartment the day after the alleged assault. Our review of the record tells a different

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story. Admittedly, the complainant fled from several homes after DCYF became

involved in her life. However, she did so only to evade DCYF care, as she was

adamant that she did not want to be placed in a group home.

In fact, in every instance in which the complainant was staying with a friend

or family, she ran away only under the threat of being forcibly removed from that

home by DCYF, whether that be because the friend or family member housing her

could no longer care for her or because it was not a proper placement for her to begin

with. This is further evidenced by her testimony that once she did leave defendant’s

apartment, she begged her mother and boyfriend not to go to the police, as she was

terrified that police involvement would place her back into DCYF care and a group

home. She testified that she made a promise to herself and her mother that she would

report the assault only when she was no longer on the run from DCYF.

Additionally, the complainant testified that she was still scared in the hours

immediately following the assault, and that she did not leave the apartment that night

because she knew that defendant had a gun and because “he had told [her] not to

leave before, so [she] wasn’t going to risk it then.” Thus, it is not apparent to us, as

defendant advances, that “no explanation was needed for why [the complainant] left

the apartment” or that this was not the true reason why the state sought to elicit the

testimony at trial.

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We are also unpersuaded by defendant’s contention that Diluglio’s statements

did not actually prompt the complainant to leave. The complainant testified that

immediately upon returning to the apartment after the assault, she took a shower.

When she got out of the shower, she messaged her boyfriend to tell him what had

happened. As previously stated, she was nervous about leaving the apartment

because she knew that defendant had a gun and had told her not to leave. She

testified that she was “[s]till anxious and scared” when she spoke with Diluglio the

following morning. After she spoke with Diluglio, and he told her that she needed

to leave, she then texted her mother who later arrived with her cousin and boyfriend

to pick her up from defendant’s apartment.

On cross-examination, the complainant also stated that her mother, boyfriend,

and cousin eventually picked her up after her boyfriend read her messages. The

defendant points to this testimony in arguing that Diluglio’s statements did not

prompt her to leave; instead, she left “when her ride arrived * * *.” The defendant’s

focus on this statement ignores the complainant’s prior testimony that, after speaking

with Diluglio, she then texted her mother, and it was her mother, among others, who

picked her up from defendant’s apartment. At this point in her life, the complainant

had been taken away, or turned away, from the homes of various friends and family

members over a period of several years. She was insistent on evading DCYF care,

and at this time, it appeared that defendant’s apartment was one of the options, if not

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the only option, available to her to avoid being placed in a group home. In

considering this, reviewing the entirety of the record, and giving deference to the

trial justice’s decision, we cannot say that the trial justice abused his discretion by

allowing this testimony to stand.

The state also contends that, if this Court were to determine that Diluglio’s

statements were hearsay, its admission would be harmless error because the

“[d]efendant’s guilt was sufficiently established by proper evidence, and testimony

about Mr. Diluglio’s demeanor and statements at the time of [the complainant’s]

contemporaneous disclosure are cumulative.” Because we conclude that the

testimony was not offered for its truth, and thus was not hearsay, we need not address

this contention.

IV

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment of

conviction. The papers in this case may be remanded to the Superior Court.

Justice Goldberg participated in the decision but retired prior to its

publication.

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Justice Robinson, concurring. After much hesitation, I have decided that I

am able to join in the Court’s opinion. From the beginning, I have been troubled by

the trial justice’s allowing the complainant to testify (after a timely objection) as

follows: “He [i.e., Mr. Diluglio] told me that I needed to leave and that I should get

out of there as soon as possible.” To my mind, that sentence can be understood as

indicating that Mr. Diluglio believed the complainant’s allegations and therefore told

her that she should “get out of there as soon as possible.” Pursuant to that

understanding, the statement would have been offered to prove the perceived truth

of the matter and would have been impermissible hearsay evidence. However, the

Court’s opinion points out that, in addition to the possibility that Mr. Diluglio’s

statement was in effect a statement that he believed that the complainant had been

sexually assaulted by the defendant, it is (in the Court’s words) “equally plausible

that Diluglio urged the complainant to leave the apartment for a host of other

reasons.” Although I still consider it to be a close question, having carefully

considered the just-summarized reasoning, I join the Court’s opinion.

In my judgment, the trial justice’s overruling of the objection fell within his

sound discretion and was not clearly erroneous. See State v. Oliveira, 127 A.3d 65,

82 (R.I. 2015).

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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case State v. William Gilbert.

No. 2025-22-C.A.
Case Number
(P1/20-1751A)

Date Opinion Filed April 30, 2026

Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.

Written By Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Stephen P. Nugent

For State:

Lindsay Grizzard
Department of Attorney General
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Defendant:

Piper M. Pehrson
Rhode Island Public Defender

SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)