Jeanette Runey v. Wayne S. Faring, Individually and as Trustee of the Wayne S. Faring Trust dated March 12, 2007

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Supreme Court

No. 2024-201-Appeal.
(PC 22-3030)

Jeanette Runey et al. :

v. :

Wayne S. Faring, Individually and as :
Trustee of the Wayne S. Faring Trust
dated March 12, 2007.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov of any typographical
or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court

No. 2024-201-Appeal.
(PC 22-3030)

Jeanette Runey et al. :

v. :

Wayne S. Faring, Individually and as :
Trustee of the Wayne S. Faring Trust
dated March 12, 2007.

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court. The plaintiff, Jeanette Runey1

(plaintiff), appeals from a Superior Court order denying her motion for a preliminary

injunction against her neighbor, Wayne S. Faring2 (defendant). After considering

the parties’ written and oral submissions and carefully reviewing the record, we

conclude that cause has not been shown and that this case may be decided without

further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth herein, we deny and dismiss

the plaintiff’s appeal.

1
The other plaintiff in the Superior Court, Jeffrey Runey, who is Jeannette Runey’s
husband, is not a party to this appeal. Therefore, we will refer to only one plaintiff.
2
Mr. Faring is also named in his capacity as trustee of the Wayne S. Faring Trust
dated March 12, 2007. For clarity, we refer to him simply as “defendant.”
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Facts and Travel

The plaintiff filed the underlying lawsuit against defendant as a continuation

of a longstanding boundary dispute between the two neighbors. The plaintiff owns

the property located at 930 East Wallum Lake Road, Burrillville, Rhode Island,

while defendant owns 860-900 East Wallum Lake Road. In 2019, defendant filed

an action against plaintiff to determine ownership of a shared driveway between the

adjacent properties (PC 19-1798). The defendant amended the initial complaint and

submitted claims of an easement by prescription, necessity, implication, and/or

estoppel related to the driveway. After another amendment, plaintiff responded with

a counterclaim for declaratory relief.

In 2021, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The

defendant sought a declaration that he owned the disputed area containing the

driveway by way of a flaw in the deeds, abandoning defendant’s claim of adverse

possession. A justice of the Superior Court issued an order, concluding that plaintiff

received title to the disputed land from the previous owner of the parcel and that

defendant did not.

In his decision, the hearing justice3 detailed a contentious relationship

between the parties. He determined that Diane Jackvony, plaintiff’s predecessor in

3
Because the determinations of two different Superior Court justices who ruled on
those separate actions are referenced in this opinion, we refer to the justice in the
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title, owned “Parcel 4” 4 among other connected pieces of property, which she deeded

to James and Deborah Bolton. The hearing justice also made reference to another

deed received by Ms. Jackvony from Joseph and Jeanne Smith, which included

Parcel 4; the hearing justice concluded that the Boltons acquired Parcel 4 from Ms.

Jackvony. The Boltons eventually deeded the property to plaintiff.

The defendant asserted ownership to the disputed property through a deed

from the Smiths to defendant. The hearing justice rejected defendant’s claimed

ownership, concluding that “[the Smiths] did not own Parcel 4. The August 2020

deed from Mr. and Mrs. Smith to Mr. and Mrs. Faring cannot correct a question of

ownership as [P]arcel 4 was never conveyed [to] Mr. and Mrs. Smith * * *. There

can be no question about Diane Jackvony’s ownership.” The hearing justice rejected

defendant’s theory that Ms. Jackvony’s ownership was invalid. A judgment entered

in favor of plaintiff on April 7, 2022; defendant prevailed on plaintiff’s

declaratory-relief counterclaim. Neither party appealed.

After successfully obtaining legal rights to the disputed driveway through the

April 7, 2022 judgment, plaintiff filed the instant action seeking, among other things,

removal of “all encroachments currently trespassing the portion of the land known

as ‘Parcel 4’ * * *.” The plaintiff moved, pro se, for a preliminary injunction under

first action (PC 19-1798) as the “hearing justice,” and the justice who issued the
order that is subject to this appeal as the “motion justice.”
4
The disputed land underlying this action is a portion of Parcel 4.
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Rule 65 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure to order the removal of

defendant’s personal property from the parcel. The defendant denied the material

allegations in the complaint and, advanced the affirmative defenses of res judicata

and collateral estoppel; he also asserted various counterclaims. In opposition to

plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, defendant maintained that he had

used the disputed land since purchasing the property in 1989 and that he therefore

had legal access to the space through adverse possession, which he gained in 1999.

A second justice of the Superior Court denied plaintiff’s motion to dismiss

defendant’s counterclaims.

Several court hearings relating to plaintiff’s request for a preliminary

injunction took place over a period of nine months in 2023 before a different justice

of the Superior Court (the motion justice). In 2024, the motion justice issued a bench

decision concluding that plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable likelihood of

success on the merits of the preliminary injunction, largely because defendant

enlisted an expert who testified that defendant owned the disputed area. The motion

justice also expressed disagreement with the April 2022 judgment issued by the

original hearing justice. The plaintiff filed a premature but timely notice of appeal

on January 15, 2024.

Before the parties submitted any materials to this Court, further proceedings

took place in the Superior Court. On June 24, 2024, the motion justice orally denied

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defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s appeal for failing to transmit the appellate

record. The Superior Court docket reflects that the motion justice mistakenly

believed that he lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the motion because the matter had

already been docketed in this Court. The motion justice later reversed himself and

granted defendant’s motion to reconsider the initial denial of the motion to dismiss

the appeal. However, the order was not filed until after the case had been docketed

in this Court.

Further, on July 1, 2024, plaintiff filed a Rule 41(a)(2) motion to voluntarily

dismiss part of the instant case based on new evidence, namely that town building

and electrical permits revealed that some of defendant’s encroachments, specifically,

a foundation, had been on plaintiff’s property for a time sufficient to satisfy the time

requirement of the adverse-possession statute. At oral argument, plaintiff

represented that she no longer considered that part of the disputed land to be her

own. The Superior Court has not yet adjudicated this motion.

Standard of Review

“A hearing justice’s decision to issue a preliminary injunction is reviewed by

this Court for abuse of discretion.” King v. Grand Chapter of Rhode Island Order of

Eastern Star, 919 A.2d 991, 995 (R.I. 2007). “If the party requesting the preliminary

injunction has established a prima facie case warranting preliminary injunctive

relief, this Court will not find an abuse of discretion.” Gabriel v. Willis, 326 A.3d

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172, 175 (R.I. 2024) (quoting Finnimore & Fisher Inc. v. Town of New Shoreham,

291 A.3d 977, 983 (R.I. 2023)); see also G.L. 1956 § 9-24-7.

Discussion

On appeal, plaintiff makes three arguments: (1) that the motion justice erred

by disregarding the previous decision by the hearing justice in PC 19-1798; (2) that

plaintiff provided evidence of ownership of the disputed land, contrary to the motion

justice’s determination; and (3) that the motion justice’s conclusions were biased

and prejudicial towards plaintiff. By contrast, defendant avers that the 2022

judgment did not award plaintiff ownership to the property. The defendant also

argues that plaintiff’s claim of ownership is based on deeds that are nullities and that

the motion justice’s conclusion was justified because plaintiff failed to provide

conclusive evidence that she owned the disputed land. Finally, defendant labels

plaintiff’s appeal as moot because it was dismissed by the motion justice at a hearing

on June 26, 2024.

Initially, we conclude that the motion justice erred when he granted

defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s appeal. The order was entered after

plaintiff’s appeal had been docketed in this Court. See Thompson v. Thompson, 973

A.2d 499, 513 (R.I. 2009) (“[O]nce an appeal has been docketed in this Court, the

lower court no longer has jurisdiction.”). Therefore, the Superior Court lacked

jurisdiction, and the appeal was not appropriately dismissed.

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This Court “has previously held that, ‘while the grant of a preliminary

injunction is appealable, the denial of a preliminary injunction is not.’”

Gianfrancesco v. A.R. Bilodeau, Inc., 112 A.3d 703, 708 (R.I. 2015) (deletions

omitted) (quoting Ciprian v. Providence School Board, 29 A.3d 1239, 1239 (R.I.

2011) (mem.)). “Instead of a direct appeal, a ‘petition for common-law certiorari is

the proper method by which to seek review of the denial of a preliminary

injunction.’” Id. (quoting Ciprian, 29 A.3d at 1239).

We note that the motion justice presented plaintiff with an opportunity to have

her motion for a preliminary injunction consolidated with a trial on the merits, a trial

that would have resulted in an appealable judgment. However, plaintiff opted

against the consolidation and is seeking review of the denial of a preliminary

injunction by direct appeal. Because the appropriate avenue for review of an

interlocutory order is by petition for writ of certiorari, plaintiff’s appeal is denied

and dismissed. See Gianfrancesco, 112 A.3d at 708.

Although we decline to reach the merits of the plaintiff’s appeal because it is

procedurally defective, we express concern for the motion justice’s disregard for the

April 7, 2022 judgment, which was not appealed. When the judgment was raised

before the motion justice, he stated “[w]ell, I disagreed with that from day one. So,

I mean, that’s my decision.” This Court has been abundantly clear that the “doctrine

of res judicata relates to the preclusive effect of a final judgment in an action between

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the parties.” Apex Oil Company, Inc. v. State by and through Division of Taxation,

297 A.3d 96, 111 (R.I. 2023) (quoting Plunkett v. State, 869 A.2d 1185, 1187 (R.I.

2015)). “Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars the relitigation of all issues that

were tried or might have been tried in an earlier action.” Mello v. Killeavy, 242 A.3d

53, 56 (R.I. 2020) (quoting JHRW, LLC v. Seaport Studios, Inc., 212 A.3d 168, 177

(R.I. 2019)). “Res judicata serves as a bar to a second cause of action where there

exists: (1) identity of parties; (2) identity of issues; and (3) finality of judgment in

an earlier action.” Id. (quoting JHRW, LLC, 212 A.3d at 177). We reiterate those

principles and direct the Superior Court to consider them in future proceedings,

should the plaintiff choose to go forward on the merits.

Conclusion

For the reasons outlined herein, we deny and dismiss the appeal. The papers

may be returned to the Superior Court.

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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Jeanette Runey et al. v. Wayne S. Faring, Individually
Title of Case and as Trustee of the Wayne S. Faring Trust dated
March 12, 2007.
No. 2024-201-Appeal.
Case Number
(PC 22-3030)

Date Opinion Filed June 12, 2025

Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Erin Lynch Prata

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Kevin F. McHugh

For Plaintiff:

Jeanette Runey, pro se
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Defendant:

David M. D’Agostino, Esq.

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