State v. Joseph Coletta

Supreme Court

No. 2022-35-C.A.
(P2/17-1841ADV)

State :

v. :

Joseph Coletta. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical
or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court

No. 2022-35-C.A.
(P2/17-1841ADV)

State :

v. :

Joseph Coletta. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Justice Long, for the Court. The defendant, Joseph Coletta (Mr. Coletta or

defendant), appeals from a Superior Court judgment of conviction following a jury

trial at which he was found guilty of five counts of second-degree child molestation.

On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial justice erred in (1) denying his motion

to suppress his post-arrest statement to police because it was obtained in violation of

the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and article 1, section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution; (2) denying

his motion to suppress his post-arrest statement to police because it was obtained in

violation of Rule 5(a) of the District Court Rules of Criminal Procedure; (3) granting

the state’s motion in limine to preclude the defendant’s false-confessions expert from

testifying; and (4) denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial. For the reasons

stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

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Facts and Procedural History

On January 13, 2017, the Rhode Island State Police (the state police) arrested

Mr. Coletta pursuant to a warrant after receiving a complaint that he had engaged in

various instances of child molestation involving A.R., the complaining witness.1

The state police took Mr. Coletta to the state police barracks at approximately 8 a.m.

and interviewed him about A.R.’s allegations; during the interview, defendant

acknowledged various instances of sexual contact with A.R.

The state police presented Mr. Coletta at the District Court later that day.

Thereafter, on July 11, 2017, the state filed a ten-count criminal information in

Providence County Superior Court charging defendant with eight counts of second-

degree child molestation in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-37-8.3 and § 11-37-8.4; one

count of intimidation of a witness or victim of a crime in violation of G.L. 1956

§ 11-32-5(a) and § 12-29-5; and one count of intimidation of a witness or victim of

a crime in violation of § 11-32-5(a).

Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress all statements made to the

state police on January 13, 2017, during his post-arrest interview. The defendant

asserted that the length of his interrogation and the conduct of the state police

officers who conducted the interrogation rendered his confession involuntary and,

1
We refer to A.R. by her initials because she was a minor at the time the alleged
molestations occurred. A.R. was an adult at the time of trial.
-2-
therefore, its admission at trial would violate defendant’s rights under the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, defendant asserted that,

after his arrest pursuant to a valid arrest warrant, the police unnecessarily delayed

defendant’s presentment to the District Court, in violation of Rule 5(a) of the District

Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. He claimed that he remained in state police

custody for six hours and that the state police officers interrogated him for four and

a half hours before presenting him to a neutral judge in the District Court. The

defendant argued that this unnecessary delay in presentment was “clearly causative

of [his] confession.”

The defendant also disclosed his intention to call Brian L. Cutler, Ph.D., as a

witness at trial. The defendant provided Dr. Cutler’s curriculum vitae and stated that

Dr. Cutler would testify “about topics such as the link between false confessions and

wrongful convictions” among other subjects. The state filed a motion in limine

seeking to exclude expert testimony by Dr. Cutler regarding false confessions. The

state argued that Dr. Cutler’s testimony ran the risk of impeding the jury’s function

of determining the trustworthiness and the reliability of the evidence and that Rhode

Island courts have yet to allow admission of the type of testimony defendant sought

to introduce.

A justice of the Superior Court held a hearing on the parties’ motions on

January 13, 2020. The trial justice stated at the outset that she had reviewed both

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the transcript and the video of the post-arrest interview and determined that she

would not permit any references to a polygraph examination that defendant had

taken during the post-arrest interview. The defendant declined to present additional

evidence, asserting that the video spoke for itself.

The trial justice found that defendant was a college-educated man, articulate,

and sufficiently mature. She also found that defendant was given his Miranda 2 rights

but nonetheless agreed to speak with the police in an attempt to “convince the

officers of his innocence by being very cooperative * * *.” She found that the

conduct of the state police was less coercive than that of the police in State v. Munir,

209 A.3d 545 (R.I. 2019). She noted that Mr. Coletta was not handcuffed, unlike

the defendant in Munir, where the police “were much more bullying[.]” The trial

justice concluded that defendant made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver

of his rights and further that the four-and-a-half-hour length of the interrogation did

not negate the voluntariness of his statement. Notwithstanding the trial justice’s

finding that the statement was voluntary, she nevertheless directed the parties to

work together to redact references in the interview to the polygraph examination and

conditionally denied the motion to suppress accordingly.

The trial justice then addressed the state’s motion in limine to preclude the

testimony of defendant’s proffered expert, Dr. Cutler, from testifying about false

2
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
-4-
confessions. Defense counsel argued that Dr. Cutler would testify about general

practices used by police interrogators, the impact of those techniques and tactics on

a person under interrogation, and how those techniques and tactics could lead to a

false confession. The state asserted that, despite defendant’s stated limits on what

Dr. Cutler would testify to, his testimony “as a whole” would serve as impermissible

vouching or bolstering of defendant’s testimony.

The trial justice granted the motion in limine, reasoning that effective cross-

examination of the police would elicit testimony about the conditions of defendant’s

interrogation. She also determined that the expert testimony that defendant wished

to introduce would invade the province of the jury and be inconsistent with Rhode

Island caselaw prohibiting one witness from testifying to another witness’s

credibility.

On January 16, 2020, a jury trial commenced on counts 1 through 8.3 The

state presented three witnesses in its case-in-chief: A.R.; Mara Olink; and Detective

Connor O’Donnell (Det. O’Donnell).

A.R. became acquainted with defendant when she was four years old, after

her mother began dating and moved in with defendant. The defendant later fathered

A.R.’s younger siblings.

3
The state dismissed counts 9 and 10, the charges related to intimidation of a witness
or victim of a crime, in an amended criminal information before trial.

-5-
At trial, A.R. recalled several instances in which defendant had fondled her,

asked her to perform oral sex, or otherwise made her feel uncomfortable. The first

incident A.R. detailed occurred in Providence in 2009 when she was eight years old

(count 1). She testified that she was sitting on a chair across from defendant in the

living room of their apartment when he called her over to sit with him. A.R. found

defendant’s invitation to be “weird” because he was “usually not gentle towards

[her]. He was always * * * aggressive and it was very out of character.” A.R.

nevertheless obliged, she testified, and defendant proceeded to rub her legs and

thighs.

A.R. testified to a second incident (count 2) immediately after the first in

which defendant told A.R. that they were going somewhere, “like to the park.” A.R.

testified that defendant took her to a parking lot near a woodsy area not too far from

their home. While parked in the parking lot, A.R. testified that defendant told her to

pull her pants down and then proceeded to touch her genital area with his fingers.

The inappropriate touching lasted for a few minutes, she recalled, before they exited

the car and moved to another area.

A.R. testified that defendant led her to the woodsy area nearby and touched

her inappropriately again (count 3). She provided detail about the location of this

event, including that she remembered climbing up a steep rock surrounded by a lot

of trees and vegetation. Once there, A.R. testified that defendant told her to undress

-6-
again and he also undressed this time. She stated that she pulled her pants and

underwear down to her ankles and defendant put her hands on his genitals. She

described feeling very uncomfortable and very scared. A.R. recalled that defendant

asked her to perform oral sex on him, but she started crying and was too frightened.

Once they arrived home, A.R. did not tell her mother what had occurred because she

was afraid of defendant, who she testified was “very physically abusive [and]

verbally abusive towards me and my whole family.” She ultimately told her mother

about the third incident over a year later because he no longer lived in their home

and she felt safe enough to disclose it.

A.R. testified that, on July 4, 2012, defendant touched her a fourth time (count

4). She testified that she was sitting on the futon in their living room when

defendant, who was sitting behind her, briefly touched her back and the top of her

buttocks under her clothing with both of his hands. A.R. testified that she did not

tell her mother about this fourth incident because “the first time I told her something

happened, she dismissed me and moved back in with him and told me to keep quiet.”

Also on a summer day in 2012, A.R. explained that defendant took her to

Lincoln Woods in Lincoln, Rhode Island, after she agreed to go fishing with him,

but once they arrived, they began discussing trying to find a secluded area where

A.R. “could do stuff to him, like the touching” (count 5). A.R. stated that they

walked around Lincoln Woods for no more than an hour before returning to the car

-7-
and driving to a golf course. During the ride, A.R. testified that defendant released

the button of his pants and told her to touch his genitals, which she did (count 6).

Upon arriving at the golf course, A.R. testified, she remembered defendant parking

next to a gate or a fence, asking her to pull her pants down, exposing himself, and

propositioning her to grab his genitals. A.R. also testified that defendant touched

her buttocks after she pulled her pants down. She testified that defendant again tried

to get her to perform oral sex on him but she refused. A.R. recalled feeling very

upset and angry and that she expressed wanting to leave.4

The final incident A.R. recalled (count 8) occurred the day before she started

sixth grade. A.R. testified that she fell asleep that evening in bed with her mother

and sister and remembered waking up to the feeling of someone “groping [her] butt”

with their hands. She recalled that it was “pitch black,” but that she remembered the

feeling of the touching sensation that night from prior instances in which defendant

had assaulted her. A.R. testified that defendant did not say anything to her during

this incident.

A.R. testified that she was referred to counseling at some point between 2012

and 2013 after she began exhibiting self-injurious behaviors, behaviors concerning

her treatment of animals, and difficulty in her interactions with her mother and sister.

4
At the close of evidence, the state dismissed count 7 of the criminal information
pursuant to Rule 48(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.
-8-
A.R. testified that she was assigned to a therapist named Mara Olink and that, during

either their first or second session together, she told Ms. Olink a few details about

the first alleged assault. A.R. testified that she only discussed a few details because

she felt very uncomfortable talking about “that kind of subject matter” and she

wanted to see what Ms. Olink would do with the little information she provided.

A.R. testified that she later recanted the allegations, but then came forward

again in 2016 after realizing that her decision to recant had a very negative effect on

her mental health. A.R. also testified that she was motivated to re-report the

incidents because she was concerned that defendant would come back into her life

after her mother became pregnant with his child in 2016. She testified that she had

initially recanted to “keep everybody else happy * * *.” A.R. stated that Ms. Olink

accompanied her to the appropriate municipal police stations to re-report the

allegations.

On cross-examination, defense counsel queried A.R.’s memory of the assaults

and details about her police reports, primarily regarding her recall of whether her

mother was present during her police reports and whether her report to the

Providence police occurred at her home or at the police department. A.R.

acknowledged that “details are quite fuzzy” and her “timeline * * * was very hazy”

because three of the incidents happened close in time to one another. Defense

counsel also asked A.R. about the recanting of her accusations, and A.R.

-9-
acknowledged that she had, at that time, expressed feeling bad about “blaming”

defendant.

Defense counsel further elicited on cross-examination that A.R.’s mental

health struggles began in 2006, years prior to when the sexual assaults allegedly

occurred. A.R. additionally testified that she did not appreciate how defendant

treated her mother, that defendant was abusive, that she had witnessed several

arguments between her mother and defendant, and that she wanted defendant out of

the home.

Ms. Olink, A.R.’s licensed clinical social worker, testified that she began

treating A.R. in 2013 after reports of A.R.’s struggles with depression and concerns

that she had been engaging in unsafe and self-injurious behaviors. Ms. Olink

testified that during their first session, A.R. reported that she had suffered physical,

emotional, and sexual abuse by defendant. Specifically as to the sexual abuse, Ms.

Olink testified that A.R. reported the details of the incident in the woodsy area near

the park where, when she was eight years old, defendant reportedly took A.R. into

the woods, pulled her underwear down, touched her genital region, and had her touch

his genitals as well. Ms. Olink further testified that A.R. disclosed four other

incidents wherein defendant sexually assaulted her. Ms. Olink testified that, in 2016,

A.R. shared that the time period after her decision to recant was the worst time of

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her life; A.R. also stated that she wanted to “take her control back and move forward

and report the sexual abuse.”

Next, Det. O’Donnell, a detective in the major crimes unit of the Rhode Island

State Police, testified about his involvement in the investigation into A.R.’s

allegations against defendant. After A.R. reported the allegations, Det. O’Donnell

testified that he obtained an arrest warrant for defendant and took him into custody.

Detective O’Donnell testified that, once defendant was in his police cruiser, he

advised defendant of his Miranda rights. He testified that defendant responded that

he wished to speak with Det. O’Donnell and stated something along the lines of

wanting to provide his account of what happened. Detective O’Donnell testified that

he took defendant to police headquarters instead of directly to court because it is

common practice to first complete the booking process. He stated that, in cases

where there is an investigation ongoing, it is customary to offer the defendant the

opportunity to give an interview or statement before bringing them to court.

Once they arrived at the police station, Det. O’Donnell testified, he took

defendant to a holding facility where he asked again if defendant wanted to provide

a statement, which defendant agreed to. Detective O’Donnell subsequently took

defendant to an interview room, which he described as having four walls with a fixed

silver table in the middle, a few chairs, and a one-way mirror. Detective O’Donnell

testified that he, a special agent from the FBI, and then-state police detective, now

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Corporal Herbert Tilson (Cpl. Tilson) conducted the interview with defendant.

Detective O’Donnell testified that defendant was informed of his Miranda rights

again in the interview room and defendant signed a form waiving his rights. He

testified that the interview lasted for approximately four and a half hours, during

which time defendant did not ask to speak with an attorney or ask to stop speaking

with police.

Detective O’Donnell testified about the details of the interview, stating that

defendant initially denied having sexual contact with A.R. but that defendant also

changed his position throughout the interview. Detective O’Donnell testified that

he did not threaten or make physical contact with defendant nor did he observe

anyone else doing so, at any point during the interview. Toward the end of the

detective’s direct examination, the state played video excerpts of defendant’s

interview to the jury.

On cross-examination, Det. O’Donnell agreed with defense counsel that

defendant denied the allegations many times throughout his interview.

The state rested and defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on counts 4,

5, and 8 pursuant to Rule 29(a)(1) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal

Procedure. The trial justice granted the motion as to count 5 but denied the motion

as to counts 4 and 8.

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The defendant then testified as the only witness in his case-in-chief. He

testified that A.R. caused problems in his household from the moment she and her

mother moved in with him. When they moved to North Providence, he testified that

things with A.R. became out of control and she became destructive of their

apartment.

The defendant also testified that on the day of his arrest, he was taken into

custody around 8 a.m. and transported by police cruiser to the state police barracks,

where he remained in a cell for a few hours. The defendant testified that he was very

scared and nervous during the interview, and that he confessed to the allegations

because he kept telling the police “no” and they would not accept “no” as an answer.

On cross-examination, defendant stated that he did not remember being

advised of his Miranda rights and that he never told police he wanted to speak with

them during the ride to the police station. He testified that, once he arrived at the

police station, he agreed to speak with police. The defendant acknowledged that he

was advised of his Miranda rights at that point and signed a form waiving his rights.

The defendant admitted that he initiated discussion of a lawyer during the interview,

but when asked directly if he wanted one, he declined and stated, “I’m telling you

guys the truth. I don’t want none of that stuff.” The defendant agreed that he

admitted during his interview that A.R. had, on three separate occasions, allegedly

touched his genitals with her foot when she walked over him while he was seated on

- 13 -
the floor, grabbed his genitals in the kitchen of their home (kitchen incident), and

fondled his genitals in the car while defendant was driving (car incident). The

defendant testified that the interviewers yelled at him most of the time but that he

never asked to stop the interview.

On redirect examination, defendant testified that he agreed to speak with

police because he had nothing to hide and he did not ask for an attorney because he

did not think he did anything wrong. He testified that, during the interview, Cpl.

Tilson leaned over the metal table and was grinding his teeth as if he was going to

jump out at defendant. He also provided a different narrative of the kitchen incident

than what he admitted to in his interview and during cross-examination: Defendant

testified that he walked by A.R. in the kitchen and she stuck her hand out and flicked

his genitals, but she did not grab it. As to the car incident, he explained that while

he was driving A.R. to her father’s house, she slipped her hand into his shorts and

grabbed his genitals; he grabbed her hand and pushed it away.

Corporal Tilson testified as a rebuttal witness for the state and explained how

he assisted in the interview of defendant. He testified that he raised his voice at

defendant at times during the interview, but that he never physically threatened

defendant, leaned over the table in a threatening manner at him, or grinded his teeth

at him.

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At the close of the evidence, defendant renewed his motion for a judgment of

acquittal on counts 4 and 8. The trial justice denied the motion as to both counts.

After closing arguments, the trial justice instructed the jury, including as

follows with respect to defendant’s post-arrest interview statements while in police

custody:

“[Y]ou may not consider those statements in your
deliberations unless you’re satisfied by clear and
convincing evidence that the [d]efendant had been advised
of certain [c]onstitutional rights, commonly known as
one’s Miranda [r]ights, before he made the statements.

“* * *

“[I]n addition, did they demonstrate to you that the
[d]efendant was advised of those rights? The state has to
prove from the totality of the circumstances by clear and
convincing evidence that the [d]efendant understood those
[r]ights and that he or she voluntarily waived those [r]ights
in an intelligent manner without threats or force [from] the
police.”

The jury returned a guilty verdict on counts 1 through 4 and 6 and a verdict of not

guilty on count 8. Mr. Coletta filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the verdict

was against the weight of the evidence. The trial justice denied the motion for a new

trial and subsequently sentenced defendant to a term of incarceration of twenty-five

years with eighteen years to serve and the balance of time suspended, with probation.

A judgment of conviction entered thereafter and defendant filed a timely notice of

appeal.

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Discussion

The defendant argues on appeal that the trial justice erred in (1) denying his

motion to suppress his post-arrest statement to police because it was obtained in

violation of the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution and article 1, section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution; (2)

denying his motion to suppress his post-arrest statement to police because it was

obtained in violation of Rule 5(a) of the District Court Rules of Criminal Procedure;

(3) granting the state’s motion in limine to preclude testimony from Dr. Cutler; and

(4) denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.

Motion to Suppress

This Court employs a two-step analysis when reviewing a trial justice’s

decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress a statement alleged to have been made

involuntarily: (1) we review the trial justice’s findings of historical fact for clear

error; and (2) if the trial justice’s findings of historical fact are not clearly erroneous,

we apply those historical facts and review de novo the trial justice’s decision

regarding the voluntariness of the statement. State v. Munir, 209 A.3d 545, 550-51

(R.I. 2019); State v. Dennis, 893 A.2d 250, 261 (R.I. 2006) (“[T]he ultimate question

of whether a confession was given voluntarily is legal in nature, and ‘this Court

undertakes a de novo review of questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact

- 16 -
insofar as those issues involve constitutional issues.’”) (quoting State v. Page, 709

A.2d 1042, 1044 (R.I. 1998)).

1. Due-Process Violation

Mr. Coletta first argues that the trial justice erred in denying his motion to

suppress his statement because the confession was obtained in violation of his due-

process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

and article 1, section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution. Specifically, defendant

contends that the police subjected him to a long interrogation in an isolated room at

the police station and “overbore his will” with threats of harsh punishments,

deception, and retaliation. The totality of the circumstances, he asserts,

demonstrates that he was coerced and improperly induced into confessing.

It is clear from the record that Mr. Coletta did not challenge the post-arrest

interview statement on state constitutional grounds in the Superior Court. We will

not review on appeal what the trial justice has not had the opportunity to consider in

the first instance. State v. Ciresi, 45 A.3d 1201, 1212 (R.I. 2012). We will therefore

consider Mr. Coletta’s due-process argument under the Fourteenth Amendment to

the United States Constitution only.

Evaluating whether a defendant’s statement was made consistent with the

mandates of due process requires the trial justice to determine whether the state

proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant knowingly,

- 17 -
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. State v. Sabourin, 161 A.3d

1132, 1142 (R.I. 2017). A statement was made voluntarily when it was the product

of defendant’s free will and rational choice; a statement was made involuntarily

when it was extracted from the defendant by coercion or improper inducement,

including threats, violence, or any undue influence that overcomes defendant’s free

will. State v. Garcia, 140 A.3d 133, 140 (R.I. 2016). Assessing voluntariness

requires an analysis of the totality of the circumstances in each given case. Sabourin,

161 A.3d at 1142. In conducting this analysis, among the relevant considerations

are “the background, experience and conduct of the accused, as well as the level of

a suspect’s educational attainments.” State v. Gouin, 182 A.3d 28, 34 (R.I. 2018)

(quoting State v. Bojang, 138 A.3d 171, 181 (R.I. 2016)). “[A]bsent evidence that

[the] defendant’s will was overborne and his capacity for self-determination

critically impaired because of coercive police conduct, his waiver was voluntary

under Miranda.” Munir, 209 A.3d at 552 (brackets and deletions omitted) (quoting

State v. Jimenez, 33 A.3d 724, 734 (R.I. 2011)).

We also evaluate a defendant’s challenge to the voluntariness of her or his

statement according to the Humane Practice Rule. Dennis, 893 A.2d at 261-62. “The

Humane Practice Rule requires that judge and jury make separate and independent

determinations of voluntariness—and the defendant’s statement may not serve as a

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basis for conviction unless both judge and jury determine that it was voluntarily

made.” Id. at 262 (emphasis omitted).

The record in this case supports the conclusion that Mr. Coletta made his post-

arrest interview statement knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, notwithstanding

the four-and-a-half-hour length of the interrogation. The trial justice reviewed the

video and transcript in their entirety—the extent of the evidence presented—and

found that Mr. Coletta was advised of his Miranda rights; that he appeared to be an

intelligent, articulate, sufficiently mature, college-educated man; that he agreed to

speak with the police without an attorney present; that he was not handcuffed; and

that although the interrogation was somewhat exhausting and not pleasant, it was not

enough to negate the voluntariness of his statement.

We are satisfied that the trial justice’s findings of fact were not clearly

erroneous, and therefore we afford those findings great deference. State v. Barros,

24 A.3d 1158, 1179 (R.I. 2011).

The totality of the circumstances reveals that Mr. Coletta knowingly and

intelligently waived his Miranda rights. He is an intelligent and educated man who

was advised of his Miranda rights and who subsequently signed a form waiving

those rights, which demonstrates that he had the “capacity and knowledge to

understand what he was doing.” State v. Marini, 638 A.2d 507, 513 (R.I. 1994).

- 19 -
Moreover, the totality of circumstances also supports the conclusion that the

conduct of the state police was not so coercive as to have overcome Mr. Coletta’s

will and capacity for self-determination. See Munir, 209 A.3d at 552. Although the

interviewers raised their voices at times when clarifying their questions to defendant,

leading to an unpleasant and somewhat exhausting interrogation, there is an absence

of evidence of threats, violence, or undue influence. See id. at 554 (determining that

“significant level of vulgarity, raised voices, and a barrage of questions” did not

amount to grounds for suppression); Garcia, 140 A.3d at 140.

Finally, related to the trial justice’s evaluation of the voluntariness of Mr.

Coletta’s post-arrest interview statement, we acknowledge also that the jury made a

separate and independent determination of the voluntariness of the statement,

pursuant to the instructions of the trial justice. See Dennis, 893 A.2d at 262. We

perceive no error in the decision of the trial justice to deny defendant’s motion to

suppress his post-arrest interview statement as having been obtained in violation of

his due-process rights. Furthermore, we are assured by the procedural safeguard that

the Humane Practice Rule provided to defendant in this case.

2. Violation of Rule 5(a) of the District Court Rules of Criminal Procedure

The defendant argues that the delay by the state police in presenting him

before a judge of the District Court was unreasonable and unnecessary in violation

of Rule 5(a) of the District Court Rules of Criminal Procedure and warranted

- 20 -
suppression of his confession. He asserts, in a conclusory statement, that the “delay

was causative of his confession.”

Rule 5(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “an officer making an arrest under a

warrant issued upon a complaint shall take the arrested person without unnecessary

delay before a judge of the District Court” for a prompt bail hearing. Dist. R. Crim.

P. 5(a). However, our well-settled caselaw is clear that a defendant who seeks to

have his statement excluded because of a violation of Rule 5(a) must demonstrate

that the delay was unnecessary and that such delay caused the defendant to give a

confession. State v. King, 996 A.2d 613, 622 (R.I. 2010).

We are unpersuaded by defendant’s conclusory argument that the delay in

presenting him to the District Court “was causative of his confession.” Our review

of the record in this matter leads us to conclude that defendant failed to meet his

burden. See King, 996 A.2d at 623 n.18 (“It is important to distinguish between the

occasion for an occurrence and the cause for an occurrence. The mere fact that an

event (e.g., an incriminating confession) occurs within a period of delay does not

mean that the delay necessarily caused that confession * * *.”). Moreover, the

recognized goal of Rule 5(a), which is substantially similar to its federal counterpart,

is to minimize the police’s opportunity to obtain confessions in violation of

important rights, such as the right against self-incrimination, by ensuring that the

arrested person is provided with an adequate statement of his constitutional rights as

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soon as possible after arrest. 1 Charles Alan Wright & Andrew D. Leipold, Federal

Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 71 at 153 n.4 (4th ed. 2008); see also State v.

Nardolillo, 698 A.2d 195, 199 (R.I. 1997). Here, we are satisfied that Rule 5(a)’s

priority was met because defendant acknowledged that he was advised of his

Miranda rights, that he declined to speak with a lawyer, and that he consented to

speaking with police.

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial justice did not err in denying

defendant’s motion to suppress his post-arrest interview statement as obtained in

violation of Rule 5(a).

Motion in Limine to Preclude Expert Testimony

When reviewing a trial justice’s decision concerning the admissibility of

expert testimony, this Court will not reverse the decision save for an abuse of

discretion. State v. Gaspar, 982 A.2d 140, 153-54 (R.I. 2009). This Court will

sustain the trial justice’s decision if the trial justice’s discretion was “soundly and

judicially exercised,” meaning that “it has been exercised in the light of reason

applied to all the facts and with a view to the rights of all the parties * * *.” Id. at

154 (quoting In re Mackenzie C., 877 A.2d 674, 684 (R.I. 2005)).

The defendant argues that the trial justice erred in granting the state’s motion

in limine to exclude defendant’s expert witness on false confessions, Dr. Cutler,

because the trial justice applied an incorrect legal standard and failed to conduct a

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hearing on the admissibility of such evidence pursuant to Rules 702 and 403 of the

Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. He relies on United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126

(1st Cir. 1995), for the proposition that expert testimony should not be automatically

excluded simply because that testimony concerns a credibility question. See Shay,

57 F.3d at 131.

Rule 702 allows a witness qualified as an expert to testify in the form of a fact

or an opinion if her or his scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge would

assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue.

R.I. R. Evid. 702. This Court has not evaluated the admissibility of expert testimony

relating to false confessions. See Barros v. State, 180 A.3d 823, 832 (R.I. 2018)

(noting that this Court has not addressed the admissibility of false-confession expert

testimony and that courts are divided about this issue). However, Rhode Island law

is generally clear that no witness, expert or otherwise, may testify that another

witness is lying because determining the truthfulness or credibility of a witness is a

function reserved for the jury. State v. Miller, 679 A.2d 867, 872 (R.I. 1996); State

v. Lassiter, 836 A.2d 1096, 1107 (R.I. 2003); State v. Adefusika, 989 A.2d 467, 476

(R.I. 2010); State v. Richardson, 47 A.3d 305, 314 (R.I. 2012); State v. Gaudreau,

139 A.3d 433, 447 (R.I. 2016). This is the case even when the witness’s opinion

“does not literally state an opinion concerning the credibility of another witness’s

testimony” because that testimony could have the same “substantive import” as

- 23 -
testimony that literally addressed another witness’s credibility. Lassiter, 836 A.2d at

1107.

Furthermore, we have previously held that, before a trial justice schedules an

evidentiary hearing on the admission of expert testimony, the party seeking to

introduce expert testimony “must alert the court to the nature of the evidence to be

presented through affidavits or other offers of proof.” State v. Werner, 851 A.2d

1093, 1100 (R.I. 2004). However, evidentiary hearings are not mandated in every

case. Roe v. Gelineau, 794 A.2d 476, 483 (R.I. 2002). Rather, the party seeking

admission of the testimony must alert the trial justice that scientific or medical

evidence is at issue and make a threshold showing that the evidence is derived from

a valid scientific theory. Id.

Our review of the record and relevant caselaw reveals that the trial justice did

not abuse her discretion in granting the state’s motion in limine to preclude Dr. Cutler

from testifying about false confessions.

Beyond proffering that Dr. Cutler would testify about “psychological

reactions to interrogation” and submitting Dr. Cutler’s curriculum vitae, defendant

made no other showings to alert the trial justice that scientific or medical evidence

was at issue. See Werner, 851 A.2d at 1099-1101 (concluding that the defendant’s

proffer of expert’s curriculum vitae, that expert would testify about issues involving

psychiatry, memory of trauma, unreliability of eyewitness identifications, certain

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specific psychological theories, and a study regarding an eyewitness’s confidence in

her testimony was not sufficient to alert the trial justice to a specific theory that

required expert explanation). In the absence of a threshold showing that scientific

evidence was at issue, and in light of the fact that defendant was silent as to his need

for an evidentiary hearing at the hearing on the state’s motion in limine, we will not

say that the trial justice abused her discretion. Gelineau, 794 A.2d at 483; see

Werner, 851 A.2d at 1101 (holding that the trial justice was not required to prolong

the judicial proceedings based on a few general statements about what the

anticipated expert would testify to, none of which demonstrated that an expert was

indeed required).

The defendant urges us to look to Shay for the notion that not all testimony

concerning a witness’s credibility should be automatically precluded. Furthermore,

he highlights that, in Shay, the court was unable to address the state’s arguments

regarding the exclusion of the expert testimony under Rule 403 because the lower

court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing below, which the court determined was

not harmless error. Shay, 57 F.3d at 134. The defendant’s argument fails.

In Shay, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit evaluated

whether the trial court erred in precluding expert testimony about the defendant’s

mental disorder that may have caused him to make false statements about his own

interests. Shay, 57 F.3d at 133. And while defendant is correct that the court

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determined that testimony concerning the credibility of a witness is not always

inadmissible, the court did not express that the failure to conduct an evidentiary

hearing was categorically erroneous, but instead, determined that the failure to do so

on the particular trial record before it constituted prejudicial error. Id. at 134. Here,

defendant’s argument is wholly undercut by the fact that, dissimilar to the defendant

in Shay, he failed to make a threshold showing that Dr. Cutler’s testimony derived

from scientific evidence. Accordingly, Shay is distinguishable and unconvincing in

this case.

In rendering her decision, the trial justice noted the current jurisprudence on

testimony concerning the credibility of a witness in Rhode Island, concluded that the

proffered testimony would invade the province of the jury as factfinder, and

reasoned that effective cross-examination of the police at trial would offer defendant

the same desired effect. Based on her reasoning, the law of our state, and defendant’s

fatal failure to make a showing that Dr. Cutler’s testimony derived from scientific

evidence, we hold that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in granting the

state’s motion.

Motion for a New Trial

This Court reviews a trial justice’s decision on a motion for a new trial with

“great deference because a trial justice, being present during all phases of the trial,

is in an especially good position to evaluate the facts and to judge the credibility of

- 26 -
the witnesses.” State v. Valdez, 267 A.3d 638, 644 (R.I. 2022) (quoting State v.

Acosta, 247 A.3d 489, 494 (R.I. 2021)). “We consider whether the trial justice,

acting as the thirteenth juror, exercised independent judgment in analyzing the

evidence presented.” Id. at 645. If the trial justice has conducted the appropriate

analysis and articulated adequate reasoning for denying the motion, we will not

disturb the decision unless she or he overlooked or misconceived material evidence

or otherwise was clearly wrong. Id.

The defendant argues that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a

new trial because the verdict went against the fair preponderance of the weight of

the evidence. The defendant contends that the trial justice erred in finding that the

complaining witness was credible given her troubled past and clear issues with her

testimony regarding places and times of the allegations.

Our review of the record reveals that the trial justice stated the standard

applicable to a motion for a new trial, thoroughly evaluated the testimony of the

witnesses, articulated her view of the video evidence as well as her credibility

determinations, and ultimately conducted the appropriate analysis. She noted that

A.R. was credible, sympathetic, and candid, while defendant did not appear credible

and seemed to want to paint A.R. as a villain. The trial justice acknowledged that

A.R. clearly had a difficult childhood and struggled with her mental health from a

young age and prior to the alleged misconduct. The trial justice also recognized that

- 27 -
A.R. recanted her allegations at one point and discussed A.R.’s stated reasons for

doing so. The trial justice also pointed to defendant’s own admissions of sexual

contact with A.R. in the interview video, and his statements that A.R. instigated the

sexual contact. To the trial justice, such testimony was “very damaging to

defendant.” Finally, the trial justice determined that she would have come to the

same conclusion as the jury in this case.

The defendant asserts that the trial justice erred in finding A.R. credible in

light of her troubled past and inconsistencies regarding places and times of the

alleged incidents. However, this Court has repeatedly held that a defendant’s

disagreement with the trial justice’s credibility determinations is not a sufficient

basis to warrant granting a new trial. State v. Gonzalez, 56 A.3d 96, 103 (R.I. 2012);

see also State v. Muralles, 154 A.3d 925, 934 (R.I. 2017) (noting that a defendant

who chooses to testify at trial runs the risk “that if disbelieved, the trier of fact may

conclude that the opposite of his testimony is the truth”) (quoting State v. Mattatall,

603 A.2d 1098, 1109 (R.I. 1992)). Here, the trial justice acknowledged A.R.’s

troubled past but found her credible anyway, which is her unique task as the person

best situated to witness the “human drama that is part and parcel of every trial

* * *.” State v. Paola, 59 A.3d 99, 106 (R.I. 2013) (quoting State v. DiCarlo, 987

A.2d 867, 872 (R.I. 2010)). Moreover, inconsistencies in a complaining witness’s

testimony do not automatically render that testimony not credible. State v. Lopez,

- 28 -
149 A.3d 459, 465 (R.I. 2016). In his papers, defendant does not point specifically

to what aspects of A.R.’s testimony were inconsistent, but we are nevertheless

satisfied that the trial justice’s credibility determinations as a whole were well-

reasoned and not clearly erroneous.

Therefore, because it is clear to us that the trial justice applied the appropriate

standard, conducted the correct analysis, and did not otherwise clearly err, we affirm

her decision denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.

Conclusion

Therefore, we affirm the judgment of conviction and remand the record to

the Superior Court.

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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case State v. Joseph Coletta.

No. 2022-35-C.A.
Case Number
(P2/17-1841ADV)

Date Opinion Filed July 9, 2025

Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Melissa A. Long

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Netti C. Vogel

For State:

Sean P. Malloy
Attorney(s) on Appeal Department of Attorney General
For Defendant:

Stefanie DiMaio Larivee, Esq.