Moreno v. Ranger Energy Servs.

The slip opinion is the first version of an opinion released by the Chief Clerk of the
Supreme Court. Once an opinion is selected for publication by the Court, it is
assigned a vendor-neutral citation by the Chief Clerk for compliance with Rule 23-
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deviations from the formal authenticated opinion.

1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 Opinion Number:

3 Filing Date: May 14, 2026

4 NO. S-1-SC-40442

5 JESUS MORENO,
6 Plaintiff-Petitioner,
7 v.

8 RANGER ENERGY SERVICES, LLC
9 and WILDCAT OIL TOOLS, LLC,

10 Defendants-Respondents.
11 ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI
12 Kathleen McGarry Ellenwood, District Judge

13 Durham, Pittard & Spalding LLP
14 Caren I. Friedman
15 Justin R. Kaufman
16 Rosalind B. Bienvenu
17 Santa Fe, NM

18 Arnold & Itkin LLP
19 Andrew R. Gould
20 Brian M. Christensen
21 Trenton R. Shelton
22 Noah M. Wexler
23 Houston, TX
24 for Petitioner
1 Stephanie K. Demers
2 Albuquerque, NM

3 for Respondent Ranger Energy Services, LLC

4 Priest & Miller, LLP
5 Ada B. Priest
6 Brian L. Shoemaker
7 Albuquerque, NM

8 for Respondent Wildcat Oil Tools, LLC
1 OPINION

2 VARGAS, Chief Justice.

3 {1} The question presented by this case is whether a plaintiff’s second lawsuit,

4 filed in New Mexico, may benefit from the New Mexico savings statute, NMSA

5 1978, § 37-1-14 (1880), when the plaintiff’s first lawsuit was filed in another state

6 and dismissed under that state’s statute of limitations.

7 {2} Plaintiff Jesus Moreno first filed a lawsuit in Texas state court, which was

8 dismissed under Texas’s two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff then filed a lawsuit

9 in New Mexico state court, after the expiration of the New Mexico three-year statute

10 of limitations, seeking to benefit from the New Mexico savings statute’s six-month

11 grace period to refile a previously dismissed action as a continuation of the first. The

12 district court dismissed the New Mexico lawsuit and the Court of Appeals affirmed,

13 holding that Plaintiff’s second lawsuit cannot benefit from the New Mexico savings

14 statute because the factual circumstances of his dismissal fell within the statute’s

15 negligence in prosecution exception. Moreno v. Ranger Energy Servs., LLC, 2024-

16 NMCA-065, ¶ 16, cert. granted (S-1-SC-40442, Aug. 29, 2024); Section 37-1-14

17 (stating that, if a plaintiff’s lawsuit fails “for any cause, except negligence in its

18 prosecution,” a new suit may “be commenced within six months”).
1 {3} Plaintiff now argues, relying on Zangara v. LSF9 Master Participation Tr.,

2 2024-NMSC-021, 557 P.3d 111, that the Court of Appeals erred and the dismissal

3 of his first lawsuit does not fall under the New Mexico savings statute’s negligence

4 in prosecution exception. Instead, he claims that his second lawsuit should benefit

5 from the New Mexico savings statute and be deemed a continuation of his first

6 lawsuit.

7 {4} We agree with Plaintiff that the dismissal of his first lawsuit does not implicate

8 the negligence in prosecution exception to the New Mexico savings statute as we

9 defined it in Zangara. Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s claim cannot proceed because he did

10 not timely commence his first action. See § 37-1-14; Zangara, 2024-NMSC-021, ¶

11 1 (“The savings statute suspends the running of an otherwise applicable statute of

12 limitations when an action is timely commenced but later dismissed for any cause

13 except negligence in prosecution.” (emphasis added)). Because Plaintiff’s first

14 action was not timely commenced, his second action cannot benefit from the New

15 Mexico savings statute as a continuation of the first. We affirm.

16 I. BACKGROUND

17 A. Plaintiff’s First Lawsuit

18 {5} Plaintiff alleges he suffered severe and permanent injuries to his head, back,

19 left ankle, and right shoulder when he fell off a rig platform at a drilling site in Lea
1 County, New Mexico. Approximately two years and eight months after the injury,

2 Plaintiff filed his first action in Texas state court for negligence, negligence per se,

3 and/or gross negligence. Plaintiff alleged his claims were governed by New Mexico

4 law. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing Plaintiff’s lawsuit should

5 be dismissed because it was filed eight months after Texas’s two-year statute of

6 limitations period for personal injury claims. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.

7 § 16.003(a) (Vernon 2005). The Texas state court granted summary judgment

8 motions, and Plaintiff’s first lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff did not

9 appeal the Texas state court’s determination.

10 B. Plaintiff’s Second Lawsuit

11 {6} Four months after the Texas state court dismissed Plaintiff’s lawsuit, Plaintiff

12 filed a similar action against Defendants in New Mexico state court.1 Plaintiff’s New

13 Mexico lawsuit was filed after New Mexico’s three-year statute of limitations period

14 for personal injury actions had expired. See NMSA 1978, § 37-1-8 (1976). However,

1
Plaintiff’s first lawsuit included additional Defendants based on their alleged
ownership and operation of the drill site where he was injured. Still, no party
challenges whether Plaintiff’s second lawsuit is substantially similar for purposes of
the New Mexico savings statute; thus, we assume, without deciding that it is. See
Rito Cebolla Invs., Ltd. v. Golden W. Land Corp., 1980-NMCA-028, ¶ 40, 94 N.M.
121, 607 P.2d 659 (“To be considered as a continuation, both [suits] must be
substantially the same, involving the same parties, the same cause of action and the
same right, and this must appear from the record.”).
1 Plaintiff claimed his second action was viable as a continuation of his previously

2 dismissed Texas lawsuit under New Mexico savings statute’s six-month grace period

3 to refile. Defendants moved to dismiss the second lawsuit, arguing the savings

4 statute did not apply because Plaintiff was negligent in the prosecution of his first

5 lawsuit by failing to timely file it. Defendants argued that as a result, Plaintiff’s

6 second lawsuit was barred by the New Mexico statute of limitations. The New

7 Mexico district court agreed and dismissed the case.

8 {7} Plaintiff appealed the district court’s determination. The Court of Appeals

9 affirmed the district court, holding that Plaintiff “first pursuing the claim in Texas

10 was a failure to prosecute the action with reasonable diligence under the

11 circumstances, and the New Mexico savings statute does not apply.” Moreno, 2024-

12 NMCA-065, ¶ 16 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court of

13 Appeals relied on Barbeau v. Hoppenrath, 2001-NMCA-077, 131 N.M. 124, 33 P.3d

14 675, overruled by Zangara, 2024-NMSC-021, ¶ 27, and similar precedent to

15 determine “whether the error under these circumstances constitutes negligent

16 prosecution.” Moreno, 2024-NMCA-065, ¶ 8. However, shortly after the Court of

17 Appeals issued the Moreno decision, this Court overruled Barbeau and related

18 precedent, “which extended the negligence in prosecution exception to
1 circumstances beyond a party’s failure to timely take the steps necessary to bring the

2 first-filed suit to a close.” Zangara, 2024-NMSC-021, ¶ 27.

3 {8} We accepted certiorari to review whether the Court of Appeals correctly

4 decided the issue in view of Zangara. Order, Moreno v. Ranger Energy Servs., LLC,

5 S-1-SC-40442 (N.M. Aug. 29, 2024).

6 II. DISCUSSION

7 A. The Court of Appeals’ Reasoning Is Contrary to Zangara

8 {9} Plaintiff contends that the precedent the Court of Appeals relied on to

9 determine that he was negligent in prosecuting his first action was subsequently

10 overruled by this Court in Zangara, 2024-NMSC-021, ¶¶ 20-27, mandating the

11 reversal of the Court of Appeals’ ruling. We review this question of law de novo.

12 Boradiansky v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2007-NMSC-015, ¶ 5, 141 N.M.

13 387, 156 P.3d 25.

14 {10} In Zangara, we rejected and overruled the Court of Appeals’ fact-intensive

15 analysis used to determine whether the negligence in prosecution exception applies

16 under the savings statute. Id. ¶¶ 24-25, 27 (overruling Barbeau, and rejecting the

17 analysis relied upon by the Court of Appeals in Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. McRostie,

18 2006-NMCA-046, 139 N.M. 486, 134 P.3d 773, and Foster v. Sun Healthcare Grp.,

19 Inc., 2012-NMCA-072, 284 P.3d 389). We reasoned that such a fact-intensive
1 analysis was “inconsistent with our prior analyses of Section 37-1-14.” Zangara,

2 2024-NMSC-021, ¶ 24. This Court, instead, “equated negligence in prosecution with

3 dismissal for failure to prosecute.” Id. ¶ 12. In other words, we held that the

4 negligence in prosecution exception applies only when the first action is dismissed

5 due to the “party’s failure to timely take the steps necessary to bring the first-filed

6 suit to a close.” Id. ¶ 27; see also Rule 1-041(E) NMRA (addressing dismissal for

7 failure to take significant action).

8 {11} However, as Zangara had not yet been decided, the Court of Appeals in this

9 case relied on the previous fact-intensive analysis of the negligence in prosecution

10 exception to reach its holding. See Moreno, 2024-NMCA-065, ¶ 7 (distinguishing

11 the “careless prefiling investigation at issue in Amica”); id. ¶ 15 (applying Barbeau

12 to determine that Plaintiff’s “Texas filing was [not] an innocent mistake” (internal

13 quotation marks and citation omitted)). In doing so, the Court of Appeals applied the

14 very “case-by-case determination of whether there was negligence of any sort in the

15 filing of the first action” that Zangara rejected. 2024-NMSC-021, ¶ 14.

16 {12} As the law relied upon by the Court of Appeals changed after deciding this

17 case, we reject the Court of Appeals’ reasoning as contrary to our holding in

18 Zangara. We nevertheless conclude that Plaintiff’s second action cannot benefit

19 from the savings statute because the New Mexico savings statute requires the first
1 action to be timely commenced. Id. ¶ 1. Here, Plaintiff’s first lawsuit was not timely

2 commenced, and therefore, he is not entitled to the benefit of the New Mexico

3 savings statute.2

4 {13} Because Plaintiff’s first lawsuit was not timely commenced, we do not reach

5 the question of whether Plaintiff was negligent in the prosecution of his Texas

6 lawsuit.

2
In his reply brief Plaintiff suggested that Section 37-1-14 should incorporate
the applicable New Mexico statute of limitations to determine whether a suit was
timely commenced, even if the suit was filed in another state. Plaintiff relied on the
“text, purpose, and policy of the Savings Statute,” but provided no authority to
support his position. At oral argument, Plaintiff reiterated this argument and cited to
several out-of-state cases that were not contained in his briefing. See Allen v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 656 F.2d 418, 423 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that Montana’s
saving statute incorporated Montana’s own statute of limitations when considering
whether an action first filed and dismissed in Utah was timely commenced);
LaBarge, Inc. v. Universal Cirs. Inc., 751 F. Supp. 807, 809 (W.D. Ark. 1990)
(holding the policy behind the Arkansas savings statute is satisfied as long as the suit
in question was commenced within the time frame specified by Arkansas law).
However, Plaintiff does not properly develop this argument, asserting little more
than the policy favoring judicial resolutions on the merits prohibits this Court from
construing “a statute to defeat its intended purpose.” Baker v. Hedstrom, 2013-
NMSC-043, ¶ 21, 309 P.3d 1047 (text only) (citation omitted). Absent proper
development, we will not consider the argument further. Elane Photography, LLC
v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 70, 309 P.3d 53 (“We will not . . . rule on an
inadequately briefed issue [where doing so would require this Court] to develop the
arguments itself, effectively performing the parties’ work for them.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
1 B. To Benefit from the New Mexico Savings Statute, a Plaintiff’s First
2 Action Must Be Timely Commenced and Dismissed for Any Reason
3 Other Than Negligence in Prosecution

4 {14} We now turn to the question of whether the New Mexico savings statute

5 requires the first action to be timely commenced and begin with the plain language

6 of the statute, which we review de novo. See Quynh Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

7 2010-NMSC-009, ¶ 22, 147 N.M. 583, 227 P.3d 73 (“[T]he meaning of language

8 used in a statute is a question of law that we review de novo.” (internal quotation

9 marks and citation omitted)). “When construing statutes, our guiding principle is to

10 determine and give effect to legislative intent.” Baker v. Hedstrom, 2013-NMSC-

11 043, ¶ 11, 309 P.3d 1047 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The

12 primary indication of legislative intent is the plain language of a statute because the

13 Legislature is presumed to mean what it says. State v. Rael, 2024-NMSC-010, ¶ 40,

14 548 P.3d 66. However, “if the plain meaning of the statute is doubtful, ambiguous,

15 or if an adherence to the literal use of the words would lead to injustice, absurdity or

16 contradiction, we will construe the statute according to its obvious spirit or reason.”
1 Baker, 2013-NMSC-043, ¶ 11 (text only)3 (citation omitted). With these canons of

2 construction in mind, we look to the text of the New Mexico savings statute.

3 {15} The plain language of the New Mexico savings statute provides:

4 If, after the commencement of an action, the plaintiff fail[s] therein for
5 any cause, except negligence in its prosecution, and a new suit be
6 commenced within six months thereafter, the second suit shall, for the
7 purposes herein contemplated, be deemed a continuation of the first.

8 Section 37-1-14.

9 {16} Plaintiff argues that the plain language of the statute does not contain any

10 requirement for the first action to be timely commenced and this Court should not

11 read words into a statute that are not there. Plaintiff also asserts that a timeliness

12 requirement would defeat the important purpose of our savings statute, “to facilitate

13 resolution of disputes on their merits,” and “New Mexico’s policy favoring access

14 to judicial resolutions.” Zangara, 2024-NMSC-021, ¶¶ 1, 19 (internal quotation

15 marks and citation omitted). Therefore, he insists this Court rely upon the New

16 Mexico savings statute’s remedial nature and liberally construe the statute to

17 maintain our “focus on protecting plaintiffs’ substantive rights.” Id. ¶¶ 16, 19; see

18 also Albuquerque Hilton Inn v. Haley, 1977-NMSC-051, ¶ 7, 90 N.M. 510, 565 P.2d

3
“(Text only)” indicates the omission of nonessential punctuation marks—
including internal quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets—that are present in the
text of the quoted source, leaving the quoted text otherwise unchanged.
1 1027 (noting that courts should liberally construe the application of remedial

2 statutes).

3 {17} While it is true that the plain language of the New Mexico savings statute does

4 not contain an explicit requirement for the first action to be timely commenced, we

5 conclude that such a requirement is implicit in the basic operation of the statute. In

6 practice, the savings statute permits a plaintiff whose initial action is dismissed for

7 any reason other than negligence in prosecution to bring a new action within six

8 months of the dismissal. See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Aeronautics, Inc., 1988-NMSC-

9 051, ¶ 5, 107 N.M. 320, 757 P.2d 790. Essentially, the savings statute ensures that

10 the statute of limitations will not bar the second action as long as a plaintiff diligently

11 pursues relief but the initial action fails for some reason not related to the merits. See

12 William D. Ferguson, The Statutes of Limitation Saving Statutes 79 (1978).

13 {18} The New Mexico savings statute must also be read in harmony with the

14 primary purpose of the statute of limitations—ensuring that defendants receive

15 timely notice of any claims against them. See id.; Roberts v. Sw. Cmty. Health Servs.,

16 1992-NMSC-042, ¶ 25, 114 N.M. 248, 837 P.2d 442 (stating statute of limitations

17 are intended to “encourage[] plaintiffs to bring their actions while the evidence is

18 still available and fresh”). Accordingly, in order for the New Mexico savings statute
1 to extend the time to file a subsequent action, it is necessary for the first action to

2 have been timely commenced against the defendant. Ferguson, supra, at 79.

3 {19} Moreover, while the New Mexico savings statute is remedial, we will not

4 construe the statute so liberally as to render statutes of limitation virtually

5 meaningless, particularly when such an expansive construction would lead to an

6 absurd result. See Katz v. N.M. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 1981-NMSC-012, ¶ 18, 95

7 N.M. 530, 624 P.2d 39 (explaining that a “statute must be construed so that no part

8 of the statute is rendered surplusage or superfluous”); see also Denish v. Johnson,

9 1996-NMSC-005, ¶ 37, 121 N.M. 280, 910 P.2d 914 (noting that, under the basic

10 rules of construction, no “provision should be interpreted so that it is rendered

11 meaningless”); Baker, 2013-NMSC-043, ¶ 36 (“We will not construe a statute to

12 defeat [its] intended purpose or achieve an absurd result.” (internal quotation marks

13 and citation omitted)).

14 {20} Here, Plaintiff’s proposed interpretation of the New Mexico savings statute

15 would lead to an absurd result by omitting any requirement for the first action to be

16 timely commenced and allowing plaintiffs to maintain a second action at any time—

17 even when the first action was filed months, or even years, after the applicable

18 limitation period expired. See e.g., Baker, 2013-NMSC-043, ¶ 35 (noting the

19 plaintiff’s suggested interpretation of the Medical Malpractice Act would lead to
1 “absurd results”). This interpretation clearly contradicts the Legislature’s intent to

2 codify a limit on the time to file an action by effectively nullifying the limitation

3 period and transforming the New Mexico savings statute from a remedial protection

4 for diligent litigants whose timely action is dismissed on procedural grounds to a

5 perpetual opportunity to circumvent the statute of limitations. This cannot be what

6 our Legislature intended.

7 {21} We therefore reject Plaintiff’s proposed interpretation of the New Mexico

8 savings statute. Instead, we must balance the New Mexico savings statute’s intent to

9 facilitate the resolution of timely filed actions on the merits, Zangara, 2024-NMSC-

10 021, ¶ 1, with the statute of limitations’ intent to encourage plaintiffs to bring their

11 action before evidence becomes stale and provide defendants with timely notice of

12 claims, Roberts, 1992-NMSC-042, ¶ 25. To do so, we must construe the New

13 Mexico savings statute in a manner that preserves both its remedial purpose and the

14 intended purpose of limitation periods. See Chavez v. Bridgestone Ams. Tire

15 Operations, LLC, 2022-NMSC-006, ¶ 40, 503 P.3d 332 (“When possible, we must

16 read different legislative enactments as harmonious instead of as contradicting one

17 another.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

18 {22} To strike this balance, we make explicit what has previously been an implicit

19 principle in our precedent: the New Mexico savings statute requires a plaintiff’s first
1 action to be timely commenced, and dismissed for any reason except negligence in

2 prosecution, in order for the second action to be deemed a continuation of the first.

3 See Zangara, 2024-NMSC-021, ¶ 1 (presuming that the statute only operates “when

4 an action is timely commenced”); Gathman-Matotan Architects & Planners, Inc. v.

5 Dep’t of Fin. & Admin., 1990-NMSC-013, ¶ 8, 109 N.M. 492, 787 P.2d 411 (same).

6 Timely commenced means filing an action within the applicable statute of

7 limitations. See generally Timely, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining

8 timely as “[w]ithin a specified deadline”); NMSA 1978, § 37-1-13 (1880) (defining

9 “commencement of [an] action” as the “filing in the proper clerk’s office of the

10 petition, . . . upon the filing of which process is authorized by law to be issued”).

11 Our interpretation aligns with the purpose of the New Mexico savings statute and

12 prevents the statute from becoming a tool to unilaterally override the applicable

13 statute of limitations. Ferguson, supra, at 287-88. Accordingly, we hold that when a

14 plaintiff’s first action is not timely commenced, a second action cannot “be deemed

15 a continuation of the first” under the New Mexico savings statute because the first

16 action was a nullity. Section 37-1-14; see DeVargas v. Montoya, 796 F.2d 1245,

17 1250 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that, under the New Mexico savings statute, a

18 plaintiff’s second action could not “be deemed a continuation of the first” if the first
1 action was not timely commenced), overruled on other grounds by Newcomb v.

2 Ingle, 827 F.2d 675, 678 (10th Cir. 1987).

3 {23} As applied to the facts of this case, we determine that Plaintiff’s second

4 lawsuit cannot benefit from the savings statute because his first action was not timely

5 commenced. Though the issue of whether the New Mexico savings statute applies

6 when the first action was not timely commenced in another forum is an issue of first

7 impression in this Court, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed an

8 analogous issue in DeVargas, 796 F.2d at 1247. In DeVargas, the plaintiff’s first

9 action was dismissed because it was filed after the applicable statute of limitations

10 had expired in state court. Id. at 1247. The plaintiff then refiled in federal district

11 court claiming his federal action was allowed to proceed under the New Mexico

12 savings statute as a continuation of his state court action. Id. at 1248-50. Rejecting

13 the plaintiff’s arguments, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that when the

14 plaintiff’s first action is dismissed on statute of limitations grounds, there can be no

15 “continuation of the first.” Id. at 1250. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that,

16 in essence, the New Mexico savings statute cannot “resurrect [an action that] never

17 existed.” Id.

18 {24} While not binding, DeVargas is persuasive because here, like DeVargas, the

19 Texas state court dismissed Plaintiff’s first action as it was filed after the applicable
1 Texas statute of limitations expired. The Texas state court’s decision was rooted in

2 the choice of law principle, codified by Texas statute, that statutes of limitations are

3 procedural and the law of the forum governs matters of procedure. See Tex. Civ.

4 Prac. & Rem. Code § 71.031(a), (b) (Vernon 1997) (allowing personal injury actions

5 that occurred in a foreign state to be brought in Texas state court but providing that

6 “all matters pertaining to procedure in the prosecution . . . are governed by” Texas

7 state law (emphasis added)); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003(a)

8 (providing a two-year limitation period for personal injury actions); see also Nez v.

9 Forney, 1989-NMSC-074, ¶ 4, 109 N.M. 161, 783 P.2d 471 (recognizing that this

10 Court has “viewed statutes of limitation as procedural for choice of law purposes”

11 and “that the law of the forum governs” procedure); Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486

12 U.S. 717, 730 (1988) (noting that statutes of limitations uphold each state’s “interest

13 in regulating the work load of its courts and determining when a claim is too stale to

14 be adjudicated [sufficient by imposition of] statutes of limitations”). By dismissing

15 Plaintiff’s action on statute of limitation grounds, the Texas state court concluded

16 that Plaintiff’s action was not timely commenced. Based on these circumstances,

17 Plaintiff’s second lawsuit cannot benefit from the savings statute, despite New

18 Mexico’s longer statute of limitations period for personal injury lawsuits. In essence,

19 the New Mexico savings statute cannot resurrect Plaintiff’s first action because it
1 never was. 4 Therefore, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s second

2 action because it was filed after New Mexico’s three-year statute of limitations and

3 Plaintiff cannot rely on the applicability of the savings statute to an action that never

4 existed to show that it was timely filed with the district court.

5 III. CONCLUSION

6 {25} We hold that Plaintiff cannot benefit from the New Mexico savings statute’s

7 six-month grace period to refile because his first lawsuit was not timely commenced.

8 We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals and the district court in the dismissal of

9 Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants.

10 {26} IT IS SO ORDERED.

11
12 JULIE J. VARGAS, Chief Justice

Because Plaintiff’s Texas action was not timely commenced, we need not
4

address the effect of the dismissal being with prejudice. See Zangara, 2024-NMSC-
021, ¶ 11 (concluding that “any cause as used in our savings statute means any
disposition without prejudice that produces or results in the failure of the first-filed
action” (text only)).
1 WE CONCUR:

2
3 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice

4
5 DAVID K. THOMSON, Justice

6
7 BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice

8
9 FRANCIS J. MATHEW, Judge
10 Sitting by designation