The Providence Retired Police and Firefighter's Association v. The City of Providence, by and through its Treasurer, James J. Lombardi

Supreme Court

No. 2023-330-Appeal.
(PC 20-8024)

The Providence Retired Police and :
Firefighter’s Association

v. :

The City of Providence, by and through :
its Treasurer, James J. Lombardi.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical
or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court

No. 2023-330-Appeal.
(PC 20-8024)

The Providence Retired Police and :
Firefighter’s Association

v. :

The City of Providence, by and through :
its Treasurer, James J. Lombardi.

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Justice Long, for the Court. The City of Providence (the city), by and

through its Treasurer James J. Lombardi,1 appeals from the entry of partial summary

judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the Providence Retired Police and Firefighter’s

Association (the Association or plaintiff), on its claim for declaratory judgment

regarding entitlement to occupational cancer disability benefits under G.L. 1956

chapter 19.1 of title 45, “Cancer Benefits for Fire Fighters” (the act). This case came

before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and

show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided.

1
During the pendency of this case, Shomari Husband replaced James Lombardi as
the treasurer for the City of Providence.
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After considering the parties’ written and oral submissions and reviewing the record,

we conclude that cause has not been shown and that we may decide this case without

further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate the

judgment of the Superior Court.

Facts

The facts relevant to this appeal are taken from the parties’ agreed statement

of facts filed in support of their cross-motions for partial summary judgment. See

Hagenberg v. Avedisian, 879 A.2d 436, 441 (R.I. 2005).

Legislative Background

This appeal concerns retirement benefits programs administered by the city

and the State of Rhode Island. In 1923 the General Assembly enacted P.L. 1923,

ch. 489 (“An Act to Provide for the Retirement of Employees of the City of

Providence”) (the Providence System). Under the Providence System, the General

Assembly retained authority to legislate retirement benefits, including accidental-

disability retirement benefits, for city employees. Once the Providence Home Rule

Charter was enacted in 1980 and ratified in 1983, however, the Providence City

Council (city council) replaced the General Assembly as the legislative body with

authority to establish the city’s municipal pension program. See Betz v. Paolino, 605

A.2d 837, 838 (R.I. 1992). In 1936, long before the city council assumed control of

the Providence System, the General Assembly created the “Employees Retirement

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System of the State of Rhode Island” (ERSRI), and later, in 1951, the “Municipal

Employees Retirement System” (MERS). The General Assembly subsequently

established within MERS the “Optional Retirement for Members of Police Force

and Firefighters” in 1968. Participation by a municipality in MERS and its programs

is voluntary. Municipalities that choose to participate in MERS have access to

alternative retirement plans with accidental-disability benefits managed by ERSRI.

a. General Laws 1956 Chapter 19.1 of Title 45

In 1986, after the city council assumed control of the Providence System, the

General Assembly established the act, which defined “occupational cancer” as “a

cancer arising out of [a person’s] employment as a fire fighter, due to injury from

exposures to smoke, fumes, or carcinogenic, poisonous, toxic, or chemical

substances while in the performance of active duty in the fire department.” General

Laws 1956 § 45-19.1-2(d). The act provided, in relevant part:

“Any fire fighter, including one employed by the state, or
a municipal fire fighter employed by a municipality that
participates in the optional retirement for police officers
and fire fighters * * * who is unable to perform his or her
duties in the fire department by reason of a disabling
occupational cancer * * * and any retired member of the
fire department of any city or town who develops
occupational cancer, is entitled to receive an occupational
cancer disability, and he or she is entitled to all of the
benefits provided for in chapters 19, 21 and 21.2 of this
title and chapter 10 of title 36 if the fire fighter is employed
by the state.” Section 45-19.1-3(a).

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In 2019 this Court considered the act in Lang v. Municipal Employees’

Retirement System of Rhode Island, 222 A.3d 912 (R.I. 2019); we held that the act

“does not contain a conclusive * * * presumption that all cancers in firefighters are

occupational cancers.” Lang, 222 A.3d at 922. The General Assembly subsequently

amended the act to include § 45-19.1-4(a), which provides that “[a]ny type of cancer

found in a firefighter is conclusively presumed to be an occupational cancer as that

term is defined in § 45-19.1-2.”

b. Ordinance Establishing a Presumptive Cancer Benefits and Wellness
Incentive for Firefighters

The city does not participate in MERS. Instead, when the city council

obtained authority over the Providence System in 1983, the Providence System

became part of the local ordinances. In 2008 the city council enacted an “Ordinance

Establishing a Presumptive Cancer Benefits & Wellness Incentive for Firefighters”

(the ordinance). Section 2 of the ordinance provides, in relevant part:

“There shall exist a presumption that a firefighter
employed by the City of Providence who suffers from
cancer * * * resulting in total or partial disability,
developed the cancer during the course and scope of
employment with the City of Providence as a firefighter,
if the following requirements are met and maintained:

“(a) Prior to entering service with the City of
Providence Fire Department as a firefighter, the
individual shall submit to a physical examination by
a physician engaged by the director of human

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resources or the fire department that fails to reveal
evidence of cancer.
“(b) The individual shall submit to annual
physical exams administered by a physician
engaged by the director of human resources or the
fire department, the results of which shall be sent to
the human resources department and added to the
individual’s personnel file maintained within the
fire department.
“(c) The individual must have been employed by
the City of Providence for one (1) or more years as
a firefighter before being diagnosed with cancer.
“(d) The individual, while employed as a
firefighter by the City of Providence, must have
responded on the scene to fires, emergencies or
hazardous materials incidents involving the release
of radiation or a known or suspected carcinogen as
defined by the International Agency for Research
on Cancer.
“(e) Upon application for disability benefits * * *
the individual’s cancer must be diagnosed by three
(3) licensed and practicing oncologists engaged by
the director of human resources, with the following
stipulations:
“(1) The cancer must be diagnosed while
the individual is employed by the City as a
firefighter.
“(2) If the individual has retired or
otherwise ceased employment with the City
of Providence as a firefighter, the cancer must
be diagnosed within three (3) years of the last
date on which the individual actively served
as a firefighter for the City of Providence.”
Providence City Ordinance Ch. 2008-27, No.
211, § 2 (May 9, 2008).

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The presumption established under § 2 of the ordinance does not apply under

certain circumstances. Providence City Ordinance Ch. 2008-27, No. 211, § 3

(May 9, 2008). Furthermore, § 4 of the ordinance authorizes the city to rebut the

presumption established under § 2 of the ordinance by presenting certain evidence.

Id. at § 4.

Procedural History

After the General Assembly amended the act to include § 45-19.1-4(a), the

Association, an organization that represents retired members of the Providence Fire

Department, asked the City Retirement Board2 (the retirement board) whether the

“any fire fighter” language contained in § 45-19.1-3(a) of the act includes the

Association’s retired members, thereby entitling them to the conclusive presumption

in § 45-19.1-4(a) of the act. The retirement board informed the Association that

§ 45-19.1-4(a) of the act did not apply to its retired members because § 45-19.1-4(a)

applied only to municipalities that participate in MERS. The city thus stated that it

2
The Retirement Board was the body created prior to the enactment of the home
rule charter to oversee the Providence System. See Betz v. Paolino, 605 A.2d 837,
838 (R.I. 1992).

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would not process applications for cancer benefits under the act but would, instead,

process those applications under the ordinance.

The Association filed a two-count complaint in Superior Court seeking (1) a

declaration, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-30-1, that the city shall process any retired

firefighter’s application for occupational cancer disability benefits pursuant to the

act; and (2) compensatory damages for the city’s failure to process the retired

firefighters’ claims pursuant to the act. After the city filed an answer, the parties

filed an agreed statement of facts and cross-motions for partial summary judgment

on the declaratory judgment count.

The Association asserted that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law

for two reasons: first, because § 45-19.1-3(a) of the act applies to “all” firefighters

in the state regardless of their municipality’s participation in MERS; and second,

because in City of East Providence v. International Association of Firefighters Local

850, 982 A.2d 1281 (R.I. 2009) (Local 850), this Court held that § 45-19.1-3(a)

applied to “any fire fighter” regardless of whether their municipality participates in

MERS. See Local 850, 982 A.2d at 1288.

The city argued that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Betz,

where this Court determined that Providence firefighters were not entitled to the

act’s benefits under the “general rule of construction that a special act [(the

Providence System)] should prevail over a statute of general application

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[(§ 45-19.1-3)].” Betz, 605 A.2d at 840. The city therefore argued that Providence

employees and retirees must look to provisions of the city ordinance, rather than to

state law, for occupational cancer disability benefits.

The trial justice agreed with the Association that Local 850 controlled.

Without distinguishing Betz, the trial justice opined that “any fire fighter” as used in

§ 45-19.1-3(a) of the act includes Providence firefighters and the Association’s

retired members because the act “does not restrict its application to only firefighters

of municipalities that participate in the MERS.” The trial justice therefore concluded

that the Association’s retired members are entitled to occupational cancer disability

benefits under § 45-19.1-3 of the act; he granted the Association’s motion for

summary judgment and denied the city’s cross-motion for summary judgment with

respect to the declaratory judgment count. On July 24, 2023, partial judgment was

entered in favor of the Association pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court

Rules of Civil Procedure. The city filed a timely notice of appeal on July 26, 2023.

Standard of Review

“It is well established that this Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de

novo.” Commerce Park Realty, LLC v. HR2-A Corp., 253 A.3d 1258, 1266 (R.I.

2021) (quoting Moore v. Rhode Island Board of Governors for Higher Education,

18 A.3d 541, 544 (R.I. 2011)). We therefore apply the same standards and rules

used by the trial justice. See DeCurtis v. Visconti, Boren & Campbell Ltd., 252 A.3d

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765, 770 (R.I. 2021). To that end, “[w]e view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, and if we conclude that there are no genuine issues

of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,

we will affirm the judgment.” Commerce Park Realty, 253 A.3d at 1266 (quoting

Moore, 18 A.3d at 544).

Discussion

The parties dispute whether the Association’s retired members are entitled to

occupational cancer disability benefits under the act or under the ordinance. The

city argues that Betz controls the outcome because it dictates that special legislative

provisions pertaining to the Providence System supersede state statutes of general

application, while the Association asserts that Local 850 controls. We agree that

Betz is dispositive of the question in this case and that, therefore, the city is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.

In Betz, retired Providence firefighters applied to the retirement board for

expanded benefits; specifically, longevity benefits and benefits for occupational

cancer. Betz, 605 A.2d at 837. In defending a Superior Court decision that the

plaintiff-firefighters were entitled to expanded benefits, the plaintiff-firefighters

advanced two arguments: first, that the retirement board was authorized to grant

expanded benefits to the plaintiff-firefighters; and, second, that the plaintiff-

firefighters were entitled to benefits for occupational cancer under § 45-19.1-3 of

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the act. Id. at 838-39, 840. This Court rejected both contentions. Id. at 840. We held

that the retirement board could not award expanded benefits because only the city

council could establish expanded benefits under the Providence System; and we

further held that the plaintiff-firefighters were not entitled to benefits for

occupational cancer under the act because the Providence System is “a

comprehensive system of contributions, benefits, and regulations relating to

pensions to be paid to firefighters, police officers, and civilian employees of the city”

which superseded the act. Id. at 838-40 (“This general statute was enacted in 1986.

In a series of cases we have held that general statutes purporting to benefit

firefighters or police did not supersede the special statute that had been enacted by

the Legislature in respect to the city of Providence.”). The Court disagreed with the

contention that the intent of the act was to provide benefits for occupational cancer

to all firefighters, stating that “[t]here is no indication that the General Assembly

manifested a different specific intent in enacting § 45-19.1-3. In this case, as in the

prior cases, we must apply the general rule of construction that a special act should

prevail over a statute of general application.” Id. at 840.

Betz answers the precise question in dispute. The Association represents

retired members of the Providence Fire Department who, like the

plaintiff-firefighters in Betz, seek to have the city process applications for

occupational cancer benefits pursuant to the act. They seek this relief despite the

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existence of the Providence System, which this Court has held supersedes the act.

Betz, 605 A.2d at 840; see also Police and Firefighter’s Retirement Association of

Providence v. Norberg, 476 A.2d 1034, 1036 (R.I. 1984) (enforcing the Providence

System’s provision exempting certain employees from taxation because it is a

special act that supersedes conflicting state law); Santanelli v. City of Providence,

105 R.I. 208, 212-13, 250 A.2d 849, 851-52 (1969) (holding that G.L. 1956

§ 45-19-1, a general statute for firefighter disability benefits, did not supersede, alter,

or amend the Providence System because special acts prevail over general ones);

Landers v. Reynolds, 92 R.I. 403, 407-08, 169 A.2d 367, 368-69 (1961) (holding

that a statewide statute applicable to all cities and towns related to accidental

disability benefits did not repeal the Providence System’s provisions for city

employees, and therefore the Providence System superseded the statewide law).

Furthermore, they advance their argument in the absence of any “indication that the

General Assembly manifested a different specific intent” when it enacted

§ 45-19.1-4(a). Betz, 605 A.2d at 840. We have never deviated from the holding in

Betz, and we see no reason to do so now.

The Association’s reliance on Local 850 in arguing that the city is subject to

the act is misplaced. In Local 850, the City of East Providence appealed an order

denying a motion to vacate an arbitration award wherein the arbitrator found that the

City of East Providence had to provide benefits under the act to the grievant. Local

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850, 982 A.2d at 1283-85. In affirming the judgment of the Superior Court, we

interpreted the act and its inclusive phrase “any fire fighter[,]” and we concluded

that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority in determining that the City of East

Providence was obligated to provide the benefits sought, notwithstanding that the

City of East Providence did not participate in MERS. Id. at 1288-89. However, that

conclusion was based, in part, on the fact that the grievant sought benefits pursuant

to a collective-bargaining agreement that specifically referred to chapter 19 and that

the arbitrator determined incorporated chapter 19.1 of title 45. Id. at 1284-86. As

the Association acknowledges, such incorporation language is absent from the

collective-bargaining agreement applicable in this case.

Moreover, as we explained in Lang, we did not interpret the act on de novo

review when considering the appeal by the City of East Providence in Local 850.

Lang, 222 A.3d at 919. Our discussion of § 45-19.1-3(a) of the act was “only with

regard to whether the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law * * *.” Id. The

Association’s attempt to inflate the significance of Local 850 is unavailing.

Finally, the cases evaluating conflicts between home-rule charter provisions

and state statutes of general application, to which the Association directed this

Court’s attention during oral argument, are also unpersuasive. See, e.g., City of

Cranston v. Hall, 116 R.I. 183, 186, 354 A.2d 415, 417 (1976); Marro v. General

Treasurer of City of Cranston, 108 R.I. 192, 195, 273 A.2d 660, 662 (1971); City of

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East Providence v. Local 850, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO,

117 R.I. 329, 338, 366 A.2d 1151, 1156 (1976). The question of priority between

the Providence System and state statutes of general application is answered by Betz,

and we see no reason to deviate from its holding. See Betz, 605 A.2d at 840.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court and

remand the record with instructions that the Superior Court enter judgment for the

city.

Justice Lynch Prata did not participate.

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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

The Providence Retired Police and Firefighter's
Title of Case Association v. The City of Providence, by and through
its Treasurer, James J. Lombardi.
No. 2023-330-Appeal.
Case Number
(PC 20-8024)

Date Opinion Filed February 4, 2025

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, and Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Melissa A. Long

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice R. David Cruise

For Plaintiff:

Joseph F. Penza, Jr., Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Defendant:

Aaron L. Weisman, Esq.