Perkins v. Dept. of Rev.

370 	March 23, 2017 	No. 38
IN THE OREGON TAX COURT
REGULAR DIVISION
Randall A. PERKINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
Defendant.
(TC 5275)
Plaintiff (taxpayer) filed a complaint containing claims for relief regarding
timber tax. Taxpayer argued that ORS 321.600, being a statute of limitations on
collection actions of timber taxes, was a tax law of this state and that the Tax
Court had jurisdiction in the matter. Taxpayer further alleged that Defendant
(the department) could no longer collect on timber tax amounts due from tax-
payer to the State of Oregon. The underlying and recurring premise in taxpayer’s
claims was that the department had untimely instituted collection proceedings
in contravention of ORS 321.600, which established a six-year statute of limita-
tions on collection proceedings for timber taxes. Moving to dismiss taxpayer’s
complaint, the department argued that the Tax Court did not have subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over the case, because the underlying tax assessments were final
and further, that the court’s jurisdiction did not extend to collection matters.
Granting the department’s motion, the court ruled that the statutory provisions
overwhelmingly demonstrated that the legislature intended to locate jurisdic-
tion over the issuance and enforcement of timber tax warrants in either circuit
court or before the department, but also that the department’s general jurisdic-
tion assertion regarding collections was too broad; in at least two instances, the
legislature appeared to have provided that the Tax Court may address certain
collection matters. The court concluded, in either event, that the processes for
issuing and enforcing warrants for timber tax amounts due in this case were
outside the jurisdiction of the Tax Court.
Oral argument on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss was
held August 8, 2016, in the courtroom of the Oregon Tax
Court, Salem.
Robert 	C. 	Weaver, 	Jr., 	Garvey 	Schubert 	Barer 	PC,
Portland, filed the response and argued the cause for
Plaintiff (taxpayer).
James C. Strong, Assistant Attorney General, Depart-
ment of Justice, Salem, filed the motion and argued the cause
for Defendant Department of Revenue (the department).
Decision for Defendant rendered March 23, 2017.
HENRY C. BREITHAUPT, Judge.

Cite as 22 OTR 370 (2017) 	371
I. 	INTRODUCTION
This case is before the court on the motion of
Defendant Department of Revenue (the department) to dis-
miss the complaint filed by Plaintiff (taxpayer) for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state ultimate facts
sufficient to constitute a claim, and failure to timely bring
the action. Tax Court Rule (TCR) 21 A. Because this court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over taxpayer’s claims, this
court does not address the department’s alternative bases
for dismissal.
II. 	FACTS
In considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, the facts in the complaint are accepted
to be true. However, this court’s review is not limited solely
to those facts. The court may also consider “ ‘matters out-
side the pleading, including affidavits, declarations and
other evidence.’ ” Douglas County v. Smith, 18 OTR 450, 453
(2006) (citing TCR 21 A). The record in this case comprises
the allegations in taxpayer’s complaint and the declara-
tion of Marcus Cridge, collections policy coordinator for the
department, which was attached to the department’s motion
to dismiss.
Between 1993 and 1995, taxpayer owned forestland
subject to the Western Oregon Forestland and Privilege Tax
(privilege tax) and Forest Products Harvest Tax (harvest
tax) provisions contained in ORS chapter 321 (referred to
collectively as timber taxes). Taxpayer has not alleged that
he filed timber tax returns for either tax for tax years 1993,
1994, or 1995. Nor has taxpayer alleged that he submitted
timely payment for either tax for tax years 1993, 1994, or
1995.
The 	department 	assessed 	taxpayer 	for 	unpaid
timber taxes on September 24, 1997, for tax year 1993;
September 26, 1997, for tax year 1994; and July 6, 1999, for
tax year 1995. Appeal from such assessments may be made
to this court. ORS 305.275 (1993);1 see also ORS 305.280(2),
1 The 1993 and 1995 editions of the Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) apply
to the specific tax years at issue. There is no difference in text of the statutes in
effect during those tax years.

372 	Perkins v. Dept. of Rev.
(3) (1993) (providing time limitations for appeals of taxes
contained in ORS chapter 321 to this court). Taxpayer did
not allege that he appealed these assessments. They there-
fore became final and personal obligations. ORS 305.265(14)
(1993) (providing that “[a]ssessments and billings of taxes
shall be final after the expiration of the appeal period spec-
ified in ORS 305.280”); ORS 321.600 (1993) (providing that
liabilities for timber taxes “constitute a debt due the State of
Oregon”).
A. 	Multnomah County Warrants
On February 15, 2000, the department recorded
warrants in Multnomah County against taxpayer for priv-
ilege taxes due for tax years 1993, 1994, and 1995. On
the same date, the department also recorded warrants in
Multnomah County against taxpayer for harvest taxes due
for tax years 1993 and 1995. On July 21, 2005, the depart-
ment recorded a warrant in Multnomah County against
taxpayer for harvest taxes due for tax year 1994.
Taxpayer 	alleges 	that 	the 	department 	did 	not
renew its warrants that were filed on February 15, 2000,
in Multnomah County. Taxpayer alleges that the warrants
therefore expired on February 15, 2010, pursuant to ORS
18.182 (formerly ORS 18.360) (extension of judgment rem-
edies) and ORS 205.126(2) (enacted 1997) (expiration and
extension of warrants filed in circuit court). There is no
allegation that the department renewed or failed to renew
its warrant filed in Multnomah County on July 21, 2005.
However, taxpayer has not alleged that this warrant has
expired.
B. 	Benton County Warrants
On April 19, 2006, the department recorded war-
rants in Benton County against taxpayer for the timber
taxes due for tax years 1993, 1994, and 1995. Taxpayer
alleges that on October 16, 2013, the department “again
filed distraint warrants in Benton County on five of the six
alleged tax debts: the 1993, 1994 and 1995 Harvest Taxes,
and the 1994 and 1995 Timber Privilege Taxes.” Taxpayer
alleges that the department did not “file” a warrant in 2013
with respect to timber privilege taxes for tax year 1993.

Cite as 22 OTR 370 (2017) 	373
C. 	The Department’s Collection Actions
The 	department 	began 	garnishing 	taxpayer’s
wages in September 2006 and has continued to do so at least
through May 2015. “As of May 7, 2015, $57,634.22 had been
garnished” from taxpayer’s wages. The department applied
the garnishments solely to taxpayer’s 1993 privilege tax
debt. As of May 7, 2015, taxpayer alleges that the depart-
ment’s records indicated that taxpayer still owed the follow-
ing amounts:
Tax Year 	Tax 	Amount
1993 	Privilege Tax 	$33,860.46
1994 	Privilege Tax 	$ 4,752.28
1995 	Privilege Tax 	$ 13,350.62
1993 	Harvest Tax 	$ 	9,937.96
1994 	Harvest Tax 	$ 	209.36
1995 	Harvest Tax 	$ 	979.51
D. 	Taxpayer’s Complaint
Taxpayer filed a complaint in this court contain-
ing three claims for relief. In one form or another, taxpayer
alleges that the department can no longer collect on timber
tax amounts due from taxpayer to the State of Oregon. The
underlying and recurring premise in taxpayer’s claims is
that the department has untimely instituted collection pro-
ceedings in contravention of ORS 321.600 (establishing a
six-year statute of limitations on collection proceedings for
timber taxes). 2, 3
Taxpayer requested five forms of relief. Taxpayer
requests this court to enter an order that (1) declares that
the timber taxes are uncollectable and the warrants are
void; (2) requires the department to return all amounts gar-
nished, plus interest; (3) requires the department to release
2 References to ORS 321.600 are to the 1993 and 1995 editions of the ORS.
See 22 OTR at 375 n 6 for full text of statute.
3 Taxpayer variously claimed that the department violated ORS 321.600,
either when it recorded its warrants in circuit court or when it allegedly failed
to renew its warrants in circuit court. Taxpayer also claims that the department
acted ultra vires when it violated ORS 321.600.

374 	Perkins v. Dept. of Rev.
its judgment liens; (4) requires the department to confirm
that the timber taxes have been satisfied; and (5) requires
the department to pay taxpayer’s costs, disbursements, and
fees.
III. 	ISSUE
The issue is whether the Oregon Tax Court has
jurisdiction over challenges to the department’s actions
related to the issuance and enforcement of warrants under
ORS 321.600.
IV. 	ANALYSIS
This 	court 	has 	jurisdiction 	over 	“all 	questions
of law and fact arising under the tax laws of this state.”
ORS 305.410.4 The legislature’s grant of jurisdiction in
ORS 305.410 “has never been a picture of statutory clarity.”
Jarvill v. City of Eugene, 289 Or 157, 162, 613 P2d 1 (1980).
However, the Supreme Court has provided ample guidance
to decide the issue in this case.
A. 	The Bounds of This Court’s Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court has ascertained “two boundar-
ies” to this court’s jurisdiction. Sanok v. Grimes, 294 Or 684,
697, 662 P2d 693 (1983). The first boundary is that “ques-
tions which must be resolved in order to decide taxability
or the amount of tax do arise under the tax laws.” Id. The
second boundary is that “a precondition to taxation does not
arise under the tax laws if jurisdiction to decide that precon-
dition has been affirmatively located in another court or if a
decision on the precondition has substantial non-tax conse-
quences.” Id. In summary, “a claim is not one ‘arising under
the tax laws’ unless it has some bearing on tax liability.” Id.
at 701.
The boundaries ascertained in Sanok implicitly
address questions that might arise before a tax liability is
determined. It is not clear what these boundaries mean
for actions to collect tax amounts due, which arise after a
tax liability is determined. However, the Supreme Court
4 Unless otherwise indicated, the court’s references to the ORS are to the
2013 edition.

Cite as 22 OTR 370 (2017) 	375
provided an analytical framework to determine whether a
claim is within this court’s jurisdiction.
As employed by the Court in Sanok, the relevant
analysis to determine whether the Tax Court has jurisdic-
tion over a claim concerns the nature of the relief requested.
Id. at 697-98 n 22. Analyzing the nature of the relief
requested helps this court “determine the subject matter of
each claim.” Id. at 698 n 22.
In addition to determining the subject matter of
the claim, it is also important to consider whether the leg-
islature affirmatively located jurisdiction over that claim
elsewhere. If the legislature has, “then that procedural fact
implies that the case is not one ‘arising under the tax laws’ ”
and it is not within this court’s jurisdiction. Id. at 692 n 6.
Otherwise, if this court also had jurisdiction over such mat-
ters, this court’s jurisdiction would no longer be limited and
exclusive. 5 See ORS 305.410(1). The only statutory excep-
tions to the limited and exclusive nature of this court’s juris-
diction are found in ORS 305.410(2), which provides concur-
rent jurisdiction between this court and the circuit courts to
determine the priority of property tax liens and the validity
of certain deeds, conveyances, transfers, or assignments of
property. See Sanok, 294 Or at 692.
With this framework in mind, this court turns to
taxpayer’s jurisdictional arguments.
B. 	Analysis of Taxpayer’s Jurisdictional Arguments
All three of taxpayer’s claims are predicated on an
argument that the department’s issuance and enforcement
of its warrants violated the six-year statute of limitations
contained in ORS 321.600.6 Taxpayer argues that ORS
5 The court’s jurisdiction is limited in that it does not reach to claims affir-
matively located elsewhere. The court’s jurisdiction is exclusive in that, if a claim
is within this court’s jurisdiction, it cannot be within another court’s jurisdiction
absent a legislatively created exception.
6 ORS 321.600 (1993) provides:
“All taxes, interest and penalties due and unpaid under ORS 321.005 to
321.185, 321.257 to 321.381, 321.405 to 321.520 or 321.560 to 321.600 shall
constitute a debt due the State of Oregon and may be collected, together with
interest, penalty and costs, by appropriate judicial proceeding, which remedy

376 	Perkins v. Dept. of Rev.
321.600, being a statute of limitations on collection actions
of timber taxes, is a tax law of this state. Accordingly,
taxpayer argues that this court has jurisdiction over his
claims because the only, or primary, issue before this court
is whether the department violated the provisions of ORS
321.600.
Making arguments under ORS 321.600 does not,
alone, create jurisdiction in this court. Under Sanok, this
court looks to the nature of the relief requested to determine
the nature of taxpayer’s claims.
With respect to taxpayer’s five requests for relief,
his first request—relating to the collection of the tax
amounts due—is the only independent request. The remain-
ing requests for relief merely effectuate, or are contingent
on, taxpayer’s first request.7 Accordingly, if this court does
not have jurisdiction over claims supporting taxpayer’s first
request for relief, then it does not have jurisdiction to con-
sider taxpayer’s complaint.
Taxpayer argues that this court has jurisdiction
over his complaint because he “seeks declaratory and
injunctive relief, which have ‘some bearing on tax liabil-
ity.’ ” According to taxpayer, “his claims relate to [tax-
payer’s] ‘taxability’ and ‘the amount of tax.’ ” Taxpayer
“seeks declaratory relief regarding acts of misconduct by
the Department of Revenue and procedural defects result-
ing in tax liability exceeding what was allowed under the
applicable timber tax statutes, namely, the time limitation
on collection of taxes.”
Taxpayer’s first request for relief may relate to a
claim or claims regarding tax collection, but it does not relate
to tax liability. Taxpayer does not now contest the amount
of timber taxes assessed by the department, and he did not
is in addition to all other existing remedies. However, no proceeding for the
collection of taxes under ORS 321.005 to 321.185, 321.257 to 321.381, 321.405
to 321.520 or 321.560 to 321.600 shall be instituted after the expiration of six
years from the date such taxes were due.”
7 Recall that the remaining requests for relief are for an order directing the
department to return all amounts garnished plus interest, release all of its judg-
ment liens, confirm to taxpayer that the timber taxes have been satisfied, and
pay taxpayer’s costs, disbursements, and fees.

Cite as 22 OTR 370 (2017) 	377
appeal from them to this court. Those assessments are now
final as to tax liability.8 ORS 305.265(14) (1993).
At bottom, taxpayer argues that the department
violated the statutory procedures to collect timber taxes due
and owed by taxpayer. The question then is whether this
court has jurisdiction over such collection claims. A review
of the statutes providing for the issuance and enforcement of
warrants for timber tax debts demonstrates that the depart-
ment’s collection actions, and objections thereto, belong
either before the department or in circuit court—in either
event outside the jurisdiction of this court. That fact runs
counter to a conclusion that this court has exclusive juris-
diction over such matters, and implies that jurisdiction has
not been located in this court. Sanok, 294 Or at 692 n 6.
First, once a timber tax debt is determined, the
department may collect on that debt by issuing a “warrant
for the payment of the amount of the tax, with the added
penalties, interest and cost of executing the warrant.” ORS
321.570(1).
Second, after issuing such a warrant, the depart-
ment may “record the warrant in the County Clerk Lien
Record of any county of this state.” ORS 321.570(2).
Third, once the warrant is recorded under ORS
321.570 in the County Clerk Lien Record, it “has the effect
described in ORS 205.125.” ORS 321.570(2).
Fourth, the department (as agent of the State of
Oregon) may collect on such debt “by appropriate judicial
proceeding.” ORS 321.600. The legislature did not explicitly
place jurisdiction over such proceedings in this court. As will
be seen, such proceedings are not, under Sanok, located in
this court. In addition, to determine whether a warrant has
been properly recorded would require this court to inquire
into the relevant county records.
8 Taxpayer argues that the finality of the department’s timber tax assess-
ments has no bearing here when taxpayer’s cause of action for allegedly untimely
collection activity by the department did not accrue until “many years after the
taxes became due.” That is not relevant to the issue before this court. It does
not change the nature of taxpayer’s claim, or whether it is within this court’s
jurisdiction.

378 	Perkins v. Dept. of Rev.
Fifth, ORS 205.125 provides that a warrant is
treated like a judgment entered in that county, becomes a
lien upon the property of the taxpayer “in the same manner
as a judgment that creates a judgment lien under ORS chap-
ter 18,” and “may be enforced as provided in ORS 205.126.”
ORS 205.125(3), (4).
Sixth, the provisions in ORS 205.126 direct the
agency to “file in the circuit court” a copy of the warrant.
ORS 205.126(1). Once the warrant is satisfied, ORS 205.525
provides that satisfaction of the warrant must be recorded
in the county. ORS 205.525(2).
Seventh, ORS 205.126 provides that the agency
may enforce the warrant by various “proceedings,” includ-
ing garnishment, as provided in ORS chapter 18. See ORS
205.126(1)(a) (writs of execution), (b) (proceeding in support
of execution), and (c) (garnishment). It is apparent that these
are the types of “appropriate judicial proceeding[s]” consid-
ered in ORS 321.600. This court is a stranger to such judi-
cial proceedings.
Eighth, and of great importance, ORS chapter 18
does not apply to the Tax Court. See ORS 18.025 (providing
that the provisions of ORS chapter 18 apply to “circuit courts,
municipal courts and justice courts and to county courts
performing judicial functions”). In addition, judgments, and
accordingly warrants as provided in ORS 321.570(2), may be
enforced by execution only by the court in which the judg-
ment (or warrant) is filed, or in the circuit court where the
debtor resides. ORS 18.252.
Ninth, ORS chapter 18 provides opportunities for
debtors to object to collection actions in circuit court. See,
e.g., ORS 18.700 - 18.718 (challenge to garnishment); ORS
18.892 - 18.899 (challenge to writ of execution). Debtors may
also object to the collection actions of a sheriff pursuant to
chapter 18 in the circuit court, which will resolve any dis-
putes and “provide such additional instructions to the sheriff
as may be necessary.” ORS 18.992. It is difficult, or impossi-
ble, to see how this court has the authority to direct a county
sheriff on whether or how to conduct collection actions in
accordance with chapter 18, given the fact that chapter 18
does not apply to this court.

Cite as 22 OTR 370 (2017) 	379
Tenth, returning to ORS chapter 321, once the war-
rant is recorded in the county, the department may “direct
the sheriff for the county in which the warrant is recorded
to levy upon and sell the real and personal property of the
taxpayer found within that county, and to levy upon any
currency of the taxpayer found within that county.” ORS
321.570(2). Again, this court is not provided with the explicit
authority to direct sheriffs for the county.
Eleventh, the county sheriff is to “proceed on the
warrant in the same manner prescribed by law for execu-
tions issued against property pursuant to a judgment.” ORS
321.570(2); see also ORS 321.570(4) (providing that, until the
warrant is satisfied in full, the department “has the same
remedies to enforce the claim for taxes against the taxpayer
as if the state had recovered judgment against the taxpayer
for the amount of the tax”).
In summary, the statutory provisions overwhelm-
ingly demonstrate that the legislature intended to locate
jurisdiction over the issuance and enforcement of timber tax
warrants in either circuit court or before the department.
In either event, the processes for issuing and enforcing war-
rants for timber taxes amounts due are outside this court’s
jurisdiction.
The legislature has provided for the department to
pursue the collection of tax amounts due by issuing war-
rants. Then, to collect on those warrants, the department
is directed to record them in circuit court, which affords
them the status of judgments, and to enforce them as pro-
vided in ORS chapter 18, which does not apply to this court.
If taxpayer disputes that the department may collect on a
warrant, it may challenge the garnishment, judgment lien,
and other collection actions related to that warrant in circuit
court. 9 In those proceedings, taxpayer can raise any defenses
9 The court notes that taxpayer has also made arguments challenging the
issuance of the warrants in this case, including that there is no other forum
available for a taxpayer to challenge such issuance. Because the department may
issue warrants administratively, see ORS 321.570(1), the circuit court may not be
the appropriate forum to challenge the initial issuance of the warrant. However,
a taxpayer may make its objections known to the department after receiving a
copy of the warrant. See ORS 321.570(1) (“A copy of the warrant shall be mailed
or delivered to the taxpayer * * *.”). In addition, the department cannot enforce a

380 	Perkins v. Dept. of Rev.
or arguments that it thinks are appropriate and applicable,
including the limitations period contained in ORS 321.600.10
C. 	Taxpayer’s Arguments Under Numrich v. Dept. of Rev.
Taxpayer argues that this court has demonstrated
its jurisdictional reach over collection matters in Numrich
v. Dept. of Rev., 17 OTR 402 (2004). According to taxpayer,
Numrich stands for the proposition that this court has
jurisdiction over collection matters, including the case cur-
rently before this court. Taxpayer’s reliance on Numrich is
misplaced.
In Numrich, the taxpayer presented eleven claims
in this court, including claims as to the collection actions
of the department. Id. at 403-04. The department, after
reviewing the case, admitted that it had sent pertinent
notices to an incorrect address for the taxpayer. Id. at 403.
It “therefore undertook to abate any assessments, discharge
related liens,” and “refund[ ] to taxpayer any funds previ-
ously garnished together with interest.” Id. at 403, 405. It
then moved to dismiss the taxpayer’s complaint.
This court analyzed taxpayer’s claims and deter-
mined that the only claims that were arguably within the
court’s jurisdiction would be mooted by the department’s
actions. Id. at 406-07; see also id. at 405 (noting “taxpayer
admits this court does not have jurisdiction over any claims
sounding in tort”). Accordingly, this court granted the
department’s motion, but “retain[ed] jurisdiction” to ensure
that the department acted in accordance with its represen-
tations and undertakings, the completion of which would
warrant until it is recorded in circuit court. See ORS 321.570(2) (“After recording
a warrant, the department may direct the sheriff for the county * * * [to collect on
the debt].”) (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, a taxpayer may challenge the validity
of a warrant in circuit court at such time as the department seeks to enforce it.
10 Taxpayer argues that only this court, not the circuit courts, should inter-
pret the limitations period contained in ORS 321.600. Taxpayer appears to be
making an appeal to this court’s expertise in tax matters. Such an appeal is not
well taken. There is no indication that the circuit courts lack the skills or exper-
tise to interpret a statute of limitations. Indeed, the circuit courts would seem
to have more experience in collection matters than this court, and may be better
suited to interpret a statute of limitations on such collection matters. The circuit
courts are already tasked with addressing statutory limitations imposed upon
collection matters. See, e.g., ORS 18.345 - 18.364 (personal property exemption);
ORS 18.385 (wage exemption); ORS 18.395 - 18.422 (homestead exemption).

Cite as 22 OTR 370 (2017) 	381
render the matter moot. Id. at 408. Because those claims,
including the taxpayer’s collection claims, were dismissed
as moot, they were not justiciable, and this court never
addressed subject matter jurisdiction.
Numrich does not help taxpayer here. Taxpayer
here argues that “ORS 321.600, the substantive, statutory
bar to the institution of collection proceedings for timber
taxes after six years of becoming due * * * is a ‘tax law of
this state.’ ” That bald assertion is belied by the above statu-
tory analysis, and unchanged by Numrich. Without an inde-
pendent basis for establishing subject matter jurisdiction in
this court, taxpayer cannot seek relief from the issuance or
enforcement of timber tax warrants by the department.
D. 	Jurisdiction Over Collection Matters
Before concluding, this court addresses the asser-
tion by the department that this court’s jurisdiction “does
not extend to collection matters.” That assertion is too broad.
In at least two instances, the legislature appears to have
provided that the Tax Court may address certain collection
matters.
First, ORS 305.180 provides that a warrant issued
by the department has the same effect as a judgment for
purposes of out-of-state collection proceedings. However, if
the laws of another state require a judgment to be issued by
a court, then the department may seek a judgment from this
court. ORS 305.180(1). To do so, the department must give
notice to the taxpayer of its intent to seek a judgment from
this court. ORS 305.180(2). The taxpayer then has an oppor-
tunity to either pay the amount due, or to file a complaint
in this court “contesting the validity of the warrant.” ORS
305.180(2)(b). If the taxpayer does not, and the department
shows that the warrant was issued correctly, this court
“shall enter a judgment” in favor of the department. ORS
305.180(4). That judgment may then be enforced in the other
state.11
Second, ORS 305.620(1) provides that state agencies
(including the department) and political subdivisions of the
11 At which time, the debtor may make any appropriate arguments as exist
and are appropriate under that state’s laws, including exemptions.

382 	Perkins v. Dept. of Rev.
state may enter into agreements with respect to the “collec-
tion, enforcement, administration and distribution of local
taxes.” ORS 305.620(6) provides this court with “exclusive
jurisdiction to review determinations of the Department of
Revenue * * * relating to the collection, enforcement, admin-
istration, and distribution of local taxes under agreements
entered into under” ORS 305.620(1).
Moreover, in another order entered on this date,
this court concluded that it has jurisdiction over claims
arising under ORS 305.890 (2015), a statute which provides
for taxpayers a right to enter into installment agreements
with the department to pay a tax liability if the Director
of the department determines that such agreements will
facilitate collection. See Christensen v. Dept. of Rev., 22 OTR
384 (2017). In Christensen, the department similarly argued
that this court has no jurisdiction over collection matters,
and therefore has no jurisdiction over claims related to
the determination of whether to enter into an installment
agreement or on what terms. Id. at 388-89. After reviewing
the relevant statutes and legislative history surrounding
ORS 305.890 (2015), this court rejected that argument. Id.
at 389-91.
The lesson learned from the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Sanok, and this court’s orders in Christensen and
here, is that generalizations, including generalizations about
this court’s jurisdiction over “collection” matters is danger-
ous. Notwithstanding the broad language contained in ORS
305.410, careful analysis of statutory and other provisions
is needed in each case to determine where jurisdiction is
located.
V. 	CONCLUSION
The subject matter of taxpayer’s claims relate to a
determination of the collectability of taxpayer’s tax liability,
which liability has not been challenged. The determination
of collectability relates to the procedures governing issu-
ance, recording, and enforcement of timber tax warrants.
The recording and enforcement of such warrants takes place
in circuit court, where taxpayers are afforded an opportu-
nity under ORS chapter 18 to object to the basis of the war-
rant or the collection actions taken. ORS chapter 18 does not

Cite as 22 OTR 370 (2017) 	383
apply to this court. This court does not have jurisdiction to
consider taxpayer’s claims related to the collectability of the
timber tax warrants issued by the department and recorded
and enforced in circuit court. Now, therefore,
IT 	IS 	ORDERED 	that 	Defendant’s 	Motion 	to
Dismiss is granted.