State v. Wallace Cable

Supreme Court

No. 2024-255-C.A.
(P1/21-1161A)

State :

v. :

Wallace Cable. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email: opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any
typographical or other formal errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court

No. 2024-255-C.A.
(P1/21-1161A)

State :

v. :

Wallace Cable. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Justice Goldberg, for the Court. The defendant, Wallace Cable (defendant

or Cable), was charged with three counts of first-degree child molestation sexual

assault and one count of second-degree child molestation sexual assault.1 After two

counts were dismissed, a jury found the defendant not guilty on one count of

first-degree child molestation sexual assault and guilty on the remaining charge of

first-degree child molestation sexual assault.2

1
The record contains different spellings of the defendant’s first name. We adopt the
spelling used in the defendant’s brief.
2
Count 1 was dismissed by the state pursuant to Rule 48(a) of the Superior Court
Rules of Criminal Procedure and count 3 was dismissed by the trial justice, upon the
defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, which the state did not oppose.
-1-
On appeal, defendant claims that the trial justice erred when he permitted the

state to introduce into evidence multiple out-of-court statements concerning what

the complaining witness told a treating physician about the alleged sexual assaults.

We reject defendant’s arguments, and therefore affirm the judgment of conviction.

Factual Background

Maria3 was fourteen years old at the time of trial and described multiple

instances of sexual assault perpetrated upon her by defendant, her biological father.4

Maria never lived with defendant and testified that she did not recall spending much

time with him before the age of six. Instead, Maria lived with her mother.5 Although

the record does not detail the precise timeline, at some point defendant entered

Maria’s life. Initially, Maria testified, she had a loving relationship with her father,

but that changed when the events that form the basis of this indictment occurred.

Accordingly, counts 2 and 4—both charging first-degree child molestation sexual
assault—were the only charges presented to the jury for its consideration.
3
We identify the complaining witness through the use of a pseudonym in order to
afford some measure of privacy.
4
Although Maria testified concerning multiple instances of child molestation sexual
assault, we recount only the events presented to the jury for its deliberation (counts
2 and 4).
5
As discussed infra, Maria reported that she had been physically assaulted by her
mother.
-2-
In the spring of 2020—just after Maria turned eleven years old—she and

defendant rode the bus to his mother’s residence, where they planned to spend the

evening. Although they were the only passengers on an otherwise empty bus,

defendant and Maria sat in the back. Maria testified that, during the bus ride,

defendant “started touching, like, my thighs and then over -- under my clothes, my

pants” and “put his hand down under my pants, and then he put his fingers inside

my -- the part that I pee.” Maria later clarified that she was referencing her vagina.

This episode ended when the bus approached its destination; thereafter Maria and

defendant disembarked and walked to his mother’s residence.

Maria was no stranger to her grandmother’s home; she had previously resided

there for an entire summer. On this occasion, though, the residence was crowded

with other family members who also planned to stay the evening. While the other

relatives snoozed in locations throughout the residence, Maria and defendant retired

to the living room; he slept on the couch, and she rested on a nearby air mattress.

Soon, however, defendant positioned himself on the air mattress and instructed that

Maria remove her underwear. She refused but defendant persisted; at trial, Maria

testified that he “move[d] my shorts and underwear to the side,” “pull[ed] his pants

halfway down and puts his private area into my private, butt.” This assault lasted

minutes, ending after defendant ejaculated. Despite the presence of family members,

-3-
Maria did not immediately report this incident, explaining that she “was still scared

and because he was my dad so I didn’t want anything to happen to him.”

In the ensuing months, Maria continued spending time with defendant and,

eventually, revealed that he had assaulted her. Maria disclosed the assaults to a

young friend, and later to the friend’s mother; but, at Maria’s insistence, neither

reported the incidents. Thereafter, on September 14, 2020, Maria confided in Justin

Pasquazzi, an instructor in an after-school program that she had been attending.

Pasquazzi did not remain silent.

Pasquazzi was the president and interim executive director of an after-school

program called Arts, Sports, and Technology Resource Organization (ASTRO),

which provided wellness and educational opportunities to children and adults.

Pasquazzi testified that ASTRO works with families at risk for Department of

Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) involvement and children having problems

in the home, behavioral issues, and/or mental health challenges. Pasquazzi related

that Maria disclosed that she had suffered multiple instances of physical assault

exacted by her mother and sexual assault perpetrated by defendant. Maria also

revealed that she had engaged in self-harm.

As the after-school program was ending and students were being dismissed,

Pasquazzi transported Maria to Hasbro Children’s Hospital (Hasbro or hospital). In

so doing, Pasquazzi later recounted that he “didn’t feel like it was safe to bring her

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back to the house, so I * * * [drove] her to the hospital to be seen” and that he “didn’t

feel [Maria] was safe to return back to her home and I thought that [bringing her to

Hasbro] was the best thing to do at the time.” For her part, Maria explained that she

revealed the sexual assaults because she could no longer “keep it a secret up in me

anymore” and that the secret was “hurt[ing] me bad like I was like crying a lot.”

Maria further revealed “try[ing] to hurt myself before.”

Upon arrival, Maria was examined by doctors in the emergency department

and remained at Hasbro into the early morning hours. A seventy-two-hour hold was

issued, effectively removing Maria from her biological parents’ custody and placing

her with a relative through the temporary custody of DCYF. After conducting an

examination, the emergency department referred Maria to the Aubin Child

Protection Center (Aubin Center) at Hasbro, for an appointment later that morning.

During that appointment, Christine Barron, M.D., a physician at the Aubin Center,

conducted a comprehensive examination of Maria.

Doctor Barron testified that the Aubin Center at Hasbro provides

comprehensive medical evaluations for children and young adults suspected of

having been physically or sexually assaulted. When presented with a new patient,

Dr. Barron explained, she would “obtain history from anyone who is available to

provide that history,” and she further detailed:

“We would review any records that are available including
prior evaluations by physicians or emergency department.
-5-
We will look for past medical history, something we call
review of systems which we identify if they have any
complaints. We then actually will do a physical exam
head to toe including a genital exam and then we will
determine if there is additional labs, review labs and then
we do a report that includes all of that information as well
as an assessment and our recommendations.”

Significantly, when asked whether the evaluation process for children contains a

mental health component, Dr. Barron responded, “Absolutely. * * * I would speak

with that child separately in regards to their medical and mental health to be able to

identify the safety concerns.”

Doctor Barron was declared an expert in child-abuse pediatrics and testified

concerning her examination of Maria, including statements made during the course

of the examination. These statements—which form the basis of defendant’s

appeal—include Dr. Barron’s testimony that Maria:

• “reported a history of physical abuse and neglect and then
reported sexual abuse by her father. Her exact words were
that he quote raped me twice end quote. I asked her who
that was and she identified him as quote Wallace Cable.”

• “reported that there were incidents that included kissing
on her mouth, fondling her breast over and under clothing,
fondling her vagina under and over clothing and two
separate instances of pen[ile] anal penetration and she
experienced anal pain and bleeding in both instances and
anal pain and bleeding in the last incident.”

• “reported that [the first incident] occurred at her father’s
girlfriend’s home, that there was pen[ile] anal penetration

-6-
with pain. That incident would have been a year or two
before my exam.”6

• “stated that her father had placed his hands over her
mouth.”

• “identified [Cable] as her father.”

• indicated that the second incident “was approximately four
to six months prior to [her] evaluation.”

• stated “[t]hat the [second] incident occurred at her paternal
grandmother’s home in East Providence, and that she
experienced both anal pain and bleeding after the incident
of pen[ile] anal penetration.”

The defendant also challenges on hearsay grounds Dr. Barron’s testimony that the

identification of the person who sexually assaulted Maria is

“important because as I stated earlier, my job is also to
determine safety and therefore, it is part of my history to
obtain who the patient is disclosing about to determine
whether or not that requires me as a mandated reporter and
to ensure there is a safety plan in place as to whether or
not that child would come in contact with that individual
again. So in this case since she identified it was her father,
mandatory reporting was done to DCYF with a physician
recording examination and [a] 72 hour hold was issued in
the emergency room and that is why she was placed with
[a relative] and came into the Aubin Center with [that
relative].”

6
Although Dr. Barron made this statement to the jury, the facts underlying this
incident did not comprise counts 2 or 4, and therefore were not presented to the jury
for its deliberation. Accordingly, we have omitted discussion of the underlying
events.
-7-
Finally, defendant contests Dr. Barron’s testimony that Maria “stated that her father

told her not to tell or he would go to jail.”

At the conclusion of the state’s case, defendant pressed a motion for judgment

of acquittal. Although the state objected to dismissing counts 2 and 4, the state did

not object to the dismissal of count 3. The trial justice granted the motion for

judgment of acquittal on count 3 and denied the motion for judgment of acquittal on

counts 2 and 4. Thereafter, the jury found defendant not guilty on count 2 and guilty

on count 4. The trial justice sentenced defendant to life in prison at the Adult

Correctional Institutions. This appeal ensued.

Additional relevant information will be set forth as needed.

Standard of Review

It is axiomatic that this Court “review[s] a trial justice’s admission of evidence

under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Benitez, 266 A.3d 1221,

1227 (R.I. 2022) (quoting State v. Brown, 9 A.3d 1240, 1247 (R.I. 2010)). “Under

that standard, ‘it is well established that this Court will not disturb a trial justice’s

ruling on an evidentiary issue unless that ruling constitutes an abuse of the justice’s

discretion that prejudices the complaining party.’” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting

State v. Flori, 963 A.2d 932, 941 (R.I. 2009)).

-8-
Discussion

On appeal, defendant argues that the statements to Dr. Barron that are

challenged as hearsay were not made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or

treatment. According to defendant, the trial justice improperly concluded that Dr.

Barron’s testimony relaying these statements was admissible pursuant to Rule

803(4) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Before examining the hearsay

arguments, however, we consider the state’s contention that defendant failed to

preserve this issue for appeal.

A

The Motions in Limine and Waiver

The admissibility of Dr. Barron’s testimony was the subject of dueling

motions in limine. Specifically, Cable sought to preclude Dr. Barron’s testimony in

its entirety, arguing, among other grounds, that Maria was not brought to the Aubin

Center at Hasbro for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment.7 Rather,

defendant insists that Maria had been treated at Hasbro and then referred to the

Aubin Center, a Hasbro facility, for the purpose of reporting the crime and the

collection of evidence for prosecution. It was during the evaluation at the Aubin

Center that Maria expressed the hearsay statements challenged in this appeal.

7
On appeal, defendant does not challenge the trial justice’s refusal to exclude Dr.
Barron’s testimony in toto. The defendant’s appellate argument is limited to the
admissibility vel non of the challenged hearsay statements.
-9-
Alternatively, Cable argued that if Dr. Barron were permitted to testify, the

challenged hearsay statements did not fall within Rule 803(4) and, therefore, should

be excluded.

Disparately, the state sought to admit Dr. Barron’s testimony and submitted

that, because Maria “reported [to the Aubin Center at Hasbro] for medical treatment

or diagnosis,” the testimony was admissible as an exception to the rule against

hearsay evidence. See R.I. R. Evid. 803(4). In this respect, the state noted that Dr.

Barron’s evaluation “contain[ed] a psychological element as well as [a] physical one

* * *.”

In ruling on the motions in limine, the trial justice recognized that he did not

know “exactly the testimony that is going to be introduced * * *.” Nonetheless, he

expressed that “based on the way it has been described by both counsel,” he

concluded that Maria “presented with mental health issues, suicidal ideations * * *

[and that the responses] these doctors received from this patient [were] clearly for

the purposes of diagnosis and treatment and are therefore admissible.” Accordingly,

the trial justice declared that Dr. Barron would be permitted to testify concerning the

out-of-court statements made by Maria “as they were related to diagnosis and

treatment * * *.”

Critically, with respect to the statements challenged as hearsay, however,

during trial, defendant failed to object to all but a single statement Maria made at the

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Aubin Center, viz., “that her father told her not to tell or he would go to jail.” While

that specific objection is preserved for appeal, see infra, we conclude that all other

hearsay statements challenged in this appeal have been waived.

“It is beyond peradventure that ‘this Court staunchly adheres to the raise or

waive rule.’” State v. Tavares, 312 A.3d 449, 458 (R.I. 2024) (quoting State v.

Barros, 148 A.3d 168, 174 (R.I. 2016)). “As we have said on innumerable

occasions, a litigant cannot raise an objection or advance a new theory on appeal if

it was not raised before the trial court.” Id. (quoting Barros, 148 A.3d at 172).

In this context we have declared that, “[a]lthough [a] defendant objected to

the state’s motion in limine, such an objection is not adequate to preserve the issue

for appeal.” State v. Mensah, 227 A.3d 474, 483 (R.I. 2020). Rather, “‘[t]his Court

repeatedly has stated that the grant or denial of a motion in limine is by no means a

final ruling on the admissibility of the evidence addressed in the motion,’ * * * and

such a ruling is ‘preliminary in nature.’” Id. (brackets omitted) (first quoting State v.

Buchanan, 81 A.3d 1119, 1126 (R.I. 2014), then quoting State v. Colon, 198 A.3d

1249, 1255 (R.I. 2019)). “The inherent purpose of a motion in limine is to prevent

the proponent of potentially prejudicial matter from displaying it to the jury in any

manner until the trial court has ruled upon its admissibility in the context of the trial

itself.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Colon, 198 A.3d at 1255). As such, “it is

incumbent upon counsel to raise timely and appropriate evidentiary objections

- 11 -
throughout the trial in order to preserve the issues for appeal.” Id. (emphasis added)

(quoting Colon, 198 A.3d at 1255). Here, except for Maria’s out-of-court statement

concerning defendant’s fear of imprisonment, Cable posed no hearsay objections to

the challenged statements during Dr. Barron’s testimony.8

To be sure, defendant suggests that the hearsay issue is adequately preserved

because it was raised during the motions in limine and because it was argued during

Dr. Barron’s testimony. Our precedent controls the former argument, see supra, and

is highlighted by the trial justice’s in limine recognition that he did not “know exactly

8
Although the record is not entirely clear, our review reveals that the hearsay
statements discussed during the hearing on the motions in limine were limited in
scope as compared to the hearsay statements challenged in this appeal. For instance,
during the hearing on the motions in limine, defendant did not seek to exclude
Maria’s statements that she had been “raped,” that Maria had experienced pain or
bleeding after the sexual assaults, or that defendant had placed his hands over
Maria’s mouth. Similarly, on appeal, defendant contends that certain challenged
hearsay statements were improperly admitted into evidence because the state failed
to establish a proper foundation and/or demonstrate that Maria’s statements were
motivated by a desire to seek a medical diagnosis or treatment. These arguments,
however, were not raised during the hearing on the motions in limine or during trial.
Typically, foundational issues are intensively fact-driven and dependent upon a
witness’s trial testimony.

In a proper case, a trial justice has the discretion to direct an examination of a
voir dire witness in order to consider foundational issues. Here, neither party
requested a voir dire, nor do we suggest that a voir dire was necessary in this case.
We make these observations to underscore the inherently preliminary nature of the
motions in limine and the necessity to renew (or raise) objections during trial.
Because the foundational and motivational issues were not raised during trial, they
are likewise waived. See State v. Tavares, 312 A.3d 449, 458 (R.I. 2024).

- 12 -
the testimony that is going to be introduced,” as well as the trial justice’s in limine

decision, which was premised upon “the way it has been described by both counsel

* * *.”

The defendant’s latter argument—that the Rule 803(4) objection was renewed

during Dr. Barron’s testimony—is also misguided and contradicted by the record.

In this regard, defendant did not object at the beginning of Dr. Barron’s testimony,

nor was defendant’s objection in response to the state’s effort to elicit hearsay

testimony. Rather, when the state moved to qualify Dr. Barron as an expert in the

field of child-abuse pediatrics, defendant requested a sidebar. The defendant’s entire

objection advised the trial justice that “we filed a motion in limine pretrial. One of

the grounds for excluding Dr. Barron’s testimony was that her testimony would [not]

be helpful to the trier of fact, under Rule 703 I believe, the rule about experts. I just

want to renew that objection for the record.” (Emphasis added.) The trial justice

immediately responded and elucidated the singular focus of the objection: “So, just

so I understand, in essence are you saying that there is nothing material or relevant

that [Dr. Barron] could offer with respect to the allegations in the case.” (Emphasis

added.) Defense counsel responded, “That’s right.” Thereafter, although the state

articulated its response and invoked Rule 803(4), the trial justice overruled the

objection and focused on defendant’s argument seeking to exclude Dr. Barron’s

testimony in toto:

- 13 -
“I think clearly Dr. Barron does have relevant and
material information that would be appropriate to be heard
by the jury. She, again, she did see the complaining
witness at Hasbro Children’s Hospital, examined her, and
that examination was clearly for purposes of diagnosis and
treatment of the complaining witness at that time, and I see
no bases to exclude her testimony. I can’t think of any
basis upon which to do that. I think she is an appropriate
witness particularly for this type of case.” (Emphases
added.)

We are satisfied that defendant’s objection—which was devoid of any

reference to hearsay—was in response to the state’s effort to qualify Dr. Barron as

an expert and sought to preclude Dr. Barron’s testimony. The objection was not

precipitated by a pending question and did not raise a hearsay objection. The trial

justice’s decision to overrule the objection on relevancy and materiality grounds and

thereafter to qualify Dr. Barron as an expert in the field of child-abuse pediatrics

supports our conclusion. Accordingly, except for the out-of-court statement

concerning defendant’s fear of imprisonment, we are of the opinion that the hearsay

issues are not preserved and are deemed waived. See Tavares, 312 A.3d at 458.

B

Rule 803(4)

“Hearsay evidence is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while

testifying at a trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter

asserted.” State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022, 1030 (R.I. 2004) (quoting State v. Angell,

122 R.I. 160, 167, 405 A.2d 10, 14 (1979)). “As a rule, hearsay statements are
- 14 -
excluded from the evidence introduced at trial because the usual safeguards of the

oath, confrontation, and cross-examination, are not available.” Id. There are,

however, numerous exceptions to this rule, including statements made for the

purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment. See id.

Rule 803(4), entitled “Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or

Treatment,” permits hearsay statements to be admitted into evidence when the

statements were

“made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and
describing medical history, or past or present symptoms,
pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of
the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment, but not including
statements made to a physician consulted solely for the
purposes of preparing for litigation or obtaining testimony
for trial.” (Emphases added.)

The underlying rationale supporting the admissibility of hearsay statements

made for the purpose “of medical diagnosis or treatment is that a person has a ‘strong

motivation to be truthful about information that will form the basis of his or her

diagnosis and treatment.’” Lynch, 854 A.2d at 1031-32 (brackets omitted) (quoting

Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 803(4)). “Statements that narrate details

unconnected with either diagnosis or treatment, however, are inadmissible unless

they fall under another hearsay exception.” Benitez, 266 A.3d at 1228 (quoting State

v. Watkins, 92 A.3d 172, 187 (R.I. 2014)). This Court has emphasized that “[a]

declarant’s motive in making the statement must be consistent with seeking
- 15 -
diagnosis or treatment” and that “[t]here must * * * be a proper foundation showing

that the statements in question were made ‘for the purposes of medical diagnosis or

treatment.’” Lynch, 854 A.2d at 1031 (quoting R.I. R. Evid. 803(4)). Admissibility

“hinge[s] on whether the statements were ‘reasonably pertinent to the formulation

of a medical diagnosis or treatment.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting State v.

Momplaisir, 815 A.2d 65, 72 (R.I. 2003)).

We conclude that Dr. Barron’s testimony relaying Maria’s statement that

defendant threatened that if she disclosed the sexual assaults “he would go to jail”

was supportably admissible pursuant to Rule 803(4). The record is clear that despite

alleging multiple occurrences of sexual assault spanning approximately a one- or

two-year period, Maria kept this information secret, pursuant to defendant’s threat.

When asked about the nondisclosure, the psychological dilemma was self-evident;

Maria explained that at the time she still loved her father, and that she was “scared

and because he was my dad * * * I didn’t want anything to happen to him.” In this

respect, Dr. Barron examined Maria for psychological trauma and mental health

issues associated with an eleven-year-old girl having been sexually assaulted by her

biological father, and she evaluated Maria’s ongoing risk for future self-harm—a

concern heightened by her reports of a prior instance of self-harm. See State v. White,

296 A.3d 692, 704 (R.I. 2023) (“It is a completely logical inference that [the

complaining witness described the sexual assaults] for the purpose of obtaining

- 16 -
whatever relief the * * * hospital could provide—namely such diagnosis or treatment

as might be appropriate, whether it be through traditional hands-on medical

intervention or the prescription of medication or intelligent and supportive counsel

from a medical professional.”).

Equally important, Dr. Barron elucidated that, in conjunction with the medical

examination, Maria revealed past occurrences of self-injurious behavior and suicidal

ideations; there is no doubt that establishing the root cause of these mental health

issues falls within Rule 803(4). As we previously explained:

“Given [the child’s] history of self-harm and the resultant
importance of treating the effect on her mental health of
the abuse she purportedly suffered, we perceive no
reversible error in the trial justice’s determination that the
statements at issue were ‘inextricably intertwined’ with
[the doctor’s] examination and with her need to obtain all
the reasonably pertinent information needed to treat [the
child].” Benitez, 266 A.3d at 1229; see also White, 296
A.3d at 706 n.16 (“Unquestionably, part of the nurse’s role
in such a situation was to deal with the patient’s emotional
state.”).

Likewise, we perceive no error in the trial justice’s admission of Maria’s statement

given its obvious import to Dr. Barron’s treatment of Maria’s mental health and

history of self-harm. As such, the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in

admitting this statement pursuant to Rule 803(4).

Moreover, to the extent that the statement assigned fault, we are satisfied that

the trial justice was within his discretion to admit the statement. Doctor Barron’s

- 17 -
testimony belies any argument that the statement was not for the purpose of medical

diagnosis or treatment. Although defendant did not reside in Maria’s immediate

household, there is no dispute that this eleven-year-old child was in her biological

father’s sole care for extended periods of time. See Lynch, 854 A.2d at 1031 (“When

the perpetrator is a member of the child’s immediate household, his or her identity

may well be reasonably pertinent not only to the formulation of a treatment plan, but

also to ensure that the child is in a safe and secure environment so that treatment can

be effectuated.”). As the state aptly characterized during the hearing on the motions

in limine, “[t]hat is how the whole predicament came about.” And, even after the

last incident of sexual assault, Maria testified that she continued spending time with

defendant.

As Dr. Barron related, the purpose of Maria’s out-of-court statement assigning

fault to defendant was to implement a safety protocol in an effort to prevent future

risk of self-harm and to provide protection to a child of tender years who had been

sexually assaulted by her biological father. After performing the evaluation, Dr.

Barron concluded that DCYF’s temporary custody, and placement with a relative,

should be continued with Maria having no contact with either biological parent. The

trial justice did not abuse his discretion in admitting this testimony.

- 18 -
C

Cumulative Evidence

Even assuming arguendo that Dr. Barron’s testimony concerning defendant’s

fear of imprisonment did not fall squarely within Rule 803(4), this evidence was

undoubtedly cumulative and harmless in light of the testimony adduced.

“Cumulative evidence means evidence tending to prove the same point to which

other evidence has been offered.” Benitez, 266 A.3d at 1229 (brackets omitted)

(quoting Lynch, 854 A.2d at 1032). This Court has also recognized that “the

admission of hearsay evidence is not prejudicial when the evidence is merely

cumulative and when the defendant’s guilt is sufficiently established by proper

evidence.” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Robinson, 989 A.2d 965, 979 (R.I.

2010)). “The test to be applied is ‘a retrospective one, administered at the close of

all the evidence to determine whether the admission of certain evidence was

harmless in light of all the evidence admitted on that point.’” Id. (quoting Watkins,

92 A.3d at 189).

Our review reveals that defendant’s statement concerning his fear of

imprisonment was independently admitted into evidence; and, significantly, it was

admitted without objection. Specifically, Maria testified that defendant told “me

that I can’t tell anybody about this because he would go back to jail or he would go

- 19 -
to jail.” Later in her testimony, Maria was asked, “Mr. Cable told you not to tell

anyone or he would go to jail, right?” She answered, “Yes.”

In light of this independent evidence, we are satisfied that Dr. Barron’s

testimony that Maria “stated that her father told her not to tell or he would go to jail”

was repetitious and cumulative of Maria’s own testimony. See Benitez, 266 A.3d at

1229 (“Thus, Dr. Adewusi’s short testimony with respect to various facts that [the

complaining witness] had provided to her in the course of her evaluation * * * was

simply a repetition of [the complaining witness’s] own lengthy testimony which was

highly specific * * *.”). Notably, “[t]he usual reasons for excluding hearsay

statements—lack of the oath, confrontation, and cross-examination—are greatly

abated here because [Dr. Barron’s] testimony did not reveal anything other than that

testified to by [Maria] herself.” Lynch, 854 A.2d at 1032. We also observe that Dr.

Barron did not opine on the veracity or credibility of Maria’s statement. See Benitez,

266 A.3d at 1229-30; Lynch, 854 A.2d at 1033 (“In her testimony, Ms. Tillotson

only repeated [the complaining witness’s] statements. She offered no opinion about

their veracity or credibility.”). Accordingly, we are satisfied that the statement at

issue represented cumulative evidence.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated, the judgment of conviction is affirmed. The papers in

this case are remanded to the Superior Court.

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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case State v. Wallace Cable.

No. 2024-255-C.A.
Case Number
(P1/21-1161A)

Date Opinion Filed January 23, 2026

Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Daniel A. Procaccini

For State:

Virginia M. McGinn
Department of Attorney General
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Defendant:

Kara J. Maguire
Rhode Island Public Defender