Francisco Rosario, on behalf of himself and all others so similarly situated v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC NKA Mr. Cooper

Supreme Court

No. 2024-145-Appeal.
(PC 23-663)

Francisco Rosario, on behalf of :
himself and all others so similarly
situated

v. :

Nationstar Mortgage, LLC NKA Mr. :
Cooper et al.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov of any typographical
or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court

No. 2024-145-Appeal.
(PC 23-663)

Francisco Rosario, on behalf of :
himself and all others so similarly
situated

v. :

Nationstar Mortgage, LLC NKA Mr. :
Cooper et al.

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court. The plaintiff, in this uncertified class

action brought by Francisco Rosario (Rosario), appeals from a Superior Court order

granting the motion to dismiss by the defendants, Nationstar Mortgage, LLC NKA

Mr. Cooper (Mr. Cooper) and The Bank of New York Mellon, as Trustee for First

Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-AA1 (BNYM). This Court

directed the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal

should not be summarily decided. After considering the parties’ written and oral

submissions, and carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been

shown and that this case may be decided without further briefing or argument. For

the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the order of the Superior Court.

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Facts and Travel

We derive the following facts from plaintiff’s complaint, which, for the

purposes of a motion to dismiss, are assumed to be true. EDC Investment, LLC v.

UTGR, Inc., 275 A.3d 537, 542 (R.I. 2022). Rosario brings this class action on

behalf of himself and all others similarly situated against defendants for “collecting

* * * illegal and unlicensed third-party loan servicing fees and advances expressly

prohibited by the Security Instruments or by Applicable Law” on his mortgage.

Rosario is the owner of 183-185 Laban Street, a property in Providence, Rhode

Island. Mr. Cooper is a mortgage servicer located at 8950 Cypress Waters Blvd.,

Coppell, TX 75261. BNYM, located at 240 Greenwich Street, New York, NY

10007, was the trustee of a securitized trust that claimed to hold Rosario’s mortgage

and note at the time fees were collected from plaintiff’s mortgage account.

On December 23, 2005, a deed to the property was conveyed to Rosario. The

same day, Rosario executed a promissory note and mortgage deed in favor of

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) as mortgagee and First Horizon

Home Loan Corporation as lender. The mortgage was assigned to BNYM, and the

transfer was recorded in the City of Providence Land Evidence Records. Sometime

before the fall of 2016, Rosario was in default of the mortgage loan. In November

of 2016, Rosario and defendants entered into a loan modification agreement that

resolved the default and reinstated the note and mortgage. The modification

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referenced the original mortgage’s terms and conditions and required that the fee

provisions remain in place.

On July 1, 2015, G.L. 1956 § 19-14.11-1 became effective, mandating that all

third-party residential mortgage servicers be licensed by the Rhode Island

Department of Business Regulation (DBR). Rosario alleges that defendants are

parties to servicing agreements, which, in this case, granted servicing rights to Mr.

Cooper over plaintiff’s mortgage loan. Mr. Cooper received fees for its service of

Rosario’s loan. As servicer, Mr. Cooper was responsible for carrying out foreclosure

proceedings with the consent of BNYM upon Rosario’s default. 1

Rosario alleges that both Mr. Cooper and BNYM collected illegal servicing

fees and advances in the amount of 0.375 percent during the period in which Mr.

Cooper was in violation of § 19-14.11-1. These fees were recouped based on the

yearly balance of the principal of a pool of loans owned by the trust and were

recovered from monthly payments and foreclosure proceeds. Rosario further alleges

that defendants charged illegal fees that include inspection fees, convenience fees,

attorneys’ fees, appraisal fees, maintenance fees, eviction fees, and wire fees. He

submits that approximately $410 in a “[p]roperty [i]nspection [f]ee[]” was charged

to his account during a five-month period in 2016. The same year, Rosario avers,

1
It was represented at oral argument that Rosario’s default was cured by the loan
modification agreement.
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he was charged over a thousand dollars in “[l]egal [f]ees” and $9.95 in an illegal “E

Pay Fee Assessed.” In total, Rosario’s complaint details $1,550.51 in illegal fees.

Ultimately, Rosario contends that Paragraph 14 of his mortgage contract

specifically outlaws the fees that were charged, because defendants were unlicensed

at the time the money was collected. The fees, in Rosario’s estimation, were

“[p]rohibited acts and practices” from a third-party loan servicer that operated in

violation of Rhode Island law. Rosario contends that this illegal loan-servicing

activity occurred from July 1, 2015, through December 28, 2016.2

On February 8, 2023, Rosario filed the instant complaint alleging breach of

contract for the collection of illegal fees and seeking class certification. In lieu of

submitting an answer, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The

plaintiff objected, to which defendants filed a reply. The hearing justice requested

that the parties submit supplemental memoranda addressing similar cases,

specifically the decision issued by the United States District Court for the District of

Rhode Island in Leone v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, C.A. No. 21-323-JJM-LDA,

and another Superior Court justice’s determination in Gaskell v. Ocwen Loan

2
Notwithstanding this eighteen-month period in which Rosario alleges that he was
charged unlawful fees, plaintiff’s counsel conceded at oral argument that Rosario
cannot recoup fees that predated the parties’ loan modification agreement.
Consequently, we are left with a two-month period in which 0.375 percent was
charged. Rosario’s counsel was unable to confirm whether the amount in
controversy was sufficient to satisfy the amount required to confer jurisdiction on
the Superior Court.
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Servicing, LLC, PC 22-7165. In a written decision filed on February 6, 2024, the

hearing justice granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. An order to that effect entered

on March 20, 2024. The plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal.

Standard of Review

“The sole function of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the

complaint.” Maltais v. Maltais, 306 A.3d 449, 452 (R.I. 2024) (quoting Jenkins v.

City of East Providence, 293 A.3d 1267, 1270 (R.I. 2023)). “In passing on a Rule

12(b) dismissal, this Court applies the same standard as the trial justice.” Id. (quoting

Jenkins, 293 A.3d at 1270). “We thus are confined to the four corners of the

complaint and must assume all allegations are true, resolving any doubts in

plaintiffs’ favor.” Id. (quoting Jenkins, 293 A.3d at 1270). In certain circumstances,

“when a motion to dismiss includes documents not expressly incorporated in a

complaint, * * * we have acknowledged a narrow exception for ‘documents the

authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties; for official public records; for

documents central to plaintiffs’ claim; or for documents sufficiently referred to in

the complaint.’” EDC Investment, LLC, 275 A.3d at 542-43 (quoting Mokwenyei v.

Rhode Island Hospital, 198 A.3d 17, 22 (R.I. 2018)).

Notably, “allegations that are more in the nature of legal conclusions rather

than factual assertions are not necessarily assumed to be true.” DiLibero v. Mortgage

Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 108 A.3d 1013, 1016 (R.I. 2015) (brackets

-5-
and emphasis omitted) (quoting Doe ex rel. His Parents and Natural Guardians v.

East Greenwich School Department, 899 A.2d 1258, 1262 n.2 (R.I. 2006)). “A

motion to dismiss may be granted only ‘if it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that

a plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any conceivable set of facts.’”

Narragansett Electric Company v. Minardi, 21 A.3d 274, 278 (R.I. 2011) (brackets

omitted) (quoting Estate of Sherman v. Almeida, 747 A.2d 470, 473 (R.I. 2000)).

Discussion

Rosario first argues that the Superior Court erred in granting defendants’

motion to dismiss because defendants breached the mortgage contract by charging

fees in violation of §§ 19-14.11-1 and 19-14.11-4(17). He continues that the term

“involving lending,” which is included in G.L. 1956 § 19-14-26.1(b), deserves a

broad definition because § 19-14-1(33) discusses loans. 3 Rosario further points to

the criminal sanctions outlined in § 19-14-26 to support his contention that

defendants breached the contract.

According to Rosario, defendants’ failure to obtain licensure under the statute

while collecting servicing fees breaches the agreement’s prohibition against

violating “Applicable Law.” Rosario submits that the Superior Court ignored the

contractual language at issue to arrive at “a preordained conclusion” that the statute

3
We presume that Rosario intended to reference G.L. 1956 § 19-14-1(35).
Subsection 33 contains the definition of “Retail installment contract,” while
subsection 35 defines “Servicing,” which is central to his argument.
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did not provide a private right of action for borrowers. Rosario cites several cases

from the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island and maintains

that the Superior Court erred by failing to follow persuasive federal precedent. He

takes issue with the Superior Court’s categorization of his complaint as “artful

pleading” and argues that the licensure requirement of the statute helps to ensure that

third-party loan servicers act responsibly when collecting a borrower’s payments.

By contrast, defendants first contend that § 19-14-26.1 applies to lending and

brokering, not loan servicing. The defendants note that the definitions of “lender”

and “loan broker” do not discuss servicing. The defendants further attest that the

statute does not prohibit a licensed lender from using an unlicensed servicer to

collect fees on the loan. The defendants also argue that § 19-14.11-4 does not confer

a private right of action on borrowers to recoup servicing fees.

Moreover, defendants advance that Paragraph 14 of the mortgage is unrelated

to plaintiff’s allegations because the clause specifies that refunds of fees will be

conducted only if a law is finally interpreted to set a maximum amount of loan

charges and the fees exceed that limit. The defendants state that no final

interpretation of the laws applicable here exist and that § 19-14-26.1(b) applies only

to lending and brokering. 4

4
At oral argument, defendants’ counsel deemed any reference to this provision in
Paragraph 14 as “irrelevant.”
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What is more, defendants declare that Rosario waived his right to challenge

the fees because the fees predate a loan modification agreement that Rosario signed

after he initially defaulted on the loan. To cure the default, Rosario agreed to pay

all fees including the ones he challenged within the complaint. The defendants also

contend that Rosario does not have standing to sue for the fees because he was not a

party to the servicing agreement. They state that Rosario is not seeking to recover

his fees; rather, he is trying to access the monies paid from the lender to the servicer

sourced from the interest on Rosario’s account. According to defendants, this does

not confer Rosario standing to recoup fees. Lastly, defendants aver that Rosario’s

complaint should fail because the breach-of-contract claim is premised on violation

of a statute with no private right of action.

“The determination of whether a contract’s terms are ambiguous is a question

of law to be decided by the court.” Botelho v. City of Pawtucket School Department,

130 A.3d 172, 176 (R.I. 2016) (quoting JPL Livery Services, Inc. v. Rhode Island

Department of Administration, 88 A.3d 1134, 1142 (R.I. 2014)). “We review

questions of law de novo.” Id. “A term in a contract is ambiguous when it is

‘reasonably and clearly susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.’” Id.

(quoting Miller v. Saunders, 80 A.3d 44, 49 (R.I. 2013)). “In determining whether

language in a contract is ambiguous, ‘we give words their plain, ordinary, and usual

meaning. * * * The subjective intent of the parties may not properly be considered

-8-
by the Court; rather, we consider the intent expressed by the language of the

contract.’” Id. (quoting JPL Livery Services, Inc., 88 A.3d at 1142).

“[I]t is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and

unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words

of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.” Progressive Casualty Insurance

Co. v. Dias, 151 A.3d 308, 311 (R.I. 2017) (quoting Whittemore v. Thompson, 139

A.3d 530, 540 (R.I. 2016)). “In matters of statutory interpretation our ultimate goal

is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature.” Id. (quoting

Whittemore, 139 A.3d at 540).

In pertinent part, Paragraph 14 of the mortgage states that the “[l]ender may

not charge fees that are expressly prohibited by this Security Instrument or by

Applicable Law.” The mortgage defines “Applicable Law” 5 as “all controlling

applicable federal, state and local statutes, regulations, ordinances and

administrative rules and orders (that have the effect of law) as well as all applicable

final, non-appealable judicial opinions.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the question

before this Court is whether defendants’ alleged violation of § 19-14.11-1

5
“Applicable” means “affecting or relating to a particular person, group, or situation
* * *.” Black’s Law Dictionary 123 (12th ed. 2024); High Steel Structures, Inc. v.
Cardi Corporation, 152 A.3d 429, 435 (R.I. 2017) (examining the dictionary
definition of a word to ascertain its plain meaning).
-9-
and § 19-14-26.1 are “Applicable Law[s]” under the agreement and, therefore, a

breach of the contract.

Notably, § 19-14.11-1 provides that “[n]o person shall act as a third-party loan

servicer, directly or indirectly, for a loan to a Rhode Island borrower without first

obtaining a license * * *.” Section 19-14.11-1. The defendants acknowledge that, at

the time the fees in question were collected, Mr. Cooper had not been issued a license

by DBR.

However, penalty for violation of the statute is generally vested with the

issuance of a civil penalty from DBR directly to the unlicensed servicer. See

generally § 19-14-26. An exception to this lies in § 19-14-26.1, which declares “[i]n

the case of any unlicensed transaction involving lending or loan brokering activities,

the amount of interest, fees, or charges previously collected shall be credited to the

principal balance of the loan then due and owing or paid to the debtor * * *.” Section

19-14-26.1(b).

Nevertheless, this exception does not extend to Mr. Cooper’s servicing fees

because the exception applies only to lending and loan brokering activities. Section

19-14-26.1(b). While the statute does not define “transaction involving lending,”

the definition of both “lender” (“any person who makes or funds a loan”) and “loan

broker” (“any person or entity who * * * solicits, processes, negotiates, places or

sells a loan”) notably omit reference to the act of servicing a loan. Section

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19-14-1(10)(i), (13). “Servicing” is defined elsewhere as “receiving a scheduled,

periodic payment from a borrower pursuant to the terms of a loan * * * and making

the payments to the owner of the loan * * * pursuant to the terms of the servicing

loan documents or servicing contract.” Section 19-14-1(35).

Therefore, we must conclude that § 19-14-26.1 does not permit a borrower to

recoup fees that a third-party loan servicer collected while the servicer was

unlicensed. The statute clearly applies to “lending” and “loan brokering

activities[,]” neither of which involve the servicing fees paid here. Section

19-14-26.1; see Finnimore & Fisher Inc. v. Town of New Shoreham, 291 A.3d 977,

984 (R.I. 2023) (“[I]t is an accepted rule of statutory construction that an express

enumeration of items in a statute indicates a legislative intent to exclude all items

not listed.”) (quoting Terrano v. State Department of Corrections, 573 A.2d 1181,

1183 (R.I. 1990)). While plaintiff urges us to broadly interpret “involving lending,”

we decline to do so in the face of the definitions provided by the General Assembly.

Further, “the function of prescribing remedies for statutory rights is a

legislative responsibility and not a judicial task.” Stebbins v. Wells, 818 A.2d 711,

716 (R.I. 2003) (brackets omitted) (quoting Cummings v. Shorey, 761 A.2d 680, 685

(R.I. 2000)). This Court has “held that the General Assembly’s failure to include a

civil-action enforcement provision within a statute indicated ‘no private cause of

action for damages [under the statute] was intended.’” Id. (quoting Cummings, 761

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A.2d at 685). Here, aside from a brief provision that allows borrowers to recoup

fees collected by unlicensed lenders or loan brokers, the statute is silent on a

borrower maintaining a right to enforce a licensure requirement for a loan servicer.

See § 19-14-26.1(b). Therefore, we will not infer a private cause of action where

one has not been included by the General Assembly. See Shine v. Moreau, 119 A.3d

1, 10 (R.I. 2015) (“[I]t is not within our power to read language into a statute which

the General Assembly chose not to put there.”). Accordingly, we discern no error

in the Superior Court’s conclusion that no private right of action exists under the

statute.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the order of the Superior Court.

The papers may be returned to the Superior Court.

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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Francisco Rosario, on behalf of himself and all others
Title of Case so similarly situated v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC
NKA Mr. Cooper et al.
No. 2024-145-Appeal.
Case Number
(PC 23-663)

Date Opinion Filed March 24, 2025

Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Erin Lynch Prata

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Brian P. Stern

For Plaintiff:

Todd S. Dion, Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Defendants

Krystle G. Tadesse, Esq.