Alison Glassie, in her capacity as of the Estate of Jacquelin C. Glassie and as Assignee of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Trustee of the Jacquelin Caffrey Glassie Trust II v. Paul Doucette, in his capacity as of the Estate of Donelson C. Glassie, Jr.

Supreme Court

No. 2023-372-Appeal.
(NP 16-265)

(Dissents begin on Page 22)

Alison Glassie, in her capacity as :
Executrix of the Estate of Jacquelin
C. Glassie and as Assignee of Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., Trustee of the
Jacquelin Caffrey Glassie Trust II

v. :

Paul Doucette, in his capacity as :
Executor of the Estate of Donelson
C. Glassie, Jr.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical
or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court

No. 2023-372-Appeal.
(NP 16-265)

(Dissents begin on Page 22)

Alison Glassie, in her capacity as :
Executrix of the Estate of Jacquelin
C. Glassie and as Assignee of Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., Trustee of the
Jacquelin Caffrey Glassie Trust II

v. :

Paul Doucette, in his capacity as :
Executor of the Estate of Donelson
C. Glassie, Jr.

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Justice Robinson, for the Court. The defendant, Paul Doucette, in his

capacity as Executor of the Estate of Donelson C. Glassie, Jr., appeals from a

November 14, 2023 order of the Superior Court, which granted the plaintiff’s motion

to dismiss the defendant’s appeal from a judgment on a jury verdict.1 The defendant

contends that the trial justice abused his discretion when he granted the plaintiff’s

1
The plaintiff is Alison Glassie, who commenced this civil action in her
capacity as Executrix of the Estate of Jacquelin C. Glassie and as assignee of Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), Trustee of the Jacquelin Caffrey Glassie Trust II.
-1-
motion to dismiss for the reason that the defendant had failed to timely order

transcripts and did not convince the trial justice that said failure was the result of

excusable neglect.

This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the

parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be

summarily decided. After considering the parties’ written and oral submissions and

after carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and

that this case may be decided without further briefing or argument.

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the order of the Superior

Court.

I

Facts and Travel

A

The Original Claim and Appeal

The factual background of this case is described in our opinion in Glassie v.

Doucette, 157 A.3d 1092 (R.I. 2017), which dealt with an earlier issue in this case.

Accordingly, we shall recount here only the facts necessary for our analysis of the

issues relevant to this appeal.

-2-
Jacquelin Glassie was the youngest child of Donelson and Marcia Sallum

Glassie.2 On August 11, 1993, Donelson established the Jacquelin Caffrey Glassie

Trust II (the Trust). According to the property settlement agreement that was

reached at the time of Donelson and Marcia’s divorce, Donelson was to fund the

Trust so that it would provide benefits that would be substantially similar to the

benefits which other trusts provided for Jacquelin’s sisters, Alison Glassie and

Georgia Glassie. Following the death of Donelson on February 3, 2011, Jacquelin

filed a claim against his estate, alleging that Donelson had breached the above-

referenced agreement by failing to adequately fund the Trust. Her claim was

disallowed by the executor, Mr. Doucette, and it was referred to the Superior Court

in accordance with the provisions of G.L. 1956 § 33-11-16.

On June 25, 2012, Jacquelin filed a complaint against the estate in the Superior

Court. In due course, Mr. Doucette, in his capacity as executor, proceeded to file a

counterclaim, alleging that Jacquelin had forfeited any interest as a beneficiary by

virtue of an in terrorem clause in Donelson’s will. Shortly after the complaint was

filed, Jacquelin died unexpectedly. Jacquelin’s sister, Alison, was appointed

executrix of Jacquelin’s estate, and she was substituted in that capacity as the party

plaintiff in this case. Summary judgment was subsequently granted in favor of the

2
Because several individuals involved in this case share the same last name,
they usually will be referred to herein by their first names. No disrespect is intended.
-3-
estate on the grounds that only a trustee may institute an action on behalf of the

beneficiaries of a trust. On appeal, this Court held that the proper plaintiff in the

action should have been the Trustee of the Trust, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells

Fargo); and it further held that Alison, as executrix of Jacquelin’s estate, did not have

the requisite standing. Glassie, 157 A.3d at 1100.

1. The Assignment

On January 7, 2016, in the context of a partial settlement of litigation taking

place in the state of Utah, Wells Fargo assigned to Alison any “claims that the

Trustee may possess, in its capacity as Trustee of the Trust, against defendant arising

out of an alleged breach of Donelson’s obligations under a property settlement

agreement dated July 1, 1993.” Glassie, 157 A.3d at 1096 n.6 (brackets omitted). In

May of 2016, Alison, as executrix of Jacquelin’s estate and assignee of the Trustee

(Wells Fargo), petitioned the Newport Probate Court for permission to file a claim

against the estate out of time. The petition was denied by the Probate Court, and

Alison appealed to the Superior Court. After considering the contentions of the

parties, the Superior Court determined that Alison had satisfied her burden of

establishing excusable neglect and that she should be allowed to pursue her claim

against Donelson’s estate out of time. On April 15, 2022, Alison filed an amended

complaint in the Superior Court, alleging substantially the same claims as had been

set forth in the original complaint. Mr. Doucette again asserted a counterclaim

-4-
alleging that, because of an in terrorem clause in Donelson’s will, Alison, both in

her individual capacity3 and as executrix of Jacquelin’s estate, had forfeited any

interest under Donelson’s will.

2. The Trial

On March 7, 2023, a jury trial commenced. The trial concluded on March 17,

2023, when the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff. The jury found that

“Donelson [had] breached his obligations contained in the Property Settlement

Agreement to fund [the Trust].” Additionally, the jury found that the estate of

Jacquelin Glassie did not forfeit “any bequest it was entitled to pursuant to Donelson

Glassie’s Will.” The jury awarded plaintiff $1,164,138.43 in damages. Judgment

entered in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $2,856,572.45, which included

prejudgment interest; judgment also entered in favor of plaintiff on defendant’s

counterclaim.

Subsequently, several post-trial motions were filed by the parties. The

plaintiff filed a motion to amend her complaint to conform to the evidence presented

at trial. The defendant filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, or,

in the alternative, a motion for a new trial and/or remittitur. The trial justice granted

plaintiff’s motion and denied defendant’s motions.

3
Mr. Doucette’s counterclaim against Alison in her individual capacity was
dismissed prior to trial.
-5-
B

The Instant Appeal

1. The Request for Transcripts

On June 7, 2023, defendant filed a notice of appeal;4 the notice expressly

indicated that transcripts would be ordered. The defendant’s request for transcripts

was not docketed until August 21, 2023—seventy-four days after the notice of

appeal was filed. Over a month later, on September 26, 2023, defendant paid for the

transcripts. On October 10, 2023, plaintiff moved in the Superior Court to dismiss

defendant’s appeal for failure to have timely ordered the transcripts and for failure

to have followed the proper procedure in seeking an extension of time for the

transmission of the record.

On October 3, 2023, defendant filed a motion with this Court seeking an

extension of time for transmission of the record to December 31, 2023, stating that

the stenographer had indicated that the transcripts would not be ready before

mid-December. The plaintiff objected to defendant’s motion, noting that defendant

had ordered the transcripts beyond the deadline established by Article I, Rule 35(e)

of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure. The plaintiff further pointed

out that, pursuant to Rule 11(f) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure,

4
We shall on occasion refer to this June 7, 2023 appeal as “the substantive
appeal.”

-6-
defendant should have addressed his motion to the trial court. The plaintiff also

noted that defendant had failed to send a copy of the motion to the Superior Court

Administrator, as is required by Rule 11(c). By an order dated November 6, 2023,

this Court held defendant’s motion in abeyance pending a decision in the Superior

Court on plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the appeal.

The completed transcripts relative to the substantive appeal were filed in the

Superior Court on November 3, 2023, and the case was certified to this Court on

November 6, 2023. The appeal was docketed in this Court on November 14, 2023.

2. The Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s Appeal

A hearing on plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the appeal was held in the Superior

Court on November 7, 2023. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial justice found

that defendant had failed to provide an adequate explanation that would justify a

finding of excusable neglect with respect to his failure to abide by the pertinent rules

relative to the timely ordering of the transcripts and the transmission of the record.

The trial justice took into consideration defendant’s argument that the delay was

based on what defendant asserted was his hope that the case would be resolved in

mediation and his desire to conserve funds by not having to pay for the transcripts if

there were to be a settlement. However, the trial justice ultimately concluded that

defendant’s argument was meritless and that defendant had not borne his burden of

proving excusable neglect. The trial justice expressly found that the argument about

-7-
defendant’s wish to avoid having to spend money for the transcripts in the hope that

there would be a successful mediation was especially unconvincing when viewed

against the background of the vast amount of time and money that had already been

expended in the litigation of this case and in the litigation of other cases closely

related to this one. As a result of these findings, the trial justice granted plaintiff’s

motion to dismiss defendant’s substantive appeal. An order to that effect entered on

November 14, 2023; and, on the same day, defendant filed a notice of appeal. It is

the latter appeal that is presently before us.

II

Issue on Appeal

On appeal, defendant contends that the trial justice’s decision to grant

plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the substantive appeal due to the fact that defendant had

ordered the transcripts after the deadline set forth in Rule 35(e) was an abuse of

discretion.

III

Standard of Review

This Court has previously stated that “[i]n reviewing a trial court’s dismissal

of an appeal, we shall reverse the trial court’s decision only upon a finding that the

motion justice abused his or her discretion.” Pelosi v. Pelosi, 50 A.3d 795, 798 (R.I.

2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sentas v. Sentas, 911 A.2d 266,

-8-
269 (R.I. 2006). We have emphasized that the abuse of discretion standard gives

extreme deference to the trial court’s determination. See State v. Werner, 831 A.2d

183, 204 (R.I. 2003) (“The standard of abuse of discretion is one that gives extreme

deference to the trial justice’s determination. Upholding a trial court’s discretionary

ruling does not imply that the appellate court necessarily would have ruled in the

same manner as the original determination.”); see also Harodite Industries, Inc. v.

Warren Electric Corporation, 24 A.3d 514, 533 (R.I. 2011).5

It is clearly established that the trial court has the authority to dismiss an

appeal for failure to comply with the rules regarding the ordering of transcripts.

Pelosi, 50 A.3d at 798. However, we have also made it clear that “a court should

not dismiss an appeal for failure to perfect the record if the inability of the appellant

to cause timely transmission of the record is due to causes beyond his control or to

circumstances which may be deemed excusable neglect.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and emphasis omitted); see Small Business Loan Fund Corporation v.

Gallant, 795 A.2d 531, 533 (R.I. 2002). We have stated that “[a] litigant asserting

excusable neglect must demonstrate extenuating circumstances sufficient to excuse

his or her noncompliance with the court rules.” Sentas, 911 A.2d at 270. And we

5
See generally Roscoe Pound, Discretion, Dispensation and Mitigation: The
Problem of the Individual Special Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 925, 926 (1960)
(“Discretion is an authority conferred by law to act in certain conditions or situations
in accordance with an official’s * * * own considered judgment and conscience.”).

-9-
have also indicated that “[t]he existence of excusable neglect is a question of fact to

be proven by evidence.” Vitale v. Elliott, 120 R.I. 328, 331, 387 A.2d 1379, 1381

(1978).

In addition, we have clearly stated that, in order for a litigant to establish

excusable neglect, he or she must show “that the neglect * * * was occasioned by

some extenuating circumstances of sufficient significance to render it excusable.”

Fields v. S. & M. Foods, Inc., 105 R.I. 161, 162, 249 A.2d 892, 893 (1969); see

Boranian v. Richer, 983 A.2d 834, 840 (R.I. 2009) (“[T]o establish excusable

neglect, the party must generally show that the circumstances that caused the party

to miss a deadline were out of that party or counsel’s control.”); see also UAG West

Bay AM, LLC v. Cambio, 987 A.2d 873, 880 (R.I. 2010).6

IV

Discussion

Although the show cause order that was entered on April 19, 2024 is silent as

to specific issues that the parties should further address on appeal, the parties have

indicated that, at the prebriefing conference, they were directed to address the

6
In connection with the instant case, we see special significance in the
requirement that the circumstances that might trigger a finding of excusable neglect
must be out of the control of the party claiming excusable neglect or that party’s
counsel. See UAG West Bay AM, LLC v. Cambio, 987 A.2d 873, 880 (R.I. 2010);
Boranian v. Richer, 983 A.2d 834, 840 (R.I. 2009). As we emphasize infra, that
requirement was clearly not met in this case.

- 10 -
question of whether the payment of the judgment by defendant renders this appeal

moot. Therefore, we shall briefly explain why we do not believe that mootness

resolves the matter on this record.

Our review of the record reveals that questions of fact remain unresolved

relating to defendant’s actions in the post-jury-verdict phase of this litigation.

Counsel for defendant contends that the payment was involuntary, underscoring that

he sought to halt the accrual of interest but that he had declined plaintiff’s request to

withdraw the instant appeal. For her part, counsel for plaintiff emphasizes that

defendant had indicated that he would forward to her a “Satisfaction of Judgment.”

Specifically, the issue of mootness vel non would hinge on this Court’s

determination as to whether defendant’s payment of the judgment was voluntary or

involuntary. It is clear to us that any meaningful analysis of the possible issue of

mootness would require a remand for fact-finding.7 Moreover, this Court has not

yet opined on the issue of what constitutes a voluntary payment of a judgment in this

context, and we firmly believe that this is not the record upon which we should

undertake that legal analysis. Accordingly, in view of the fact that the only issue

that is squarely before us at present pertains to plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, we

7
Further fact-finding would obviously extend the duration of this long-pending
case, and we see no sufficient reason for taking that path when there is no necessity
that we do so. See Arena v. City of Providence, 919 A.2d 379, 396 (R.I. 2007) (“It
is time for this litigation to end.”).
- 11 -
discern no reason to scrutinize the issue of possible mootness, and we will proceed

to address the substantive issue on appeal.

A

The Parties’ Contentions

The defendant contends before this Court that the dismissal of his appeal in

this case was an abuse of discretion. In pressing this argument, defendant asserts

that “this Court has never dismissed an appeal in the circumstances that exist here.”

To support this contention, defendant relies on this Court’s opinions in Boschetto v.

Boschetto, 183 A.3d 536 (R.I. 2018) (mem.); Valkoun v. Frizzle, 973 A.2d 566 (R.I.

2009); and Armstrong v. Polaski, 116 R.I. 661, 360 A.2d 558 (1976). In particular,

defendant points to these cases as examples of instances where, in defendant’s

words, this Court “looked beyond strict technical adherence to rule requirements and

assessed the overall status of the case, including whether the appellant had taken

concrete steps to perfect the appeal.”

With respect to the facts of this case, defendant claims that, although his

transcript request was not made within the time requirements set forth in Rule 35(e),

the request was made within the time allowed for transmission of the record. The

defendant specifically asserts that, because “he was acting within the time periods

that the Valkoun court sanctioned as being consistent with the interest of justice and

fairness, [his] crossing of the date for ordering the transcript must be seen as

- 12 -
excusable neglect.” In addition, defendant also notes that his “desire for a mediated

resolution to the litigation and avoidance of additional litigation expense turned out

to have been in vain.” Lastly, he emphasizes that the trial justice imposed the

ultimate sanction even though the delay at issue was of thirty-one days duration,

which defendant does not consider to be of great significance.

In turn, plaintiff contends that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in

dismissing defendant’s appeal. The plaintiff points out that, in rendering his

decision, the trial justice ultimately rejected defendant’s explanations for the

untimely transcript request, indicating that he found those explanations to be without

merit. The plaintiff further contends that the trial justice’s “discretionary decision

to dismiss the appeal was properly informed by his knowledge of the lengthy history

of the litigation.” Lastly, in response to defendant’s assertion that “this Court has

never dismissed an appeal in the circumstances that exist here,” plaintiff replies that

defendant “disregards significant factual distinctions between the cases cited in

support of that argument and this case.”

B

The Pertinent Rules

Article I, Rule 10(b)(1) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure

provides that “within twenty (20) days after filing the notice of appeal,” the appellant

- 13 -
must order such transcripts of the proceedings “as the appellant deems necessary for

inclusion in the record.”

Rule 11(a) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:

“Except as provided for in Rule 35(e) with respect to cases
eligible for mediation, the record on appeal, including the
transcript necessary for the determination of the appeal,
shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court within sixty (60)
days after the filing of the notice of appeal unless the time
is shortened or extended by an order entered under
subsection (c) of this rule.”8

Rule 11(c) states that the trial court “may extend the time for transmitting the

record.” The request for extension pursuant to Rule 11(c) “must be made within the

time originally prescribed or within an extension previously granted, and the trial

court shall not extend the time to a day more than ninety (90) days from the date of

filing of the first notice of appeal.”9

Rule 35(e) extends the time for ordering a transcript to sixty days from the

filing of the notice of appeal for cases eligible for mediation; it also extends the time

8
See Estate of Mitchell v. Gorman, 970 A.2d 1, 5 (R.I. 2009).
9
Article I, Rule 11(c) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure also
provides that, if “the trial court is without authority to grant the relief sought or has
denied a request therefor, the Supreme Court may on motion extend the time for
transmitting the record or may permit the record to be transmitted and filed after the
expiration of the time allowed or fixed.” Rule 11(f) further states that “[f]rom the
time of the filing of notice of appeal, the Supreme Court and trial courts shall have
concurrent jurisdiction to supervise the course of said appeal and to promulgate
orders of dismissal of appeal for failure to comply with these rules, either upon
motion of a party or upon the court’s own motion.”
- 14 -
for transmitting the record to sixty days after the transcript has been ordered.

Importantly, Rule 35(e) states: “The Rules of Appellate Procedure are not suspended

during participation in the Appellate Mediation Program except as expressly

provided for herein.”

C

Analysis

We begin our analysis by first stating that we are unpersuaded that the facts

of the instant case are, in actuality, genuinely similar to the facts of the cases relied

upon by defendant—viz., Boschetto v. Boschetto; Valkoun v. Frizzle; and Armstrong

v. Polaski. This case involves a factual context that differs meaningfully from the

factual context of the just-cited cases. For that reason, it is our view that those cases

do not have a dispositive precedential value with respect to the instant case. For

example, in Boschetto, the plaintiff timely ordered and paid a substantial sum of

money for a partial set of transcripts. Boschetto, 183 A.3d at 537. However, Mr.

Boschetto had failed to fully comply with Rule 10(b)(1), which sets forth the duties

of the appellant in the event that a partial transcript is ordered. Id. Upon discovering

that he was not in total compliance with the rule, the plaintiff filed a motion for an

extension of time to transmit the record to this Court. Id. This Court held that the

plaintiff’s failure to comply with all the requirements of Rule 10(b)(1) “should not

have been fatal to [his] appeal.” Id. at 538. This Court expressly distinguished that

- 15 -
case from prior cases in which the appellants had failed to timely order any

transcripts. Id.

In the instant case, the relevant rules required defendant to order the

transcripts no later than August 7, 2023 and to see to it that the record was

transmitted to this Court no later than October 6, 2023. However, defendant did not

order the transcripts (or even a portion of them) until August 21, 2023 and did not

actually pay for the transcripts until September 26, 2023. Unlike the plaintiff in

Boschetto, who partially complied with the operative rules, it is undisputed that

defendant in this case ordered transcripts well beyond the prescribed deadline and

asserted as justifications for not complying with the deadlines set forth in the

pertinent rules: (1) his hope for a successful mediation and (2) his desire not to have

to spend money for transcripts in the event the case were to settle.

We are similarly of the opinion that defendant’s reliance on Valkoun v.

Frizzle, 973 A.2d 566 (R.I. 2009), and Armstrong v. Polaski, 116 R.I. 661, 360 A.2d

558 (1976), is also unavailing.

In Valkoun, the plaintiff did not timely order the transcript. Valkoun, 973 A.2d

at 573. The order from which the plaintiff undertook the appeal granted the

defendant physical placement of the couple’s children and granted the defendant’s

motion to relocate to North Carolina with the children. Id. at 569. This Court held

that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial justice’s ruling that it would be unfair

- 16 -
to dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal and deny his motion for an extension of time. Id. at

575. This Court emphasized that the trial justice “noted that plaintiff’s motion for

an extension of time was timely and that, although plaintiff had not ordered the

transcript within the time period provided for in Rule 10(b)(1), it was ordered before

the expiration of the sixty-day period within which to transmit the record or file a

motion for an extension.” Id.

In Armstrong, the plaintiff had timely ordered a limited part of the transcript.

Armstrong, 116 R.I. at 662, 360 A.2d at 558. Later, without prior leave of court, the

plaintiff filed a complete transcript of the relevant testimony. Id., 360 A.2d at 559.

This Court adopted a “broad brush approach” that “authorized the record to be

supplemented by an additional transcript provided the party seeking relief has acted

in good faith, and that to relieve him from the consequences of his error will not

result in a disservice to the interests of justice.” Id. at 663, 360 A.2d at 559. In

applying that standard to the facts of that case, this Court held that it was not

persuaded that the “late filing, though perhaps evidencing a lack of an awareness

that prior court permission was a requisite, constituted bad faith.” Id. at 664, 360

A.2d at 559.

It is clear to us that the trial justices’ discretionary rulings in both Valkoun and

Armstrong addressed factual circumstances that are materially different from those

with which the trial justice in this case was confronted. And, in Valkoun and

- 17 -
Armstrong, the respective trial justices exercised their discretion in accordance with

the unique factual circumstances that confronted them. Accordingly, we view those

cases as being plainly distinguishable.

We have scrutinized the record in this case, and we have been unable to

perceive any extenuating circumstance of sufficient significance (or indeed of any

significance) that would constitute excusable neglect. In fact, it appears that in this

case there was no genuine neglect, but rather a conscious decision not to abide by

the clear mandates of the pertinent rules. The defendant has not pointed to any

circumstances that were beyond his control or his counsel’s control. See UAG West

Bay AM, LLC, 987 A.2d at 880; Boranian, 983 A.2d at 840. Given such

circumstances, the trial justice clearly did not abuse his discretion in granting the

motion to dismiss. See Iddings v. McBurney, 657 A.2d 550, 553-54 (R.I. 1995).

Rather, the trial justice clearly acted in accordance with his own considered

judgment.10

Accordingly, after carefully reviewing the record in the instant case, we are

satisfied that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in granting plaintiff’s

motion to dismiss the appeal. See Hartman v. Carter, 121 R.I. 1, 4-5, 393 A.2d 1102,

10
See Pound, supra note 5, at 929 (“[T]here are * * * today an increasing number
of situations where what is to be done or exactly how it is to be done, must be left to
the court’s individual sense of what is right and just, conscientiously applied.”).

- 18 -
1105 (1978) (“[D]iscretion is not exercised by merely granting or denying a party’s

request. The term ‘discretion’ imports action taken in the light of reason as applied

to all the facts and with a view to the rights of all the parties to the action while

having regard for what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law.”);

see also Rhode Island Construction Services, Inc. v. Harris Mill, LLC, 68 A.3d 450,

455 (R.I. 2013) (“The inquiry into whether there has been excusable neglect is at

bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding

the party’s omission.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

It is our opinion that, in determining whether defendant’s conduct amounted

to excusable neglect, the trial justice appropriately evaluated the reasons provided

by defendant for failing to timely order the transcripts. Specifically, the trial justice

expressly rejected as insufficient defendant’s proffered reason that he was

attempting to save the estate the cost of preparing the transcripts in the hope that

mediation would be successful. The trial justice cited the lengthy travel of this case

as well as the previous unsuccessful settlement attempts as reasons for his not being

persuaded by defendant’s explanation. The trial justice minced no words in that

regard, stating:

“[C]onsidering the amount of money it must have cost to
litigate this case and the amount of the [judgment] at stake,
the funds necessary to obtain transcripts amount to a

- 19 -
proverbial ‘drop in the bucket.’[11] It appears to this [c]ourt
that the appellant’s assertions in this regard are
disingenuous.”12

The trial justice quite pointedly stated that defendant’s deliberate decision not to

order and pay for the transcripts in a timely manner based upon the financial

concerns alluded to by defendant’s counsel did not establish excusable neglect.

The trial justice further pointed out that the court had made “every effort to

bring this case to trial in a timely manner since it became involved;” and he added

that “moving this case forward was a struggle.” The trial justice concluded his

decision by noting that the “deadlines are there to move cases forward to resolution

and this case has been the perfect example as to why the deadlines are necessary and

should be adhered to.” It is clear to us that, in view of the fact that the trial justice

had presided over this case for several years, he was well-positioned to assess

defendant’s proffered explanations, and he was acutely aware of the extensive travel

of this case.13 Accordingly, it is our view that the trial justice’s determination that

11
In our judgment, the trial justice appropriately took into account the
magnitude of the damages in this case as he considered what would be “right and
equitable under the circumstances and the law.” Hartman v. Carter, 121 R.I. 1, 5,
393 A.2d 1102, 1105 (1978).
12
The first definition of “disingenuous” in the American Heritage Dictionary
reads as follows: “Not straightforward or candid; insincere or calculating * * *.” The
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 518 (5th ed. 2011).
13
The unreported Superior Court decision at an earlier stage of this case in
Glassie v. Doucette, No. NP-2016-0265, 2020 WL 6736278 (R.I. Super. Nov. 6,
- 20 -
defendant’s conscious choice not to order the transcripts did not amount to excusable

neglect fell squarely within the broad range of his discretion. See DeBartolo v.

DiBattista, 117 R.I. 349, 353, 367 A.2d 701, 703 (1976) (“To say * * * that the

question is addressed to the trial justice’s discretion does not mean that his ruling is

not reviewable. What it does mean is that the ruling will be sustained provided the

discretion has been soundly and judicially exercised, that is, if it has been exercised

in the light of reason applied to all the facts and with a view to the rights of all the

parties * * * and not arbitrarily or willfully, but with just regard to what is right and

equitable under the circumstances and the law.”); see also Stepp v. Stepp, 898 A.2d

724, 725 (R.I. 2006) (mem.).

For all of these reasons, we have no hesitation about affirming the ruling of

the trial justice, whose patience in dealing with this seemingly endless case is to be

commended.

V

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the order of the Superior

Court. The record may be returned to that tribunal.

2020), is evidence of the fact that the course of this entire litigation has been anything
but smooth.

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Chief Justice Suttell, dissenting. I am in complete harmony with the

majority’s conclusion “that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in granting

plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the appeal” for failure to order the transcripts in a timely

manner. Nevertheless, I dissent for the reasons set forth by Justice Goldberg in her

dissenting opinion. I believe that this appeal was rendered moot when the defendant

tendered a cashier’s check to the plaintiff in the amount of $2,987,515.56, without

conditions, thereby satisfying the judgment debt in full. See Sager v. Moy, 15 R.I.

528, 529, 9 A. 847, 848 (1887) (“[F]or it is well settled that payment by one primarily

liable as a judgment debtor extinguishes the judgment.”). For that reason, this

protracted case is no longer justiciable and should be quietly laid to rest.

Although I concur in the judgment affirming the order of the Superior Court,

I would dismiss the defendant’s appeal on the grounds of mootness.

Justice Goldberg, dissenting. Because this case is moot, I dissent from the

decision of the majority that upholds the dismissal of an appeal based on a

fourteen-day delay ordering the transcripts, after the transcripts had been filed and

docketed in the Superior Court. The record before this Court manifestly

demonstrates that the judgment in this case was fully and voluntarily satisfied,

without conditions, on February 22, 2024, a fact the majority opinion overlooks.

Based upon well-established principles of mootness, this Court need not, and indeed

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should not, proceed to decide whether the dismissal of this appeal—from a

multimillion-dollar judgment—was an abuse of discretion.

The justiciability of a case or controversy is this Court’s first order of business

because “without the presence of a justiciable case or controversy, judicial power is

at its weakest ebb.” National Education Association Rhode Island v. Town of

Middletown by and through Dible, 210 A.3d 421, 425 (R.I. 2019) (quoting Robar v.

Robar, 154 A.3d 947, 948 (R.I. 2017) (mem.)). We need not take the extraordinary

step of addressing the dismissal of this appeal because our decision would have no

effect—the judgment was satisfied—thus terminating defendant’s ongoing stake in

the appeal. Seibert v. Clark, 619 A.2d 1108, 1110 (R.I. 1993). In a marked departure

from settled law, the majority sidesteps this crucial step because it “would require a

remand for fact-finding.” This is a red herring. Two justices of this Court are of the

opinion that this case is moot and there is not a scintilla of evidence to suggest

otherwise. Mootness has fallen on the sword of convenience.

On March 17, 2023, a verdict in favor of plaintiff awarded $1,164,138.43 in

damages. Judgment for $2,856,572.45 was entered on March 20, 2023. On June 7,

2023, after the trial justice passed on the parties’ posttrial motions, defendant filed a

notice of appeal to this Court. Unquestionably, defendant was required to order the

requisite transcripts in a timely manner in order to properly perfect the appeal. See

Article I, Rule 10(b)(1) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure. The

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defendant was fourteen days late in ordering the transcripts and even later in paying

for them. Although I agree with the trial justice’s findings in this case concerning

counsel’s diabolical behavior, including imposing sanctions and awarding plaintiff

costs and attorneys’ fees for numerous motions to compel and motions to adjudge in

contempt and Doucette’s declared and shameful intention to pursue a course of

“procedural gamesmanship” against the decedent’s daughters, the basis of this

dismissal is the timeliness of the transcripts.

While the majority focuses on defendant’s fourteen-day delay in ordering the

transcripts, it accords no weight to the fact that the transcripts had been filed in the

Superior Court and certified to this Court before the case was dismissed. A party’s

delay in ordering a transcript has come before this Court on numerous occasions. I

know of no case in which this Court has granted a motion to dismiss an appeal when

the transcripts, although late, have been filed before the motion to dismiss was heard.

This case is a first. I wholly disagree that these are the proper grounds to affirm the

dismissal of any appeal from a two-million-dollar judgment, even this one.

Thus, I view this as an effort to avoid declaring this case moot and am not

convinced the decision would stand if the judgment had not been satisfied. One need

only contemplate the consequences and chaos to plaintiff, her attorney, and the court

were this Court to vacate the dismissal and reinstate the appeal. The funds have been

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distributed. Now what? This is why courts determine whether a case is moot as the

first order of business. Thus, I decline to engage.

Despite its scant reference to the post-judgment phase of this appeal—while

overlooking the bizarre and troubling manner in which defendant has conducted

himself by satisfying the judgment and continuing to pursue the appeal—the

majority ignores the critical events that render this case moot. According to our

long-standing principles, “[t]he constituent parts of a justiciable claim include a

plaintiff who has standing to pursue the action and some legal hypothesis which will

entitle the plaintiff to real and articulable relief.” Lacera v. Department of Children,

Youth, and Families, 272 A.3d 1064, 1067 (R.I. 2022) (quoting Bowen v. Mollis,

945 A.2d 314, 317 (R.I. 2008)). Because defendant has no prospect for articulable

relief, the matter before this Court no longer constitutes a justiciable controversy—

the funds have been disbursed.

On February 22, 2024, eight months after defendant filed a notice of appeal

on June 7, 2023, and three months after the appeal was dismissed in Superior Court,

defendant forwarded $2,987,515.56 to plaintiff, in full satisfaction of the judgment,

without conditions. The record is clear. The appeal was pending in this Court. An

execution had not issued. There was no stay of execution because defendant

knowingly failed to deposit the requisite funds in the Registry of the Superior Court.

There was no notice to plaintiff’s counsel that defendant intended to pursue the

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appeal.14 Factfinding to determine whether this tawdry episode was voluntary on

the part of defendant has been waived and is otherwise unnecessary.

Critically, upon receipt of the bank check from defendant, plaintiff filed a

document entitled “Satisfaction of Judgment” in the Superior Court. The check was

cashed; the funds were distributed; the case was over. Counsel for plaintiff

explained that after receipt of the funds she contacted defense counsel confirming

that he would withdraw the appeal; she received no response. Defense counsel has

represented to this Court that he “declined” plaintiff’s request to withdraw the

appeal. This statement is not true; counsel ignored the request and failed to notify

plaintiff’s counsel or this Court that he intended to pursue the appeal despite having

satisfied the judgment.

At oral argument, defense counsel represented to this Court that the judgment

was satisfied in order to stop the accrual of interest, while the appeal remained

pending. This is an admission. Satisfaction of a judgment designed to stop the

accrual of interest is a voluntary act, which the majority fails to address. The

majority’s reliance on the tentative requirement of factfinding with credibility

14
In my mind, the voluntary decision to decline to deposit the funds for a supersedeas
bond speaks volumes concerning the manner in which defendant addressed this
appeal. The order granting the stay of execution was issued on September 19, 2023,
and was conditioned on defendant depositing $3,100,000 in the Registry of the
Superior Court. He failed to do so. I suggest that Doucette’s campaign of
“procedural gamesmanship,” aided by the assistance of counsel, was expensive for
the estate.
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determinations to avoid addressing the preeminent controlling issue of mootness is

incorrect and unfathomable.

In arguing against a finding of mootness, defendant points to scant caselaw

from other jurisdictions to support his contention that the trial justice abused his

discretion in dismissing the appeal; and, notwithstanding that the judgment has been

satisfied, he is entitled to pursue the appeal on the merits to claw back the funds that

were distributed over a year ago.

The defendant directs our attention to a case from Missouri as support for his

contention that the appeal is not moot because the payment was involuntary. See

Kinser v. Elkadi, 654 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Mo. 1983) (en banc). Kinser is inappropriate

to the case at bar. In Kinser, a medical malpractice case, the jury awarded $900,000

in damages and an additional $25,000 for loss of consortium to the plaintiffs. Id. at

902. One of the defendant’s insurers, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, agreed

to pay the premium for a supersedeas bond by a specific date and time; and failed to

do so. Id. Within minutes of the deadline, the plaintiffs filed a writ of garnishment

in aid of execution, and almost immediately thereafter, Aetna paid the garnishment

amount into the court Registry and abandoned the case. Id. Significantly, Aetna

reserved the right to a refund if the case were reversed on appeal and no satisfaction

of judgment was entered by the plaintiffs. Id. A second insurer, St. Paul Fire and

Marine Insurance Company, entered into a settlement contract with the plaintiffs in

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which the plaintiffs agreed to a partial satisfaction of judgment after resolution of

the appeal. Id.

In the face of a complicated procedural record, the Kinser court ultimately set

forth two propositions which, defendant contends, support his argument that the

satisfaction of the judgment to the Jacqueline Glassie Estate was involuntary. First,

in Kinser, the court recognized that “when a defendant voluntarily pays a judgment

rendered against him, he may not appeal from that judgment.” Kinser, 654 S.W.2d

at 903. But “[w]hen a defendant pays a judgment after execution or writ of

garnishment in aid of execution has issued, courts have generally held that payment

was involuntary.” Id. (emphasis added). The Kinser court further recognized that

there was a strong inference of legal coercion because payment was made after the

writ of execution had issued. See id. The defendant attempts to persuade this Court

that despite the representation that the judgment was satisfied in order to stop the

running of interest, the payment was nonetheless involuntary. This argument is

without merit. An execution did not enter. Accordingly, defendant’s tender of

payment on the judgment was voluntary.

It is abundantly clear that the case before this Court is moot. This Court has

consistently held that “[a] question is moot if a court’s judgment would fail to have

a practical effect on the existing controversy.” Lynch v. Rhode Island Department of

Environmental Management, 994 A.2d 64, 71 (R.I. 2010) (internal quotation marks

- 28 -
and deletion omitted). Although this Court has recognized that there are limited

circumstances where “a determination of mootness does not always preclude judicial

review,” we do so only when the cases before us are “of extreme public importance,

which [is] capable of repetition, but which evade review.” National Education

Association Rhode Island, 210 A.3d at 426 (quoting Robar, 154 A.3d at 948). The

issue before us is not of extreme public importance; this case is moot. See id.

Unfortunately, in sidestepping the issue of mootness, the majority ignores the

record before us, which is devoid of any evidence that payment was made

involuntarily. The defendant knowingly failed to secure a stay of execution. There

was no reservation of rights or notice to the plaintiff that payment did not terminate

the controversy; and, critically, the plaintiff’s counsel cashed the check and

distributed the funds to her client. The majority overlooks defense counsel’s

deception and its cost to this innocent plaintiff and her counsel.

Accordingly, I reject the majority’s rationale in deciding the fate of this

appeal. The defendant paid the judgment; there is no longer a justiciable claim.

Although the defendant has taken issue with the trial justice’s decision to dismiss

the appeal based on his failure to timely order the transcripts, I am firmly of the

opinion that this Court can no longer address these contentions because the

defendant satisfied the judgment and the case is moot. Consequently, I dissent.

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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Alison Glassie, in her capacity as Executrix of the
Estate of Jacquelin C. Glassie and as Assignee of
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Trustee of the Jacquelin
Title of Case
Caffrey Glassie Trust II v. Paul Doucette, in his
capacity as Executor of the Estate of Donelson C.
Glassie, Jr.
No. 2023-372-Appeal.
Case Number
(NP 16-265)

Date Opinion Filed June 25, 2025

Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice William P. Robinson III

Source of Appeal Kent County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Brian Van Couyghen

For Plaintiff:

Daniel R. Prentiss, Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Defendant:

Melissa M. Horne, Esq.