Lamka v. Dept. of Rev.

566 	December 11, 2019 	No. 26
IN THE OREGON TAX COURT
REGULAR DIVISION
Peter E. LAMKA
Plaintiff,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
State of Oregon,
Defendant.
(TC 5330)
Plaintiff (taxpayer) made a motion to stay prelitigation payment of his
assessed personal income tax based on undue hardship pursuant to ORS
305.419(3). The court, after considering the text, context, and legislative history
of ORS 305.419(3), interpreted its ability to grant relief due to “undue hard-
ship.” The court found inconsistencies between taxpayer’s affidavits to the court
and documents he filed with the Internal Revenue Service regarding income,
expenses, and the value of assets. The court held that taxpayer did not prove that
immediate payment of his assessed personal income tax would constitute undue
hardship.
Submitted on Plaintiff’s Motion for Stay of Payment of
Income Tax, Penalties, and Interest.
John Stuart Jones, Attorney at Law, Salem, filed the
motion for Plaintiff.
James C. Wallace, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Department of Justice, Salem, filed the response for Defen-
dant Department of Revenue.
Decision for Defendant rendered December 11, 2019.
ROBERT T. MANICKE, Judge.
I. 	INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the court on a motion by
Plaintiff Peter E. Lamka (taxpayer) to stay payment of per-
sonal income tax pursuant to ORS 305.419(3).1 Taxpayer
filed a supporting affidavit concurrently with his complaint
appealing from an adverse decision in the Magistrate
Division, where taxpayer challenged assessed deficiencies
1 The court’s references to the Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) are to 2017.

Cite as 23 OTR 566 (2019) 	567
in personal income tax that Defendant Department of
Revenue (the department) asserts now total $67,716.66 and
$66,269.42 for 2013 and 2014, respectively. 2 The depart-
ment initially objected and, after substantial discovery and
supplemental filings by both parties, continues to object to a
finding of undue hardship.
II. 	ISSUE
Has taxpayer carried his burden of proving that
immediate payment of the personal income tax, interest,
and penalties assessed would be an undue hardship?
III. 	BACKGROUND
ORS 305.419(1) generally requires payment of any
asserted deficiency of net income tax, along with any penal-
ties and interest, on or before the filing of a complaint in this
division of the court. However, ORS 305.419(3) provides:
“Where payment of the tax, penalty and interest would
be an undue hardship, plaintiff may file an affidavit alleg-
ing undue hardship within the time described in subsec-
tion (1) of this section. * * * If the tax court finds undue
hardship, the tax court judge may stay all or any part of
the payment of tax, penalty and interest required under
subsection (1) of this section. If the tax court judge finds no
undue hardship, the tax court judge may grant the plain-
tiff up to 30 days from the date of determination to pay the
tax, penalty and interest. Failure by the plaintiff to pay the
tax, penalty and interest or to establish undue hardship
will be cause for dismissing the complaint.”
ORS 305.419(3) (emphasis added). Neither this court nor the
Oregon Supreme Court has articulated a definition or stan-
dards for the application of the statute. Accordingly, this
order first considers the meaning of the key phrase “undue
hardship,” then examines whether taxpayer’s initial affi-
davit supports a conclusion of undue hardship. Finally, the
court considers the department’s objections and taxpayer’s
filings in response.
2 Taxpayer claims that the total amount assessed is somewhat less than
these amounts. The court finds it unnecessary to resolve the discrepancy for pur-
poses of this opinion.

568 	Lamka v. Dept. of Rev.
IV. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Text
The court starts by reviewing the text of the law,
its context and its relevant legislative history, to determine
the meaning of “undue hardship.” See State v. Gaines, 346
Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). The tax statutes do not
define the phrase; accordingly, the court reviews dictionary
definitions as evidence of plain meaning. See, e.g., Hodges v.
Oak Tree Realtors, Inc., 363 Or 601, 608, 426 P3d 82 (2018).
The phrase was part of the original version of ORS 305.419,
enacted in 1982. See Or Laws 1982, ch 29, § 2 (HB 3314).
That version of subsection (3) provided:
“Upon a showing of undue hardship by the plaintiff, the
tax court may stay all or any part of the payment of tax,
penalty and interest required under subsection (1) of this
section.”
The legislature amended ORS 305.419 in 1985, replacing
the entire text of subsection (3) with the following:
“Where payment of the tax, penalties and interest
would be an undue hardship, plaintiff may file an affida-
vit alleging undue hardship with the complaint. If the tax
court finds undue hardship, it may stay all or any part of
the payment of tax, penalty and interest required under
subsection (1) of this section. If the tax court finds no undue
hardship, it may grant the plaintiff up to 30 days from the
date of determination to pay the taxes, penalties and inter-
est. Failure by the plaintiff to pay the taxes, penalties and
interest or to establish undue hardship will be cause for
dismissing the complaint.”
Or Laws 1985, ch 407, § 1. Neither the 1985 amendment nor
any later amendments have changed the phrase “undue hard-
ship,” nor has any version of the statute defined the phrase.
The court thus looks to dictionary definitions. Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary does not define the phrase as
a whole. It defines “hardship” as “something that causes
or entails suffering or privation.” Webster’s Third New Int’l
Dictionary 1033 (unabridged ed 2002). “Suffering” is defined
as “1: the state or experience of one who suffers: the endur-
ance of or submission to affliction, pain, loss 2: a pain endured
or a distress, loss, or injury incurred.” Webster’s at 2284.

Cite as 23 OTR 566 (2019) 	569
“Privation” is defined as “a condition characterized by the loss
of something previously or normally possessed.” Id. at 1805.
The word “undue” (apart from its meaning in the context of a
debt that is not yet “due”) is defined as “unsuited to the time,
place, or occasion” or “exceeding or violating propriety or fit-
ness,” with synonyms for the latter definition given as “exces-
sive, immoderate, unwarranted.” Id. at 2492. Similarly, the
contemporaneous edition of Black’s Law Dictionary includes
no definition of “undue hardship” but defines “hardship”
as “In general, privation, suffering, adversity.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 646 (5th ed 1979). Black’s adds: “As used in zon-
ing statutes as grounds for variance, [“hardship”] refers to
the fact that zoning ordinance or restriction as applied to a
particular property is unduly oppressive, arbitrary, or confis-
catory.” Id. Black’s defines “undue” as “More than necessary;
not proper; illegal. It denotes something wrong, according to
the standard of morals which the law enforces in relations of
men, and in fact illegal * * *.” Id. at 1370. From these defini-
tions, the court concludes that the plain meaning of “undue
hardship” is a loss that involves pain, distress, or injury that
is excessive, unwarranted, or arbitrary.
B. 	Context
The court turns to the context of the “undue hard-
ship” requirement. The court has found no Oregon statutes
or administrative rules in existence in 1982 or 1985 that
define the term.3 Nor has the court found contemporaneous
Oregon cases articulating specific factors or criteria for a
finding of undue hardship in settings involving individuals
and purely financial conditions; the limited case law at that
time involved substantial nonfinancial issues such as family
law or liberty interests.4
3 Cf., e.g., former ORS 10.050(1) (1985) (allowing excuse from jury service
“upon a showing of undue hardship or extreme inconvenience to the person, the
person’s family, the person’s employer or the public served by the person”); former
ORS 135.050(1)(d) (allowing court-appointed attorney if, among other criteria,
“defendant is financially unable to retain adequate representation without sub-
stantial hardship in providing necessities to the defendant or the defendant’s
family”).
4 Cf. Grove and Grove, 280 Or 341, 353, 571 P2d 477 (1977) (articulating
avoidance of “undue hardship” as one criterion to determine amount of spousal
support to award in divorce cases); State v. Gordon, 43 Or App 511, 603 P2d 1196
(1979) (applying former ORS 130.050(1) (1985)).

570 	Lamka v. Dept. of Rev.
Although Oregon income tax law does not generally
incorporate procedural provisions of federal income tax law, 5
the court here considers for context any federal tax law defi-
nition of the term that might have existed in 1982 or 1985.
Section 6161(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code allows the
Secretary of the Treasury, “[u]nder regulations prescribed
by the Secretary,” to extend the time to pay an income tax
deficiency “only where it is shown to the satisfaction of the
Secretary * * * that the payment of a deficiency upon the date
fixed for the payment thereof will result in undue hardship
to the taxpayer * * *.” That language was in place in 1982
and 1985. See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 6161(b) (“An
extension under this subsection may be granted only where
it is shown to the satisfaction of the Secretary or his dele-
gate that the payment of a deficiency upon the date fixed for
the payment thereof will result in undue hardship * * *.”). A
corresponding federal Treasury regulation, also in place at
that time, states:
“The term ‘undue hardship’ means more than an incon-
venience to the taxpayer. It must appear that substantial
financial loss, for example, loss due to the sale of property
at a sacrifice price, will result to the taxpayer from mak-
ing payment on the due date of the amount with respect to
which the extension is desired. If a market exists, the sale
of property at the current market price is not ordinarily
considered as resulting in an undue hardship.”
Treas Reg § 1.6161-1(b); see Treasury Decision 6364 (Feb 13,
1959) (adopting quoted text). This context, though limited,
indicates that the Internal Revenue Service required a tax-
payer to show “substantial” financial loss in order to defer
payment of an income tax deficiency. Having to sell property
to pay the tax would not suffice, unless there was no market
for the property and the taxpayer had to sell the property at
a “sacrifice price.”
Federal bankruptcy law in place in 1982 and 1985
required courts to determine whether to discharge an indi-
vidual debtor from student loan debt based on an “undue
hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents.” 11 USC
5 See Allison v. Dept. of Rev., 11 OTR 431, 434-35 (1990) (“Oregon has its own
administrative provisions * * *.”).

Cite as 23 OTR 566 (2019) 	571
§ 523(a)(8)(B). Courts often looked for guidance to a 1973
Congressional report, which suggested that courts consider
whether, upon review of present and anticipated earnings
and unearned income or wealth, the debtor and dependents
could “maintain * * * a minimal standard of living within
their management capability, as well as * * * pay the edu-
cational debt.” Communication from the Executive Director,
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States,
HR Doc No 93-137, 93d Cong, 1st Sess, Pt II at 140-41 (1973);
see also In re Bagley, 4 BR 248, 6 BCD 404, 405 (D Ariz 1980).
Based on this review of materials available to the
Oregon legislature in 1982 and 1985, the court concludes
that the Oregon legislature was aware of a range of cir-
cumstances that might constitute an undue hardship, from
inability to maintain a minimal standard of living, to the
excessive loss caused by having to sell property at a distress
sale price.
C. 	Legislative History
The court turns to a review of the legislative history
of the 1982 and 1985 statutes. The court has found nothing
from which it can infer any standards for the court to apply.
In fact, the department’s representative at the 1982 spe-
cial session House Revenue Committee hearings, Elizabeth
Stockdale,6 testified that “there are no standards in the
bill to guide the court in determining whether there is an
undue hardship, so the court’s going to have freedom and
discretion to look at all the circumstances that affect that
particular taxpayer and make a determination on those facts
* * *.” Tape Recording, House Committee on Revenue, HB
3314, Feb 18, 1982, Tape 46, Side B, (testimony of Elizabeth
Stockdale).7 The 1982 bill was one of a set of budgetary pro-
posals that Governor Atiyeh asked the legislature to con-
sider in a special session to address a projected state budget
shortfall of $99.8 million. Id., Tape 46, Side A (testimony of
Jon Yunker, State Budget Director). Much of the discussion
6 Stockdale represented the department as an attorney for the Department
of Justice and later became the department’s director.
7 Stockdale was responding to a comment by the Chair of the House Revenue
Committee that “I don’t know what standards a court would apply” to determine
a hardship. Id. (statement of Rep Powell).

572 	Lamka v. Dept. of Rev.
and testimony about the tax prepayment proposal involved
the amount of revenue that would be recovered on an accel-
erated basis by requiring taxpayers to pay the assessment
at the beginning of litigation in this court, as opposed to only
at the end of unsuccessful litigation, including appeal to the
Oregon Supreme Court. The accelerated revenue amounted
to about $8 million, or about eight percent of the Governor’s
total proposal. See id., Tape 46, Sides A & B. The chair of
the House Revenue Committee expressed concern about
the potential to chill a taxpayer’s appeal rights and asked
Stockdale whether a prepayment requirement would be con-
stitutional. Id., Tape 46, Side B. Stockdale responded that a
body of case law from other states supported the validity of
the requirement. Id. One senator inquired about taxpayers’
ability to claim hardship relief solely to delay payment or
to manipulate the then-existing interest rate difference
as between tax refunds and tax assessments, and asked
whether a mechanism could be devised to reduce that risk.
Stockdale responded that devising such a mechanism would
be difficult. Id., Tape 31, Side A; Tape 30, Side B.
The 1985 replacement of ORS 305.419(3) apparently
arose because Tax Court Judge Carl Byers observed that
the 1982 provision arguably required the court to determine
whether an undue hardship existed before a taxpayer’s com-
plaint could be filed. Given the short deadlines to file a tax
complaint, Judge Byers was concerned that even a brief time
for court review could jeopardize the timeliness of otherwise
timely complaints. He therefore drafted new suggested lan-
guage for subsection (3), which ultimately became the only
surviving portion of a larger procedural bill. Tape Recording,
Senate Committee on Revenue and School Finance, SB 186,
May 1, 1985, Tape 163, Side A, (testimony of Hon Carl Byers);
see Or Laws 1985, ch 407, § 1; SB 186. The legislative his-
tory of the 1985 bill restating the phrase “undue hardship”
gives no indication that the legislature intended to change
the meaning of the phrase or to add any standards. In fact,
Judge Byers testified that taxpayers generally do not know
what constitutes an undue hardship. See Tape Recording,
Senate Committee on Revenue and School Finance, SB 186,
May 1, 1985, Tape 163, Side A. A business lobbyist urged the
committee to reverse course and eliminate the prepayment

Cite as 23 OTR 566 (2019) 	573
requirement altogether, noting that the immediate fiscal
crisis that prompted the 1982 requirement had passed.
There was minimal discussion of the consequences of thus
“re-deferring” revenue, and no legislator proposed an amend-
ment to do so. Id. (statement of Gary Carlson, Associated
Oregon Industries).
Based on its review of the text, context and legis-
lative history of ORS 305.419(3), the court concludes that
the legislature in 1982 and 1985 viewed the prepayment
requirement as an important source of immediate revenue,
any undoing of which would incur at least a short-term cost.
The legislature decided to create only one basis for relief
from the prepayment requirement, and to vest the court
with discretion to administer that relief. Although the leg-
islature adopted the undue hardship criterion without any
stated standard, the court infers from the text and context
of the law that the legislature certainly intended the court
to grant hardship relief where immediate payment of the
tax would prevent a taxpayer from maintaining a minimal
standard of living. Furthermore, the legislature authorized
the court to consider other potential factors, such as an
excessive, permanent loss that would be caused when a tax-
payer would have to sell off property at a distress sale price.
Implicitly, by using the word “undue,” the legislature also
authorized the court to weigh the public policy of ensuring
public access to an appeal against the public benefit of an
immediate collection (and elimination of the corresponding
risk of abuse by taxpayers seeking primarily to delay).
D. 	Taxpayer’s Affidavit and Supplemental Sworn Statements
The court turns to taxpayer’s first affidavit, which
he signed on June 8, 2018, by answering questions on a form
provided by the court (“June 8 Statement”). Under penalty of
perjury, taxpayer stated that he was not employed and listed
“N/A” in the space provided for his past employment his-
tory. He received income from “consulting” in the amount of
$4,000, on a basis he described as “intermittently-monthly.”
He received no help with expenses from any family mem-
ber, and no one owed him money. He had no cash or bank
accounts, no vehicle, and no other property except a house
in Portland, which he valued at $680,000 “at last appraisal,”

574 	Lamka v. Dept. of Rev.
and on which he owed $740,000. Taxpayer’s monthly living
expenses added up to $3,956, including “rent/mortgage” of
$2,936 and $200 for “utilities,” leaving net monthly income
of $44. Solely based on a review of the June 8 Statement, the
court would seriously consider granting taxpayer’s motion
on the grounds that enforcing the prepayment require-
ment would work an undue hardship on taxpayer. Taxpayer
stated that he has no liquid assets to pay the more than
$130,000 in combined assessments. Taxpayer owned a valu-
able asset, the Portland house, but the house secured debt
well in excess of its value, and the record does not indicate
whether the tax debt would take priority in a sale.
The June 8 Statement is far from the end of the
story, 	however. 	The 	department 	has 	made 	document
requests, taken depositions and scrutinized other informa-
tion available to it. Taxpayer has supplemented the June 8
Statement multiple times in an attempt to address the
department’s objections.
Taxpayer’s second statement under penalty of per-
jury is his Supplemental Declaration filed June 26, 2018
(“June 26 Statement”). He there declared:
“This matter concerns my appeal of a [sic] adjustments to
my taxes by defendant for the tax years 2013 and 2014.
During the period in question, most of my Income was
derived from transactions with Lioness Holdings LLC,
which owned and operated tanning salons. Between the
final quarter of 2016 and the second quarter of 2017, all
of the stores were closed or sold. Licensing and leasing
revenue from Lioness Holdings to and through my pass
through entitles Gibraltar Holdings LLC and Pathos LLC
thereafter ceased.”
Taxpayer also stated:
“My current monthly income from consulting is $4000, paid
intermittently but approximately monthly. My expenses
are $3956 per month. *** I do not have savings, and do
not have substantial property or assets available to pay my
outstanding tax assessments.”
On 	July 	23, 	2018, 	taxpayer 	signed 	a 	Second
Supplemental Affidavit (“July 23 Statement”), incorporating
the June 26 Statement and stating in part:

Cite as 23 OTR 566 (2019) 	575
“[T]he tanning businesses that are the original source of
the income at issue are not operating. Tan Republic, dba
Lioness Holdings LLC, Gibraltar Holding LLC, and Pathos
Holding LLC are no longer in the retail or tanning busi-
ness. * * * Neither Peter Lamka or Ariel Peterson[8] * * *
have owned or operated any of the tanning salons since
2017.
“* * * * *
“I reside outside of the United States for more than six
months each year. As a result, I do not have regular US
employment. I do receive consulting payments regarding
the operation of Lioness Holding LLC. Attached here as
Exhibit 2 are cover sheets for Lioness Holdings, LLC bank
account statements for the several months. This account is
used to wrap up the businesses and to pay my consulting
fees. The intermittent payments are in varying amounts.
which I referred to in my original Affidavit in Support of
Motion for Stay (‘intermittent-> monthly’). Over the past six
month period * * * the transactions average approximately
$4500 per month. Of that approximately $4000/month can
be attributed to compensation for my consulting.”
On January 10, 2019, taxpayer, through counsel,
sent to the department’s counsel an email “explanation * * *
with regard to the business activities of Lioness Holdings
LLC and Gibraltar Holdings LLC from 2016 forward”
(“January 10, 2019, Statement”). Among other things, this
email states:
“Gibraltar’s cash flow has been from consulting on various
business ventures with completely unrelated business own-
ers in other parts of the country and globe, liquidating and
scrapping the remaining Lioness/Gibraltar equipment for
pennies on the dollar (using the 2017 independent US Bank
appraisal as a barometer for true value, it was pennies on
the dollar, as the appraiser in 2017 valued the equipment at
nearly $1.9M), and working to start a new revenue stream
for Gibraltar in the midst of this chaos, so I can eat and
have a roof over my head.”
On 	January 	31, 	2019, 	taxpayer’s 	counsel 	sent
to the department’s counsel an email (“January 31, 2019,
8 Peterson, a business associate of taxpayer, has filed a separate personal
income tax appeal and claim for undue hardship relief. See Peterson v. Dept. of
Rev., 23 OTR 554 (2019), which the court also issues today.

576 	Lamka v. Dept. of Rev.
Statement”) relaying taxpayer’s explanation that certain
amounts taxpayer reported as “consulting” payments in
taxpayer’s prior Statements were actually “payments for the
aborted sale of Lioness in 2017 or thereabouts.”
On April 23, 2019, taxpayer signed a Third Supple-
mental Affidavit (“April 2019 Statement”), incorporating the
June 26 and July 23 Statements and adding:
“My monthly income and expenses continue to be as I stated
in my prior Affidavits. * * * I also have an IRS employment
tax liability in the amount of approximately $1,030,000,
including a trust fund penalty assessed against me person-
ally, which amounts are in ‘currently not collectible’ status.”
E. 	The Department’s Objections
In seeking to overcome the department’s objections,
taxpayer bears the burden of proving that hardship relief is
appropriate, and the court now weighs the record to deter-
mine whether taxpayer has carried that burden. See ORS
305.427 (burden of proof is on party seeking affirmative
relief “in all proceedings” before the court).
The department’s main allegation9 is that taxpayer
has failed to disclose income streams, mischaracterized the
source of his monthly income, and declared substantially
higher amounts of income to the Internal Revenue Service,
all of which impair the credibility of his Statements to such
an extent that taxpayer has failed to carry his burden of
proof. In his June 8 Statement, responding to a question
on the court’s form, taxpayer identified the source of his
monthly income as “consulting” services. Taxpayer repeated
that characterization in his next three Statements. In the
January 31, 2019, Statement, however, taxpayer claimed
that the source of his monthly income is proceeds from a
2017 sale of the tanning business to a company owned by
a former employee, Patrick McNeill. The department has
9 The department also alleges that taxpayer has failed to prove that his real
estate is worth only $680,000, as the county assessor has assigned the property
a real market value of more than $1.2 million. On this point, taxpayer has main-
tained a fairly consistent position and has produced an appraisal report dated
October 12, 2014, showing an “as is” appraised value of $481,000 and an “as
repaired” value of $626,400. The court makes no finding as to the actual value of
the property.

Cite as 23 OTR 566 (2019) 	577
produced evidence indicating that neither explanation accu-
rately describes how taxpayer earns the income. A decla-
ration by McNeill suggests that payments for the 2017 sale
ended no later than February 2018, when McNeill’s lawyers
sent taxpayer a demand letter seeking the return of all
monies paid to date and alleging that taxpayer had com-
mitted fraud in the transaction. Also, two additional declar-
ants (Gary Sommer and Lyndsy Nysetvold) claimed that
taxpayer had sold each of them the assets of separate salons
in exchange for monthly payments totaling about $3,000.
Those payments started in April 2018 and ended in January
2019, when each declarant ceased making payments on
the ground that taxpayer had induced the transaction by
fraud.10 Taxpayer has not rebutted any of this evidence. The
court finds taxpayer’s Statements regarding the source of
his income not credible.
Even more confounding are two documents that
taxpayer filed with the Internal Revenue Service around
the time of his June 8 Statement. The first is a Form 433A,11
which taxpayer signed on April 3, 2018. That document,
signed under penalty of perjury, reports $9,700 in gross
monthly income, all of which comes from “partnerships,” and
$9,061 in total living expenses, of which $8,153 is for “hous-
ing and utilities.” The second is a Form 433-A (OIC),12 which
taxpayer signed on September 13, 2018, likewise under
penalty of perjury. The latter document shows monthly
income of $8,158, entirely from partnership distributions,
and monthly expenses of $8,746, of which “housing and util-
ities” make up $7,241. Obviously, these income amounts are
more than double the amounts that taxpayer repeatedly has
represented to this court and to the department. Likewise,
10 The Sommer and Nysetvold declarations also undermine taxpayer’s
July 23 Statement that “[T]he tanning businesses that are the original source of
the income at issue are not operating,” as both declarants assert that they made
payments on taxpayer’s behalf on “accrued” rent obligations owed by taxpayer.
11 See IRS Pub 1854, “How to prepare a Collection Information Statement”
(rev 3-2019) (“Form 433-A is used to obtain current financial information neces-
sary for determining how a wage earner or self-employed individual can satisfy
an outstanding tax liability.”).
12 See IRS Form 656 Booklet, “Offer in Compromise” (rev 8-2019) at 4 (a tax-
payer must file Form 433-A (OIC) to apply for an offer from Internal Revenue
Service to compromise an outstanding federal tax liability).

578 	Lamka v. Dept. of Rev.
the line items for housing and utilities are twice what tax-
payer claimed on his Statements. The court recognizes that
its form of affidavit differs from the forms of the Internal
Revenue Service, but all three sets of forms ask for explana-
tion of “other” categories of income and expenses. Taxpayer
has not explained the dramatic differences in the amounts
he reported.13 The court finds taxpayer’s Statements regard-
ing the amounts of his income and living expenses not
credible.
In a supplemental response dated August 2, 2019,
the department filed a copy of a complaint in Multnomah
County Circuit Court by Lioness Holdings, LLC (“Lioness”)
and Gibraltar Holdings, LLC (“Gibraltar”), seeking $400,000
in damages and other relief from Nysetvold and the company
of which she is a member. Among other things, the com-
plaint acknowledges that Lioness and Gibraltar sold assets
to the defendants in April 2018 and that the defendants
made payments to Lioness and Gibraltar until January
2019, including payments on a promissory note to the plain-
tiff companies. Read together with taxpayer’s June 23 and
July 26 Statements that he receives “pass-through” income
from Gibraltar and other income from Lioness, the com-
plaint undermines the credibility of his June 8 Statement
that he has no “money owed to you by others.”
V. 	CONCLUSION
The court concludes that taxpayer has failed to
carry his burden of proving that immediate payment of
the assessed tax, interest, and penalties would constitute
an undue hardship. The court denies taxpayer’s motion
and grants taxpayer 30 days from this order to satisfy the
assessed tax, interest, and penalties. Now, therefore,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff satisfy the assessed
tax, interest, and penalties within 30 days from the date of
this order.
13 Taxpayer also disclosed to the Internal Revenue Service a vehicle, of minor
value, not listed on taxpayer’s Statements to this court.